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  1. The Essentials of Formal Axiology.Rem B. Edwards - 2010 - Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
    This book explains and advances formal axiology as originally developed by Robert S. Hartman. Formal axiology identifies the general or formal patterns involved in (1) the meaning of "good" and other value concepts, (2) WHAT we value (value-objects), and (3) HOW we value (evaluations). It explains the rational, practical, and affective aspects of evaluation, and it shows how to make value judgments more rationally and effectively. It distinguishes between intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic values and evaluations, and it discusses how they (...)
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  2. The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument.YiLi Zhou & Rhys Borchert - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In (...)
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  3. The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument.YiLi Zhou & Rhys Borchert - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In (...)
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  4. Response‐dependence and normativity.Yifan Sun - 2022 - Theoria 88 (6):1128-1143.
    A non-normative, response-dependent view about morality can avoid metaphysical extravagance and explain why the extension of some non-normative concepts can non-accidentally match the extension of moral concepts. These features make it a plausible reductive account of moral properties. However, some philosophers believe that a response-dependent account of morality must contain an irreducibly normative component. I argue that it is impossible to defend such a position while retaining the response-dependent nature of morality in the ordinary sense. However, I believe that philosophers' (...)
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  5. Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.Caj Strandberg - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent (...)
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  6. My Life Gives the Moral Landscape its Relief.Marc Champagne - 2023 - In Sam Harris: Critical Responses. Carus Books. pp. 17–38.
    Sam Harris (2010) argues that, given our neurology, we can experience well-being, and that seeking to maximize this state lets us distinguish the good from the bad. He takes our ability to compare degrees of well-being as his starting point, but I think that the analysis can be pushed further, since there is a (non-religious) reason why well-being is desirable, namely the finite life of an individual organism. It is because death is a constant possibility that things can be assessed (...)
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  7. Resisting Moral Conservatism with Difficulties of Reality: a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian Approach to Animal Ethics.Konstantin Deininger, Andreas Aigner & Herwig Grimm - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57.
    In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally and (...)
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  8. A Defense of Global Theological Voluntarism.Justin Morton - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    In this paper, I challenge the recent consensus that global versions of theological voluntarism—on which all moral facts are explained by God’s action—fail, because only local versions—on which only a proper subset of moral facts are so explained—can successfully avoid the objection that theological voluntarism entails that God’s actions are arbitrary. I argue that global theological voluntarism can equally well avoid such arbitrariness. This does not mean that global theological voluntarism should be accepted, but that the primary advantage philosophers have (...)
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  9. Ethics of vaccine refusal.Michael Kowalik - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (4):240-243.
    Proponents of vaccine mandates typically claim that everyone who can be vaccinated has a moral or ethical obligation to do so for the sake of those who cannot be vaccinated, or in the interest of public health. I evaluate several previously undertheorised premises implicit to the ‘obligation to vaccinate’ type of arguments and show that the general conclusion is false: there is neither a moral obligation to vaccinate nor a sound ethical basis to mandate vaccination under any circumstances, even for (...)
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  10. Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2503-2516.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for (1) is unsound, and (...)
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  11. How Reasons Determine Moral Requirements.Thomas Schmidt - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 18. Oxford, Vereinigtes Königreich:
    Cases of heroic supererogation have been taken to suggest that non-moral reasons are morally relevant. While non-moral reasons are unable to make actions morally required, they can prevent moral reasons from doing so. I argue that non-moral reasons are morally relevant in yet another way, since they can also play an essential role in making it the case that an action is morally required. Even though non-moral reasons are not able themselves to make actions morally required, they can prevent reasons (...)
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  12. Kant on Autonomy of the Will.Janis David Schaab - forthcoming - In Ben Colburn (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy.
    Kant takes the idea of autonomy of the will to be his distinctive contribution to moral philosophy. However, this idea is more nuanced and complicated than one might think. In this chapter, I sketch the rough outlines of Kant’s idea of autonomy of the will while also highlighting contentious exegetical issues that give rise to various possible interpretations. I tentatively defend four basic claims. First, autonomy primarily features in Kant’s account of moral agency, as the condition of the possibility of (...)
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  13. Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity.Janis David Schaab - 2022 - Kant Yearbook 14 (1):97-120.
    While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then (...)
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  14. Demystifying Normativity: Morality, Error Theory, and the Authority of Norms.Eline Gerritsen - 2022 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, University of Stirling & University of Groningen
    We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules and the law. While some norms may simply be ignored, we live under the impression that others matter for what we ought to do. How can we make sense of this normative authority some norms have? Does it fit into our naturalist worldview? Many philosophers claim it does not. Normativity is conceived to be distinct from ordinary natural properties, making it mysterious. The (...)
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  15. Constitutivism, Moral.Luca Ferrero - 2020 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
    Moral constitutivism purports to explain moral normativity by appeal to the nature of either agency or rational powers. Ambitious constitutivism aspires to ground the categorical authority of morality and to derive the content of the basic moral norms while avoiding the problems of moral realism. As a general strategy, moral constitutivism faces three serious challenges. First, the shmagency challenge. The worry is that the authority of the norms derived from the nature of agency is only conditional on having a reason (...)
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  16. Blackburn’s Wittgenstein: The Quasi-Realist.Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - In Ali Hossein Khani & Gary N. Kemp (eds.), Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (Volume I). London: Routledge.
  17. The Unity of Normative Thought.Jeremy David Fix - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):639-658.
    Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is our will, not an intellectual capacity whose exercises can influence those of our will. If practical reason is our will, thoughts about how I am to act have an essential tie to action. They are intentions. Thoughts about how others are to act, though, lack such a tie to action. They are beliefs, not intentions. How, then, can these thoughts form a unified class? I reject two answers which deny the differences (...)
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  18. Fichte and Kant on Reason’s Final Ends and Highest Ideas.Steven Hoeltzel - 2018 - Revista de Estudios Sobre Fichte 16.
    I argue that Fichte’s account of pure reason and its supreme self-wrought Idea is, in its transcendental essentials, very much modeled on Kant’s. The key difference between their positions, I suggest, is simply that Fichte operates with a more abstract understanding of the transcendentally basic elements of finite rationality; consequently, he arrives at a conceptually more concentrated understanding of pure reason’s preeminent Idea. In section one, I supply some context for that comparison. In section two, I recount Fichte’s depiction of (...)
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  19. The Three Basic Principles (drei Grundsätze).Steven Hoeltzel - 2020 - In Marina F. Bykova (ed.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Fichte. pp. 327-35.
    Part One of Fichte’s 1794/95 Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre sets forth three basic principles (Grundsätze) as the founding claims of a ‘theory of science’ that should continue and consolidate Kant’s work by vindicating and integrating the theoretical and practical essentials of the Critical philosophy. These principles (my translations) are: (1) “The I originally absolutely posits its own being.” (2) “A not-I is absolutely opposed to the I”; ergo, “opposition in general is absolutely posited by the I.” (3) “In the (...)
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  20. Fichte’s Account of Reason and Rational Normativity.Steven Hoeltzel - 2019 - In The Palgrave Fichte Handbook. pp. 189-212.
    This essay argues for a unifying and clarifying analysis of Fichte’s diverse and unusual characterizations of the nature of reason and rational normativity. Fichte equates or closely associates reason with “I-hood,” “positing” (especially self-positing), “acting” (as opposed to being), “self-reverting activity,” and “subject-objectivity.” He also claims that reason, qua reason, harbors “an absolute tendency toward the absolute” – and even that, in the final analysis, “only reason is.” I argue that we can readily grasp the meaning, interconnection, and putative justification (...)
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  21. Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
    The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the relation and its relevance to contemporary debates in normative and metanormative philosophy and proceeds to survey issues to do with fittingness covered in the volume’s chapters, including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relations between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of issues to (...)
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  22. Normative Powers, Agency, and Time.Arto Laitinen - 2022 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Time in Action. The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought. New York and London: pp. 52-72.
    Agents have powers to bring about change. Do agents have normative powers to bring about normative change directly? This chapter distinguishes between direct normative change and descriptive and institutional changes, which may indirectly be normatively significant. This article argues that agents do indeed have the powers to bring about normative change directly. It responds to a challenge claiming that all normativity is institutional and another claiming that exercises of normative powers would violate considerations of supervenience. The article also responds to (...)
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  23. From Non-Usability to Non-Factualism.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):747-758.
    Holly Smith has done more than anyone to explore and defend the importance of usability for moral theories. In Making Morality Work, she develops a moral theory that is almost universally usable. But not quite. In this article, I argue that no moral theory is universally usable, in the sense that is most immediately relevant to action, even by agents who know all the normative facts. There is no moral theory knowledge of which suffices to settle deliberation about what to (...)
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  24. Feeling as Consciousness of Value.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):71-88.
    A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three (...)
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  25. Natural goodness without natural history.Parisa Moosavi - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:78-100.
    Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to show that moral evaluation of human action and character is an evaluation of natural goodness—a kind of evaluation that applies to living things in virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. The standard neo‐Aristotelian view defines natural goodness by way of generic statements describing the natural history, or the ‘characteristic’ life, of a species. In this paper, I argue that this conception of natural goodness commits the neo‐Aristotelian view to a problematic (...)
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  26. Norm and Ideal: Kant’s Postulates of Practical Reason and their Heideggerian Reconceptualization.Irene McMullin - 2020 - In Matt Burch & Irene McMullin (eds.), Transcending Reason: Heidegger on Rationality. New York, NY, USA: pp. 187-210.
    The received view of Martin Heidegger’s work is that he leaves little room for reason in the practice of philosophy or the conduct of life. Citing his much-scorned remark that reason is the “stiff-necked adversary of thought”, critics argue that Heidegger’s philosophy effectively severs the tie between reason and normativity, leaving anyone who adheres to his position without recourse to justifying reasons for their beliefs and actions. Transcending Reason is a collection of essays by leading Heidegger scholars that challenges this (...)
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  27. A Holist Balance Scale.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-21.
    Scale-based models of weighing reasons face challenges concerning the context-sensitivity of weight, the aggregation of weight, and the methodology for determining what the weights of reasons are. I resolve these challenges.
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  28. On the Analogy between the Sensing of Secondary Qualities and the Feeling of Values: Landmann-Kalischer’s Epistemic Project, Its Historical Context, and Its Significance for Current Meta-Ethics.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Beatrice Centi, Faustino Fabbianelli & Gemmo Iocco (eds.), Philosophy of Value. The Historical Roots of Contemporary Debate: An Overview. De Gruyter.
    This paper explores Landmann-Kalischer’s analogy between the sensing of secondary qualities and the feeling of values in her work “Philosophie der Werte” (Philosophy of Values) (1910). Attention is paid to the epistemic motivation of the analogy, the distinction between pure feelings and affects, and the relation of pure feelings to value judgments. Her account is contrasted with two other accounts of the Brentanian tradition: Scheler’s approach within early phenomenology and Meinong’s account within the Graz School. I demonstrate that Landmann-Kalischer’s pioneering (...)
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  29. Hutcheson's Theory of Obligation.Michael Walschots - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (2):121-142.
    In this article I argue that Hutcheson has a theory of obligation that is different in important ways from the views of his predecessors and that his theory may not be as problematic as critics have claimed. In section (I) I sketch a brief picture of the rich conceptual landscape surrounding the concept of obligation in the Early Modern period. I focus on the five figures Hutcheson explicitly references: Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, their French translator and commentator Jean Barbeyrac, as (...)
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  30. The ‘Ethic of Knowledge’ and Responsible Science: Responses to Genetically Motivated Racism.Natan Elgabsi - 2022 - Social Studies of Science 52 (2):303-323.
    This study takes off from the ethical problem that racism grounded in population genetics raises. It is an analysis of four standard scientific responses to the problem of genetically motivated racism, seen in connection with the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP): (1) Discriminatory uses of scientific facts and arguments are in principle ‘misuses’ of scientific data that the researcher cannot be further responsible for. (2) In a strict scientific sense, genomic facts ‘disclaim racism’, which means that an epistemically correct grasp (...)
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  31. Richard Price e la fallacia definizionistica.Francesco Allegri - 2003 - In Rosaria Egidi, Mario De Caro & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), Normativity, Facts, and Values. Macerata, Italia: Quodlibet. pp. 261-268.
  32. Richard Price e la fallacia definizionistica.Francesco Allegri - 2003 - In M. Dell’Utri R. Egidi (ed.), Normatività, Fatti, Valori. Macerata, Italia: Quodlibet. pp. 261-268.
  33. Moral Principles: Hedged, Contributory, Mixed.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - In Deontic Logic and Normative Systems 2020/21.
    It's natural to think that the principles expressed by the statements "Promises ought to be kept" and "We ought to help those in need" are defeasible. But how are we to make sense of this defeasibility? On one proposal, moral principles have hedges or built-in unless clauses specifying the conditions under which the principle doesn't apply. On another, such principles are contributory and, thus, do not specify which actions ought to be carried out, but only what counts in favor or (...)
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  34. Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truthmaking, and Ontological Cheating.Farbod Akhlaghi - 2022 - Ethics 132 (2):291-321.
    Derek Parfit defended Non-Realist Cognitivism. It is an open secret that this metaethical theory is often thought at best puzzling and at worst objectionably unclear. Employing truthmaker theory, I provide an account of Non-Realist Cognitivism that dispels charges of objectionable unclarity, clarifies how to assess it, and explains why, if plausible, it would be an attractive theory. I develop concerns that the theory involves cheating into an objection that ultimately reveals Non-Realist Cognitivism faces a dilemma. Whether it can escape demands (...)
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  35. The Modesty of the Moral Point of View.Karl Schafer - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Harman - have argued that there is a sense in which morality itself does not treat moral reasons as consistently overriding.2 My aim in the present essay is to develop and extend this idea from a somewhat different perspective. In doing so, I offer an alternative way of formalizing the idea that morality is modest about the weight of moral reasons in this way, thereby making more explicit (...)
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  36. The Conceptual Foundation of Morality.Gal Yehezkel - 2021 - Springer.
    This book offers a solution to the ancient philosophical problem regarding the nature and the justification of morality. The importance of this subject matter is obvious, not merely as an abstract philosophical problem, but perhaps even more as a practical challenge, regarding the way we ought to live our lives: the values that ought to direct us, and the ends that we ought to pursue. -/- In the course of this inquiry, a wide array of philosophical topics is explored: the (...)
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  37. Hamburg: “Motivation and Normativity of Practical Reasons: Moral Philosophy in the 14th Century”.Christoph Grellard, Magali Roques & Sonja Schierbaum - 2021 - Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 62:380-387.
    Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, Volume 62, Issue, Page 380-387, January 2020.
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  38. Varieties of Normativity: Reasons, Expectations, Wide-scope oughts, and Ought-to-be’s.Arto Laitinen - 2020 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 133-158.
    This chapter distinguishes between several senses of “normativity”. For example, that we ought to abstain from causing unnecessary suffering is a normative, not descriptive, claim. And so is the claim that we have good reason, and ought to drive on the right, or left, side of the road because the law requires us to do that. Reasons and oughts are normative, by definition. Indeed, it may be that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, (...)
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  39. Four Notes on John Broome’s ‘Rationality versus Normativity’.Nomy Arpaly - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):312-320.
    ABSTRACT I argue that Broome's view of the distinction between rationality and normativity needs more to be said for it to be preferable to more mundane views that connect reasons and rationality more intimately, and that it has curious implications about the connection between whether an agent does what she ought to do and the results of her action. I also argue that the etymology and history of words like ‘reason’ and ‘rational’ have absolutely no bearing on the issue at (...)
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  40. Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics.Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.) - 2019 - Routledge.
    Comparisons between morality and other 'companion' disciplines - such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics - are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the 'companions in guilt' strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the (...)
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  41. Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Several recent debates in ethics and metaethics highlight what has been called the “central deliberative question.” For instance, in cases involving normative uncertainty, it is natural to ask questions like “I don’t know what I ought to do—*now* what ought I to do?” But it is not clear how this question should be understood, since what I ought to do is precisely what I do not know. Similar things can be said about questions raised by normative conflicts, so-called “alternative normative (...)
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  42. Locating Practical Normativity.David J. Plunkett - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    A central feature of ethical thought is that it appears to involve not only descriptive belief, belief about what is the case, but also normative belief about what should be done. Suppose we take this at face value and understand normative thought in ethics to consist of attitudes that, at the most basic explanatory level, are genuine beliefs. What then should we say about the basic nature of the normative properties that such beliefs are about? I argue that normative properties (...)
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  43. Neuroscience and Normativity: How Knowledge of the Brain Offers a Deeper Understanding of Moral and Legal Responsibility.William Hirstein - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):327-351.
    Neuroscience can relate to ethics and normative issues via the brain’s cognitive control network. This network accomplishes several executive processes, such as planning, task-switching, monitoring, and inhibiting. These processes allow us to increase the accuracy of our perceptions and our memory recall. They also allow us to plan much farther into the future, and with much more detail than any of our fellow mammals. These abilities also make us fitting subjects for responsibility claims. Their activity, or lack thereof, is at (...)
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  44. The Golden Rule as it Ought to Be.Michael Kowalik - manuscript
    The Golden Rule, most commonly expressed in the form "do to others what you would have them do to you", has attracted criticism for failing to provide practical guidance in case of moral disagreement and for being susceptible to irrational outcomes. I argue that the alleged limitations are not a defect but just what makes the Golden Rule an effective tool of socio-ontological transformation towards ideal agency.
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  45. Sur la régularité.Mario Barra Jover - manuscript
    La régularité est traitée non pas comme une propriété primitive de certains événements du monde, mais comme une relation d'implication entre une situation S et une événement E. La régularité, aussi bien dans les descriptions du monde que dans les comportements, n'est pas expliquée en termes de règles abstraites (il n'a a pas un "secret de la règle" à percer) mais à travers ses trois manifestations : conventions, règles individuelles et énoncés normatifs. Table des matières : I. De la régularité (...)
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  46. Personality and Authenticity in Light of the Memory-Modifying Potential of Optogenetics: A Reply to Objections about Potential Therapeutic Applicability of Optogenetics.Agnieszka K. Adamczyk & Przemysław Zawadzki - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (1):3-21.
    There has been a growing interest in research concerning memory modification technologies (MMTs) in recent years. Neuroscientists and psychologists are beginning to explore the prospect of controllable and intentional modification of human memory. One of the technologies with the greatest potential to this end is optogenetics—an invasive neuromodulation technique involving the use of light to control the activity of individual brain cells. It has recently shown the potential to modify specific long-term memories in animal models in ways not yet possible (...)
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  47. A Filosofia Moral Kantiana Como Teoria da Aplicação da Norma.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2011 - [email protected] 1 (1):27-44.
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  48. Empiricism or Its Dialectical Destruction?Gene Fendt - 2021 - International Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):139-160.
    Pamphilus’ introductory letter opens contradictory ways of reading Hume’s Dialogues. The first, suggested by Pamphilus' claim to be “mere auditor” to the dialogues, which were “deeply imprinted in [his] memory,” is the empiricist reading. This traditional reading could, and has, gone several ways, including to such conclusions as Philo forces upon Cleanthes, shocking Demea; e.g., that the design of the mosquito and other “curious artifices of nature,” which inflict pain and suffering on all, bespeaks an utterly careless and insensate, if (...)
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  49. Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. I show that there are, in fact, two different reasons for/against distinctions, and I provide an account of the relationship between the various kinds (...)
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  50. Collective Responsibility and Entitlement to Collective Reasons for Action.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), Routledge Handbook for Collective Responsibility. Routledge. pp. 243-257.
    What are the implications for agency – and in particular, the idea of acting for reasons – if we are to take seriously the notion of collective responsibility? My thesis is that some cases of individuals subject to a collective form of responsibility and blame will force us to make sense of how it is that an individual can be entitled to collective reasons for action, i.e. entitled to a reason had in the first place by a plurality of individuals (...)
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