Ethical Theories, Miscellaneous

How should we respond to the humanity of others? Should we care for others’ well-being? Respect them as autonomous agents? Largely neglected is an answer we can find in the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism: we should love all. This paper argues that an ideal of love for all can be understood apart from its more typical religious contexts and moreover provides a unified and illuminating account of the the nature and grounds of morality. I defend a novel (...) account of love for all that avoids serious worries about the incoherence or impossibility of loving everyone. Doing so requires countenancing a neglected form of love. Love admits as its object not just individual entities like people and groups; we can also bear a love for the Fs in general---for all the Joneses, all the philosophers, or even all the human beings. I go on to argue that while it is possible for ordinary agents like us to love all, we shouldn't. Instead, we should approximate love for all. The minimal approximation of love for all is, surprisingly, respect; I derive the basic, structural features of deontological ethics (including anti-paternalism and anti-aggregation) from the ideal of loving all. (NB: This paper used to be titled "Ethics in the Shadow of Love" and has been cited as an unpublished manuscript under that title.). (shrink)

It seems appropriate for you to care more about your friends than about strangers, more about your keepsakes and projects than about the keepsakes and projects of others. Some things are personally significant to you. But when is something significant to you? In this paper, we advance the contact account of significance. You are in contact with a value when it is manifest in your life or when your life is manifest in it. And it is this contact with a (...) value that makes it significant to you. We argue that this captures standard cases of personal relationships to people, objects, and projects. We then suggest that it explains various other normative phenomena too: our reasons of gratitude and compensation, as well as how we discount for temporal and modal distance. In light of its theoretical virtues and explanatory power, we conclude, the contact account is worth taking seriously indeed. (shrink)

This paper introduces an enactive perspective to Neo-Confucian ethics, specifically focusing on Wang Yangming’s concept of moral knowledge (liangzhi良知). While traditional ethical models in the Song-Ming Neo-Confucian tradition typically emphasize establishing a solid foundation by grasping universal rational principles or cultivating a moral mind essential for ethical living, this paper challenges such notions with the enactive insights of groundlessness. It argues against the existence of a fixed, isolated metaphysical ground in our ethical lives. Instead, it posits that any metaphysical moral (...) mind, if it exists, must manifest through embodied interactions and engagement with the world. This perspective reconceptualizes the moral mind and liangzhi as more than cognitive processes confined to the head; they are part of an integrated mind-body-world system, characterized by supra-reflective, embodied, and contextually grounded coping mechanisms. By redefining these elements, the paper aims to transform our understanding of (Neo-Confucian) ethics and significantly advance the discourse on moral agency, autonomy, and moral responsibility in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe in improvement: they think that the world is a better place than it used to be, and that future generations will fare even better. Others see decline: they claim that the condition of humanity has deteriorated and will continue to do so. Much ink has also been spilt over what explains these historical patterns. These two disagreements about the shape of history concern largely descriptive issues. But there is also a third, purely normative question that has been (...) neglected: is it better if a history features a pattern of improvement rather than deterioration, holding other things equal? This paper develops an answer to this normative question and explores some of its implications for matters related to the future of humanity. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of utilitarianism in relation to suicide, drawing insights from Freudian psychoanalytic theory and Durkheimian sociology, while presenting a Christian ethical response. Freud’s theory of the death drive (Thanatos) and Durkheim’s classifications of suicide suggest that individuals may seek relief or perceived pleasure in ending their lives, which could align with a utilitarian calculus of maximising pleasure and minimising pain. However, this paper argues that such a perspective fails to account for the broader pain caused to (...) family, friends, and society, thus presenting a moral dilemma within the utilitarian framework. Christian ethics, rooted in the sanctity of human life, categorically rejects suicide as a violation of divine law and the inherent dignity of human existence. The paper employs a qualitative methodology, utilising a critical analysis of existing literature on Freud and Durkheim’s theories of suicide, alongside theological texts on Christian moral theology. Through this interdisciplinary approach, the work contrasts the utilitarian implications of suicide with the Christian ethical stance, ultimately concluding that Christian ethics offers a more holistic response, emphasising the moral obligation to preserve life. (shrink)

This article offers a novel interpretation of enacted knowledge through the lens of Wang Yangming’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action. By framing Wang’s concept of knowledge within an enactive model, it advances a holistic perspective that integrates mind, body, and world, as well as knowledge and action, into a unified whole. To bridge historical analysis with contemporary philosophical discourse, this article engages in dialogue with Harvey Lederman’s introspective model, offering a complementary framework that, together, provides a more (...) precise and comprehensive understanding of Wang’s philosophy. Moving beyond Lederman’s dichotomy of correspondence and identity, I introduce a third interpretation of “unity”: the Continuum Thesis. This interpretation places a more fundamental focus on the original condition of moral knowledge, presenting it as a singular entity that inherently integrates the distinct aspects of knowledge and action. By asserting that “action just is knowledge,” Wang indeed affirmed their original unity. (shrink)

We present an argument about the methodology of ethics, broadly conceived, drawing on recent research on modelling in the philosophy of science. More specifically, we argue that normative ethics should adopt the methodology of modelling. We make our case in two parts. First, despite the perhaps unfamiliar terminology, modelling already happens in ethics. We identify it, and argue that its practice could be improved by recognising that it is modelling and by adopting some methodological lessons from philosophy of science. Second, (...) modelling should be adopted more widely within normative ethics, because it fits well with various methodological ends we shall identify. Models can be used to investigate ethical questions in a manner that is systematic but relatively free of foundational theoretical commitments in first-order ethics. Models are more local, and less ambitious, than theories. They can be used to break deadlocks, by focusing attention on the particularities of a sub-domain and by providing a common tool–the surrogate model system–which each side can use to make their principles precise, illustrate the implications of their view, and identify sources of disagreement or points of agreement. We are pluralists about method, so this is not a call to abandon other philosophical methods. It is simply a plea for modelling, motivated by the method’s independent benefits and its fruitfulness in resolving some persistent methodological problems in ethics. (shrink)

Some moral philosophers argue that we hold others and ourselves morally responsible for acting on second-personal reasons. This article connects this idea with the emerging literature on the moral responsibility of groups by exploring in which sense, if any, groups can be held accountable for acting on second-personal reasons. On the developed view, groups are second-personally competent if and only if they possess capacities for sympathy, acting on that sympathy, and related self-reactive attitudes. Focusing especially on loosely structured groups without (...) unifying decision-making procedures, the article goes on to argue that the required group-level capacities can be realized through the interdependent exercise of member-level capacities. (shrink)

Resumen: El trabajo pretende esclarecer los motivos filosóficos que subyacen a la ambivalencia endógena que persigue a las éticas de la autorrealización, repasando para ello el debate que suscitó el uso del ideal ético de la «autorrealización» patente en los ensayos «La autorrealización como el ideal moral» (1893), de John Dewey, y «Autorrea-lización -una crítica» (1896), de Alfred Edward Taylor. Tras revisar las inconsistencias del principio ético de la autorrealización advertidas por estos filósofos en el siglo xix, se busca rastrear (...) las huellas de este ideal moral y su pervivencia en nuestro tiempo presente. Palabras clave: autorrealización, éticas idealistas, John Dewey, Alfred Edward Taylor. Abstract: This article seeks to clarify the philosophical problems that underlie the endogenous ambivalence of the ethics of self-realization, reviewing the debate raised by the moral ideal of «self-realization» as it is found in Dewey’s «Self-realization as the moral ideal» (1893), and Alfred Edward Taylor’s «Self-realization -a critique» (1896). After showing the philosophical inconsistencies around «self-realization», as described during the 19th century by both philosophers, the text proposes to find the traces of this moral ideal in our present time. Keywords: self-realization, idealistic ethics, John Dewey, Alfred Edward Taylor. (shrink)

This book addresses the medical-ethical dilemma of distributive justice. The focus is on situations where patients compete for limited resources and not everyone can be helped, as was recently observed in connection with the coronavirus. Such conflicts of assistance are characterized by a fundamental tension between the principles of fairness and efficiency. Dufner demonstrates how these opposing principles can be balanced and what such a position means for medicine, for example, in the allocation of donor organs or in triage situations. (...) -/- ----- Dieses Buch befasst sich mit dem medizinethischen Dilemma der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit. Im Fokus stehen dabei Situationen, in denen Patient*innen um begrenzte Ressourcen konkurrieren und nicht allen geholfen werden kann, wie es zuletzt auch im Zusammenhang mit dem Corona-Virus zu beobachten war. Derartige Hilfskonflikte sind gekennzeichnet durch ein elementares Spannungsverhältnis zwischen den Geboten der Fairness und der Effizienz. Dufner zeigt, wie diese gegenläufigen Gebote ins Verhältnis gesetzt werden können und was eine solche Position für die Medizin etwa bei der Verteilung von Spenderorganen oder in Triage-Situationen bedeutet. (shrink)

Recension of the 2023 book "Ethics and Time in the Philosophy of History" an interesting book on metaphysics, moral philosophy, existentialism, and speculative philosophy of history.

A presente investigação tem por objetivo responder à questão título considerando os argumentos apresentados, de um lado, pelos desenvolvimentistas e, de outro, pelos ambientalistas. Entendemos que os argumentos apresentados refletem um conflito de valores mais profundo que, se abordado por uma metodologia de solução de conflitos adequada, pode contribuir para elucidação da questão. A metodologia proposta é o personalismo ético de Scheler. A hierarquia de valores a ser aplicada na solução de conflitos traz (i) o valor pessoa como o mais (...) elevado, seguido dos (ii) valores espirituais, como a justiça, (iii) os vitais, como o bem estar e o útil, e (iv) os sensíveis. Através das ações de preferir e postergar, é possível encontrar pontos de equilíbrio numa permanente atitude crítica. O objetivo é contribuir para que as ações ocorram com a devida diligência para com os direitos humanos. A hipótese inicial é que, identificando os valores em conflito e aplicando a metodologia descrita, a solução de conflitos neste caso concreto permite pensar numa transição energética que concilie o desenvolvimento e o meio ambiente. Compreendemos que ambos têm como fim proteger o valor pessoa. Portanto, o que está em conflito de fato, sem com isso assumir uma postura ingênua, são os valores espirituais e vitais de cada uma das partes. Neste sentido, defendemos que, diante da inevitável demanda por energia da sociedade contemporânea e do alto custo da transição energética, é preciso conciliar o desenvolvimento com o meio ambiente a partir de uma programada transição energética financiada pela exploração do petróleo e gás, mas com metas definidas comprometidas com a neutralidade da emissão de GEE em 2050. Para tanto, é necessário regulamentação, monitoramento e fiscalização por parte do Estado e do governo federal com a finalidade de garantir a substituição dos combustíveis fósseis por fontes energéticas limpas. (shrink)

RESUMEN (ES): ¿Es posible una moral sin Dios (Jean-Paul Sartre) o con un dios que existe en una dimensión suprahumana (Viktor Frankl)? La famosa "cita" de Dostoyevski ("Si Dios no existe, todo está permitido") no fue escrita así por Dostoyevski. El Holocausto, como punto de inflexión e interrupción en la historia, la filosofía y la teología, abre nuevos interrogantes "después" de Auschwitz. En el presente artículo discuto la moral sartreana y la frankleana, analizando la famosa "cita" de Dostoyevski y preguntándome (...) si acaso una moral con un dios ausente es capaz de prevenir futuras barbaries. /// ABSTRACT (EN): Is it possible a morality without God (Jean-Paul Sartre) or with a God that exists in a suprahuman dimension (Viktor Frankl)? The famous «quote» by Dostoevsky («If God does not exist, everything is permitted») was not written like that by Dostoevsky. The Holocaust, as a turning point and as an interruption in history, philosophy, and theology, opens new questions «after» Auschwitz. In this paper, I discuss Sartrean and Franklean morality while analyzing the famous «quote» by Dostoevsky and wondering if a morality with an absent God can prevent future barbarities. (shrink)

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is traditionally formulated in terms of whether true counterfactuals of freedom about the future (true subjunctive conditionals concerning what someone would freely do in the future if they were in certain circumstances) even partly determine an agent's present moral obligations. But the very assumption that there are true counterfactuals of freedom about the future conflicts with the idea that freedom requires a metaphysically open future. We develop probabilism as a solution to the actualism/possibilism debate, a (...) solution that accommodates an open future requirement for freedom. We argue that probabilism resolves the conflicting intuitions that arise between actualists and possibilists and maintains certain distinct advantages over actualism and possibilism. (shrink)

This brief elucidation of two quotes from the Genealogy will be apt for more accessible interpretation following the completion of my next paper. Stay tuned for some hard-fought philosophy.

哲学传统的道德观念主要基于形而上学和神学的观念和理论。最突出的传统道德概念是神圣命令理论（DCT）。 根据DCT，上帝通过创造和启示为人类奠定了道德基础。 从人类文明的早期开始，道德与神性就密不可分。 这些概念基于神学框架。它们被三大亚伯拉罕传统中的大多数人类信徒所接受：犹太教，基督教和伊斯兰教。DCT理论仅基于信仰和启示，并没有提供严格的科学 示范。 几个世纪以来，"DCT"道德概念的反对者试图淡化其重要性（尽管没有成功），理由是其形而上学和宗教假设无法得到证实。 。这只是一种信念，应该这样理解。 除了这些极端对立之外，还有许多其他概念部分或完全与DCT理论相矛盾。 从古希腊哲学到今天，许多哲学家和社会科学家都坚持认为道德是一种建构，因此在文化上是相对的和确定性的。然而，这也引发了许多其他讨论，并提出了一些棘手的问题，例如文化的意义是什么，文化中的哪些因素在道德上 是决定性的，这种相对论的局限性是什么。 道德决定论者反过来声称，一旦自由意志不存在，包括道德在内的人类行为的一切都是确定性的。 最近，现代思想家认为道德是一门严谨的科学。然而，科学的方法虽然可以解释一些事实和证据，但它本身并不能揭示道德的内涵和意义。理解道德需要更广泛的理解，需要哲学家达成共识，这是他们从未实现过的。 只要许多问题相互冲突，就会产生复杂的分析和无休止的争论。 参与这项研究的宇宙和大气是所有这些概念冲突的主题，也是客观和进化观察的结果。 尽管存在这种情况及其固有的重要性，但这些问题远远没有讨论客观伦理分析的方法论，这是这项工作的目的和范围。 我们应该简要地重新审视这些众所周知的传统理论，因为这项工作是一项比较研究，其假设与至少所有传统理论都有很大不同。 -/- 因此，有必要为读者提供直接和具体的比较要素，以便在不进行广泛研究的情况下进行有效的批评。 这项工作的目的是证明和展示史前道德原型的存在和意义，这些原型直接源于最基本的社会需求和生存努力。这些原型定义了道德的本质基础，将其聚合到集体无意识中，并用相应的逻辑组织起来。 这种逻辑被传递到人类基因组的进化阶段和不同的时空关系，无论任何当代的个人经验。这些原型定义的系统构成了人类社会的进化模型。 这是一个元伦理立场吗？ 是的，是的。 此外，在任何元伦理推理中，我们都应该仔细寻找最佳和最连贯的路径，分析哲学提供了这样的路径。 因此，这项工作应该合理地证明道德不是文明人或现代社会的文化产物。虽然它经历了许多文化的相对聚集和缺失，但它的基础是原型，从未经历过结构变化。这种推理表明，道德是智人的第一个社会建构。 它不是一种属性或偶然现象：它与人的本质融为一体，是人体的特征。 人类现象是随机决定和自由意志之间不断演绎的过程。 我们需要质疑道德是如何开始的，以及它是如何来到我们身边的。 -/- .

Brief yet thorough and affordably priced, The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, Sixth Edition, is ideal for courses in introductory ethics and contemporary moral problems. Featuring forty-eight readings divided into four parts, it introduces students to ethical theory and a wide range of moral issues. The essays include selections from such historically influential philosophers as Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Mill alongside work by contemporary philosophers like Philippa Foot, Robert Nozick, Peter Singer, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Detailed (...) reading introductions provide helpful contextual information. (shrink)

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. (shrink)

This open access book presents a comparative study of two classics of world literature, offering the first sustained study of what unites and divides the Nicomachean Ethics and the Bhagavad Gita. -/- Asking what the texts think is the nature of moral action and how it relates to the highest good, Roopen Majithia shows how the Gita stresses the objectivity of knowledge and freedom from being a subject, while the Ethics emphasizes the knower, working out Aristotle’s central commitment to the (...) idea of substance as the primary building block of the world. Yet both the Gita and the Ethics explain variety in human behaviour in terms of three driving forces. Both agree moral agency is a construct that is a function of background, education and habit, presupposing a cultural, political and economic infrastructure. -/- What distinguishes the texts is how the content of right action is generated. Reading them together, alert to their individual accounts of how the practical relates to the reflective dimensions of life, Majithaia enriches our understanding of two cornerstone texts in the Greek and Indian philosophical traditions. -/- The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollectionsdotcom. Open access was funded by The Marjorie Young Bell Faculty Fund and The Hart Almerrin Massey Endowment. (shrink)

Als Plato de hedendaagse academie zou aanschouwen, zou hij niet alleen stomverbaasd zijn over de massificatie en de byzantijnse bureaucratie, maar gezien het ethische doel van de universiteit zou hij ook reden hebben om bezorgd te zijn.

En este artículo se argumenta que el procedimentalismo epistémico de Estlund, en tanto que modelo democrático, requiere de disposiciones éticas mínimas que no son explicitadas en la propuesta. Para mostrar este punto, aborda la propuesta de Estlund desde la noción de modelo democrático de Macpherson. Con esto, se advierte que las disposiciones éticas mínimas que configurarían una base ética implícita en el procedimentalismo epistémico serían tres: una disposición frente al conocimiento que involucra el proceso; otra frente al procedimiento democrático mismo; (...) y, finalmente, una frente al reconocimiento de la legitimidad de los resultados. (shrink)

Chinese (simplified character) translation of _A Relational Moral Theory_ by Nan Zhang.

En este artículo se plantean las bases del marco ético-normativo que intervienen en la atención sanitaria de las mujeres en general, y de las mujeres mapuce, en particular. Posteriormente, se realiza un abordaje de las mujeres indígenas analizando su situación concreta, a partir de considerar de manera crítica la confluencia intersectorial de distintos sistemas opresivos que articulan las relaciones de género, clase y etnia. Para ello, el planteo se centrará en el estudio de esta problemática desde la perspectiva feminista latinoamericana, (...) que será, seguidamente, retomada y contrastada desde la voz propia de mujeres que se autoidentifican como mapuce. El objetivo del artículo se centra en poner de manifiesto las múltiples dificultades que presentan las mujeres indígenas en el acceso a la salud, con el propósito de justificar la necesidad de articular políticas públicas que promuevan la democratización del acceso sanitario, en tanto derecho humano. Para ello, realizaremos un abordaje teórico-normativo que ponga en evidencia las responsabilidades éticas y políticas del Estado, como ente garante del acceso a la salud de sus ciudadanos, en particular de los más vulnerados, como lo son las mujeres de comunidades indígenas en nuestro país. (shrink)

I argue that an act can be wrong _because_ it wrongs a particular person. I then show how this thesis serves as a constraint on moral theories, using Kantian ethics as a case study.

In this chapter the explanatory value of four conceptions of human dignity to account for two seemingly contradictory intuitions is tested. One is that many people think poverty violates the humanity of poor people. The other intuition is that poor people often act with remarkable dignity despite their trying circumstances. First Immanuel Kant’s influential view on human dignity that claims it is grounded in humans’ capability to make moral judgments is examined. Next, Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the capability approach is (...) tested, which is hugely influential across many academic disciplines and in the world of economic development. Thereafter, two related, though distinctly different African theories of human dignity, as offered by Thaddeus Metz and Polycarp Ikuenobe are assessed. Both base their theories on the core capacity of humans to engage in harmonious relationships within communities. Last, it is investigated the theory that Avishai Margalit provides of honour and humiliation as concepts that illuminate the value and risks for humans’ possession of dignity. His theory is linked to aspects of the recognition theory of Axel Honneth. In the end, it is concluded that these theories either cannot fully, or adequately, explain the complex relationship between poverty and human dignity. (shrink)

Medical populism, as a political style of handling the challenges of a public health crisis, has primarily been analyzed in terms of its influence on the efficacy of governmental efforts to meet the challenges of the current pandemic (such as those related to testing, vaccination, and community restrictions). As these efforts have moral consequences (they, for instance, will affect people’s wellbeing and may lead to suffering, loss of opportunities, and unfair distributions), an analysis of the ethics of medical populism is (...) much needed. In this essay, we address the need to analyze the moral dimension of medical populism by relating it to issues in healthcare ethics. Specifically, we identify the moral significance of medical populism by demonstrating how it contributes to the failure of governments to discharge their moral duty to provide for the healthcare needs of their people, and, correlatively, to the violation of the people’s moral right to healthcare. We argue that with medical populism, governments tend to mishandle the constraints that would morally justify their shortcomings in fulfilling such duty. We identify such constraints as mainly referring to the governments’ given (economic and institutional) capacities and the relative degree of incumbency of their competing duties. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has been dogged by the objection that it lacks the ability to provide adequate action-guidance, that it is agent-centered rather act-centered. Virtue ethics has also been faulted for devolving into moral cultural relativism. Rosalind Hursthouse has presented an action-based, naturalistic theory of virtue ethics intended to defuse these charges. Despite its merits, I argue that Hurthouse’s theory fails to successfully solve the problems associated with action guidance and relativism precisely because her attempt to provide a non-cultural basis for (...) virtue ethics undermines the possibility of using virtue ethics to derive useful action-guidance. The action-guiding power of virtue is derived from culture; seeking to avoid the cultural grounding of virtue merely brings one back to the problem of how virtue ethics can provide action-guidance. (shrink)

This chapter addresses a general question: What is responsible risking? It explores the notion of "responsible risking" as a thick moral concept, and it argues that the notion can be given moral content that could be action-guiding and add an important tool to our moral toolbox. To impose risks responsibly, on this view, is to take on responsibility in a good way. A core part of responsible risking, this chapter argues, is some version of a Forethought Condition. Such a condition (...) requires us to not make decisions or plans such that we could not deliver on our responsibility obligations. This chapter argues that three moral obligations can be derived from descriptive notions of responsibility. They are (1) the control condition, (2) the responsibility to fix condition, and (3) the responsibility to explain condition. The idea is that in order to impose risks responsibly we ought not act in ways that undermine our ability to remain in control over the risks, undermine our ability to sort out negative outcomes by reparations or compensation, or undermine our prospects of providing an explanation for our actions that also makes sense in hindsight and to those affected. This idea is then tried out on the case of germline gene editing. It is argued that such a moral notion of responsibility is also action-guiding when we do not know for certain what is the morally right or obligatory action all-things-considered due to epistemic gaps. (shrink)

Философские, традиционные подходы к морали в основном основаны на метафизических и теологических концепциях и теориях. Среди традиционных концепций этики наиболее заметной является теория божественного повеления (DCT). Согласно DCT, Бог дает человечеству моральные основы через его творение и откровение. Мораль и божественность были неразделимы со времен самой далекой цивилизации. Эти концепции укладываются в теологические рамки и в основном принимаются большинством последователей трех авраамических традиций: иудаизма, христианства и ислама: наиболее значительной части человеческого населения. Теории Божественного повеления основываются на вере и откровении и (...) не подлежат строгой демонстрации. Противники концепции морали Божьего повеления, основанной на невозможности продемонстрировать свои метафизические и религиозные допущения, пытались (хотя и безуспешно) на протяжении многих веков преуменьшать ее значение. Они придерживались аргумента, что он не демонстрирует никаких материальных доказательств и логической согласованности и по этой причине не может быть рассмотрен в научных или философских целях. Это всего лишь убеждение, и оно должно пониматься при этом условии. Помимо этих крайних противоположностей, многие другие концепции противоречат теориям Божественного повеления, так или иначе, частично или полностью. От классической греческой философии до наших дней многие философы и социологи утверждают, что мораль — это всего лишь конструкция, и поэтому она культурно относительна и обусловлена культурой. Однако это вызывает множество дальнейших дискуссий и ставит перед собой задачу определить важность культуры, какие элементы культуры являются морально определяющими, и, наконец, пределы этой относительности. Моральный детерминизм утверждает, что все, что связано с поведением человека, включая мораль, определяется таким образом, что свобода воли перестает существовать. Совсем недавно современные мыслители утверждали, что существует строгая наука о морали. Однако, несмотря на объяснение множества фактов и доказательств, один только научный метод не может пролить свет на все содержание и значение этики в целом. Понимание морали требует более широкого восприятия и согласия среди философов, чего они так и не достигли. Эти вопросы имеют множество различных конфигураций в зависимости от каждого философского направления и начинают сложный анализ и бесконечные дебаты, если многие из них противоречат друг другу. Вселенная и атмосфера, которые включает в себя это исследование, являются хозяевами всех этих концептуальных конфликтов, наблюдаемых с объективной и эволюционной точки зрения. Однако, несмотря на эти обстоятельства и их внутреннюю важность, эти вопросы далеки от методологического подхода аналитического обсуждения объективной морали, которое, по сути, является целью и областью действия этой работы. Мы должны кратко рассмотреть эти выдающиеся традиционные теории, потому что в этой работе проводится сравнительное исследование, и их предположения, по крайней мере, глубоко отличаются от всех традиционных теорий. Следовательно, становится необходимым предлагать читателю прямые и конкретные элементы сравнения для обоснованной критики без прерывания исследований. Но даже если мы пересмотрим традиционные теории для этой сравнительной и критической цели изложения, они все равно останутся в стороне от наших основных проблем как „чужеродная материя". Цель этой работы состоит в том, чтобы продемонстрировать существование и значение доисторических моральных архетипов — архетипов, вытекающих из фундаментальных социальных потребностей и борьбы за выживание — для определения сущностной основы этики, их агрегации в коллективном бессознательном и, следовательно, для определения того, что такое этика. Эти архетипы определяют эволюционную социальную модель человека. Является ли это мета этической позицией? Да, это так. Кроме того, как и в любой мета этической аргументации, мы должны тщательно искать наилучшие и наиболее правильные пути, предлагаемые аналитической философией. Эта работа была призвана обоснованно продемонстрировать, что мораль не является культурным продуктом цивилизованных людей или современных обществ. Несмотря на многочисленные культурные относительные объединения и вычитания, основные основы являются архетипическими и никогда не менялись структурно. Это рассуждение приводит к тому, что мораль является первым атрибутом „Homo sapiens"; это не собственность или случайность: она объединяет человеческое существо и является частью онтологической человеческой идентичности. Человеческие явления — это непрерывный процесс, который играет свою роль между случайной решимостью и свободной волей, и мы должны спросить, как зародилась мораль и как она пришла к нам в настоящее время. (shrink)

This collection of previously published essays by Cheshire Calhoun, with an original introduction, supplies an absorbing assemblage of some well-known and some lesser-known essays that hang together remarkably well. The overall effect is that of a robust and provocative approach to ethical theory. Calhoun builds a persuasive case for morality as an enterprise constituted as much by social practices as by abstract theorizing. Calhoun's is not merely the position that moral theory has feasibility constraints when applied. On the contrary, she (...) offers these essays as multiple viewing angles on her position that, "absent a social practice, there is no morality, although there might be moral knowledge" (13). Conventionally, we conceive of morality as a correct action guide, a theory that aims for accuracy in an attempt to "get it right," which we then carry into application in the world. Calhoun argues that our critically reflective aim of theorizing toward accuracy supervenes on -- and often unwittingly presumes -- the backdrop of a social practice of morality (17). (shrink)

The concept of character has a long history in moral philosophy. Three fundamental versions can be identified: the Aristotelian, the Humean, and the Kantian. The Aristotelian concept of character is based on the model of the wise person, who shapes her feeling according to reason. The Humean character is based exclusively on feelings, having as a criterion the feeling of approval for virtue and disapproval for vice. The Kantian character is based on freedom as autonomy and on the feeling of (...) respect. I argue that the Kantian concept avoids the risk of depending on metaphysics (as the Aristotelian model does) and of lacking universal value (as the Humean model does). (shrink)

La tradición filosófica de los enfoques morales se basa predominantemente en conceptos y teorías metafísicas y teológicas. Entre los conceptos tradicionales de la ética, el más destacado es la Teoría del Mandato Divino (DCT). Según TCD, Dios da fundamentos morales a la humanidad desde su creación ya a través de revelaciones. Así, la moral y la divinidad serían inseparables de la civilización más remota. Estos conceptos se sumergen en un marco teológico y son mayoritariamente aceptados por la mayoría de los (...) seguidores de las tres tradiciones Abrahámicas: judaísmo, cristianismo e islam, que abarcan la mayor parte de la población humana. Teniendo como fundamento la fe y la Revelación, las Teorías del Mandato Divino no están estrictamente sujetas a ningún tipo de demostración. Los opositores a la concepción moral del Mandato Divino, basados en la imposibilidad de demostrar sus supuestos metafísicos y religiosos, han intentado durante muchos siglos desvalorizar su importancia. Apoyan el argumento de que la teoría no muestra evidencia material y coherencia lógica y, por ello, no puede ser tenida en cuenta para fines científicos o filosóficos. Es solo una creencia y como tal debe entenderse. Además de estas posiciones extremas, muchos otros conceptos atacan las teorías del Mandato Divino, de una forma u otra, en parte o en su totalidad. Muchos filósofos y científicos sociales, desde la filosofía griega clásica hasta la actualidad, por ejemplo, sostienen que la moralidad es solo una construcción y, por lo tanto, culturalmente relativa y culturalmente determinada. Sin embargo, esto trae a colación muchas otras discusiones y plantea el desafío de determinar cuál es el sentido de la cultura, qué elementos de la cultura son moralmente determinantes y, finalmente, cuáles son los límites de esta relatividad. Los deterministas morales, por su parte, afirman que todo lo relacionado con el comportamiento humano, incluida la moralidad, está determinado en sus causas, ya que no existe el libre albedrío. Más recientemente, los pensadores modernos han argumentado que existe una ciencia rigurosa de la moralidad. Sin embargo, el método científico por sí solo, a pesar de explicar varios hechos y evidencias, no puede aclarar todo el contenido y significado de la ética. La comprensión moral requiere una visión más amplia y un acuerdo entre los filósofos, lo que nunca lograron. Todas estas preguntas tienen muchas configuraciones diferentes, dependiendo de cada línea filosófica, e inician análisis complejos y debates interminables, ya que muchos de ellos son recíprocamente conflictivos. Independientemente de la validez de alguno o todos los elementos de esta discusión y de su significado como universo filosófico de este trabajo, el objetivo de nuestro estudio es demostrar y justificar la existencia y el significado de los arquetipos morales prehistóricos que surgen directamente de principios fundamentales, necesita esfuerzos sociales y de supervivencia. Estos arquetipos son la definición del fundamento esencial de la ética, su agregación al inconsciente colectivo y su correspondiente organización lógica y transmisión a las etapas evolutivas del genoma humano y a las distintas relaciones espacio-temporales, independientemente de cualquier experiencia contemporánea de los individuos. El sistema definido por estos arquetipos compone un modelo social humano evolutivo. (shrink)

Many nonhuman animals have the emotional capacities to form caring relationships that matter to them, and for their immediate welfare. Drawing from care ethics, we argue that these relationships also matter as objectively valuable states of affairs. They are part of what is good in this world. However, the value of care is precarious in human-animal interactions. Be it in farming, research, wildlife ‘management’, zoos, or pet-keeping, the prevention, disruption, manipulation, and instrumentalization of care in animals by humans is ubiquitous. (...) We criticize a narrow conception of welfare that, in practice, tends to overlook non-experiential forms of harm that occur when we interfere with caring animals. Additionally, we point out wrongs against caring animals that are not just unaccounted for but denied by even an expansive welfare perspective: The instrumentalization of care and caring animals in systems of use can occur as a harmless wrong that an approach purely focused on welfare may, in fact, condone. We should therefore adopt an ethical perspective that goes beyond welfare in our dealings with caring animals. (shrink)

The present paper 1departs from the discussion on the foundation of morality in Discourse Ethics (DE) and the criticism raised against it, coming to reconstruct in a somewhat different way the foundational process. A first section is dedicated to analysing the difficulties of Habermas distinction between morality and ethics and the criticism raised against it, questioning a) the possibility to set the difference in the distinction between norms and values and b) the presumed neutrality of DE regarding ethical evaluations. A (...) second section revisits the foundational proposal of DE. First of all, it provi- des an interpretation of the Kantian proposal that makes the universalization of norms subservient to the idea of human beings as ends in themselves. It then considers a) the subsistence of Kantian moral reasoning in its architectonic and b) suggests a formal structure in practical thinking that integrates in hierarchical modus Kantian, discursive and contextually determined evaluative conceptions. (shrink)

Die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens umfasst große Menschheitsfragen: Was hält die Welt im Innersten zusammen? Was wollen wir, und lohnt das, was wir wollen und was wir tun? Ist das Leben wert, gelebt zu werden? Und welche Rolle spielt, falls es ihn gibt, Gott?

A continuous objection to virtue ethics has been its alleged inadequacy in providing a distinctive account of right action and determinate action guidance. The virtue ethical criterion “An action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in the circumstances,” has been claimed by some to give wrong results in some cases, and thus doomed to failure. However, I argue that the opponents who raise these objections overlook an important (...) distinction between “action assessment” and “action guidance” in virtue ethics. Once this distinction which is alien to other dominant moral theories is taken into consideration, I show that virtue ethics can supply a distinctive theory of right action and sufficient action guidance. Moreover, I will demonstrate that this distinction allows us to see that virtue ethics has some structural advantages that enable it to provide multiple guidance strategies to different agents with differential cognitive and moral developmental levels. Finally, I will argue that while theories that tell moral agents what to do by providing exact answers might affect moral agency in negative ways by frustrating the development of an integrated moral character, virtue ethics also avoids this effect. (shrink)

Anne Schwenkenbecher’s Getting Our Act Together offers an in-depth and timely account of how our ability to act jointly can create so-called joint moral duties. Getting Our Act Together not only co...

The aim of this paper is to show that the nascent field of ethics of collegiality may considerably benefit from a symbiosis with virtue and vice epistemology. We start by bringing the epistemic virtue and vice perspective to the table by showing that competence, deemed as an essential characteristic of a good colleague (Betzler & Löschke 2021), should be construed broadly to encompass epistemic competence. By endorsing the anti-individualistic stance in epistemology as well as context-specificity of epistemic traits, we show (...) how the individual vice of a colleague can have a positive epistemic outcome for the team while individual virtue can be damaging if all team members share it, thereby contributing to the negative epistemic outcome. We argue that the evaluation and analysis of collegial relationships should be done through one’s contribution to the team dynamics: without this collectivist perspective, the ethics of collegiality cannot aspire to become encompassing normative theory. (shrink)

Perioperative staff are frequently exposed to surgical smoke or plume created by using heat-generating devices like diathermy and lasers. This is a concern due to mounting evidence that this exposure can be harmful with no safe level of exposure yet identified. First, I briefly summarise the problem posed by surgical smoke exposure and highlight that many healthcare organisations are not sufficiently satisfying their legal and ethical responsibilities to protect their staff from potential harm. Second, I explore the ethical case for (...) compulsory smoke evacuation systems using the principlist framework and its four ethical principles – autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. I then consider some objections and argue that surgical smoke evacuation systems – when indicated – should be made compulsory. (shrink)

In _War by Agreement_ (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), Yitzhak Benbaji and Daniel Statman argue that the ‘war convention’ – i.e. the international laws and conventions that are widely accepted to govern the use of force between sovereign states – represents a morally binding contract. On their understanding, the war convention replaces a pre-contractual morality governed by principles that so-called reductive individualists have identified and argued for over the past twenty years. This paper argues that if we (...) take Benbaji and Statman’s contractarian interpretation of the war convention seriously, we have to conclude that its _in bello_ rules have moral force only in contexts where its _ad bellum_ rules were breached non-culpably. While Benbaji and Statman do not attend to this limitation of their argument, it has important ramifications in practice, as it is frequently unclear in the context of war whether one’s adversary is acting in good faith. (shrink)

"In the first study of its kind, David W. Johnson's "Watsuji on Nature" reconstructs the astonishing philosophy of nature of Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), situating it in relation both to his reception of the thought of Heidegger and to his renewal of core ontological positions in classical Confucian and Buddhist philosophy. Johnson shows that for Watsuji we have our being in the lived experience of nature, one in which nature and culture compose a tightly interwoven texture called "fūdo". By fully unfolding (...) Watsuji's novel and radical claim that this is a setting that is neither fully external to human subjectivity nor merely a product of it, this book also sets out what still remains unthought in this concept, as well as in the relational structure that underwrites it. Johnson argues that what remains unarticulated is nothing less than the recovery of a reenchanted conception of nature and an elucidation of the wide-ranging implications of a relational conception of the self for questions about the disclosive character of experience, the distinction between fact and value, and the possibility of a place-based ecological ethics. In an engagingly lucid and deft analysis, "Watsuji on Nature" radically expands our appreciation of twentieth-century Japanese philosophy and shows what it has to offer to a global philosophical conversation"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

This article handles a series of articles written by Suzuki (2016a; 2016b; 2018), in which he put forward the anti-psychologism, a new standpoint of action theory. This standpoint, however, has lost the path Anscombe originally opened up, seemingly. Anscombe’s point (called “Anscombe’s motif” in this article) was: the agent him/herself responds, by revealing his/her original motive, to the question “Why did/do you do…?” Leaving this ground, in modern theories, one sees an unfamiliar idea like a normative reason flow into the (...) debate on human action. We review this academic environment critically in terms of Kaneko (2017), whom Suzuki criticized in one of his papers (2018). (shrink)

This paper will highlight how the existing approaches to the Strawman Fallacy and the Principle of Charity are unable to fully accommodate the problems of interpreting children’s arguments. A lack of charity is as problematic as an excess of charity when arguing with children, and can contribute to misinterpretation of arguments. An application of moderate charity avoids the pitfalls of misrepresenting children. However, interpreting children’s arguments with the appropriate amount of charity is a challenging task. The argumentative context is relevant (...) in determining the interpretive approach and the extent of charity that can be justified. The context of arguing with children necessitates an Ethics of Care-based approach to interpretation. Michael Gilbert’s concept of coalescent argumentation exemplifies how Ethics of Care can be realized during argumentative exchanges involving children. (shrink)

Are there nonhuman animals who behave morally? In this paper I answer this question in the affirmative by applying the framework of care ethics to the animal morality debate. According to care ethics, empathic care is the wellspring of morality in humans. While there have been several suggestive analyses of nonhuman animals as empathic, much of the literature within the animal morality debate has marginalized analyses from the perspective of care ethics. In this paper I examine care ethics to extract (...) its core commitments to what is required for moral care: emotional motivation that enables the intentional meeting of another’s needs, and forward-looking responsibility in particular relationships. What is not required, I argue, are metarepresentational capacities or the ability to scrutinize one’s reasons for action, and thus being retrospectively accountable. This minimal account of moral care is illustrated by moral practices of parental care seen in many nonhuman animal species. In response to the worry that parental care in nonhuman animals lacks all evaluation and is therefore nonmoral I point to cultural differences in human parenting and to normativity in nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Holly Smith has done more than anyone to explore and defend the importance of usability for moral theories. In Making Morality Work, she develops a moral theory that is almost universally usable. But not quite. In this article, I argue that no moral theory is universally usable, in the sense that is most immediately relevant to action, even by agents who know all the normative facts. There is no moral theory knowledge of which suffices to settle deliberation about what to (...) do. However, this is unsurprising if the question of what to do is not a question of fact. One upshot of the discussion is that the search for a universally usable moral theory is misconceived. Another is that, contra Smith (341), agents who are radically uncertain need not lack autonomy. (shrink)

the proclivity of many people to classify human acts as good or bad calls into mind the import of ETHICS. The penchant for classification warrants the evaluation of the bases for saying that one is bad or good action. Normally, human act is ethical if it is in accordance with what one would relatively expect in view of the events or the circumstances and unethical if the action is not called for by the circumstances, or a person whose behavior is (...) disorderly and inconsistent. The same observations harbor on perception rather than on paradigms and frameworks which ethicists have somehow perfected to classify bad behavior into one division and good behavior into another. The study of ETHICS will therefore increase proficiency at least in moral decision making. Likewise, knowledge of the course will give students certain techniques for evaluating others’ action as moral or immoral, including their own. ETHICS is the science of action but the action herein alluded to is not the action that concerns those that are unconscious and spontaneous. Action here is that resulting from intellect and will herein referred to as human act. ETHICS is both a theoretical and a practical discipline. The language of ethics refers to rights, duties, and values. One of the goals of ethics is to explore the nature of moral experience, its universality, and its diversity. Another is to provide intellectual analysis of values, and value conflicts in order to define man’s duties. Also, it is oriented toward the determination of right decisions. In order to do that, it is necessary to go step by step, analyzing, first, the facts of the case, second, the values at stake, and third, the duties. In short, ETHICS has the very practical purpose of helping us to choose, decide, and act morally. It should enable us to discover defects in the action of others and to avoid defects in our own action. (shrink)

In this article I respond to six contributors to a special issue of _Social Theory and Practice_ that is devoted to critical discussions of my book _A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and Beyond the Continent_. In this book I articulate a general principle of rightness that is substantially informed by values salient in the African philosophical tradition (and some others in the Global South) and defend it as preferable to some major rivals, including utilitarianism and Kantianism. Key topics (...) that I address in this article include methodological issues, such as whether it is appropriate to provide an interpretation of the African tradition with some characteristically Western concepts and how metaphysical claims should inform the construction of normative ethical theories, as well as substantive issues pertaining to how to understand the nature of moral status and right action. (shrink)

We examine Twin Peaks' minor character Albert Rosenfeld's peculiar moral code. We make the case that Albert is the perfect exemplification of a perfect Kantian in an imperfect world.