Value

This essay draws on Heidegger’s account of technology and boredom and argues that the smartphone reveals a new kind of loneliness – profound loneliness. I examine three features of modern life – authenticity, boredom, and loneliness – and ask if any of these modes of being are the poièsis of the smartphone. I introduce three historical types of loneliness – primordial loneliness, existential loneliness, and profound loneliness. Whereas modern, industrialized life makes existential loneliness possible, the smartphone reveals our capacity for (...) profound loneliness. Like profound boredom, profound loneliness is “inconspicuous and wide-ranging,” concealed from us, hidden from view. Profound loneliness isolates us from everything, including ourselves. I also introduce a new form of boredom, profound boredom with something, and argue that the smartphone also reveals this new form of boredom, a pervasive, wide-ranging boredom of which we are unaware. (shrink)

Nagasawa has argued that the suffering associated with evolution presents a greater challenge to atheism than to theism because that evil is incompatible with ‘existential optimism’ about the world – with seeing the world as an overall good place, and being thankful that we exist. I argue that even if atheism was incompatible with existential optimism in this way, this presents no threat to atheism. Moreover, it is unclear how the suffering associated with evolution could on its own undermine existential (...) optimism. Links between Nagasawa's argument and the current debate about the axiology of theism are also explored. (shrink)

It is not uncommon to think that having a desire involves taking its object to be good in some sense. This idea has been developed in two directions: either toward a view that understands the positive evaluation in terms of a judgment or belief or a view according to which the relevant evaluation is perception-like. In this article, I defend a novel proposal that takes the positive evaluation of the object of desire to be a kind of imagining.

What is recognition and why is it so important? This book develops a synoptic conception of the significance of recognition in its many forms for human persons by means of a rational reconstruction and internal critique of classical and contemporary accounts. The book begins with a clarification of several fundamental questions concerning recognition. It then reconstructs the core ideas of Fichte, Hegel, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth and utilizes the insights and conceptual tools developed across these chapters for (...) developing a case for the universal importance of recognition for humans. It argues in favour of a universalist anthropological position, unusual in the literature on recognition, that aims to construe a philosophically sound basis for a discourse of common humanity, or of a shared human life-form for which moral relations of recognition are essential. This synthetic conception of the importance of recognition provides tools for articulating deep intuitions shared across cultures about what makes human life and forms of human co-existence better or worse, and thus tools for mutual understanding about the deepest shared concerns of humanity, or of what makes us all human persons despite our differences. -/- Recognition and the Human Life-Form will appeal to readers interested in philosophical anthropology, social and political philosophy, critical theory, and the history of philosophy. It also provides ideas and conceptual tools for fields such as anthropology, education, disability studies, international relations, law, politics, religious studies, sociology, and social research. (shrink)

Surgida como producto del proceso de universalización de la historia, forzada a moverse hacia un eje de universalidad que no emanaba de su propia entraña, portadora, a su vez, de una singularidad histórica resultado de la mezcla creadora de las más diversas influencias culturales, América Latina no podía menos que debatirse, desde su mismo surgimiento, en un perenne conflicto entre lo universal y lo propio. La presencia (casi omnipresencia) de este asunto en el pensamiento latinoamericano no es un resultado fortuito, (...) ha sido expresión del problema más raigal que ha tenido el latinoamericano en su devenir histórico: el problema de su identidad, de la integridad de su ser histórico, de la combinación de universalidad y singularidad dentro de su propia esencia. Ha sido la historia la que ha elevado a un primer plano este problema, la que ha colocado a América Latina en una constante encrucijada entre lo universal y lo propio. (shrink)

It is tempting to think that all of normativity, such as our reasons for action, what we ought to do, and the attitudes that it is fitting for us to have, derives from what is valuable. But value-first approaches to normativity have fallen out of favour as the virtues of reasons- and fittingness-first approaches to normativity have become clear. On these views, value is not explanatorily prior to reasons and fit; rather the value of things is understood in terms of (...) the pro-attitudes it is fitting to have, or that we have reasons to have, towards these things. The value-first accounts of reasons and fit that have been proposed have been direct accounts of reasons and fit. On these views, the fittingness of an attitude is explained in terms of the value of having it or the value of the object of that attitude. This chapter details and surveys these problems, explaining which are yet to be overcome, and explaining which problems direct value-first accounts can overcome. This chapter then explores the prospects of an indirect value-first account of reasons and fit. It argues that it avoids the problems that direct value-first accounts face and may be as explanatorily powerful as fittingness- and reasons-first accounts of value and normativity more generally. (shrink)

Many atheists argue that because gratuitous evil exists, God (probably) doesn’t. But doesn’t this commit atheists to wishing that God did exist, and to the protheist view that the world would have been better had God existed? This doesn’t follow. I argue that if all that evil still remains but is just no longer gratuitous, then, from an atheist perspective, that wouldn’t have been better. And while a counterfactual from which that evil is literally absent would have been impersonally better, (...) it wouldn’t have been better for anyone, including for those who suffered such evils. (shrink)

Argues that the path to the good life does not consist in working toward some abstract concept of the good, but rather by ameliorating the problems of the practices and institutions that make up our practical life.

I argue that political forgiveness is sometimes, but not always, compatible with public commemoration of politically motivated wrongdoing. I start by endorsing the claim that commemorating serious past wrongdoing has moral value and imposes moral demands on key actors within post-conflict societies. I am concerned with active commemoration, that is, the deliberate acts of bringing victims and the wrong done to them to public attention. The main issue is whether political forgiveness requires forgetting and conversely whether remembrance can be an (...) impediment to political forgiveness. The notion of political forgiveness, its definition, very possibility and desirability are contentious issues in the contemporary literature. I develop a multidimensional account of political forgiveness with a core element. The core element of political forgiveness involves taking a non-adversarial stance towards perpetrators in the sense of committing to stop holding their wrongdoing against them. The core element of forgiveness is usually combined with other attitudes and practices, which are appropriate depending on the circumstances. This is due to the fact that there are different ways of holding a wrong against an offender. I argue that forgiving perpetrators is not compatible with continue to punishing them, refusing to reconcile with them, and/or reminding them of their misdeed if perpetrators refuse to accept punishment, deny the importance of commemorating the past or wish to reconcile against the victim’s desires. I show that some forms of political forgiveness are not morally legitimate because they conflict with moral demands to punish perpetrators, commemorate atrocities and respect victims. This conclusion is less alarming than it might initially seem because the refusal to forgive politically motivated wrongdoing does not necessarily lead to the perpetuation of violence and conflict. I briefly draw on the example of Argentina in order to show how some forms of political un-forgiveness can be morally legitimate and effective ways for victims to uphold these demands. (shrink)

The paper presents an analysis of the cultural embeddedness of arguments, raised as a part of the Bulgarian debate about the ratification of the Istanbul convention. The method I employed was the localization procedure of Generalized Argumentation theory. Through a qualitative analysis of empirical argumentation data, I identified arguments in favour of or against the ratification of the Istanbul convention. Information about the cultural background against which these arguments were raised, i.e. about Bulgarian culture, was gathered from the part of (...) the ninth wave of the European Social Survey that used the Portrait Value Questionnaire—an instrument for measuring human values, based on Schwartz’s theory of human values. By establishing a certain relationship between the arguments and the cultural background information, I came to the conclusion that the debate between the proponents and the opponents of the ratification represented a conflict between the basic values of universalism and tradition, and more particularly, between the lower-order values of equality and respect for tradition. (shrink)

This article responds to the two replies, published in this issue, to my article “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have It, We Can’t Get It, and We Should Be Very, Very Sad,” published in the first issue of this journal. In the first reply, Turp, Hollinshead, and Rowe present an internalist challenge to my account of value, and a relational conception of the self as a challenge to my premise that leading a life includes everything you do and aim at within (...) the project, effort, or enterprise of living and leading a life. I respond to the internalist challenge by showing it does not succeed in inserting values into acts. I respond to the relational conception of the self by noting that, regardless of the nature of the self, the project of leading a life includes all the things you do and aim at within that project, effort, or enterprise. Thus, we can accept a relational account of the self and allow for other-regarding values but that does not change the location of our pursuit of those values: they remain located within the meta-project of leading a life, leaving the meta-project of leading and living a life with nowhere to reach for a point. In the second reply, Cowan argues against feeling sad about life’s pointlessness. In response, I argue that sad facts warrant sadness. I further argue that there are reasons other than happiness to value truth, including the very, very sad truth about the ultimate pointlessness of our lives. (shrink)

Life is pointless. That’s not okay. I show that. I argue that a point is a valued end and that, as agents, it makes sense for us to want our efforts and enterprises to have a point. Valued ends provide justifying reasons for our acts, efforts, and projects. I further argue that ends lie separate from the acts and enterprises for which they provide a point. Since there can be no end external to one’s entire life since one’s life includes (...) all of one’s ends, leading and living one’s life as a whole cannot have a point. Finally, I argue that since we live our lives and structure our living­a­human­life efforts both in parts and as a whole, it is fitting to be sad to recognize that leading and living a life is pointless. My discussion helps make sense of the literature that frequently talks around this topic but often does so vaguely and indirectly. (shrink)

The past is deeply important to many of us. But our concern about history can seem puzzling and needs justification. After all, the past cannot be changed: we can help the living needy, but the tears we shed for the long dead victims of past tragedies help no one. Attempts to justify our concern about history typically take one of two opposing forms. It is assumed either that such concern must be justified in instrumental or otherwise self-centered and present-centered terms (...) or that our interest in history must be utterly disinterested and pursued for its own sake. But neither approach can fully explain, or justify, our concern about the past. I propose a third approach, on which the past matters because it contains much that is of value—all those past people and the things they did or had endured—and this value calls for our fitting response. In short: the significance of the past is past significance. (shrink)

Primera versión al español de la Tesis en opción al grado científico de doctor en ciencias filosóficas El reflejo valorativo de la realidad y su papel en las actividades cognoscitiva y práctica. El objetivo general del trabajo consistió en mostrar la naturaleza del reflejo valorativo de la realidad y su nexo orgánico con las actividades cognoscitiva y práctica. El alcance de este objetivo presupuso solucionar las siguientes tareas: 1.- definir el objeto del reflejo valorativo; 2.- develar la naturaleza de la (...) valoración como fenómeno subjetivo; 3.- describir el mecanismo de interrelación de la valoración con el conocimiento en la estructura de la conciencia humana; 4.- puntualizar el papel de la valoración en el movimiento de la práctica al conocimiento y del conocimiento a la práctica). (shrink)

Mediante la apropiación consciente de la realidad objetiva, no solo conocemos el mundo que nos rodea, sino que lo valoramos desde determinadas posiciones, desde el punto de vista de unas u otras necesidades, inclinaciones, fines. La apropiación de la realidad no se reduce al descubrimiento del ser natural de los objetos existentes, independientemente de nosotros, sino que incluye la determinación del significado de ese ser para nosotros, para nuestra vida y actividad. Partiendo de la constatación de este hecho, el objetivo (...) del presente artículo consiste en el análisis de algunas ideas relacionadas con la naturaleza de la valoración y el mecanismo de su interrelación con el conocimiento . (shrink)

Jennifer Rose Carr’s (2020) article “Normative Uncertainty Without Theories” proposes a method to maximize expected value under normative uncertainty without Intertheoretic Value Comparison (hereafter IVC). Carr argues that this method avoids IVC because it avoids theories: the agent’s credence is distributed among normative hypotheses of a particular type, which don’t constitute theories. However, I argue that Carr’s method doesn’t avoid or help to solve what I consider as the justificatory problem of IVC, which isn’t specific to comparing theories as such. (...) This threatens the implementability of Carr’s method. Fortunately, I also show how Carr’s method can nevertheless be implemented. I identify a type of epistemic states where the justificatory problem of IVC is not a necessary obstacle to maximizing expected value. In such states, the uncertainty stems from indecisive normative intuitions, and the agent justifiably constructs each normative hypothesis on the basis of a consistent subset of her intuitions by reference to the same unit of value. This part of my argument complements not only Carr’s (2020) argument, but also some moderate defenses of IVC. The combination of Carr’s paper and mine helps to illuminate the conditions for maximizing expected value under normative uncertainty without unjustified value comparison. (shrink)

This book has two main aims. First, it develops and defends a constitutive account of normative reasons as premises of good reasoning. This account says, roughly, that to be a normative reason for a response (such as a belief or intention) is to be premise of good reasoning, from fitting responses, to that response. Second, building on the account of reasons, it develops and defends a fittingness-first account of the structure of the normative domain. This account says that there is (...) a single normative property, fittingness, which is normatively basic, and on which all other normative properties depend. On this view, reasons, oughts, value, and other normative phenomena all ultimately depend on fittingness. The account of normative reasons is a part of this general view of the normative domain. The book begins, in chapter 1, by motivating the account of reasons as premises of good reasoning. Chapter 2 argues that good reasoning is, roughly, reasoning that preserves fittingness. Chapter 3 addresses the question of what fittingness is. Chapter 4 defends constitutive accounts of evaluative properties, like goodness, in terms of fitting attitudes. Chapters 5 and 6 shows how the view provides an attractive account of how reasons determine the deontic status of a response – whether you ought or may so respond. Chapter 7 addresses some challenges concerning certain reasons for belief, the relationship between reasons for action and reasons for intention, and reasons for emotion. (shrink)

Decision theory is founded on the principle that we ought to take the action that has the maximum expected value from among actions we are in a position to take. But prior to the notion of expected value is the notion of the actual value of that action: roughly, a measure of the good outcomes you would in fact procure if you were to take it. Surprisingly many decision theories operate without an analysis of actual value. I offer a definition (...) of actual value, and show that a form of decision theory due to Stalnaker can be reformulated so as to be in line with the edict to maximize expected value. By contrast, I show that there is no quantity --- given by my definition or otherwise --- that plays the role of actual value in Jeffrey's decision theory. (shrink)

In the past few years, machine learning (ML) tools have been implemented with success in the medical context. However, several practitioners have raised concerns about the lack of transparency—at the algorithmic level—of many of these tools; and solutions from the field of explainable AI (XAI) have been seen as a way to open the ‘black box’ and make the tools more trustworthy. Recently, Alex London has argued that in the medical context we do not need machine learning tools to be (...) interpretable at the algorithmic level to make them trustworthy, as long as they meet some strict empirical desiderata. In this paper, we analyse and develop London’s position. In particular, we make two claims. First, we claim that London’s solution to the problem of trust can potentially address another problem, which is how to evaluate the reliability of ML tools in medicine for regulatory purposes. Second, we claim that to deal with this problem, we need to develop London’s views by shifting the focus from the opacity of algorithmic details to the opacity of the way in which ML tools are trained and built. We claim that to regulate AI tools and evaluate their reliability, agencies need an explanation of how ML tools have been built, which requires documenting and justifying the technical choices that practitioners have made in designing such tools. This is because different algorithmic designs may lead to different outcomes, and to the realization of different purposes. However, given that technical choices underlying algorithmic design are shaped by value-laden considerations, opening the black box of the design process means also making transparent and motivating (technical and ethical) values and preferences behind such choices. Using tools from philosophy of technology and philosophy of science, we elaborate a framework showing how an explanation of the training processes of ML tools in medicine should look like. (shrink)

The idea of the right to mobility has been fundamental to modern Western citizenship and is expressed in many legal and government documents. Although there is widespread acceptance regarding the importance of mobility in older adults, there have been few attempts to develop ethical and theoretical tools to portray mobility equalities in old age. This paper develops a novel conceptualisation of kinetic values focusing on older adults whose ability to move has been restricted for internal and external reasons. Informed by (...) the phenomenological theory of kinaesthesia, I suggest that kinetic values are related to four principal dimensions: self-motion, being-moved, co-motion, and forced movement. I assume that these dimensions can address the key dilemma of human dignity among older adults who suffer from losing their autonomy and agency through their mobility impairments and who are at risk of being confined to their homes. To concretise the formulation of kinetic values, I study movement as part of technological equipment and urban infrastructure to examine what kinds of kinetic values mobility services and assistive robots convey for older adults in smart urban environments. By bridging disciplines, the phenomenological approach provides a novel understanding of mobility and the interplay among assistive technologies, kinaesthesia, and urban technological infrastructure. The approach suggests that kinetic values should be interpreted more comprehensively so that kinaesthesia can become better identified as a positive life-promoting practice. (shrink)

In On Not Expecting Too Much from Narrative, Lamarque (2004) challenges theories of narrative identity. For while narrativity might tell us something of interest about our selves, the requirements for this would be so strong that theories of narrative identity would not be able to meet them. In contrast, he identifies minimal conditions for narrativity, so that our identity could be of a narrative nature as well. But in that case, the concept of narrativity would be so weak that it (...) would hardly be able to tell us anything about ourselves. I first examine Lamarque's criticism of narrative concepts of identity. He shows that stories, understood in a minimal sense, are not found but told and that they establish a temporal relationship between at least two events. I then examine the concept of teleological explanations of action. Considering the problem of deviant causal chains that causalists are confronted with, they are at least a serious alternative to causal explanations of action. By doing that, I also attempt to render plausible the irreducibility of teleological explanations of action to causal ones. Subsequently, I outline some features of teleological explanations of action. Finally, I defend the idea that teleological explanations of action are essentially narrative explanations of action because they meet Lamarque's minimal conditions of narratives. I then make the case that these kinds of narratives are not trivial with respect to our personal identity but, on the contrary, are the prerequisite under which we can perceive ourselves as rational agents. (shrink)

de Bruin et al. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2018) write that it is a philosophically interesting question “whether there is such a thing as an “intrinsic” value of financial assets” noting that the calculation of any intrinsic price will depend, in part, on subjective elements. McCauley suggest that there are at least five different notions of the ‘true value’ of an asset in finance theory, and argues, consistent with de Bruin et al. that in many cases (...) the calculation of such values “makes impossible information demands on our knowledge of future dividends and returns”. This paper explores some of the subjective elements involved in calculating the intrinsic value of an asset, and their implications for the Law of One Price. The Law of One Price states that investors should not pay different prices for the same investment. Consequently, the existence, and persistence, of arbitrage opportunities is often attributed to investor irrationality. However, if subjectivity is involved in the calculation of intrinsic value then two investors can, rationally, disagree about the value of a security. This implies that arbitrage opportunities may not always be instances of irrationality, or genuine mispricing, but reflect different investor’s perceptions of the security. In economics, value is taken to be subjective, and Postigo describes how goods have value because of the role they play in the satisfaction of our needs. By applying this to finance, this paper will argue that a security can play a number of roles in a portfolio, depending on an investors’ strategy. Given these different roles, different investors will be working with different data in their assessment of intrinsic value. In order to establish that an arbitrage opportunity exists it is therefore necessary to understand what information is relevant to pricing the investment in different locations, or markets. It may, in fact, be the case that the same security can trade at different prices because different investors do not see it as the ‘same thing’ at all. This analysis can also be used to throw doubt on the emphasis that fundamental analysis receives in discussions of rationality. (shrink)

In this essay, I will discuss the meaning of the human spirit and its place in the world. My understanding of human spirit is very similar as Nicolai Hartmann’s view but I also develop it according to my own experience. In my essay, I would like to examine two insights: (1) the first is that I am using the name “human spirit” instead of “human soul,” because I treat the body as an inseparable and necessary part of the human spirit; (...) without the body, the human spirit would not be the same that it is in its very essence. For example, I believe that love as an act of human spirit necessarily has its bodily component. Without our body, we would not have emotions and our feelings of values (which are the indispensable acts of the human spirit) would be different (if even possible). Human spirit is built up on three lower layers of reality (physical, organic and mental), (2) human spirit is a dialogic being. We need other human being to form and develop our spirit. The moment that allows us to transcendent these lower layers and become a spirit is precisely the dialogue in love. I will write about my spiritual experiences related to love as an act of creating and at the same time going beyond myself. Only in the relation to other human beings we can constitute our own “self.” There is some paradoxical dialectic in the fact that, on the one hand, in relation to The Other I transcendent Myself but, on the other hand, through all these acts of transcendence from Self into The Other, I change and develop myself. I would like to describe love as perhaps the most fundamental spiritual act of openness for everything that is different from my own Self and argue that there is as much real living spirituality in us as there is love of others. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the significance of philosophy for traditional societies and modern societies and their evolution. In this paper ethics is the mainstream philosophy which studies and analyses the values of both the traditional societies and modern ones. This paper is only the ethical study of the traditional values and modern values. There are three ways to philosophize societies as traditional and modern: Ethical perspective, economical and theological, but this paper deals only with the ethical approach. Philosophers from ancient to (...) modern era played an important part in the transformation of traditional into modern. Morality and religion changed the mind of the nations towards development and ethical progress. In this article ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, modern philosophy and others religious philosophies of India, china, and Muslim philosophies exercised key attempts to study traditional societies and modern societies. This paper highlights the factors that are responsible for the vices in traditional societies and also the elements that are productive for the promotion of modern societies. (shrink)

针对价值抉择难题存在不同的解决模式，以比较的视野检视几种有代表性 的模式，可以更加直观地展示它们的优缺点，从相对意义上凸显出当下存在的更为有效的 解决方案。 首先是罗蒂的自我实现与公民同胞等量齐观模式，此模式过于依赖个人与社 会两个领域的简单区分，同时也低估了不同诉求之间的张力；其次是伯林的不同价值体系 非此即彼模式，此模式夸大了不同价值体系的截然对立，错误地认为互有张力的价值不能 在同一价值体系里共存；最后是更具可行性的儒道互补模式，此模式重新解读儒道互补， 通过价值配置的方式解决了不可通约价值之间的张力问题，它允许多元价值体系的共存 和互补，从而有助于相辅相成地达成个人生活与社会的和谐。.

本文对文化的价值多样性进行多元的理解，集中阐述和讨论“文化的价值组合配置”(cultural configurations of values)概念。主要包括以下几个要点：(1)在世界的各种文化中，人类的价值有不同的表现形式，但其基本价值是相似的，甚至相同的。(2)人类的各种基本价值之间不但有互相促进的关系，也有相互矛盾、相互竞 争、相互冲突的关系。(3)一种文化类型提供对相互冲突的价值的一种处理方式。不同的文化形成其各自的价值组合与配置。这种价值的配置与其社会环境相适应，是其文化的核心部分。文化差异性的一个重要方面就是，尽管 所有文化共有这些基本价值，但是他们会给予这些价值不同的权重，形成不同的价值配置形式。(4)有时在同一个社会里，会存在若干“亚文化”，会有不同的价值配置。随着时间的推移，文化和社会都会有改变。虽然它们在 价值组合配置普世化上可能永远无法达成一致，但是它们之间的共同价值为和平共处提供了基础。.

While largely agreeing with Ruiping Fan, Chenyang Li makes three points regarding the handling of COVID-19. First, in addition to state capacity, social trust, and leadership, as identified by Francis Fukuyama, factors responsible for successful pandemic responses include the value of individual freedom upheld by citizens. A high level of individual freedom can make it difficult to implement strict measures even when they are objectively necessary. Second, a strong state can be effective in handling a pandemic, but without checks and (...) balances it also runs the risk of leading a country into a major catastrophe. Third, Confucian ethics and other ethics can aid in coping with the pandemic. However, their efficacy is not unlimited, and ultimately, human survival overrides other concerns. (shrink)

The paper argues that the moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is unified by a complex conception of reason that imposes consistency norms of both rationality and reasonableness. Hobbes’s conceptions of rightness as reciprocity, and moral goodness as sociability belong to an original and attractive moral theory that is neither teleological nor classically deontological, nor as interpreters have variously argued, subjectivist, contractarian, egoist, or dependent on divine command.

This chapter introduces several distinctions relevant to what is called the “discounting problem”, since the issue is how (future) costs and benefits are discounted to make them comparable in present terms. The author defends the claim that there are good reasons to adopt Ramsey-style discounting in the context of climate change: the Ramsey rule is robust, flexible, and well-understood. An important distinction involved in discounting—“descriptivism” and “prescriptivism”—is discussed. It is argued that, even if we adopt prescriptivism, and accept that this (...) means there is need for moral experts in parameter assignments, there is a significant issue. The type of moral expertise required for the discounting problem will not involve knowledge of moral theory—thus making moral philosophy unhelpful in terms of making particular parameter assignments, despite these being substantive moral judgments. (shrink)

Money can take many forms—a coin or a bill, a payment for an automobile or a prize for an award, a piece from the 1989 series or the 2019 series, and so on—but despite this, money is designed to represent an amount and only that. Thus, a dollar is a dollar, in the sense that money is fungible. But when adults ordinarily think about money, they think about it in terms of its source, and in particular, its moral source (e.g., (...) dirty money). Here we investigate the development of the belief that money carries traces of its moral history. We study children ages 5–6 and 8–9, who are sensitive to both object history and morality, and thus possess the component pieces needed to think that a dollar may not be like any other. Across three principal studies (and three additional studies in Appendix S1; N = 327; 219 five‐ and six‐year‐olds; 108 eight‐ and nine‐year‐olds), we find that children are less likely to want money with negative moral history, a pattern that was stronger and more consistent among 8‐ and 9‐year‐olds than 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds. These findings highlight pressing directions for future research that could help shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to the belief that money carries traces of its moral history. (shrink)

In the past few years, scholars have been questioning whether the current approach in data ethics based on the higher level case studies and general principles is effective. In particular, some have been complaining that such an approach to ethics is difficult to be applied and to be taught in the context of data science. In response to these concerns, there have been discussions about how ethics should be “embedded” in the practice of data science, in the sense of showing (...) how ethical issues emerge in small technical choices made by data scientists in their day-to-day activities, and how such an approach can be used to teach data ethics. However, a precise description of how such proposals have to be theoretically conceived and could be operationalized has been lacking. In this article, we propose a full-fledged characterization of ‘embedding’ ethics, and how this can be applied especially to the problem of teaching data science ethics. Using the emerging model of ‘microethics’, we propose a way of teaching daily responsibility in digital activities that is connected to the higher level ethical challenges discussed in digital/data ethics. We ground this microethical approach into a virtue theory framework, by stressing that the goal of a microethics is to foster the cultivation of moral virtues. After delineating this approach of embedding ethics in theoretical detail, this article discusses a concrete example of how such a ‘micro-virtue ethics’ approach could be practically taught to data science students. (shrink)

This is chapter 5 of the book project _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, in which I explore the claim that both alethic and pragmatic reasons for belief are basic, but that they share a pragmatic foundation in a pluralist theory of wellbeing in which being in a positive epistemic state is a non-derivative component of wellbeing. This chapter argues that all three of fittingness first, reasons first, and value first views are false. It does (...) so by showing that fittingness and reasons both have unalike variance conditions with respect to value, i.e. that sometimes the value of something can switch from good to bad or bad to good without there being any change in whether it is fitting to favour it or whether there are reason to favour it. This is a form of an argument from under-generation following on earlier work by Krister Bykvist and Andrew Reisner, respectively. It is also more tentatively that reasons cannot be analysed in terms of correctness. Because the the arguments in this paper concern the extensional adequacy of the various bi-conditionals linking fittingness, reasons, and value, they suffice for rejecting even modest versions of '-first' views that do not purport to provide analyses, but rather only sets of correctness conditions for, e.g., reasons and value in terms of fittingness, or any two in terms of the third. (Updated 10 May 2022). (shrink)

The current global COVID-19 pandemic has led to a deep and multidimensional crisis across all sectors of society. As countries contemplate their mobility and social-distancing policy restrictions, we have a unique opportunity to re-imagine the deliberative frameworks and value priorities in our food systems. Pre-pandemic food systems at global, national, regional and local scales already needed revision to chart a common vision for sustainable and ethical food futures. Re-orientation is also needed by the relevant sciences, traditionally siloed in their disciplines (...) and without adequate attention paid to how the food system problem is variously framed by diverse stakeholders according to their values. From the transdisciplinary perspective of food ethics, we argue that a post-pandemic scheme focused on bottom-up, regional, cross-sectoral and non-partisan deliberation may provide the re-orientation and benchmarks needed for not only more sustainable, but also more ethical food futures. (shrink)

El estudio de la justicia como valor y del lugar que ella ocupa o debe ocupar dentro de la sociedad responde en estos momentos a una necesidad más práctica que teórica. Las reflexiones que aquí presentamos se enmarcan dentro de este contexto. Se refieren a algunos presupuestos teórico-metodológicos que necesitan ser tenidos en cuenta en el estudio de la justicia como valor, pero su móvil fundamental no está tanto en la teoría misma, como sí más allá de ella, en la (...) cruda realidad práctica que reclama universalmente un mundo más justo. No se oculta entonces que estas ideas se elaboran buscando acercar respuestas teóricas y metodológicas a ese reclamo práctico, ni se obvia el hecho de que, aun cuando se piensan para todo el mundo de hoy, esto se hace desde el marco referencial concreto de la singular experiencia cubana, que ofrece un mirador muy especial cuando de pensar la justicia se trata. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone demostrar que el diseño editorial deconstructivo, a la par que pone en jaque la identidad del lector, en la forma en la que la educación le enseñó que debe reconocerse, lo empuja a identificarse con una nueva forma de ser y comprender el mundo, adquiriendo mayor conciencia de su carácter globalizado, rizomático, polifónico y polisémico. El diseño editorial deconstructivo se levantaba en su momento contra la imposición homogeneizadora de una identidad proclive a la defensa de los (...) valores instituidos por el poder hegemónico. Sin embargo, ese poder, con su capacidad para asimilar en su seno y bajo sus propios valores a lo que en algún momento le fue contestatario, logra convertir en propia a la deconstrucción misma. ¿Por qué? Tal vez sea porque la deconstrucción por sí sola no basta, porque no puede ser el lugar definitivo de llegada, porque tiene que señalar un tránsito hacia alguna otra cosa que es, en definitiva y a la larga, la única que puede darle un verdadero sentido revolucionario. (shrink)

El trabajo argumenta el significado que ha de tener la centralidad de la vida en la construcción de un nuevo modelo de convivencia social basado en el "Buen Vivir", tal como hoy ya aparecen en las constituciones de Bolivia y Ecuador. Se enfrenta críticamente aquellas posturas que niegan la centralidad del ser humano para afirmar la de la naturaleza en esos nuevos modelos sociales.

En diálogo crítico con otras posturas, el trabajo cuestiona las interpretaciones ontológica (América fue descubierta) y epistemológica (América fue inventada) de lo ocurrido a partir de 1492 en esta parte del mundo que hoy identificamos con América Latina. En su lugar propone una interpretación praxiológica (América Latina fue construida) y señala las consecuencias teóricas y prácticas de esa diferente interpretación.

This project begins with the selective sensory experience suggested by lngarden followed by an insensitivity he insinuates to digestive processes. This is juxtaposed with an oenological explanation of phenomenal sedimentation offered by Jean-Luc Marion. It compares the dynamics of time in the former with the those of wine in the latter. Emphasis is given to lngarden's insinuation of time as fluid, liquid, or aquatic. It revisits Ingarden's physiological explanations of partially-open systems by way of the bilateral excretion and absorption of (...) semi-permeable cellular membranes. The importance he eventually grants to inner secretion is considered alongside perspiration and salivation collateral to skin and membranes. It suggests that Ingarden's interest in thermoregulation, partial permeation, and secretion invites alternative conceptions of temporal consciousness in physiological experiences, beyond sequential and linear clock-time and/or Kantian intuition. Temporality experienced as temperance becomes discernible at a permeable point in which the sedimentation of Husserl, the maturation of Marion, and the fluidity and secretion of Ingarden mix and mingle into the taste of time. (shrink)

William James once suggested that the underlying difference between empiricists and rationalists is that empiricists explain wholes in terms of parts, while rationalists explain parts in relation to wholes.1 Whatever the merits of this description, it is fair to say that modern thought has predominantly followed the empiricist habit of emphasizing parts and particularity rather than wholes and totality. This essay explores the views of three philosophers who have challenged this dominant trend. In various ways, John Dewey, Thomas Nagel, and (...) Franklin Gamwell have argued that the meaning and value of human life are only properly understood in relation to the whole of reality. To be sure, Dewey embraced the empiricist... (shrink)

Many praise science for its systematic drive to objectivity. But scientific objectivity is in fact a species of objectivity in a broader sense, which extends to aesthetic experience and broadly artistic creativity. Objectivity should be understood as outwardness, or receptivity to basic features of the world. Scientific objectivity is receptivity to basic features of the world specifically by adopting their 'point of view'. It is not a 'view from nowhere', in the sense of a globally- or universally-valid perspective. Nor is (...) it a matter of the liberal democratic regulation of knowledge production, or of adopting the 'standpoints' of marginalized groups. Scientific objectivity is a view from causally-basic phenomena that are often totally impersonal—like gravity, from whose standpoint we see objective spatiotemporal relations. By contrast to this objective scientific view from causally-basic forces onto the objects they impact, a broadly poetic kind of objectivity involves adopting a view directly onto basic forces, like loci of aesthetic impact, ethical value, or causal power. Poetic understanding allows us to directly apprehend nature as impactful, whereas science only gives us unconscious insight into basic forces, by cognitively imitating their physical impact. This framework helps to explain modern 'disenchantment', as it bears on both the value and the limits of science. At a metaphysical level, this approach also radically extends Nietzsche's view that theories and artworks are 'perspectival' expressions of their creators' drives. Nietzsche is right to treat the outlet of strong human drives in acts of artistic or philosophical creativity as just one among many higher modes of 'will to power' in nature, many of which are totally impersonal. But he is still too focused on self-expression, or willing one's own power. In fact, objective science and art involve external forces' expression in and through us, not just us expressing our own powers. And Nietzsche's vitalistic 'will to power' must be replaced by a basic ontology that better accommodates inorganic phenomena, like the 'cold' order and precision of celestial motions. Thus I work to de-anthropomorphize and de-organicize post-Kantian notions of will and creative development, while preserving for force the primary ontological and evaluative status that theorists from Schiller and Goethe to Emerson and Nietzsche attributed to willful striving or to life. (shrink)