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Deliberation
Edited by Jonathan Way (University of Southampton)
About this topic
| Summary | In (practical) deliberation we aim to decide what to do by considering reasons to act. Deliberation of this sort raises many questions, including: (i) What is the relationship between deliberation and acting for reasons? For instance, is deliberation necessary for acting for a reason? (ii) To what extent is it possible for us to take into account things other than reasons for and against doing A in deliberating about whether to A? What explains any such restriction? (iii) What kind of freedom, if any, is presupposed in deliberation? (iv) What is the relationship between rational deliberation and rational action? For instance, does rational deliberation which concludes in a decision to A ensure that it is rational to A? (v) What kinds of factors make for rational deliberation? Is deliberation about whether to A rational only insofar as it responds to reasons for and against A-ing? Or do other factors – for instance, about the benefits of being disposed to deliberate in certain ways – also bear on the rationality of deliberation? Some philosophers have also discussed the possibility of doxastic deliberation – deliberation about what to believe. Some philosophers have argued that features of doxastic deliberation support the view that belief is essentially normative. |
| Key works | For a very helpful recent discussion of (i), see Arpaly & Schroeder 2012. For discussion of (ii) see e.g. Hieronymi 2006, Kavka 1983, and Shah 2008. Much of the literature on (iv) and (v) takes off from David Gauthier's work, especially Gauthier 1986. Morris & Ripstein 2001 is a very useful collection of essays on Gauthier's work. Much of the recent debate about doxastic deliberation begins with Shah 2003. |
| Introductions | Pettit 2010 |
Show all references
Related
Siblings
- Decision (299)
- Desire and Motivation (322)
- Desire and Reason (358)
- Instrumental Reasoning (294)
- Practical and Theoretical Reasoning (327)
- Rational Requirements (410)
- Pratical Reason, Misc (643)
Contents
429 found
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| 1 — 50 / 429 |
- On the content and role of we-intentions.Olle Blomberg - manuscript[Forthcoming in Signs of the Social (provisional title), edited by Bhaskarjit Neog, and to be published by Routledge. For a penultimate draft, please email the author.] Assuming a causal theory of action, this chapter argues that the distinctive feature of joint intentional activity is that each participant’s contribution is rationalised and guided by a ‘we-intention’. It contends that such we-intentions can be reduced to ordinary mental states with collective content, in accordance with the ‘content approach’. The chapter proposes two jointly (...)Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Risk, Ignorance, and What We Ought to Do.Danny Frederick - manuscriptI consider cases in which risk or ignorance create barriers to our discovery of what we ought to do. I argue that neither expected utility theory, nor the maximin principle, nor a timid gambling temperament, is relevant to discovering what we ought to do in one-off or infrequently recurring types of decisions involving risk, or to decisions involving ignorance. I argue, contra Kolodny and MacFarlane, that the miners case does not require us to give up any classical logical principle in (...)
- How Do You Like Me Now?Gerald Hull - manuscriptThese reflections are an attempt to get to the heart of the "reason is the slave of the passions" debate. The whole point of deliberation is to arrive at a choice. What factors persons find to be choice-relevant is a purely empirical matter. This has significant consequences for the views of Hume, Williams, Nagel, Parfit and Korsgaard regarding practical reason.
- Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought.Benjamin Kiesewetter - manuscriptAccording to the Balancing View of Ought, we ought to perform an action if and only if performing the action is most strongly supported by the balance of our reasons. The Balancing View faces the objection from exclusionary reasons, which are second-order reasons not to act for certain other reasons. According to Joseph Raz, the existence of exclusionary reasons undermines the Balancing View: a reason might tip the balance in favour of performing an act but at the same time be (...)
- Is there a liberal principle of instrumental transmission?Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018Some of our reasons for action are grounded in the fact that the action in question is a means to something else we have reason to do. This raises the question as to which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of a liberal transmission principle, which plays a prominent role in the current literature. The principle states that an agent has an instrumental reason to whenever -ing is (...)
- A Hybrid View of Commitment.Facundo M. Alonso - forthcoming - In David W. Shoemaker, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 9. Oxford: Oxford University Press.We often appeal to the notion of an agent’s commitment to action to characterize, e.g., an agent’s faithfulness to a promise she has given to another, her robust disposition to pursue a goal she values or cares about, and her determination to stick to that goal. In the philosophy of action, that notion is often associated with the idea of an agent’s intention to act. In ethics, it is associated primarily with the idea of an agent’s commitment to, or endorsement (...)
- Précis of Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - Analysis.
- Replies to Carroll, Horwich and McGrath.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - Analysis.I am grateful to Sean Carroll, Paul Horwich, and Sarah McGrath for their stimulating responses to Morality and Mathematics (M&M). Their arguments concern the reality of unapplied mathematics, the practical import of moral facts, and the deliberative and explanatory roles of evaluative theories. In what follows, I address their responses, as well as some broader issues.
- What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian, New Essays on Normative Realism.Logical monism is the view that there is ‘One True Logic’. This is the default position, against which pluralists react. If there were not ‘One True Logic’, it is hard to see how there could be one true theory of anything. A theory is closed under a logic! But what is logical monism? In this article, I consider semantic, logical, modal, scientific, and metaphysical proposals. I argue that, on no ‘factualist’ analysis (according to which ‘there is One True Logic’ expresses (...)$40.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 3 citations
- Ought We to Do What We Ought to Be Made to Do?William A. Edmundson - forthcoming - In Georgios Pavlakos Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.The late Jerry Cohen struggled to reconcile his egalitarian political principles with his personal style of life. His efforts were inconclusive, but instructive. This comment locates the core of Cohen’s discomfort in an abstract principle that connects what we morally ought to be compelled to do and what we have a duty to do anyway. The connection the principle states is more general and much tighter than Cohen and others, e.g. Thomas Nagel, have seen. Our principles of justice always put (...)
- Practical Deliberation is Normative.Jesse Hambly - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-16.It is common for philosophers to suggest that practical deliberation is normative; deliberation about what to do essentially involves employing normative concepts. This thesis – ‘the Normativity Thesis’ – is significant because, among other things, it supports the conclusion that normative thought is inescapable for us. In this paper, I defend the Normativity Thesis against objections.
- Explaining Deontic Status by Good Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.This paper offers an account of deontic normativity in terms of attributive goodness. An action is permissible for S in C just in case there is a good practical inference available to S in C that results in S performing (or intending to perform) the action. The standards of goodness for practical inferences are determined by what is a good or bad exercise of the human capacity of practical reason, which is an attributive (and not a deontic) assessment.
- Robust vs Formal Normativity II, Or: No Gods, No Masters, No Authoritative Normativity.Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati, The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...)
- The Normative Insignificance of the Will.Jason Kay - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.The fact that I am a committed gardener has some practical upshot or other. But what, exactly, is the upshot of the fact that I am committed to some project, person, or principle? According to a standard view, my commitment to gardening directly effects a change in the normative facts by giving me a further reason to garden. I argue that we should reject this view and its attendant psychological story involving a normatively significant will. According to the view I (...)
- When Reasons Run Out.Jason Kay - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.Subjectivists about practical normativity hold that an agent’s favoring and disfavoring attitudes give rise to practical reasons. On this view, an agent’s normative reason to choose vanilla over chocolate ice cream ultimately turns on facts about what appeals to her rather than facts about what her options are like attitude-independently. Objectivists—who ground reasons in the attitude-independent features of the things we aim at—owe us an explanation of why it is rational to choose what we favor, if not because favoring is (...)
- The Inconsistency of a Normative Pluriverse.Seungsoo Lee - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.Normative realism is the view that there are ought facts, i.e. facts about what we ought to do. A recent influential challenge to normative realism, raised separately by Justin Clarke-Doane and Matti Eklund, argues that ought facts—even if they exist—are inert in the sense that they cannot tell us what to do. The ground for this challenge is the epistemic possibility of a normative pluriverse, that is, the epistemic possibility of there being not only ought facts but also ought-like facts. (...)
- Knowing what you Want.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - In Lucy Campbell, Forms of Knowledge. Oxford.How do you know what you want? Philosophers have lately developed sophisticated accounts of the practical and doxastic knowledge that are rooted in the point of view of the subject. Our ability to just say what we are doing or what we believe—that is, to say so authoritatively, but not on the basis of observation or evidence—is an aspect of our ability to reason about the good and the true. However, no analogous route to orectic self-knowledge is feasible. Knowledge of (...)
- The Strategic Allocation Theory of Vigilance.Samuel Murray & Santiago Amaya - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.Despite its importance in different occupational and everyday contexts, vigilance, typically defined as the capacity to sustain attention over time, is remarkably limited. What explains these limits? Two theories have been proposed. The Overload Theory states that being vigilant consumes limited information-processing resources; when depleted, task performance degrades. The Underload Theory states that motivation to perform vigilance tasks declines over time, thereby prompting attentional shifts and hindering performance. We highlight some conceptual and empirical problems for both theories and propose an (...)
- Problems on the Legalization of LGBT Marriage in the Communist Block - A Preliminary Legal Review.Yang Immanuel Pachankis - forthcoming - Scientific Research Publishing.The article analyzes the legislative issues on equal marriage in P. R. China. It adopts a path dependency analysis on the liberal institutional order’s effects to the regime’s structural discrimination on the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) population. The research adopted a duo-lingual paradigm on Christianity with intercultural and transnational interpretations, and the research found the mis-adaption of language in the Chinese text of the United Nations charter is the key source to the suppression of the LGBT population in (...)
- Rules, Rights, and Hedges.John Schwenkler & Marshall Bierson - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.One is sometimes, but only sometimes, justified in pursuing a suboptimal course of action due to a concern that, in attempting the ideal course, one might fail to follow through and so make the situation even worse. This paper explains why such hedging is sometimes justified and sometimes not. -/- The explanation we offer relies on Elizabeth Anscombe’s distinction between reasons and logoi. Reasons are normative considerations that identify something good or bad that an act will secure or avoid, while (...)
- The Positional Nature of Valuing.X. Zhang - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-28.This paper aims to explore one significant yet insufficiently elaborated aspect of valuing, namely the positional nature of valuing, which essentially reveals the fact that the valuer occupies a particular position or takes a specific viewpoint in relation to the object being valued. This positional nature of valuing does not merely embody a specific viewpoint from which the valuer’s beliefs, attitudes, reasons, and emotions are conveyed in a complex manner towards the valued object, but also constitute a particular position from (...)
- A Theory of Assessability for Reasonableness.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2025 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):1-37.This essay defends an account of what things are assessable for reasonableness and why. On this account, something is assessable for reasonableness if and only if and because it is the functional effect of critical reasoning.
- Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions.Conner Schultz - 2025 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):72-87.In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism—the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an attitude must be able to feature in that agent’s deliberation to that attitude. My argument for this premise is that in order to have reasons for an attitude, we need to be able to exhibit some relevant (...)
- On Essentially Intentional Actions.Armand Babakhanian - 2024 - Dissertation, Georgia State UniversityEssentially intentional actions are kinds of action that can only be done intentionally. Essentialism is the view that essentially intentional actions exist. Accidentalism is the view that essentialism is false. In my thesis, I develop and argue for naïve essentialism, a species of essentialism based on Michael Thompson’s naïve action theory. First, I present key features of naïve action theory and the broader Anscombean tradition, distinguish between essentially and accidentally intentional actions, and provide an argument for the existence of essentially (...)
- Temptation and Apathy.Juan Pablo Bermúdez, Samantha Berthelette, Gabriela Fernández, Alfonso Anaya & Diego Rodríguez - 2024 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 8:10–32.Self-control is deemed crucial for reasons-responsive agency and a key contributor to long-term wellbeing. But recent studies suggest that effortfully resisting one’s temptations does not contribute to long-term goal attainment, and can even be harmful. So how does self-control improve our lives? Finding an answer requires revising the role that overcoming temptation plays in self-control. This paper distinguishes two forms of self-control problems: temptation (the presence of a strong wayward motivation) and apathy (the lack of commitment-advancing motivation). This distinction makes (...)
- Vontade, Autonomia e Universalidade: Um ensaio sobre a capacidade da razão prática de gerir autonomamente a conduta moral sob uma perspectiva universalista na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes de Kant.Fernanda Cardoso - 2024 - Revista If-Sophia (28).Como começamos a refletir e deliberar sobre nossa conduta moral, colocando-nos no lugar dos outros? Mais especificamente, de que forma gerimos, de maneira arbitrária, nossa conduta a partir de uma perspectiva que prioriza o bem de todos os seres humanos de forma universal? Com o objetivo de responder essa questão, parto da hipótese de que o conceito de razão prática, frequentemente tratado como 'vontade' na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes de Kant, pode esclarecer o desenvolvimento de nossa capacidade de refletir (...)
- Anscombe and the Anscombe Archive.Nathan Hauthaler & Nicholas Ogle (eds.) - 2024 - Philadelphia, PA: Collegium Institute for Catholic Thought and Culture.The present collection of essays is dedicated to the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, in particular her work collected in the Anscombe Archive at the University of Pennsylvania. The collection brings together scholars working on Anscombe and her tradition, all of whom have significant expertise in Anscombe’s philosophical thought, with many having worked directly at the Archive. While a variety of perspectives on Anscombe’s thought are represented in the collection, including some vigorous scholarly disagreements, the contributing authors nevertheless share a commitment (...)
- (1 other version)Knowing What to Do.Ethan Jerzak & Alexander W. Kocurek - 2024 - Noûs.Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge-how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge-to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like _where to meet_, _when to leave_, and _what to bring_. We offer an analysis of knowledge-to and argue on its basis that, regardless of whether knowledge-how reduces to knowledge-that, no such reduction of knowledge-to is forthcoming. Knowledge-to, unlike knowledge-that and knowledge-how, requires the agent to have formed (...)
- Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Frederik Tollerup Junker & Thor Grünbaum - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (5):706–725.Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting (...)
- (1 other version)Doxastic Agent's Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy.This paper introduces and motivates the claim that we possess doxastic agent’s awareness. I argue that this is a form of agentive awareness concerning our belief states that we enjoy in virtue of deliberating and judging. Namely, we experience these activities as those of making up our mind and keeping it made up regarding our beliefs. Following related work in the philosophy of action, I understand this awareness as a form of conscious experience which can then ground our self-ascriptions. As (...)
- Exploring Arbitrariness Objections to Time Biases.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, O. H. Jordan, Sam Shpall & Y. U. Wen - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (3):588-614.There are two kinds of time bias: near bias and future bias. While philosophers typically hold that near bias is rationally impermissible, many hold that future bias is rationally permissible. Call this normative hybridism. According to arbitrariness objections, certain patterns of preference are rationally impermissible because they are arbitrary. While arbitrariness objections have been leveled against both near bias and future bias, the kind of arbitrariness in question has been different. In this article we investigate whether there are forms of (...)
- Conditional causal decision theory reduces to evidential decision theory.Mostafa Mohajeri - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (1):93-106.Advocates of Causal Decision Theory (CDT) argue that Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) is inadequate because it gives the wrong result in Newcomb problems. Egan (2007) provides a recipe for converting Newcomb problems to counterexamples to CDT, arguing that CDT is inadequate too. Proposed by Edgington (2011), the Conditional Causal Decision Theory (CCDT) is widely taken uncritically in the recent literature as a version of CDT that conforms to the supposedly correct pre-theoretic judgments about the rationality of acts in Newcomb problems (...)
- Commonsense morality and the bearable automaticity of being.Samuel Murray & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2024 - Consciousness and Cognition 125 (C):103748.Some research suggests that moral behavior can be strongly influenced by trivial features of the environment of which we are completely unaware. Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have argued that these findings undermine our commonsense notions of agency and responsibility, both of which emphasize the role of practical reasoning and conscious deliberation in action. We present the results of four vignette-based studies (N = 1,437) designed to investigate how people think about the metaphysical and moral implications of scientific findings that reveal (...)
- The Deliberative Constraint on Reasons.Conner Schultz - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (7):e13010.Must reasons be able to feature in our deliberation? Proponents of a deliberative constraint on reasons endorse an affirmative answer to this question. Deliberative constraints enjoy broad appeal and have been deployed as premises in support of a variety of controversial philosophical positions. Yet, despite their uses, deliberative constraints have not received systematic philosophical attention. This entry aims to fill this gap in the literature. First, I sketch what's at stake in the debate over whether a deliberative constraint is true. (...)
- How Temptation Works.John Schwenkler - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (3).For most philosophers who have written recently on the topic, to give into temptation is always to revise a decision in a way that is somehow unreasonable—as when, say, recalling that there is a World Cup game that I can stream from my office, I abandon my plan to spend the morning writing. But I argue in this paper that a person can also give in to the temptation to violate a decision without undoing that decision or even calling it (...)
- Unthinkable actions.Etye Steinberg - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.For each person, some actions are unthinkable: performing them requires crossing a line that one's conscience cannot allow crossing. This article explores what such unthinkability is. In doing so, it introduces a novel categorization of theories of action and practical reason. The article argues that an action is unthinkable if and only if the agent judges that she should never treat any consideration as a reason in favor of performing this action. This view meets two important tests. The first is (...)
- The Hard Things about Hard Choices? A Reply to Chang.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2024 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):aa-aa.In this paper, I reply to Ruth Chang’s ‘What is so Hard about Hard Choices’.
- Preferences: What We Can and Can’t Do with Them.Johanna Thoma - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (5).In her Choosing Well, Chrisoula Andreou puts forth an account of instrumental rationality that is revisionary in two respects. First, it changes the goalpost or standard of instrumental rationality to include “categorial” appraisal responses, alongside preferences, which are relational. Second, her account is explicitly diachronic, applying to series of choices as well as isolated ones. Andreou takes both revisions to be necessary for dealing with problematic choice scenarios agents with disorderly preferences might find themselves in. Focusing on problem cases involving (...)
- The Poets of Our Lives.Kenneth Walden - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (5):277-297.This article proposes a role for aesthetic judgment in our practical thought. The role is related to those moments when practical reason seems to give out, when it fails to yield a judgment about what to do in the face of a choice we cannot avoid. I argue that these impasses require agents to create, but that not any creativity will do. For we cannot regard a response to one of these problems as arbitrary or capricious if we want to (...)
- Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations: Schwenkenbecher, Anne, New York: Routledge, 2021, pp. xiii + 174, US$160 (hb). [REVIEW]Maike Albertzart - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):240-243.Anne Schwenkenbecher’s Getting Our Act Together offers an in-depth and timely account of how our ability to act jointly can create so-called joint moral duties. Getting Our Act Together not only co...
- Deliberation and the Possibility of Skepticism.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 239-249.No one is responsible for their conduct because free will is an illusion, say some skeptics. Even when it seems that we have several options, we only have one. Hence, says the free will skeptic, we should reform our practices which involve responsibility attributions, such as punishment and blame. How seriously should we take this doctrine? Is it one that we could live by? One thorn in the side of the skeptic concerns deliberation. When we deliberate about what to do—what (...)(collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation Bookmark
- Risk-taking and tie-breaking.Ryan Doody - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2079-2104.When you are indifferent between two options, it’s rationally permissible to take either. One way to decide between two such options is to flip a fair coin, taking one option if it lands heads and the other if it lands tails. Is it rationally permissible to employ such a tie-breaking procedure? Intuitively, yes. However, if you are genuinely risk-averse—in particular, if you adhere to risk-weighted expected utility theory (Buchak in Risk and rationality, Oxford University Press, 2013) and have a strictly (...)
- The Force of Habit.William Hornett - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):1-30.Habits figure in action‐explanations because of their distinctive force. But what is the force of habit, and how does it motivate us? In this paper, I argue that the force of habit is the feeling of familiarity one has with the familiar course of action, where this feeling reveals a distinctive reason for acting in the usual way. I do this by considering and rejecting a popular account of habit's force in terms of habit's apparent automaticity, by arguing that one (...)
- Democratic Deliberation in the Absence of Integration.Michael Merry - 2023 - In Johannes Drerup, Douglas Yacek & Julian Culp, The Cambridge Handbook of Democratic Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 230-249.In order for democratic deliberative interactions in educational settings to fruitfully occur, certain favorable conditions must obtain. In this chapter I chiefly concern myself with one of these putative conditions, namely that of school integration, believed by many liberal scholars to be necessary for consensus-building and legitimate decision-making. I provide a critical assessment of the belief that integration is a necessary facilitative condition for democratic deliberation in the classroom. I demonstrate that liberal versions of democratic deliberation predicated on this condition (...)
- Games Unlike Life.C. Thi Nguyen - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23 (3).This is a reply to Elisabeth Camp's and Elijah Millgram's probing discussions of "Games and the Art of Agency", in a symposium in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. Millgram argues that games cannot function as a guide to life, because they are too different from life. Games are limited in a special way: in life, we deliberate about what goals we want to take on, but in games, the goals are fixed and given to us. Camp argues that there (...)
- Ethics Beyond the Limits: New Essays on Bernard Williams’ Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Matthieu Queloz - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):234-243.Bernard Williams’ books demand an unusual amount of work from readers. This is particularly true of his 1985 magnum opus, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (ELP)—a work so charged with ideas that there seems to be nothing more to say, and yet at the same time so pared-down and tersely argued that there seems to be nothing left to take away. Reflecting on the book five years after its publication, Williams writes that it is centrally concerned with a Nietzschean (...)
- Kamachinakuy: derecho y sumak kawsay.Fausto César Quizhpe Gualán - 2023 - Ecuador: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar Sede Ecuador.Este trabajo critica del derecho y la economía, bajo la corriente desarrollada por Franz Hinkelammert. Se utiliza el método transdisciplinario, atravesando la Filosofía indígena, la Teología de la Liberación y la Filosofía de la Liberación. En el análisis de casos se recurre a la justicia comunitaria del pueblo kichwa Saraguro. Se critica que tanto la teoría como la filosofía del derecho grecorromana está centrada en la propiedad privada, que justifica y protege al sistema económico capitalista. La propuesta está centrada en (...)
- Wisdom: A Skill Theory.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.What is wisdom? What does a wise person know? Can a wise person know how to act and live well without knowing the whys and wherefores of his own action? How is wisdom acquired? This Element addresses questions regarding the nature and acquisition of wisdom by developing and defending a skill theory of wisdom. Specifically, this theory argues that if a person S is wise, then (i) S knows that overall attitude success contributes to or constitutes well-being; (ii) S knows (...)
- Populism and the virtues of argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2022 - In Gregory Peterson, Engaging Populism: Democracy and the Intellectual Virtues. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 147-163.This chapter argues that a virtue-theoretic account of argumentation can enhance our understanding of the phenomenon of populism and offer some lines of response. Virtue theories of argumentation emphasize the role of arguers in the conduct and evaluation of arguments and lay particular stress on arguers’ acquired dispositions of character, otherwise known as intellectual virtues and vices. One variety of argumentation of particular relevance to democratic decision-making is group deliberation. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for maintaining that intellectual (...)
- Graded Ratifiability.David James Barnett - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (2):57-88.An action is unratifiable when, on the assumption that one performs it, another option has higher expected utility. Unratifiable actions are often claimed to be somehow rationally defective. But in some cases where multiple options are unratifiable, one unratifiable option can still seem preferable to another. We should respond, I argue, by invoking a graded notion of ratifiability.
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