Jean-Paul Sartre

I argue that Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego draws on Kant's theory of spontaneity to articulate its metaphysical account of consciousness's mode of being, to defend its phenomenological description of the intentional structure of self‐consciousness, and to diagnose the errors that motivate views of consciousness qua person or substance. In addition to highlighting an overlooked dimension of Sartre's early relation to Kant, this interpretation offers a fresh account of how Sartre's argument for the primacy of pre‐personal consciousness works, and brings (...) the extent of his proximity to idealist models of mind into greater relief. It also affords Sartre the resources to respond to criticisms that his account of self‐consciousness relies on a spurious distinction and that his view of freedom cannot explain how consciousness is conditioned by its world. (shrink)

This paper takes the movement of transcendence in Sartre and examines it in relation to another understanding of transcendence in relation to God circulating in Paris in Sartre’s formative years: that of Karl Jaspers. Through exploring the transmission and reception of Jaspers' thought in French philosophy, different understandings can be advanced as to why he engages with the figure of God as that which we transcend towards, however impossibly, and why he counts Jaspers as a Catholic existentialist.

This essay argues for a new conception of bad faith based partly on Harry Frankfurt's famous account of personal autonomy in terms of higher‐order volitions and caring, and based partly on Sartre's insights concerning tacit or pre‐thetic attitudes and “transcendent” freedom. Although Sartre and Frankfurt have rarely been connected, Frankfurt's concepts of volitional “wantonness” and “bullshit” (wantonness about truth) are similar in certain revealing respects to Sartre's account of bad faith. However, Sartre leaves no room for Frankfurt's central point that (...) people can volitionally commit themselves to develop certain motives and reduce others, thereby shaping an authentic identity through volitional “identification” and “alienation” of motives. Frankfurt in turn minimizes the role that a sense of liberty to form and alter higher‐order volitions plays in experiences of autonomy, which Sartre recognizes in the transcendence of the “for‐itself.” When these points are combined, we get a tri‐level theory of intrasubjective volitional stances that explains Sartre's cases better than his own theory can, and also clarifies how sincere or procedurally autonomous self‐relation is possible. (shrink)

Sartre maintains that “all consciousness is consciousness of something.” Idiosyncratically, he also understands this “intentionality principle” to entail that what consciousness is “of” is necessarily distinct from it (or “outside of” it, or “transcendent to” it). Nonetheless, he also maintains that all consciousness is necessarily conscious of—or rather, “(of)”—itself in a non‐intentional (in his terms: “non‐positional/non‐thetic”) manner. Given that this non‐positional/thetic self‐consciousness is not intentional, it is evidently immune to the “difference” principle, but this is less clear with respect to (...) self‐reflection (which Sartre simply calls “reflection”). It seems impossible for reflection to be “intentional” because intentionality entails difference—yet it also seems problematic to consider reflection “non‐intentional” because it then becomes difficult to distinguish reflection from non‐positional/thetic self‐consciousness as such (which is inherently “unreflective”). This can be called Sartre's “dilemma of reflection.” While Sartre seems to alternate between portraying reflection as intentional and as non‐intentional (it generally appears like the former), this paper argues that it should be conceived as both according to different respects. By piecing together various passages of Sartre's texts and drawing out their implications, Sartre can be shown to have the resources for an answer to his own dilemma. (shrink)

The Introduction to Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (B&N) contains a condensed, cryptic argument – the ‘ontological proof’ – that is meant to establish a position ‘beyond realism and idealism’. Despite its role in establishing the fundamental ontological distinction of B&N – the distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself – the ontological proof has received very little scholarly attention. My goal is to fill this lacuna. I begin by clarifying the idealist position Sartre attacks in the Introduction to B&N: Husserl’s idealism as (...) interpreted by Aron Gurwitsch and Roman Ingarden. I then propose a new interpretation of the ontological proof that gives a central role to the transparency of experience. On this interpretation, Sartre argues from the ‘emptiness’ of consciousness – its purely relational nature – to the existence of mind-independent substance (being-in-itself). In assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Sartre’s case against idealism, I put him in critical dialogue with contemporary work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The Introduction to Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (B&N) contains a condensed, cryptic argument – the ‘ontological proof’ – that is meant to establish a position ‘beyond realism and idealism’. Despite its role in establishing the fundamental ontological distinction of B&N – the distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself – the ontological proof has received very little scholarly attention. My goal is to fill this lacuna. I begin by clarifying the idealist position Sartre attacks in the Introduction to B&N: Husserl’s idealism as (...) interpreted by Aron Gurwitsch and Roman Ingarden. I then propose a new interpretation of the ontological proof that gives a central role to the transparency of experience. On this interpretation, Sartre argues from the ‘emptiness’ of consciousness – its purely relational nature – to the existence of mind-independent substance (being-in-itself). In assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Sartre’s case against idealism, I put him in critical dialogue with contemporary work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This article offers a philosophical reading of Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels by bringing the tetralogy into conversation with Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological ontology. In addition to highlighting the striking similarities between Ferrante’s notion of smarginatura (‘dissolving margins’) and Sartre’s depiction of the existential sensation of nausea, this article argues that the two main characters of Ferrante’s tetralogy, Lila Cerullo and Elena Greco, respectively exemplify Sartre’s ontological categories of ‘being-for-oneself’ and ‘being-for-others’ in his phenomenological account of human existence. However, Ferrante—like Simone de (...) Beauvoir before her—goes beyond Sartre in her ability to offer an account of the imperfect existential freedom of women, who remain constrained in their pursuit of authenticity by social and cultural factors. Drawing on Ferrante’s assertion that readers ‘are both Elena and Lila’ as well as her recent claim that there are within her two kinds of writing (broadly equated to the ‘compliant’ Elena and ‘impetuous’ Lila), we establish Ferrante’s exploration of the ambivalent features of human subjectivity as a consummate philosophical and literary project. (shrink)

In the debates on phenomenal consciousness that occurred over the last 20 years, Sartre’s analysis of pre-reflective consciousness has often been quoted in defence of a distinction between first- and third-personal modes of givenness that naturalists reject. This distinction aims both at determining the specificity of the access one has to their own thoughts, beliefs, intentions, or desires, and at justifying the particular privilege that one enjoys while making epistemic claims about their own mental states. This chapter defends an interpretation (...) of Sartre’s theory of pre-reflective consciousness that does not put him completely at odds with the naturalist critique and stresses that one’s pre-reflective experience should not be understood in terms of first-/third-person differentiation. This pre-reflective dimension of experience nevertheless allows a peculiar access to oneself, which grants no infallible epistemic privilege to the first-person, but lays the ground for a transformative process that makes self-knowledge possible. (shrink)

In the opening lines of ‘Black Orpheus’, written as a preface to an anthology of negritude poetry, Sartre challenges white readers ‘to feel, as I do, the shock of being seen’. Reading this poetry, he thinks, should undermine white people’s presumption of the objectivity of their perspective. Accordingly, the essay itself contradicts two prominent aspects of the philosophy he had so far developed: the idea that poetry could not be politically engaged; and the theory of radical freedom. These changes are (...) ultimately rooted in his realisation, upon reading this poetry, that his previous understanding of prose is mistaken. This has the consequence that his philosophical method, which derives ontological conclusions from prose descriptions of experience, has two important limitations: its premises cannot be drawn solely from his own experience; and French prose might be insufficient for formulating all relevant premises. He therefore revises his method to deploy this poetry as phenomenological grounds for ontological conclusions, which transforms his ontology of human existence to include cultural inheritance as a primary feature. We will see how this reading of negritude poetry exemplifies both the epistemic challenge involved in what he calls ‘the look’ and the use of listening in response to it. (shrink)

In Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre highlights how emotions can transform our perspective on the world in ways that might make our situations more bearable when we cannot see an easy or happy way out. The point of this chapter is to spell out and discuss Sartre’s theory of emotion as presented in the Sketch with two aims in mind. The first is to show that although emotions have the power to transform our perspectives on the world (...) in ways described by Sartre, Sartre is mistaken to think emotions comprise the cognitive transformations in question. The second aim is to show why on one plausible way of thinking about the relationship holding between emotions and the cognitive transformations they help to bring about, emotions turn out to be the very sort of things that Sartre claims at the outset they are not, namely types of bodily feelings or sensations, a view of emotion that can be accredited to William James. (shrink)

Freedom is a necessary prerequisite for living, as most existentialists emphasized. A prominent existentialist, Sartre, fully appreciated the importance of freedom in helping humans lead authentic lives. In his philosophical magnum opus, Being and Nothingness, he boldly contends that human beings possess absolute freedom, meaning they are not determined by external factors or pre-existing essence, and are therefore responsible for creating their 'own' meaning and purpose in life. Admittedly, Sartre claims that man's freedom is tied to responsibility. He proposed the (...) notion of freedom and responsibility as a moral compass for leading an authentic existence. This critical analysis explores Sartre's notion of existential freedom, focusing on its philosophical conceptions, implications, and deficiencies. This paper will properly understand Jean-Paul Sartre's notion of freedom and responsibility, starting by defining freedom in the way Sartre wants us to conceive it. This paper will examine some of the objections raised by Alvin Plantinga against Sartre's philosophy of freedom. And finally, this paper will also analyze Sartre's notion of freedom and responsibility and reveal its incompatibilities with universal morality. By critically evaluating Sartre's concept of existential freedom, this analysis aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of his existentialist philosophy and stimulate further dialogue on the nature and implications of human freedom. (shrink)

Earthly Engagements brings together scholars who take up Jean-Paul Sartre's thought as a critical and heuristic resource to think through the planetary socio-ecological crisis. The volume advances the ecological voice in Sartre studies and the Sartrean voice in environmental studies, from environmental philosophy to eco-criticism.

El presente ensayo se inscribe en el centenario del nacimiento de Jean-Paul Sartre. Hoy, a veinticinco años de su muerte, se debate en un marco diferente en muchos aspectos de la pretérita generación a la que perteneció: el presente ahora es el de la denominada globalización, el de la Unión Europea, el conflicto étnico y cultural, la caída de la Unión Soviética… y se debate, por circunstancias históricas y de progreso en un mundo que discute críticamente, y precisamente, sobre el (...) filósofo y escritor francés. Nos proponemos estudiar, desde las coordenadas del materialismo filosófico, los componentes filosóficos presentes en L’Idiot de la famille, el último trabajo de Jean-Paul Sartre antes de su fallecimiento en 1980. Obra que es producto de una larga reflexión iniciada en su juventud con la lectura de Madame Bovary y latente a lo largo de su vida como escritor, para concluir en los años setenta con su publicación y en el marco de los acontecimientos revolucionarios del París de mayo del 68. (shrink)

Book review of Jean-Paul Sartre, George Orwell, and István Bibó: _Antisemitismin kirous: kolme kriittistä esseetä_. Translated by Anssi Halmesvirta and Tuomas Laine-Frigren. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2023.

Esse artigo pretende explorar os temas do estatuto e da função do intelectual em dois autores significativos para a questão a partir do século XX: Julien Benda e Jean-Paul Sartre. Trata-se de revisitar as noções de autonomia e engajamento, fundamentais para uma compreensão comparativa entre os dois autores. O texto procura caracterizar de forma ampla o tipo de intelectual defendido por Benda no mesmo passo em que procura evidenciar a gênese e as condições de aparecimento do intelectual para Sartre. O (...) Caso Dreyfus, momento histórico de surgimento do intelectual como o conhecemos, é revisitado a fim de estabelecermos um referencial concreto para as posições dos autores em discussão. A partir dos elementos levantados, procura-se argumentar no sentido das divergências entre Benda e Sartre sobre a natureza e o papel do intelectual, mas também propõe-se evidenciar o solo comum em que os dois autores parecem trafegar. O texto, ainda, aponta questões para se pensar o intelectual a partir das novas condições políticas e sociais na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

Cet article entend montrer que le travail biographique de Sartre s’inscrit dans son projet d’unification des sciences humaines, et que la notion de génération constitue dans ce cadre une médiation centrale de l’analyse. Non seulement l’œuvre et la vie d’un individu s’éclairent mutuellement, mais l’une et l’autre sont inséparables de l’époque et de la situation dans lesquelles elles s’inscrivent ; et parce que la prise en compte de la génération aide à comprend le lien entre l’individu et la société, elle (...) fait de la biographie un complément nécessaire à l’étude historique et sociologique. (shrink)

This book provides a reconstructive and critical interpretation of Sartre’s mature dialectical ethics. Taken together, as Sartre intended, the posthumously published key texts demonstrate that the ultimate goal of praxis is “integral humanity” and that “making the human” is always possible because the means to humanity can always be invented.

O artigo analisa os argumentos de Sartre em torno da violência e do reconhecimento de novos sujeitos na política e a sua crítica ao formalismo dos discursos humanistas a partir do “Prefácio” que ele escreveu para Os condenados da terra, de Frantz Fanon. Para isso, o texto se divide em três partes. A primeira, mais histórica, apresenta o trabalho de Sartre como prefaciador e trata das condições que cercam a redação do “Prefácio” para Fanon; a segunda aborda o problema do (...) reconhecimento de outras vozes no contexto político; a última retoma a crítica sartriana às incoerências do humanismo ocidental. A violência atravessa todos os argumentos ao ocupar um papel capital nos trabalhos de Fanon e nas preocupações de Sartre, particularmente entre as décadas de 1950 e 1960. (shrink)

The study of the early manuscripts of the great authors most often becomes a process of monumentalising or (re)legitimising their work. The recent publication of two of Sartre's early manuscripts – first Empédocle (Empedocles) in 2016 and second, in 2018, his dissertation for his graduate diploma (diplôme d’études supérieures or DES), L'Image dans la vie psychologique (The Image in Psychological Life), both texts written in 1926–1927 – encourages us to propose another type of genetic reading that insists on the collective (...) conditions of the production of knowledge, including philosophical knowledge. Such a collective genetics, applied to Sartre's intellectual formation during the interwar years, allows us to highlight some of the little-known forms of Parisian intellectual societies (the activities of the International Information Group of the École Normale Supérieure, the critical logic of the psychology journals, the regular meetings of the cenacles, and the literary and philosophical research groups). It also reveals, at the same time, the original relationship between Sartre's thought and the German literature and philosophy mediated to him by Bernard Groethuysen, Stefan Zweig and Alexandre Koyré. (shrink)

Dans cette étude, nous examinons l’apport philosophique de l’ouvrage de Jean-Paul Sartre, Qu’est-ce que la littérature? (1948), dans le contexte de la méditation existentialiste de cette époque (Beauvoir et Merleau-Ponty). Nous établissons en quel sens Sartre y étaye le concept de liberté, selon ses aspects épistémique et praxique de témoignage et de prise de conscience, ainsi que ses dimensions intrinsèques de négativité et de construction. Nous poursuivons en montrant en quoi cet approfondissement conceptuel entraîne une méditation nouvelle par Sartre du (...) philosophème « faire l’Histoire ». Une telle méditation impose une modification drastique de la préséance et de l’ordre de ce que Sartre nomme les « catégories cardinales de la réalité humaine », laquelle se fait au détriment de celles de l’être et de l’avoir, et au profit de celle du faire. Nous montrons en quoi il y a là un changement de cap par rapport aux analyses de L’être et le néant. Nous terminons en envisageant les conséquences de cet approfondissement conceptuel de la liberté, de cette méditation de l’histoire et de ce remaniement catégoriel pour les questions du sens praxique de la littérature, de sa forme adéquate et de sa possible totalisation. (shrink)

Estas reflexões têm como objetivo principal mostrar as semelhanças que existem entre as concepções de Platão e de Jean-Paul Sartre relativamente ao “conhece-se a ti mesmo” e, principalmente, à questão da dialética do olhar e do desejo. Convém, no entanto, ressaltar que não se trata, de modo algum, de reivindicar a prioridade de Platão e demonstrar que Sartre, afinal de contas, não teria senão retomado e reinterpretado essa problemática adaptando-a à sua própria filosofia. Trata-se, antes, de relevar a convergência de (...) intuições e de ideias em torno de um mesmo tema que, a partir de horizontes e perspectivas diferentes, dois filósofos souberam investigar e aprofundar. Notar-se-á, portanto, que ambos os pensadores recorreram às metáforas do espelho, dos olhos, da pupila e da imagem que, mutuamente, os indivíduos se reenviam quando são contemplados e, portanto, olhados face a face. Trata-se, em suma, de analisar o papel que representa a dialética do olhar e do desejo nas relações intersubjetivas tais como Platão e Sartre as consideraram e as examinaram. Palavras-chave: Platão. Sartre. Lacan. Dialética do olhar. Desejo. (shrink)

Es innegable que la noción de epoché fue crucial para el surgimiento y el posterior desarrollo de la tradición fenomenológica. Si bien la resignificación que Husserl hace de ésta es sumamente original, él mismo se detiene a reconocer en la filosofía antigua el mérito de haber encontrado el camino idóneo para acceder a la subjetividad trascendental. En el siguiente trabajo buscaré, por un lado, definir la epoché tal como se origina en el pensamiento de los sofistas para luego pasar a (...) analizar el modo en el que Husserl logra reversionar dicha noción hasta convertirla en el método predilecto que nos permite arribar a la esfera trascendental. Por otro lado, continuaré rastreando la evolución de la epoché para llegar a su abandono en la filosofía de Sartre. En relación con esto último, me interesa preguntarme si el existencialismo reniega de la suspensión del juicio por considerarla inapropiada o si, más bien, se trata de una supresión parcial del método fenomenológico. Me propongo defender esta segunda tesis, alegando que, en realidad, la epoché no es una noción que esté totalmente ausente en la filosofía de Sartre sino que se mantiene vigente en términos de angustia existencial. (shrink)

This translation is of an article in the April–June 1948 issue of the Bulletin de la société française de philosophie (42, no. 3: 49–91). That article consists primarily of a lecture that Sartre had presented to La Société Française de Philosophie on 2 June 1947 in which he provided an overview of some of his main points in Being and Nothingness, with particular emphasis on its Introduction (especially its third section, ‘The Pre-Reflective Cogito and the Being of the Percipere’) as (...) well as on the first chapter of its second part, that is, “The Immediate Structures of the For-Itself” (covering content in three of its five sub-sections: I, III and IV). The title of the lecture thus does not wholly encompass the subjects that are discussed in it, although it may well be said to reflect its central theme (even in a literal sense, as the positioning of the hypothetically demarcated ‘Section III’ in the Table of Contents above shows). In addition to the presentation, the article in the Bulletin is preceded by a brief introductory statement – seemingly written by Sartre himself1 – which functions largely as a sort of ‘extended abstract’ for the talk (although not all the points in the introduction are covered in the presentation), and is followed by a transcript of the discussion that took place after the presentation between Sartre and some of the reputable scholars who were in attendance (i.e. a ‘question and answer’ session). (shrink)

Central to the philosophical practice is the application of philosophers' work by philosophical practitioners to inspire, educate, and guide their clients. For example, in Logic-Based Therapy (LBT), a philosophical practice methodology developed by Elliot Cohen, philosophical practitioners help their clients to find an uplifting philosophy that promotes a guiding virtue that acts as an antidote to unrealistic and often self-defeating conclusions derived from irrational premises. In this essay, I will explore the existential ethics of Simone de Beauvoir, a French existentialist (...) philosopher, and writer. I present the argument that Beauvoir’s existential ethics, more specifically her articulation of ambiguity, can act as an uplifting philosophy, as per LBT methodology, which could be of value to philosophical practitioners to inspire, educate and guide their counselees for confronting problems of living. I will present my discussion of Beauvoir’s existential ethics in the context of ideological obsession and ideology addiction, which is often supported by the reasoning that underlies the cardinal fallacy of existential perfectionism. I will argue that Beauvoir’s existential ethics could serve as a prophylactic for ideological obsession and ideology addiction. I will also suggest that LBT may be particularly suited when addressing the self-defeating, unrealistic conclusions derived from irrational premises in practical reasoning that may fuel ideological obsession because it could provide a methodology to address irrational beliefs in a way that could mitigate the fragmentation anxiety that may arise when relinquishing maladaptive self-object organizations. (shrink)

Central to philosophical practice is the application of philosophers' work by philosophical practitioners to inspire, educate, and guide their clients. For example, in Logic-Based Therapy (LBT) philosophical practitioners help their clients to find an uplifting philosophy that promotes guiding virtues that counteract unrealistic and often self-defeating conclusions derived from irrational premises. I will present the argument that Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics can be applied as an uplifting philosophy as per LBT methodology, and therefore has utility for philosophical practice. Additionally, (...) I will propose that Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics, as an uplifting philosophy, may act as an antidote for ideological obsession and ideology addiction. I will also suggest that LBT may be a suitable intervention when challenging the unrealistic conclusions derived from illogical premises in practical reasoning that contribute to ideological obsession, because it can contest irrational beliefs in a way that could mitigate the fragmentation anxiety that often arise when individuals relinquish maladaptive self-object organizations. (shrink)

This essay addresses the notion of self-deception as articulated by Sigmund Freud and Jean-Paul Sartre. More specifically, I will critically assess Sartre’s notion of ‘bad faith’ (mauvaise foi) as a critique of Freud’s depth-psychological account of self-deception. Sartre’s main objection to Freud’s account of self-deception rests on his argument that for self-deception to occur there needs to be a conscious awareness of the coexistence of mutually incompatible beliefs, and that Freud had obscured this fact by splitting the self and with (...) a mixture of jargon. In conclusion, I suggest a speculative and tentative hypothesis for self-deception that suggests an alternative to Freud and Sartre’s account of self-deception, one that views the self or self-system as having a disposition for self-deception when understood as having the capacity for fluid working self-states that are ‘expandable’ and ‘contractable’ that differ in self-complexity. (shrink)

Abstract:Critics often misinterpret Beckett’s Worstward Ho as being about the phenomenology of presence. The narrator, however, engages not with things that exist but, instead, the process of imaginative conjuring. The procedure resembles Sartre’s phenomenological method in The Imaginary and Beckett’s fictional depiction of the imagination serves as a corrective to Sartre’s “essential poverty” of the image—its lack of context. Worstward Ho demonstrates instead the image’s polyvalent contextual compatibility, which explains not only the referential ambivalence of Beckett’s work, but also the (...) truth function of fiction itself, wherein the imaginary particular is amenable to general insights into the real. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relevance and the conceptual role, within Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, of a fleeting impression of shame that reverts the threat of solipsism looming over any project of transcendental philosophy. In reading Sartre’s masterpiece, I underscore two methodological points that tend to be bypassed in standard interpretations and lengthy discussions of the book. On the one hand, I safeguard the strictly descriptive core of Sartre’s presentation of the impression of shame and what it reveals about the formal (...) structures of the (pre-reflective) cogito, as Sartre understands it. On the other hand, my analysis explores the different phases of the (conceptual) narrative of the For-Itself, which Sartre inherits from the Idealist tradition in modern philosophy and applies to the concreteness of a phenomenological description of the main stages of one’s experience of the outside world. (shrink)

In Sartre’s 1946 article “The Humanism of Existentialism,” Sartre places existentialists into two categories, Christian or atheist, and contends that existentialism works differently for each of them. This paper argues that such a distinction should not have been made because existentialist beliefs, views, and themes do not differ based on one’s religiosity. This paper specifically examines three examples in Sartre’s article which undermine his position, and further argues that Sartre made an equivocation fallacy by conflating two different types of essence, (...) one’s innate essence and one’s character essence. The paper then explores six central existentialist themes to demonstrate that in their existentialist beliefs both the theist and the atheist agree. Those six themes are authenticity, sincerity vs. bad faith, the absurdity of life, the meaning of life, choice, and responsibility. The paper also examines the issue of moral objectivity vs. non-objectivity, and argues that not only is this not an existentialist issue, but even if it were one’s belief on moral objectivity does not cleanly correspond to one’s religious beliefs, so here again there is no basis to distinguish the Christian and the atheist. The paper concludes that any disagreement between existentialists who are Christian and those who are atheist comes down to differences in their religious beliefs, not their existentialist views. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The French existentialists Simone de Beauvoir and Jean‐Paul Sartre are renowned philosophers of freedom. But what “existentialist freedom” is is a matter of disagreement amongst their interpreters and, some argue, between Beauvoir and Sartre themselves. Since the late 1980s several scholars have argued that a Sartrean conception of freedom cannot justify the ethics of existentialism, adequately account for situations of oppression, or serve feminist ends. On these readings, Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre about freedom—making existentialist ethics, resistance to oppression, and feminism (...) coherently defensible. This article identifies four conceptions of freedom in order to clarify the questions of whether and how they disagreed, arguing that some incompatibilist readings of Sartre and Beauvoir conflate or confuse these conceptions in ways that render their conclusions unconvincing. However, there are stronger grounds on which to claim that Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre about morality—and the conditions of its possibility. (shrink)

Rorty did not prefer any special philosophical method, neither analytic nor phenomenological, but he was a spontaneous phenomenologist. He learnt a lot first of all from Heidegger but also from Gadamer and Sartre. This chapter shows the main philosophical debates between Rorty and the abovementioned important figures of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Enumerating their main controversies, we emphasize also those ideas which were appropriated, usually in a modified form, by Rorty. At the end of the chapter, those arguments will be explained, (...) which prove the phenomenological character of Rorty’s neopragmatism. (shrink)

Contemporary critical theory and black studies have witnessed a surge in theoretical accounts of “blackness” as “nothingness”. Drawing on the work of the poet and cultural theorist Fred Moten, this article offers a reading of this recent postulation of blackness as “nothingness” in light of some of the similar theoretical endeavors in post-Kantian European philosophy. By comparing Moten’s “paraontological” conception of nothingness to Heidegger’s self-nihilating nothing, Sartre’s relative nothingness, as well as Schelling’s notion of absolute nothingness, this article argues that (...) Moten’s paraontology presents a more robust and systematic conception of nothingness than those of Heidegger, Sartre, and Schelling. By way of this comparison with these “canonical” accounts from European philosophy, this article highlights not only the unique features of Moten’s sophisticated formulation of nothingness, but also some of unacknowledged presumptions and prejudices of traditional metaphysics which Moten’s work calls into question. (shrink)

Em O ser e o nada, para que haja o fenômeno, é preciso o concurso de um ser que seja suaprópria descompressão de ser, um ser que, sendo seu próprio nada, faça com que o mundo sefenomenalize enquanto assombrado (hanté) por este nada, em direção a uma totalização que nuncapode se totalizar, pois o fechamento em uma totalidade compacta seria anular a descompressão de serque é abertura do próprio fenômeno enquanto fenômeno. Este movimento de totalização que nunca sepreenche caracteriza a (...) ipseidade do para-si. O fenômeno, quer o consideremos da perspectiva ôntica doque nos aparece no mundo cotidiano ou da perspectiva ontológica dos modos de ser implicados no queaparece, pressupõe a estrutura ontológica da ipseidade. Além disso, a questão do fenômeno em O ser eo nada não se resume a uma questão ontológica, pois, ao interrogar à gênese do fenômeno, Sartrecircunscreve o problema em uma metafísica que indaga sobre o que teria ocorrido para que o em-si,antes do surgimento da realidade-humana, se descomprimisse para tornar-se para-si. A concepção defenômeno como tendo origem no próprio modo de ser do para-si como ipseidade e a passagem entre aontologia e a metafísica marcam a originalidade do modo como Sartre assimila a fenomenologia em Oser e o nada. Com esta leitura, apoiada em Flajoliet e Bento Prado Jr, reforçamos as linhasinterpretativas que exigem o estudo da obra de Sartre em toda sua variedade de expressões, pois estavariedade não está circunscrita apenas na relação entre filosofia e ficção, visto que na própria obrafilosófica de Sartre há “modalidades” distintas de expressões filosóficas como a ontologiafenomenológica e a metafísica que, ao serem atravessadas, tornam mais profunda a compreensão daipseidade. (shrink)