Questions surrounding engagement with generative AI are often framed in terms of trust, yet mere theorizing about trust may not yield actionable insights, given the multifaceted nature of trust. Literature on trust typically overlooks how individuals make meaning in their interactions with other entities, including AI. This paper reexamines trust with insights from Merleau-Ponty’s views on embodiment, positing trust as a style of world engagement characterized by openness—an attitude wherein individuals enact and give themselves to their lived world, prepared to (...) reorganize their existence. This paper argues that generative AI mediates users’ existence by attuning their openness. Since users perceive generative AI not merely as a tool but as possessing human-like existence, their engagement with AI serves as a rehearsal for articulating and reorganizing their engagement with the world. Consequently, users neither trust nor distrust generative AI; rather, it mediates their trust. This perspective suggests that users’ moral stance towards generative AI involves both other-regarding ethics and information environment ethics. Drawing insights from Kant’s deontology, it proposes that respecting AI’s integrity is equivalent to preserving both our humanity and the integrity of the information environment. -/- . (shrink)

Philosophers sometimes refer to ‘moves’ made in the context of a philosophical debate. Once familiar with these recognizable tropes, we then possess them as tools – a suite of possible moves to make in novel contexts. In this paper, I outline three such philosophy moves, then demonstrate how moves can be combined. Examples of moves and some combinations feature throughout the paper.

Past research on people's moral judgments about moral dilemmas has revealed a connection between utilitarian judgment and reflective cognitive style. This has traditionally been interpreted as reflection is conducive to utilitarianism. However, recent research shows that the connection between reflective cognitive style and utilitarian judgments holds only when participants are asked whether the utilitarian option is permissible, and disappears when they are asked whether it is recommended. To explain this phenomenon, we propose that reflective cognitive style is associated with a (...) greater moral leniency—that is, a greater tendency to be tolerant of moral violations, and that moral leniency predicts utilitarian judgment when utilitarian judgment is measured through permissibility. In Study 1 (N = 192), we design a set of vignettes to assess moral leniency. In Studies 2 and 3 (N = 455, 428), we show that reflective cognitive style is indeed associated with greater moral leniency, and that moral leniency mediates the connection between cognitive style and utilitarian judgment. We discuss the implication of our results for the interpretation of the relationship between utilitarianism and reflective cognitive style. (shrink)

Comprehenders generate expectations about upcoming lexical items in language processing using various types of contextual information. However, a number of studies have shown that argument roles do not impact neural and behavioral prediction measures. Despite these robust findings, some prior studies have suggested that lexical prediction might be sensitive to argument roles in production tasks such as the cloze task or in comprehension tasks when additional time is available for prediction. This study demonstrates that both the task and additional time (...) for prediction independently influence lexical prediction using argument roles, via evidence from closely matched electroencephalogram (EEG) and speeded cloze experiments. In order to investigate the timing effect, our EEG experiment used maximally simple Japanese stimuli such as Bee-nom/acc sting, and it manipulated the time for prediction by changing the temporal interval between the context noun and the target verb without adding any further linguistic content. In order to investigate the task effect, we conducted a speeded cloze study that was matched with our EEG study both in terms of stimuli and the time available for prediction. We found that both the EEG study with additional time for prediction and the speeded cloze study with matched timing showed clear sensitivity to argument roles, while the EEG conditions with less time for prediction replicated the standard pattern of argument role insensitivity. Based on these findings, we propose that lexical prediction is initially insensitive to argument roles but a monitoring mechanism serially inhibits role-inappropriate candidates. This monitoring process operates quickly in production tasks, where it is important to quickly select a single candidate to produce, whereas it may operate more slowly in comprehension tasks, where multiple candidates can be maintained until a continuation is perceived. Computational simulations demonstrate that this mechanism can successfully explain the task and timing effects observed in our experiments. (shrink)

We investigate the articulation between domain-general reasoning and interpretive processes in failures of deductive reasoning. We focus on illusory inferences from disjunction-like elements, a broad class of deductive fallacies studied in some detail over the past 15 years. These fallacies have received accounts grounded in reasoning processes, holding that human reasoning diverges from normative standards. A subset of these fallacies, however, can be analyzed differently: human reasoning is not to blame, instead the premises were interpreted in a nonobvious, yet perfectly (...) predictable and reasonable way. Once we consider these interpretations, the apparent fallacious conclusion is no mistake at all. We give a two-factor account of these fallacies that incorporates both reasoning-based elements and interpretive elements, showing that they are not in real competition. We present novel experimental evidence in favor of our theory. Cognitive load such as induced by a dual-task design is known to hinder the interpretive mechanisms at the core of interpretation-based accounts of the fallacies of interest. In the first experiment of its kind using this paradigm with an inferential task instead of a simpler truth-value-judgment task, we found that the manipulation affected more strongly those illusions where our theory predicts that interpretive processes are at play. We conclude that the best way forward for the field to investigate the elusive line between reasoning and interpretation requires combining theories and methodologies from linguistic semantics and the psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

Judgments of character traits tend to be overcorrelated, a bias known as the halo effect. We conducted two studies to test an explanation of the effect based on shared lexical context and connotation. Study 1 tested whether the context similarity of trait names could explain 39 participants’ ratings of the probability that two traits would co-occur. Over 126 trait pairs, cosine similarity between the word2vec vectors of the two words was a reliable predictor of the human judgments of trait co-occurrence (...) probability (cross-validated r2 =.19, p <.001). Two measures related to word similarity increased the variation accounted for in the human judgments to 45%, cross-validated (p <.001). In Experiment 2, 40 different participants judged similarity of word meaning within the pairs, confirming that the word pairs were not simply synonymous (Average [SD] = 40.8/100 [13.1/100]). Shared lexical context and word connotation play a role in shaping the halo effect. (shrink)

In the article “The Past 110 Years: Historical Data on the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy Journals,” Hassoun et al. claim that there is a connection between triple anonymous review and the proportion of women authors in interdisciplinary journals. However, the sample size of interdisciplinary journals using triple-blind review practice in the analysis is 1. In addition, the sole interdisciplinary journal claimed to be triple-blind, the Journal of Medical Ethics, is not and has not been triple-blind. The finding that interdisciplinary (...) journals publish the greatest proportion of women authorship when practicing triple anonymous review is thus unwarranted. (shrink)

Power metaphysicians are concerned with, well, powers. Theists claim interest in the most powerful entity there is, God. As such, recent work on the ontology of powers may well have much to offer theists when thinking about God’s power. In this paper I start to provide a metaphysics of God’s ‘power’, something many definitions of omnipotence make reference to. In particular I will be interested in explicating how a power ontology can account for the strength and range of God’s power, (...) as well as showing how this account of divine power can fit with a timeless conception of God. (shrink)

Sentences with impersonal pronouns, like 'You do it like this', seem to make both statistical and prescriptive claims, that a certain way of behaving is common and that it is prescriptively good. We argue that these kinds of sentences are closely related to another kind of sentence, namely, indefinite singular generics, like 'A person does it like this'. We propose that there is a single underlying mechanism that allows both kinds of sentences to express mixed statistical/prescriptive readings. We then provide (...) a compositional semantic analysis of these sentences and explain how, together with this single underlying mechanism, it accounts for this phenomenon. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, there were many vaccine trials which had significant purposes which participants needed to understand to validly consent. For example, participants needed to understand that the purpose of dose-escalation vaccine trials was to give incremental doses of vaccine until participants became ill. Likewise, participants needed to understand that if they received placebos, they could no later take a genuine vaccine to preserve the integrity of the trials. Yet, these intuitive judgements about what participants need to understand to (...) validly consent are rejected by recent accounts of consent. According to these accounts, as long as participants were given a good opportunity to learn these purposes, they do not need to actually understand them to consent. In this paper, I reject this consensus, and I argue that participants who failed to understand these aims associated with vaccine trials failed to provide legitimate consent. I defend this claim by developing and defending a new understanding condition for valid consent. According to this understanding condition, a participant must understand when a consent transaction has features which violate the norms which govern the medical practice with which they are acquainted. I argue that this condition is independently plausible and best explains why participants needed to understand these aims associated with vaccine trials to validly consent. (shrink)

Realist theories of legislative intent can be divided between aggregative theories (on which legislative intent is what some proportion of legislators intend) and common intent theories (on which legislative intent is a unanimous intent among legislators). In this paper, we advance and defend an alternative realist conception of legislative intent: the Rational Unity Account. On this account, the legislature is an agent with a distinctive ‘rational point of view’—a concept we adopt from social ontology. The legislature’s rational point of view (...) is shaped by its procedures and structures, in ways not determined by either a common intention held by legislators or an aggregation of the intentions of legislators. We explain how our view improves on existing accounts. We then apply it to three cases to demonstrate its implications for legal interpretation. Importantly, on the proposed account, legislative intent can depart from what individual legislators think or know. (shrink)

In dialogue with theorists of reading (Iser, Rogers) in the Schutzian tradition of phenomenology, this paper focuses on social relationships in novels, between the author and the reader (as a relation of Predecessor to Successors), and especially the relationship between reader and characters of the novel. The lack of the reader’s bodily engagement with the characters contrasts with everyday life, in which one can bodily affect one’s interlocutor, resembles “direct social observation” and can function as a kind of epoché, initiating (...) one into reading as a finite province of meaning. Within such a province, beyond the features of sociality and the epoché and like the epoché, the other features (form of spontaneity, tension of consciousness, experience of self, and temporality) all affect the reader‑character relationships, which in turn evoke adaptations in how these features are experienced in pragmatic everyday life. (shrink)

This paper examines Felix Kaufmann’s ideas on the methodology of social sciences through the example of the Marshall Society at Cambridge University and on how these ideas spread. The scope of the study includes his correspondence with the Marshall Society and his unpublished text prepared for a lecture held in 1936. Connections are established between the main theme of Kaufmann’s Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften (1936) and the unpublished text of his lecture, where he highlighted the problems that the naturalism‑antinaturalism dichotomy posed (...) for the methodology of the social sciences and the promising advances in the exact sciences to overcome these problems. Kaufmann avoided adopting a totally rejectionist and adaptive attitude, emphasized that natural and social sciences may have common and different methods, and argued that some methodological conflicts could be reconciled. Kaufmann’s unpublished text serves as an English précis of his 1936 book and facilitates the dissemination of his ideas through the Marshall Society. (shrink)

Drawing partly on unpublished materials from the Sozialwissenschaftliche Archiv Konstanz (Alfred‑Schütz‑Gedächtnis‑Archiv), in this paper I attempt to reconstruct Schutz’s barely explored reception of Marx and Marxism. To this aim, I proceed in four steps. First (1), I trace the very few references to Marxian thought in Schutz’s published work. Second (2), I review Schutz’s mentions of the topic in his correspondences with his friends and colleagues Aron Gurwitsch and Eric Voegelin. Third (3), I give an overview of the books by (...) Marx and other Marxist literature that Schutz had in his personal library. Finally (4), I analyze Schutz’s unpublished lectures on “Dialectics” and “Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge,” two of the only documents where he extensively discusses Marx and Marxism. The reconstruction carried out in the paper is not an end in itself but an effort to contribute to the contemporary ‘critical turn’ in phenomenology. (shrink)

This essay explores the theme of individuation in existential phenomenology, focusing on the contributions of Alfred Schutz and Maurice Natanson, one of Schutz’s students during his tenure at the New School for Social Research in New York. To mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Social Science Archive in Konstanz, I reflect on the theory of multiple realities and its application to issues of mobility and isolation. Following a lead given by Natanson in his critique of “life‑world optimism” sketched in a (...) letter to Schutz, I delve into Natanson’s theory of individuation and his use of the phenomenological method by emphasizing his critical elaboration of Sartre’s non‑egological conception of consciousness and theory of the other. I demonstrate how the existential dimensions of anguish, aloneness, and loneliness, as raised by Natanson, restate the theory of multiple realities, in part through his engagement with phenomenological psychiatry. (shrink)

Alfred Schutz’s Constitutive Phenomenology of the natural attitude was completed under the influence of Edmund Husserl Phenomenology, Henri Bergson’s Vitalism and William James’ Psychology. Schutz used James’ psychology mainly to analyze acts, their intentional modifications and the modifications found in finite realities of meaning. While the phenomenology of Husserl was important for the topics discussed, Schutz’s appreciation of James’s psychology is due to the fact that he makes these analyses without resorting to reduction, i.e. he explores worldly consciousness. Despite these (...) differences, Schutz values the contact points between the two theories. Indeed, the first one of these contact points refers to the election of perception as the privileged act in the experience of the world. Such coincidence originated in Brentano’s basis that sustains both theories, particularly in relation to the concept of intentionality. On the other hand, the second contact point can be noticed in the use of the term “horizon” in Husserl and “fringes” in James. These notions influenced the Schutzian theory of Multiple Realities and provided significant support for that theory. This paper is intended to stress the coincidences that Schutz analyzes in detail in “William James’s ‘Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted” contained in CP III, and also as an exegesis of the way these authors cooperated with the Schutzian notion of “the world of everyday life” or “world of working” (Wirkwelt). (shrink)

This article aims to develop a comparison between Alfred Schutz’s and José Ortega y Gasset’s social theories. By examining the annotations found on the copy of Ortega’s Man and People, located in Schutz’s Hand‑Bibliothek at the Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv Konstanz, the paper focuses on the way in which the two authors conceptualized themes such as empathy, lifeworld, and taken‑for‑granted, highlighting elements of continuity and divergence. This comparative analysis reveals the significant role that intersubjectivity plays for both thinkers, through which it is (...) possible to read in filigree their comparison with other eminent voices of the phenomenological landscape, with whom Ortega and Schutz did not confront directly, and to redefine their complex relationship with Husserl’s perspective on the topic. (shrink)

Is knowledge a uniform kind? If not, what relation do the different kinds of knowledge bear to one another? Is there a central notion of knowledge which other kinds of knowledge must be understood in terms of? In this paper, I use Aristotle’s theory of homonyms as a framework to make progress on these questions. I argue that knowledge is not a uniform kind but rather a core-dependent homonym. To demonstrate this, I focus on knowledge by acquaintance. I argue that (...) the principles that govern propositional knowledge cannot govern knowledge by acquaintance. I then develop analogue principles for knowledge by acquaintance and show why, despite their different modal profiles, knowledge by acquaintance is nevertheless a form of knowledge. I then show that the analysis of propositional knowledge fundamentally depends on knowledge by acquaintance. (shrink)

Many have recently argued that there are weighty reasons against making high-stakes decisions solely on the basis of recommendations from artificially intelligent (AI) systems. Even if deference to a given AI system were known to reliably result in the right action being taken, the argument goes, that deference would lack morally important characteristics: the resulting decisions would not, for instance, be based on an appreciation of right-making reasons. Nor would they be performed from moral virtue; nor would they have moral (...) worth. I argue that, even if these characteristics all have intrinsic value, that intrinsic value has no practical relevance to decisions about whether to defer to AI. I make that point by drawing on a lesson from the literature on moral testimony. Once it is granted that deference to a reliable source is the policy most likely to bring about right action, a refusal to defer carries with it a heightened risk of wronging and mistreating people. And that heightened risk of wrongdoing, I argue, cannot be justified by appeal to the intrinsic value of striving for a morally exemplary decision-making process. (shrink)

Although AI technologies reportedly can address accessibility issues and the risks have been documented, debates around AI have left developing countries and people with disabilities (PwDs) behind. Despite the global marketization of AI technologies, the understanding of AI and disability in developing countries in the Global South remains scant. Through semi-structured interviews with key personnel of disabled people organizations in Indonesia and Vietnam, this study found that a pocket of the disabled viewed AI as formidable but foreign because of the (...) persistent information void within the disabled community. AI potentially magnifies the existing bias against the disabled, but their unique features and lived experiences are irreplaceable by AI. The findings seek attention from developers, activists, and policy makers in emerging markets as the benefits of AI have reached wider audiences but PwDs and the risks of AI–human interactions to them have been narrowly discussed in Southeast Asia (SEA). (shrink)

In this paper, we present the methodology we used in the European Horizon 2020 AI-PROFICIENT project, to evaluate the implementation of the ethical component of the project. The project is a 3-year collaboration between a university partner and industrial and tech partners, which aims to research the integration of AI services in heavy industry work settings. An AI ethics approach developed for the project has involved embedded ethical analysis of work contexts and design solutions and the generation of specific and (...) evolving ethical recommendations for partners. We have performed an ongoing evaluation and monitoring of the implementation of recommendations. We describe the quantitative results of these implementations: overall, broken down by category, and broken down by category and responsible project partner (anonymized). In parallel, we discuss the results in light of our approach and offer insights for future research into the ground-level application of ethical recommendations for AI in heavy industry. (shrink)

Automation is inherently tied to ethical challenges because of its potential involvement in morally loaded decisions. In the present research, participants (n = 34) took part in a moral multi-trial dilemma-based task where the agent (human vs. machine) and the behavior (action vs. inaction) factors were randomized. Self-report measures, in terms of morality, consciousness, responsibility, intentionality, and emotional impact evaluation were gathered, together with electroencephalography (delta, theta, beta, upper and lower alpha, and gamma powers) and peripheral autonomic (electrodermal activity, heart (...) rate variability) data. Data showed that moral schemata vary as a function of the involved decider, and when the agent and behavior factors are crossed. Subjects did not consider machines full moral deciders to the same degree as humans and tend to morally better accept human active behavior and machine inaction. Moreover, the autonomic physiological activity might support the a-posteriori moral evaluation. In the evaluation of the agent’s consciousness, a beta ventrolateral prefrontal synchronization was detected for human action and machine inaction, while a generalized gamma synchronization occurred in artificial agent trials while rating the emotional impact of the decider’s behavior. The detected differences might point to a potential explicit and implicit asymmetry in moral reasoning toward artificial and human agents. (shrink)

This paper argues, against the prevailing view, that consent to privacy policies that regular internet users usually give is largely unproblematic from the moral point of view. To substantiate this claim, we rely on the idea of the right not to know (RNTK), as developed by bioethicists. Defenders of the RNTK in bioethical literature on informed consent claim that patients generally have the right to refuse medically relevant information. In this article we extend the application of the RNTK to online (...) privacy. We then argue that if internet users can be thought of as exercising their RNTK before consenting to privacy policies, their consent ought to be considered free of the standard charges leveled against it by critics. (shrink)

This paper examines Harold Garfinkel’s work with ELIZA and a related program LYRIC from 1967 to 1969. AI researchers have tended to treat successful human–machine interaction as if it relied primarily on non-human machine characteristics, and thus the often-reported attribution of human-like qualities to communication with computers has been criticized as a misperception—and humans who make such reports referred to as “deluded.” By contrast Garfinkel, building on two decades of prior research on information and communication, argued that the ELIZA and (...) the LYRIC “chatbots” were achieving interactions that felt human to many users by exploiting human sense-making practices. In keeping with his long-term practice of using “trouble” as a way of discovering the taken-for-granted practices of human sense-making, Garfinkel designed scripts for ELIZA and LYRIC that he could disrupt in order to reveal how their success depended on human social practices. Hence, the announcement “Machine Down” by the chatbot was a desired result of Garfinkel’s interactions with it. This early (but largely unknown) research has implications not only for understanding contemporary AI chatbots, but also opens possibilities for respecifying current information systems design and computational practices to provide for the design of more flexible information objects. (shrink)

As we write this research paper, we notice an explosion in popularity of machine learning in numerous fields (ranging from governance, education, and management to criminal justice, fraud detection, and internet of things). In this contribution, rather than focusing on any of those fields, which have been well-reviewed already, we decided to concentrate on a series of more recent applications of deep learning models and technologies that have only recently gained significant track in the relevant literature. These applications are concerned (...) with artistic production (Sect. 2.1), the writing process (Sect. 2.2), music production (Sect. 2.3), text recognition and attribution (Sect. 2.4). After reviewing and analyzing the positive contributions as well as some of the major limitations of these technologies in each of those fields, we critically reflect (Sect. 3) on how their widespread implementation may affect humans and their creativity. In Sect. 4, we notice that deep learning models are here to stay; so, rather than embracing a negative or pessimistic stance with respect to their future applications in creative domains, we suggest a balanced approach for their assessment and beneficial usage. Finally (Sect. 5), we conclude by summarising what we have achieved and by pointing out possible future research directions. (shrink)