Buddhism

Lisa Zunshine stayed at Hotel Laxmi Park at Bishnupur, I do not know whether that hotel exists now or not. I sparred with Rukmani Bhaya Nair at an international literary meet at Dehradun in 2017 and I have that video. In this hurriedly written essay for an FDP conducted by a Central University in India in collaboration with a College in New Delhi, I point out the need to distinguish between philosophy and darśana while accessing the corpus of Raja Rao. (...) Zunshine in her work on literature and cognitive studies and, Bhaya Nair in her mimetic mode disregards Eastern hermeneutics to read all Indian authors in English. This essay which is not proofread, nor intended for publication shows the sorry state of Indian letters in English today. Indian scholars of Indian literatures in English do not refer to Indian thinkers but rush into aping their Western dole-givers. Therefore, I turn to Arif Dirlik's work on Third world scholars in the First world and make a case for rethinking the methodologies in approaching Indian letters in English. This author hopes that others in the future will not simply quote Plato to understand Raja Rao. (And, he was awarded an A+ for this work.) Both Zunshine and Nair effect an elision of everything Indic from world and Indian letters respectively. (shrink)

In his article Banicki proposes a universal model for all forms of philosophical therapy. He is guided by works of Martha Nussbaum, who in turn makes recourse to Aristotle. As compared to Nussbaum’s approach, Banicki’s model is more medical and less based on ethical argument. He mentions Foucault’s vision to apply the same theoretical analysis for the ailments of the body and the soul and to use the same kind of approach in treating and curing them. In his interpretation of (...) philosophical therapy, there are, however, some controversial issues, to which we would like to call attention: -/- Is restoring health by a philosophical method of treatment – health understood as a person’s ability to reach his/her vital goals – a convincing explication of philosophical therapy in general? In order to answer this question, it may be useful to look at Plato. It is not only Platonism (and especially Neo-platonism since Plotinus) that questions the idea that therapy is necessarily connected with „vital goals“. Buddhist and Gnostic philosophies are questioning „the vital“ in general. The immense effort in the history of philosophy to liberate the mind from the body casts doubt on the project to explain philosophical therapy solely in analogy to medical therapy. -/- According to Banicki a therapeutic philosophy has to identify the diseases it attempts at curing. There are, however, reasons for associating the term therapy with suffering/risk rather than disease. If a therapy aims at reducing the fear of death, as for example many classical philosophical therapies do, then there is no disease to be cured. A model based on chances and risks also has the advantage that the Buddhist and Stoic reinterpretation of desires/emotions as “diseases” can be dropped in contemporary philosophical therapy. -/- Banicki mentions the comparison of therapies as one of the primary goals of modelling. Methods should be verified by a statistical correlation between method and therapeutic success and/or by a theory which justifies the method. Some forms of therapies, however, avoid theory-specific terms and concepts in favor of an unprejudiced interpretation of the patient’s statements. Others share the (Nietzschean) aspiration to explore and change measures of value. If the therapeutic process is seen as a unique phenomenon, then there can be no theory and no statistics with co-occurrences. -/- According to Banicki philosophical therapy has to describe techniques which qualify as genuinely philosophical. Techniques like maieutics and hermeneutics, however, are antique philosophical “inventions”, which were later adopted by psychotherapy. If meditation is accepted as a therapeutic tool – as it was in ancient times – then there is not only a methodical but also an emotional relation to religion. If finally, the Socratic search for a good life is seen as one of the characteristics of philosophical therapy, then delimitation even turns into a criterion for non-philosophical therapies. The search for a good life requires an interdisciplinary approach. -/- For the concretization of the formal structure, we suggest a typology of therapies, which is based on chances and risks. Such a typology has the advantage, that it can model conflicting (and even opposing) forms of therapies. The variety of therapeutic goals and methods is a consequence of the historical development towards conceptual freedom. (shrink)

For Vajrayana Buddhism, the now is an interval, a boundary, a point of tension and suspension with an atmosphere of uncertainty. It is a bifurcation point of variable length; its name is “bardo.” The bardo is immersed in the conventional, or “seeming” reality. It emerges from what is called the “unstained” ultimate or primordial emptiness or “basal clear light.” Further, the ultimate is not the sphere of cognition. Cognition, including cognition of time, belongs to conventional reality. Buddhahood, in contrast, is (...) a condition of uncompounded knowledge where basic mind blossoms without temporal or other cognitive distinctions, unmade, unfabricated, luminous and pristine. Cyclical existence involves both the ultimate and the conventional as it moves through six bardos—all of which are the effulgent of the basal clear light—until Buddhahood. The six are: the bardo of this life ; the bardo of dream; the bardo of meditation; the bardo of dying; the bardo of dharmata ; and the bardo of existence. Each realm is both ultimate and conventional, and has specific initiation-based yogas to investigate these differences. The process of transition from one to the next involves at least three bodies, one mind, and aspects of speech. In each bardo, the character of the now as embodiment and temporal knowing varies yet a complete and consistent cross-bardo yogic wisdom leads to its total cessation in the basal clear light; the now is extinguished. The author presents, from the viewpoint of a knowledgeable practitioner of over 30 years, an essay on Vajrayana Buddhist time, drawing implications for Fraser’s time typology. The essay will draw from English translations of significant older, tantric texts on dream yoga, deity yoga, the Chod, tantric time, the bardo of death, and empowerment. Useful practices that can be applied by the audience to test the tradition and author’s assertions will be suggested. (shrink)

Religious disagreement – the existence of inconsistent religious views – is familiar and widespread. Among the most fundamental issues of such disagreement is whether to characterise the divine as personal or non-personal. On most other religious issues, the diverse views seem to presuppose some view on the personal/non-personal issue. In this essay, I address a particular question arising from disagreement over this issue. Let an exclusivist belief be a belief that a doctrine d on an issue is true, and that (...) doctrines on the issue that differ from d are false. Assume that for at least some people, there is no epistemic reason to prefer any one exclusivist view on the personal/non-personal question. This might be because disagreements act as defeaters for disputants’ beliefs, or because someone comes at the question without already holding a belief on the matter, and finds each view equally plausible. In these circumstances, is it still possible to engage with particular traditions in a realist, truth-seeking way? I answer that it is, arguing for a new pluralist approach to the personal/non-personal issue. By ‘pluralist’, I mean an approach that reinterprets a doctrine d on a given issue to be consistent with doctrines on the issue that differ from d. I start with probably the best-known pluralist account of religion, that of John Hick. After presenting his account I identify a problem that it faces which any pluralist account must address, one that has clear relevance to the personal/non-personal question. I then draw on Thomas Merton to outline an alternative pluralist route, illustrating how such an approach can apply to Christian and Buddhist ideas of an ultimate spiritual goal. The personal/non-personal issue is a good test for the approach I develop: because of the issue’s fundamentality, if the approach succeeds here then the prospects look bright for applying it to other topics of religious disagreement. (shrink)

The main tendendency of Buddha is to represent the universe as a perpetual flow, or nonentity or soullessness. According to Buddhism there is neither being uor non-being but only beeoming. Reality is a stream of becoming.life is a series of the manifestation of becoming. There is nothing which changes; only ceasless change goes on.In Buddhist schools The so-called soul is also reduced to a series of fleeting ideas. The individual self is considered to be the empirisal life of man. In (...) all individusls without exception, the relation of the component parts to one another is ever-changing. Man is a living continuous complex, which does not remain the same for two moments. (shrink)

I argue against pessimistic readings of the Buddhist tradition on which unawakened beings invariably have lives not worth living due to a preponderance of suffering (duḥkha) over well-being.

Many ethical systems hold that agents earn merit and demerit through their good and bad deeds. Some of these ethical systems also accept merit transference, allowing merit to be transferred, in certain circumstances, from one agent to another. In this article, I argue that there is a previously unrecognized paradox for merit transference involving a phenomenon I call “merit inflation”. With a particular focus on Buddhist ethics, I then look at the options available for resolving this paradox. I conclude that (...) merit inflation poses a serious challenge for any ethical system that broadly permits the transfer of merit. (shrink)

The Madhyamaka school of Buddhism, the followers of which are called Mādhyamikas, was one of the two principal schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India, the other school being the Yogācāra. The name of the school is a reference to the claim made of Buddhism in general that it is a middle path (madhyamā pratipad) that avoids the two extremes of eternalism—the doctrine that all things exist because of an eternal essence—and annihilationism—the doctrine that things have essences while they exist but (...) that these essences are annihilated just when the things themselves go out of existence. The conviction of the Madhyamaka school, which can be called the Centrist school in English, is that this middle path is best achieved by a denial that things have any inherent natures at all. All things are, in other words, empty of inherent natures. This doctrine of universal emptiness of inherent natures (svabhāva-śūnyatā) is the hallmark of the school, which places the school solidly in the tradition associated with the Perfection of Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism. (shrink)

Fazang is a seminal figure for the tradition of Huayan Buddhism. Essay on the Golden Lion is the most widely translated into English of his writings. Yet systematic English-language scholarship on Fazang’s Essay is relatively sparse. Scholars agree that the central focus of the Essay is the relation between principle and thing — a relation akin to the one between emptiness and form and, according to Fazang, also akin to the relation between the golden substance of a lion statue and (...) the statue itself. Scholars disagree about what principle is. They also disagree about how Fazang conceptualizes the relation between principle and thing. This paper develops a novel interpretation for Fazang's conception of the principle-thing relation. The methodology involves situating Fazang's metaphor of the golden lion in relation to prior efforts, by Chinese Buddhists, to conceptualize the emptiness-form relation and using theoretical considerations, from some of Fazang’s other writings, to interpret various remarks Fazang makes about his metaphor of the golden lion. (shrink)

This chapter will introduce everyday aesthetics and conceptions of happiness, explore their interconnections, and indicate some ways they might relate to depression. I introduce the main claims and concerns of everyday aesthetics and illustrate these with examples from the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese philosophical traditions. I then consider two popular accounts of happiness – ‘hedonic’ and ‘life-satisfaction’ theories – and offer an alternative phenomenological account of happiness. Aesthetic appreciation and agency and happiness, it is argued, depend on a phenomenologically fundamental (...) capacity to experience different kinds of significant possibility. It is the loss or disruption of that capacity which characterises experiences of depression. (shrink)

McNabb and Baldwin have recently argued that Classical Theism and Buddhism can be rendered in a logically consistent way. That is, one could theoretically endorse the theses of Classical Theism and the metaphysical theses of what they call mere Buddhism. One criticism of their project goes like this: McNabb and Baldwin’s project, typical to analytic philosophy, is ahistorical. While McNabb and Baldwin’s argument might go through with respect to some very generalized form of Buddhism, McNabb and Baldwin don’t show that (...) actual Buddhists who belong to robust Buddhist traditions can adhere to theism. In this paper, I put forward the hypothesis that the Shentong tradition shows promise as an actual Buddhist tradition that is consistent with Classical Theism. (shrink)

This volume includes translations of three separate Tibetan works composed by individuals who are now regarded as iconic figures of the Geluk school of Buddhism. The first work is Banisher of Ignorance: An Ornament of the Seven Treatises on Pramāṇa, by Khedrup Gelek Palsang (1385-1438), and the second is On Preclusion and Relationship, by Gyaltsab Darma Rinchen (1364-1432). The authors-popularly known as Khedrup Jé and Gyaltsab Jé-are represented as the foremost disciples of Tsongkhapa Losang Drakpa (1357-1419), and each succeeded him (...) as the Ganden throneholder. The third text, Mighty Pramāṇa Sun, a commentary on Candrakīrti's Clear Words (Prasannapadā), is by Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721), a later luminary in the Geluk school. These works concern themselves primarily with the Buddhist theory of knowledge-the means by which we are able to know things and how we can be certain of that knowledge. Encapsulating this theory is the notion of pramāṇa, a concept derived from India, the Buddhist understanding of which was shaped most significantly by the masters Dignāga (fifth to sixth century) and Dharmakīrti (seventh century). Based on their explanation, pramāṇa is often translated as "valid cognition," a literal reference to the kind of cognition that they proposed could be relied upon to supply indisputable knowledge. In recognition of the crucial role that reasoning is held to play in gaining certain knowledge, the Buddhist Pramāṇa tradition that the treatises of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti gave rise to is described as a logico-epistemological system. The works in this volume demonstrate how important a component scholastic rigor has been to Tibetan religion. They illustrate how those who follow the tradition have viewed the ordered, systematic approach as necessary not only for textual analysis, for those seeking to unravel the complexities of the Indian Buddhist scriptures and treatises, but also for practitioners aiming to progress along the spiritual path and achieve the higher Buddhist goals. (shrink)

Yogācāra, one of the two principal schools of Indian Mahayana Buddhism, arose in the first or second century CE and was introduced into Tibet and China in the fourth and fifth centuries CE, where it quickly became a dominant form. Roughly comparable to phenomenology in the West (and acknowledged as an influence by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty), it rejects ontology in favor of experiential foundations and claims that knowledge is produced by individual or collective consciousness. In the late nineteenth through mid-twentieth (...) centuries, in response to the introduction of evolutionary theory and its specious corollary of Social Darwinism, Chinese Buddhists asked what kind of philosophy could both accommodate the scientific enterprise and enable a better understanding of a social dynamics that could oppose racial, class, and colonial hierarchies. They turned to yogācāra; thinkers like Lu Cheng called into question unexamined materialist and empiricist assumptions that naturalized moral/rational egoism and hierarchy. He argued that scientific and social-scientific findings could be established epistemically by intersubjective agreement, coherence, and causal efficacy. Jessica Zu recovers this influential yogācāra movement in premodern and modern China and in turn asks why it has had no purchase in the West. Part of the reason is the epistemic policing of the boundary between philosophy and religion and its colonialist privileging of Western thought-we don't speak of Kant or Hegel as "Christian" philosophers. If we expand our conceptual universe to include world philosophies, antiessentialist Chinese process thinking is a valuable resource for combating systemic oppression and fostering social justice. (shrink)

A comprehensive comparison of the Chinese and Sanskrit texts of the Heart Sutra shows that, even after correcting transmission errors, there are substantial differences between them. Most of the differences appear to arise from the process of translating the text from Chinese to Sanskrit in isolation from Sanskrit Prajñaparamita literary traditions. Some differences appear to reflect the differing doctrinal commitments of those involved in creating/transmitting the texts. Following a suggestion by Huifeng (2014), I take a phenomenological approach when reading the (...) Heart Sutra, effectively creating a new kind of commentary that eschews the usual references to metaphysics, mysticism, and magic. The focus here is on the phenomenology of sensory experience and especially the cessation of sensory experience in meditation. (shrink)

Many accept the following three theses in animal ethics. First, although animal welfare should not be—or at least, need not be—our top moral priority, it is not a trivial one either. Second, if an animal is sentient, then it is a moral patient. Third, the extinction of an animal species is a tragic outcome that we have moral reason to prevent. I argue that a traditional (i.e., pre-modern) Buddhist perspective pushes against the first thesis and that a naturalized Buddhist perspective (...) is inconsistent with the latter two. (shrink)

What are we? Are we, for example, souls, organisms, brains, or something else? In this book, Andrew Brenner argues that there are principled obstacles to our discovering the answer to this fundamental metaphysical question. The main competing accounts of personal ontology hold that we are either souls (or composites of soul and body), or we are composite physical objects of some sort, but, as Brenner shows, arguments for either of these options can be parodied and transformed into their opposites. Brenner (...) also examines arguments for and against the existence of the self, offers a detailed discussion of the metaphysics of several afterlife scenarios - resurrection, reincarnation, and mind uploading -- and considers whether agnosticism with respect to personal ontology should lead us to agnosticism with respect to the possibility of life after death. (shrink)

Crossing the Stream, Leaving the Cave brings philosophers from two of the world's great philosophical traditions--Platonic and Indian Buddhist--into joint inquiry on topics in metaphysics, epistemology, mind, language, and ethics. An international team of scholars address selected questions of mutual concern to Buddhist and Platonist: How can knowledge of reality transform us? Will such transformation leave us speechless, or disinterested in the world around us? What is cause? What is self-knowledge? And how can dreams shed light on waking cognition? What (...) do the paradoxes thrown up by abstract thought about fundamental notions such as being and unity reveal? Is it possible to attain unity in ourselves, and should we even try? Would doing so make us happy--and is such happiness consistent with both contemplation of reality and action in the world? With close readings of texts by Buddhaghosa, Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Bhaviveka, Santideva; by Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Olympiodorus, and Damascius (among others), these studies consider not just the different answers Buddhists and Platonists might give to these questions, but also the criticisms they might bring to each other's positions, the sort of arguments they use, and the use they put these arguments to. Bringing Platonic and the Buddhist perspectives jointly to bear creates a cosmopolitan philosophical exchange which yields greater conceptual clarity on the questions and the terms in which they are cast, reveals unnoticed conceptual connections, and opens up new possibilities for addressing central philosophical concerns. (shrink)

The basic concepts we use to frame metaphysical discussions – our tools of metaphysics – profoundly influence how those discussions proceed. Much recent work in anglophone metaphysics has centred on a set of hyperintensional such tools: grounding, dependence, fundamentality, and essence. This topical collection will provide new perspectives on these debates by bringing them into contact with Asian metaphysical traditions.

Huayan Buddhism arose in the sixth century and was rooted in the Mahayana Flower Garland Sutra. The teachings of Huayan had a profound influence on Chan and Zen. Huayan is relational, practical, and positive. Its emphasis on interdependence, celebration of the sensual world, and diversity of people and practices provides inspiration for what Thich Nhat Hanh called "engaged Buddhism". With Inside the Flower Garland Sutra Zen teacher Ben Connelly explains the significance of Huayan teachings for Buddhist practice. Each chapter is (...) a commentary on one of the thirty lines of Uisang's "Song of Dharma Nature"-a seminal Korean text that summarizes Huayan thought-thus providing a broad overview of Huayan teachings and their practical implications for contemporary life, with a mix of testimonies from real-life situations and references to influential Buddhist texts. Arising fifteen hundred years ago, Huayan has made a deep impact on East Asian Buddhism, and has much to offer during this era when many folks see ever-deepening divisions. Connelly explores how Huayan offers particular wisdom for those concerned about how to care for their own lives as they work to end harms such as ecological devastation, poverty, militarism, addiction, marginalization, and exploitation. (shrink)

In “On the Teachings of Gotama Buddha” (1925) and “Socrates-Buddha” (1926), Edmund Husserl claims that the Buddha achieves a transcendental view of consciousness by performing the epoché. Yet, states Husserl, the Buddha fails to develop a purely theoretical and universal science of consciousness, i.e., phenomenology, because his purely practical goal of Nibbāna limits knowledge of consciousness. I evaluate Husserl’s claims by examining the Buddha’s Majjhima Nikāya. I argue that Husserl correctly identifies an epoché and transcendental viewpoint in the Buddha’s teachings. (...) However, I contend that Husserl’s distinction between pure theory and pure praxis leads him to misconstrue the function of the Buddha’s epoché, the extent of knowledge that the Buddha gains from the transcendental viewpoint, and the nature of Nibbāna. I finally suggest that the Buddha presents a way of studying consciousness that is a way of life, meaning that any distinction between pure theory and pure praxis is dissolved. (shrink)

What happens when scholars come together to study Buddhist and German Idealist perspectives on mind and representation? We explore this question and reflect on methodological considerations in what is often referred to as "comparative philosophy.".

This chapter provides a Buddhist response to Olla Solomyak's (forthcoming) account of the afterlife from the perspective of Hasidic Judaism.

The Apaṇṇaka Sutta, one of the early recorded teachings of the Buddha, contains an argument for accepting the doctrines of karma and rebirth that Buddhist scholars claim anticipates Pascal’s wager. I call this argument the Buddha’s wager. Does it anticipate Pascal’s wager and is it a good bet? Contemporary scholars identify at least four versions of Pascal’s wager in his Pensées. This article demonstrates that the Buddha’s wager anticipates two versions of Pascal’s wager, but not its canonical form. Like Pascal’s (...) wager, the Buddha’s wager presents a decision problem between two opposing theses in an epistemic context that lacks evidence of their truth or falsity. Like Pascal, the Buddha also tries to solve this problem using dominance, superdominance or ‘superduperdominance’ reasoning. The Apaṇṇaka Sutta likely provides the earliest textual example of such reasoning. While the Buddha’s wager does not exhibit the expected utility reasoning of the best-known form of Pascal’s wager, the article suggests a reformulation that parallels Alan Hájek’s (2018) vector-value reformulation. Is it a good bet? This article argues that it is not if this means we are rationally required to accept its recommendation. This is because, while it avoids two of the major objections levelled against Pascal’s wager, it succumbs to one and has at least two problems of its own. (shrink)

What should the Buddhist attitude be to rebirth if it is believed to be inconsistent with current science? This chapter critically engages forms of Buddhist agnosticism that adopt a position of uncertainty about rebirth but nevertheless recommend ‘behaving as if’ it were true. What does it mean to behave as if rebirth were true, and are Buddhist agnostics justified in adopting this position? This chapter engages this question in dialogue with Mark Siderits’ reductionist analysis of the Buddhist doctrine of the (...) two truths, conventional and ultimate. Richard Hayes (1998) characterises talk of rebirth as a useful fiction. Siderits characterises talk of persons as a useful fiction and explains and justifies statements that involve it as conventionally true despite persons not featuring in our final or ultimate ontology. Does rebirth satisfy the same criteria to count as conventionally true, and does thinking of it in these terms help explain and justify what it might mean to behave as if rebirth were true? This chapter will defend a conditional yes to these questions. In the process, it will clarify what is distinctive about the traditional Buddhist approach to rebirth, provide an analysis of how the concept of rebirth might relate to practical outcomes, and address some limitations of this approach. (shrink)

Abstract: According to Iris Murdoch, one of our central moral capacities is to direct our attention in a way that is just and loving. In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch explores the prospects for strengthening this capacity through engaging in Zen Buddhist practices, particularly zazen meditation as Katsuki Sekida describes it in Zen Training: Methods and Philosophy. Murdoch has a mixed view of whether zazen could really contribute to our moral development, expressing both some optimism and some reservations. (...) I argue that a stronger version of Murdoch's project, by her own lights, would have looked to the Theravāda Buddhist philosopher Buddhaghosa's instructions for taking up loving-kindness, compassion, gladness, and equanimity as meditation subjects. (shrink)

An introduction to the Buddha's thought in the language of contemporary philosophy. 'The Philosophy of the Buddha' is an intro to Buddhist thinking which doesn't assuming any prior knowledge. This book introduces key concepts of Buddhist philosophy such as suffering, karma, or nirvana, and explains the fundamentals of Buddhist thought using these concepts. It demonstrates that the central ideas of Buddha are understandable in the present day and can be discussed and understood as a philosophy, independent of religious affiliations. Real-life (...) examples and questions for further discussion and reflection provide opportunities for deeper engagement with the text. (shrink)