Environmental Ethics

We discuss how biosemiotics sheds light on a problem that characterizes the social reproduction system today in globalisation, how social and political systems threaten life on the planet. These reflections engage global semiotics developed as semioethics where “ethics” resounds as entanglement in the I-other relation. Like medical semeiotic at the origin of semiotics, semioethics elects life as a primary value. Biosemiotics reveals the condition of interconnectivity, co-implication, interdependency among all lifeforms. As such it is an important reference for semioethics which (...) in turn underlines how life in the social, political, economic and broadly cultural spheres is subject to the biological, thus how values, ideologies and responsibilities enter the same great semiobiosphere where bodies and signs are co-dependent and respond to each other in semiosis. Central notions for signs and society are questioned in this framework, firstly humanism of identity. I-other entanglement is global, the condition for life to flourish. Challenged by human and ecological emergency, semioethics considers the biocultural implications and appeals to global responsibility. (shrink)

Contemporary society is dominated by the reality of the Anthropocene ecological crisis. In a certain subset of the ecopolitical literature, however, this topic is framed as a problem of governance. Supposedly, the unintended consequences of numerous micro-level human actions can be addressed by macro-level government interventions. Such discourses of eco-governmentality are informed by an emphasis upon the ‘planetary’ and the desirability of political centralisation. Our article seeks to critically engage with both the notion of a supposedly ‘planetary’ community of interests, (...) and also reject the idea of global eco-governmentality. In our view, not only does the misguided emphasis on global ecological governance oversimply the planetary predicament, obscuring differences between cultures and social power structures; but it also runs the risk of obviating local democracy and could also lead to an ecologically legitimated undemocratic global technocracy. Instead of centralisation, further decentralisation could be key to both thinking and acting ‘glocally’, without expecting too much from political systems. We make the case against eco-authoritarianism and also reject ecomodernism. Recent critiques relating to the pitfalls of ecomodernism can help us construct a more inclusive, bottom-up form of ecopolitics. (shrink)

Steven Vogel’s work makes two main points: 1) environmental philosophy should be about environments that are always, at least partially, human built, rather than about a nonhuman nature and 2) environmental problems require collective political solutions rather than individual ethical ones. This paper addresses both themes, although its primary focus is on the second. It presents a sort of genealogy of environmental ethics, which seeks to answer the question, why, given the obviously political character of environmental problems, have English-language environmental (...) philosophers focused so intently on ethics? It is argued the dominance of environmental ethics amongst philosophers reflects an uninvestigated commitment to liberal, individualist, political principles. That is, the implicit rejection of politics in favor of ethics is itself a (tacit) political decision with real political and environmental ramifications. I then turn to Vogel’s work, in which he commits an analogous, but lesser, mistake, accepting Jürgen Habermas’s view of politics which is itself, in many ways, a reformulation of the same liberal political views that have misled so many environmental ethicists. (shrink)

The transition to renewable energy, already underway, requires a massive infrastructure overhaul. Without a commitment to justice this transition risks reproducing the problems of the fossil fuel regime. The emerging area of energy democracy aims to avoid this pitfall. It unites two key features of Vogel’s postnatural environmental philosophy: the adoption of democratic governance as a normative methodology and the inclusion of the built environment, such as infrastructure, in the philosophy's scope. After demonstrating how the energy democracy movement is one (...) answer to Vogel’s call for a postnatural ethic, I examine a case study showing how a commitment to democratic discourse could facilitate just energy transitions. Ideals of deliberative discourse should guide practices of building a shared environment including renewable energy infrastructures, doing so democratically and justly. In Vogel's spirit, we can see how these ideals can especially counteract two problems: privatization and manipulation. (shrink)

Edward Abbey and Terry Tempest Williams, exemplars of the American nature writing tradition and representative examples of modern American environmentalist politics, replicate the foundationalist epistemological assumptions of mystics in the Christian tradition. I examine the work of Richard Rorty for the encouragement his pragmatism gives to environmentalists to move away from traditional metaphysical concerns and toward a politics accountable solely to democratic reason-giving practices. Such practices, which Rorty connects to the Enlightenment’s aim to emancipate thought from any nonhuman form of (...) epistemological authority, are more adept at meeting the challenge of environmental justice as well as more productive of the hope all environmentalists need in the work to stem climate change’s worst effects. I conclude by turning to Robert Brandom on the creative possibilities mystical experience opens to Abbey, Williams, and environ-mentalists like them, for which Rorty is unable to account. (shrink)

Ethics as a field should, we argue, pay more attention to the (eco)system. Van Rensselaer Potter, one of the pillars of contemporary bioethics, advocated for a global “bios” ethics that literally and metaphorically bridges the gap between biological knowledge and ethical reflection. However, a Potterian Bio-Ethics faces a major obstacle: its acentric focus. Consequently, Global Bio-Ethics remains opaque for those trained under the anthropocentric biomedical ethics that instrumentalizes the environment. This paper aims to demystify two key concepts—Globality and Complexity—and show (...) how a Potterian Bio-Ethics can effectively bridge the gap between knowledge-building in ecology and policy-making in the context of medical and environmental practices. Drawing on an experience in Québec, Canada, to mitigate the threat of antimicrobial resistance using a biosurveillance system, we show the utility of having ethics as an integral part of ecosystem(ic) approaches to bridge health and environment. We conclude by arguing that bioethics (and bioethicists) should become a locus for cascading communication, collaboration, and translation by co-constructing biosurveillance data governance. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a proliferation of “new materialist” scholarship claiming to challenge anthropocentrism and the human/nature divide. Although new materialism echoes several themes articulated by the main approaches to environmental ethics, there has thus far been relatively little engagement between them. To discern the potential contribution it can make to environmental thought, this paper puts new materialism into dialogue with one particular branch of environmental ethics: deep ecology. I show that new materialism appears vulnerable to philosophical problems that resemble (...) certain critiques raised against deep ecology. First, they both homogenize all differences between beings and second, they undermine the ability to hold humans responsible for their actions. Despite the resemblance, I argue that new materialism is capable of addressing these critiques and moreover, that its notion of “agentic assemblages” provides a fruitful way to approach ecological problems that avoids the limitations of deep ecology’s form of environmentalism. (shrink)

Ocean-based salmon farming, as presently practiced, is thought to pose an existential threat to what we today think of as wild salmon. This raises ethical questions about, first, the value of wild salmon, and, second, the value of wild salmon of the particular type that exists today. This essay uses the debate around ocean-based salmon farming as a case study of ‘irreversible damage’, a concept that figures heavily in environmental laws and regulations, in particular, in the so-called ‘precautionary principle’. It (...) is argued that although ocean-based salmon farming may, on the face of it, seem to be a prime example of a threat of irreversible damage, a wish to avoid irreversible damage does not support banning such farming. In contrast, it is argued that concern for irreplaceable value might support a ban. The findings suggest that it would often be appropriate for environmentalists and conservationists to focus more on irreplaceable value and less on irreversible damage. (shrink)

The paper brings together Steven Vogel’s concept of the environment and the category of the world in Hannah Arendt’s and Malcom Ferdinand’s interpretations. First, the similarities between the concepts are shown: they both refer to the networks of things and relationships and, as such, emphasize the political dimension of ecological concerns. Second, it is argued Vogel’s discursive model of politics can be enriched with the aid of the model of non-appropriative relating implied by the concept of the world. Two amendments (...) to Vogel’s project are analyzed. It is shown that non-appropriative relating provides additional support for the central value of Vogel’s approach, i.e., non-domination. In the next step, it is argued the model offers insights into the problem that Vogel considers important but impossible to solve, namely—the question of politically relating to non-human beings. (shrink)

This paper considers the prospects for a green Kantian philosophy. It does so by revisiting Steven Vogel’s postnaturalist objections against Kant. Though Descartes is part of the story, Kant is a primary environmental obstacle for Vogel. Like others in environmental philosophy, Vogel criticizes Kant for his dualism, anthropocentrism, idealism, and nonconsequentialism. The present paper looks into the first two objections. It begins by reconstructing Vogel’s argument against “nature” to appreciate his claim that modern philosophy haunts contemporary environmental philosophy. After pointing (...) out difficulties with Vogel’s objections, resources in Kant are explored to assuage Vogel’s concerns regarding noumena and non-human animals. The paper concludes with a glimpse of an alternate interpretation of Kant that has the potential to respond to the remaining worries of idealism and nonconsequentialism. (shrink)

Steven Vogel and Albert Borgmann have much in common. Both thinkers agree we collectively and materially build our environment. Both also believe communal discussion is essential for constructing better environments. Yet Borgmann does not hesitate to speak of “eloquent things,” while Vogel insists on nature’s silence. This essay examines that disagreement, arguing Vogel’s position is made stronger by the inclusion of what Borgmann calls “deictic discourse.” Such discourse testifies to the goodness of things, but without being either straightforward first-person speech, (...) or the kind of ventriloquism that worries Vogel. Deictic discourse does not eschew responsibility; it accepts a deep responsibility not only for the practices it advocates, but for the wellbeing of its subject. The essay concludes by arguing deictic discourse plays a crucial and ineliminable role in the type of transparent conversations about practice Vogel promotes. (shrink)

The concept ‘nature’ and the role it has played in conservation philosophy have been criticized on theoretical and ethical grounds. Theoretical critiques include that it is ambiguous and implies a false human-nature dichotomy and/or human exceptionalism. Ethical critiques include that it has been used to justify unjust conservation practices, such as colonial erasure and displacing Indigenous and local peoples from their lands. More recently, the concept has been criticized on the grounds that under conditions of high rate and high magnitude (...) anthropogenic change it is not reliable for guiding effective conservation decision-making. Do these critiques imply theorists and practitioners ought to develop a conservation philosophy without ‘nature’? Drawing from work by Steve Vogel and Sally Haslanger, I advocate taking an ameliorative approach to ‘nature,’ rather than abandoning the concept altogether. ‘Nature’ is not an ontologically privileged category that has special moral or value properties, but sufficiently ameliorated, it nevertheless has a crucial role to play in the future of conservation philosophy. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe in improvement: they think that the world is a better place than it used to be, and that future generations will fare even better. Others see decline: they claim that the condition of humanity has deteriorated and will continue to do so. Much ink has also been spilt over what explains these historical patterns. These two disagreements about the shape of history concern largely descriptive issues. But there is also a third, purely normative question that has been (...) neglected: is it better if a history features a pattern of improvement rather than deterioration, holding other things equal? This paper develops an answer to this normative question and explores some of its implications for matters related to the future of humanity. (shrink)

The Free Market as the synthesis of totalitarianism and anarchism --- The most efficient market is the most politically-concentrated market --- There really needs to be a single consolidated global military as a result of eradicating the military other AND a single consolidated global police as a result of eradicating the military arsenal AND simply total internalization of relations of power as a result of eradicating the polis AND the principle of radical economic sustainability which is simultaneously that of radical (...) political preservation as the single principle of total internalization of relations of power only---man is something that shall be overcome. (shrink)

The article discusses research conducted in a valuable biocoenosis in the Gnieźnieńskie Lakeland in central Poland. Protected within the Natura 2000 network, the area is simultaneously affected by climate change and anthropogenic pressures. The article suggests reconsidering the conservation site as engineered by the underwater stonewort meadows, rather than understanding it as an object managed by external experts. It is argued that a broader recognition of how the site is co-created and sustained through ecological processes, rather than solely through human (...) investments, fosters a sense of belonging and responsibility towards the environments that people share with others. (shrink)

Since assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are becoming increasingly important in wildlife conservation breeding programs, we need to discuss their implications to ensure their responsible use regarding the environment, the animals, and the people involved. In this article, we seek to contribute to the ongoing ethical and philosophical debate on ART in conservation by discussing the current attempt to save the northern white rhino (Ceratotherium simum cottoni, NWR) from extinction. Only two female NWRs are known to the world, both unable to (...) carry a pregnancy, and the last chance to avoid sure extinction relies on pushing the boundaries of contemporary science through the use of advanced ART and stem cell-associated techniques. The attempt to save the NWR constitutes a valuable testbed for assessing the use of ART in conservation and an occasion for identifying possible critical issues. It touches upon several ethically relevant points—that we identify and organize in an Ethical Matrix—such as the need to guarantee animal welfare, and it provides the opportunity to discuss some significant questions related to conservation. For instance, how far is it legitimate to go in trying to save a taxon? Is using sophisticated technologies to remedy anthropogenic harm a part of the problem rather than the solution? (shrink)

The end of nature problem can be framed as a dilemma: either all human intentional actions are natural or they are all unnatural and destroy nature as an effect. Given the scope of human influence, the latter entails that there is no nature left on Earth. Therefore, the environmentalist project of protecting nature is either unnecessary or futile. Prevailing attempts to forge a middle path – by, for example, distinguishing natural from unnatural human activities – struggle to find metaphysical grounding. (...) I argue that the biological concept of human proper functioning can ground the relevant distinction between natural and unnatural human activities. Only unnatural activities can destroy nature; specifically, those activities that trace back to beliefs about value that diverge from the human lifeform. (shrink)

Invasive alien species (IAS) are globally considered major drivers of biodiversity loss. Because invasion science—the field studying IAS—informs policy and management, its normative underpinnings have become a subject of controversy. Historically, invasion science has aligned with traditional conservation, which is an ecocentric approach to conservation that recognises intrinsic value in natural collectives. This article examines debates surrounding the field's normative assumptions—focusing on the concepts of ‘origin’, ‘harm’ and ‘naturalness’—and explores three alternative conservation approaches that challenge them: new conservation, convivial conservation (...) and compassionate conservation. New conservation highlights the ecosystem services IAS may offer in novel ecosystems. Convivial conservation stresses the interconnectedness of humans and nature. Compassionate conservation focuses on individual animal welfare, regardless of native or invasive status. Each of these approaches questions rigid native-alien distinctions. They argue that invasion science's focus on nativeness and undisturbed environments overlooks contemporary ecological challenges, urging a re-evaluation of how these categories influence conservation decisions. Discussing these approaches highlights the interplay between scientific evidence and diverse value systems in IAS debates, and reveals controversies often stem from ingrained normative assumptions rather than purely scientific disagreements. The article argues that explicitly addressing these assumptions is crucial for managing the ethical and practical challenges of IAS effectively. It identifies potential convergence among different conservation approaches while acknowledging unavoidable incompatibilities. Accommodating various viewpoints involves recognising a plurality of legitimate concerns and values, promoting interdisciplinary collaboration and inclusive deliberation, balancing short-term actions with long-term objectives, and considering both human and non-human rights. (shrink)

Bringing about a genuinely sustainable post-growth society requires transformations in the domains of civil society, the state and business. In the domain of civil society, consumption needs to reduce, and humans need to adopt alternative lifestyles, such as voluntary simplicity and zero-waste. In this article, as a researcher of post-growth and a long-term practitioner of voluntary simplicity and zero-waste, I rely on an autoethnographic study to bring to the surface lived nuances and challenges associated with this mode of living. Such (...) challenges are associated with, for example, a lack of opportunities and stability, changes in relationships, employment, health, anxiety and stress. Far from saying that sustainable lifestyles are impossible, I make gentle suggestions to create better spaces for sustainable lifestyles, while avoiding placing hope solely in individual actions. I conclude that advocating voluntary simplicity and zero-waste must be approached with care, empathy and honesty. (shrink)

Conservation biologists recognize a duty to maintain as much value as possible in ecosystems that are threatened by recent anthropogenic impacts. Until recently the paradigm of contemporary conservation seemed relatively straightforward: the best way to maintain the value of species and ecosystems at a given location was to maintain—or shepherd the system back towards—historical conditions. Among the most difficult theoretical tasks was the determination of “baseline” historical conditions (or trajectories) to return to, recognizing the dynamism of ecosystems over time. However, (...) the rate, scale, and magnitude of contemporary climate change, species introductions, and land-use change make it increasingly impractical to return locations to any kind of historical state. This forces a paradigm shift which is both ongoing and difficult, and necessitates a rigorous evaluation of the scientific and ethical foundations of modern conservation along with a careful reexamination of terminology. Here, I discuss the moral relevance and waning utility of the geographically-based and dichotomous understanding of “native” (or “in situ”) which is an important component of conservation ethics and practice. I then propose a new understanding of nativeness in which a species is native—not to a geographic location—but to a quantifiable set of biotic, climatic, geologic, and topographic conditions (i.e. its niche) that can then map to geographic space. Following this, I demonstrate the unique utility of this concept, which I will refer to as “econativeness,” in thinking through conservation problems—range expansions, range contractions, species introductions, and assisted migration—where the classical understanding of nativeness has become increasingly inadequate for assessing the moral value of species. (shrink)

Changing relationships with nonhuman animals have led to important modifications in animal welfare legislations, including the protection of animal life. However, animal research regulations are largely based on welfarist assumptions, neglecting the idea that death can constitute a harm to animals. In this article, four different cases of killing animals in research contexts are identified and discussed against the background of philosophical, societal, and scientific-practical discourses: 1. Animals killed during experimentation, 2. Animals killed before research, 3. “Surplus” animals and 4. (...) “Leftover” animals. The scientific community and, accordingly, animal research regulations such as the internationally acknowledged framework 3R (“Replace”, “Reduce”, “Refine”) tend to aim at the reduction of “surplus” and, to some extent, “leftover” animals, whereas the first two classes are rather neglected. However, the perspective that animal death matters morally is supported by both societal moral intuitions and certain theoretical accounts in animal ethics. Therefore, we suggest the implementation of the 3Rs in regulations, so that they: 1. Make their underlying philosophical position transparent; 2. Are based on a weighing account of animal death; 3. Are applicable to procedures on living and dead animals; 4. Apply the “reduction” principle to procedures on dead animals; 5. Entail that methods using (parts of) dead animals need to be replaced by animal free methods, if possible; 6. Do not suggest replacing research on living animals by research on killed animals; 7. Include all kinds of animals, depending on the respective harm of death; 8. Are applied to the broader context of experimentation, including breeding and the fate of the animals after the experiment. (shrink)

This paper aims to engineer the concept of biomimetic design for its application in agricultural technology as an innovation strategy to sustain non-human species’ adaptation to today’s rapid environmental changes. By questioning the alleged intrinsic morality of biomimicry, a formulation of it is sought that goes beyond the sharp distinction between nature as inspiration and the human field of application of biomimetic technologies. After reviewing the main literature on Responsible Innovation, we support Vincent Blok’s “eco-centric” perspective on biomimicry, which considers (...) the human and natural worlds as indistinguishable parts of a shared Earth. We propose this approach as a complement to the “evomimetic” critique, which warns biomimetic research against the limits of adaptationism. By merging these two reframing of the biomimicry concept, we thus pave the way for a new understanding of the use of human-inspired technology (such as artificial intelligence) to help the “evolution” of domesticated species into (semi)autonomous natural-technological hybrids. In particular, the examples we consider concern the potential of AI-enabled robotic bases in technological beekeeping. (shrink)

The ethical debate on the moral consideration of non-human animals (hereafter animals) is currently centred on the evidence of sentience in these individuals. Legal protection for vertebrates and cephalopods (and decapods in the UK) has resulted from the recognition of sentience in these animals. Although one should celebrate the significant advances in the legal protection of animals in recent decades, current animal legislation is modulated by an instrumental viewpoint, remaining speciesist and anthropocentric. A sentient being is here understood as one (...) who has the phenomenological experience of awareness, which is the most basic sense of phenomenal consciousness that implies the existence of a subject who is not indifferent to what happens to itself. This paper demonstrates, with reasonable assumptions, that this concept of sentience would apply to many invertebrate species, thus deeming them worthy of increased moral consideration and legal protection. In cases in which sentience cannot be demonstrated clearly, one should assume the precautionary principle and consider the intrinsic value of each animal to designate moral consideration. In considering sentience as the primary condition for moral consideration, science must expand who is recognized as sentient rather than being reductionist. Animal ethics must review to whom the moral consideration should be given. Animal legislation must include legislative innovations and invertebrates in its protective scope. Thereby, a significant improvement in the current political and legislative decisions would be rooted in animal ethics. Opening the ethical perception and broadening the debate are urgent, as moral consideration should be given to all animals. (shrink)

In his Guide to the Lakes (1810, 1835), the English Romantic poet William Wordsworth used the word ‘nature’ in two senses. Sometimes it denoted a holistic ideal, in the manner of metaphysicians, and sometimes a concrete landscape of discrete things, in the manner of natural scientists. The Guide to the Lakes thus marks a watershed in Western philosophy of nature. Although chronologically the ideal preceded the concrete landscape, conceptually the concrete landscape precedes the ideal, much as in Nietzsche's ‘fiction of (...) causation’. (shrink)

(2003). Act of Ethics: A Special Section on Ethics and Global Activism. Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 43-78.

Written from the point of view of a campaigner against economic globalisation, this paper looks at the recent Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the campaign against it which eventually led to its demise. It looks at the nature of the diverse coalition of interests opposed to the MAI, and in particular their use of e-mail and the Internet, and argues that the success of this campaign has lessons beyond the immediate victory over the forces promoting the MAI. It is (...) argued that the emergence of anti-globalisation action also contains the seeds of new grassroots forms of ethical social organisation, based in specific but interconnected localities, a cosmopolitan interlocalism, and that this in itself remains a key feature in the short- and long-term success of such action. (shrink)

The article aims to transform narratives surrounding Utah’s Great Salt Lake, often referred to as “America’s Dead Sea,” by reimagining how brine shrimp (Artemia franciscana) are perceived in science, culture, and art. It introduces the concept of hydrosexuality to bridge these realms, thereby enriching feminist blue posthumanities and feminist biology through art-based practices and queer advocacy. By navigating the environmental narrative of the GSL, the hydrosexual perspective challenges settler science by exploring the connections between the reproductive system of brine shrimp (...) and the economy, ecology and culture. The article provides a framework for integrative cultural analysis that bolsters arguments about the multilayered exploitation of the lake and amplifies voices that recognize the brine shrimp as vital to the survival of multiple species and to the GSL as a unique ecosystem. Furthermore, this cultural analysis draws inspiration from low trophic theory and Queer Death Studies. This multifaceted approach is exemplified by two case studies in the arts, which gradually alter white humans’ perceptions and understandings of the brine shrimp, helping to reimagine the GSL in the context of rapid climate change. (shrink)

This paper aims to engineer the concept of biomimetic design for its application in agricultural technology as an innovation strategy to sustain non-human species’ adaptation to today’s rapid environmental changes. By questioning the alleged intrinsic morality of biomimicry, a formulation of it is sought that goes beyond the sharp distinction between nature as inspiration and the human field of application of biomimetic technologies. After reviewing the main literature on Responsible Innovation, we support Vincent Blok’s “eco-centric” perspective on biomimicry, which considers (...) the human and natural worlds as indistinguishable parts of a shared Earth. We propose this approach as a complement to the “evomimetic” critique, which warns biomimetic research against the limits of adaptationism. By merging these two reframing of the biomimicry concept, we thus pave the way for a new understanding of the use of human-inspired technology (such as artificial intelligence) to help the “evolution” of domesticated species into (semi)autonomous natural-technological hybrids. In particular, the examples we consider concern the potential of AI-enabled robotic bases in technological beekeeping. (shrink)

The emotions of guilt and shame have an effect on how individuals feel and behave in relation to environmental crises, yet studies of the moral potential of these emotions remain limited. From a philosophical perspective, some scholars have defended using eco-guilt and eco-shame as morally constructive emotions due to their ability to evoke more pro-environmental behaviour. Meanwhile, others have posited that there are pitfalls to these emotions, claiming that they perpetuate a problematic individualised focus, which diverts attention from the collective (...) and structural conditions considered necessary for pro-environmental change. This paper critically examines these two differing perspectives on eco-guilt and eco-shame, applying insights from moral and political philosophy and the sociology of emotions. Through this exploration, we try to nuance the discussion concerning the moral potential of eco-guilt and eco-shame. We argue that if individuals are able to break their introspective, consumption-based loops of eco-guilt and eco-shame alleviation, the emotions may enforce an individual ethical demand to be more sustainable and foster an ethical and political pro-environmental drive. Furthermore, experiences of eco-guilt and eco-shame have the potential to spread socially and help catalyse emotional shifts within society, sparking a greater political and social pro-environmental movement. Therefore, eco-guilt and eco-shame may indeed transcend the purported introspective and individual-level focus and have the potential to influence broader collective and structural conditions and thus foster environmental change. (shrink)

Breaking with the orthodoxy, Compassionate Conservationists have taken issue with the way that individual wild animals are routinely sacrificed for the sake of species preservation or for the good of the ecosystem. Though explicitly aligning themselves with virtue ethics, there has been some confusion about what this means in practice. How is the perfectly compassionate person to act when the choice is between intentionally harming animals and protecting biodiversity? And what if the choice is between direct and indirect harm to (...) animals? Some critics suggest that when faced with these kinds of conflicts of value, Compassionate Conservationists will invariably base their choices either on the arbitrary feelings an action elicits in them, or else revert back to the decision-making procedures that characterize Traditional Conservation. In response, I argue (first) that these critics fail to appre- ciate that compassion often plays an essential role in moral deliberation. Second, that being compassionate matters even if it does not end up having a discernable effect on what one chooses to do. When one is faced with a tragic predicament in which harming individual animals is unavoidable, for instance, it matters here that one respond with an appropriate compassion. Third, that even when a situa- tion’s difficulty requires one to appeal to the impersonal norms of justice, here too it is required that one proceed with compassion. I end by illustrating these points through the close consideration of a case study: New Zealand’s controversial preda- tor extermination campaign. (shrink)

My focus in this philosophy paper is rocks. When I say rocks, I mean the solid mineral material that forms parts of the earth’s surface, otherwise known as pebbles, boulders, or a mountain range. Specifically, my aim in this paper is to detail the kinds of moral responsibilities that humans have toward rocks within an ethical framework of Indigenous Kinship Ethics. This responsibility is complex and contextual–like all moral responsibility–but complexity is not a compelling argument to dismiss ethical obligation. To (...) do this work, first I overview the metaphysics of the force that drives moral responsibility with so-called ‘natural objects’: what I refer to as the relations-measure. Then, I detail the moral responsibilities that human agents have to rocks, as well as rocks have to human agents through a two tiers of humility model. I offer one example of relationality with rocks within Indigenous Kinship Ethics–the reverential role that Siedi rocks hold in Sámi culture, both in Sápmi and in the Sámi-American diaspora–to detail the kinds of moral responsibilities to rocks that Indigenous Kinship Ethics commits us to in pluralistic ways. Lastly, I discuss the implications of moral responsibility to so-called natural objects in global conversations on Indigenous Environmental Justice. (shrink)

हम सोच कर दुनिया नहीं बनाते। दुनिया को समझ कर हम सोचना सीखते हैं। कॉस्मोविज़न एक ऐसा शब्द है जिसका मतलब नींव का एक समूह होना चाहिए जिससे ब्रह्मांड, जीवन के रूप में इसके घटकों, जिस दुनिया में हम रहते हैं, प्रकृति, मानवीय घटनाओं और उनके संबंधों की एक व्यवस्थित समझ उभरती है। इसलिए, यह विज्ञान द्वारा पोषित विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन का एक क्षेत्र है, जिसका उद्देश्य हम जो हैं और जो हमारे चारों ओर है, और जो किसी भी तरह से (...) हमसे संबंधित है, उसके बारे में यह एकत्रित और ज्ञानमीमांसीय रूप से स्थायी ज्ञान है। यह मानव विचार जितना ही पुराना है, और वैज्ञानिक ब्रह्मांड विज्ञान के तत्वों का उपयोग करने के अलावा, यह दर्शन और विज्ञान में ब्रह्मांड और जीवन को संदर्भित करने वाली हर चीज को शामिल करता है। एक कॉस्मोविज़न विचारों, परिकल्पनाओं और मान्यताओं का एक समूह नहीं है, बल्कि अवलोकन, विश्लेषण, साक्ष्य और प्रदर्शन पर आधारित एक प्रणाली है। कोई भी कॉस्मोविज़न परिभाषित करने, स्थापित करने या प्रस्तावित करने का इरादा नहीं रखता है, बल्कि केवल समझने, विश्लेषण करने और व्याख्या करने का इरादा रखता है। हममें से प्रत्येक व्यक्ति अपने सोच और व्यवहार के लिए पृष्ठभूमि के रूप में, रूपों को स्थापित किए बिना, जीवन भर अपने कॉस्मोविज़न का निर्माण और परिवहन करता है। भाषाई रूप से, "कॉस्मोविज़न" शब्द जर्मन से लिया गया है, जो कई दार्शनिकों द्वारा इस्तेमाल किए गए "वेल्टनशाउंग" की अवधारणा के बराबर है। हालाँकि, यह भाषाई संबंध लागू नहीं होता है क्योंकि यह हमारे द्वारा प्रस्तावित ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि के विपरीत है। यह जर्मन शब्द वास्तविकता के एक पूर्व-तार्किक या प्रोटो-प्रयोगात्मक दृष्टिकोण को संदर्भित करता है, जिसमें एक सहज संदर्भ होता है और आलोचनात्मक ज्ञान से बहुत दूर होता है जो इसके निर्माण के समय भी अस्तित्व में नहीं था। निस्संदेह, ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि, जिस अर्थ में हम उन्हें समझते हैं, इन प्रोटो-प्रयोगात्मक या पूर्व-तार्किक तत्वों को समाहित करता है और उनका उपयोग करता है जिसमें इतिहास, सामूहिक अचेतन और हमारे द्वारा धारण किए जाने वाले सभी मूलरूप शामिल हैं। हालाँकि, जिस अवधारणा को हम यहाँ लागू करते हैं, उसमें ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि इस सामग्री से बहुत आगे निकल जाती है, सबसे पहले इसे लगातार वर्तमान आलोचनात्मक सोच के अधीन करके, और अंत में विश्लेषणात्मक अनुभव (और न कि विचार या अंतर्ज्ञान) को अपना वास्तविक ब्रह्मांड बनाकर। एंटोनियो लोपेस इस विषय-वस्तु की व्यापकता को उजागर करते हैं: "ब्रह्मांडीय दर्शन विचार की उपज नहीं हैं। वे जानने की सरल इच्छा से उत्पन्न नहीं होते हैं। वास्तविकता की समझ इसकी संरचना में एक महत्वपूर्ण क्षण है, लेकिन फिर भी, यह केवल एक है। यह जीवन के मूल्यांकन के अनुभव से, और हमारी मानसिक समग्रता की संरचना से, जीवन को वास्तविकता के ज्ञान में, मूल्यांकन में, और इच्छाधारी वास्तविकता में चेतना तक ऊपर उठाना वह धीमा और कठिन कार्य है जो मानवता ने जीवन की अवधारणाओं के विकास में किया है।" -/- . (shrink)

Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography is a comprehensive, practical guide to understanding and conducting qualitative research in human geography. Using a unique "how-to" approach to focus on the practical application of research in human geography by providing real-world examples of research methods at work in case studies, this fourth edition teaches students how to plan, execute, interpret, and effectively communicate qualitative research. With the inclusion of new Canadian and North American examples throughout, in addition to international and Asia-Pacific examples, (...) the text achieves its goal of providing an in-depth overview of qualitative research methods relevant to human geography that is both readable and accessible for students. Now in its fourth edition, Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography returns with improved readability for undergraduate students, end-of-chapter review exercises, and an appendix of example field notes, making the text much more accessible, current, andrelevant to today's human geography students. Three new chapters have also been added on the topics of feminist and indigenous approaches, visual methods, and new media. (shrink)

“This is not only the best environmental sociology text I’ve used, but it is the best text of any type I’ve used in college-level teaching.” –Dr. Cliff Brown, University of New Hampshire Join author Mike Bell and new co-author Loka Ashwood as they explore “the biggest community of all” and bring out the sociology of environmental possibility. The highly-anticipated Fifth Edition of An Invitation to Environmental Sociology delves into this rapidly changing and growing field in a clear and artful manner. (...) Written in a lively, engaging style, this book explores the broad range of topics in environmental sociology with a personal passion rarely seen in sociology books. The Fifth Edition contains new chapters entitled “Money and Markets,” “Technology and Science,” and “Living in An Ecological Society.” In addition, this edition brings in fresh material on extraction between core and periphery countries, the industrialization of agriculture, the hazards of fossil fuel production, environmental security, and making environmentalism normal. (shrink)

What is the ontological significance of sustainability crises – and the struggles to overcome them? Drawing on Heideggerian perspectives – in dialogue with Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theories – I argue sustainability crises become meaningful at the level of everyday experience when they disrupt the flow of ordinary skilled practices and their orientations towards the future. Such disruptions trigger what Heidegger termed ‘anxiety’, which implies an erosion of life's coherence, meaning and purpose. Developing skills to ‘cope’ with sustainability crises may (...) enact alternative ontologies that restore what anxiety threatens; ‘skills for sustainability’ potentially disclose new worlds, meanings, values and goals. I illustrate this through vignettes of individuals transitioning to organic farming in India. I show how disruptions to farmers’ skilled practices triggered anxiety while also prompting the development of skills for alternative agricultural practice. These skills enabled new ways of experiencing worlds, non-human entities and the telos of everyday activity. (shrink)

Since its origin in 15th century European imperialism, the globe has been an object of conquest involving regimes of territorial exclusion and various forms of land abstraction now known as nationalism, colonialism, capitalism, and industrialism. Coming to think like the Earth system and generating politics grounded in it could pose a welcome disruption of these systematically controlling orders only if such planetary thinking is grounded in a nondominating orientation. We propose that this grounding be geological wonder, the open consideration of (...) Earth as a system exceeding human narcissism. Following Dipesh Chakrabarty's distinction between the globe and the planet, we articulate planetarism in an emerging cosmology decentering human life while emphasizing human limits. Globality, by contrast, is a modern, narcissistic formation that geological wonder unsettles. We draw on Martha C. Nussbaum's politics of wonder to articulate a postglobal, disruptive virtue. (shrink)

Wild places are rich with meaning. This runs contrary to accounts of vast undeveloped regions like the Arctic as being devoid of meaning (and thus open for—or even in need of—resource exploitation) and to accounts that dismiss conceptualizations of the Arctic as containing substantial wilderness landscapes as an invalid colonial concept. There is rather an unappreciated commonality between Indigenous conceptions of place and conceptualizations of wilderness: both recognize undeveloped landscapes as substantial founts of meaning that are not the product of (...) their own projections. Their senses of these meanings are not equivalent but overlap in important respects and are shared by many cultures across the globe, thus challenging premises of relativism and of meaning as merely locally produced. Furthermore, meaning is a topic often overlooked or marginalized in the context of climate change adaptation and nature preservation. The Arctic is considered as a specific case study to illustrate these points as it is one of the world's largest undeveloped areas and is particularly affected by climate change. The Arctic is rich with meaning for the Inuit and other residents who depend on it for sustenance. It also contains some of the most extensive and least developed or otherwise impacted and manipulated landscapes on the planet—a relatively small portion of which is protected as parks and wilderness, though substantial in comparison to temperate or tropical regions. Climate change threatens not only the traditional subsistence livelihoods of Arctic residents, but also the emergent meanings that inhere in these landscapes. Simultaneously, the meaning and value of protected Arctic landscapes, particularly those designated as wilderness, is also under duress. Climate change is impacting the Arctic more than many other areas, posing a threat to its meanings as a home and as a wilderness. Acknowledging the centrality of meaning, while rejecting the “received idea” inherited from constructivist thought that meaning is overlaid on a passive landscape open for—or even in need of—human created meanings, can lead to new approaches to nature preservation and to human adaptation in the era of climate change. (shrink)

This article provides a comprehensive review of the rather intricate relationship between contemporary environmental ethics, understood as a philosophical branch, and ancient philosophy. While its primary focus is on Western philosophy, it also includes some brief yet crucial considerations about the influence of Eastern traditions of thought on environmental ethics. Aside from the introduction in the first section, the discussion is organised into three main sections. In the Reception: Ancient philosophy in environmental ethics section, I review the initial reception of (...) ancient philosophy in contemporary environmental ethics. Next, in the Reaction: Environmental ethics in ancient philosophy scholarship section, I examine how the scholarship in AP responded to this early reception. I conclude, in the final section, with some constructive suggestions for future research. (shrink)