Related categories

396 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 396
  1. Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Peter Brian Barry - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):5-21.
    Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal Freedom and Resentment, Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. The Moral Addressor Account of Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi - manuscript
    According to the practice-focused approach to moral agency, a participant stance towards an entity is warranted by the extent to which this entity qualifies as an apt target of ascriptions of moral responsibility, such as blame. Entities who are not eligible for such reactions are exempted from moral responsibility practices, and thus denied moral agency. I claim that many typically exempted cases may qualify as moral agents by being eligible for a distinct participant stance. When we participate in moral responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Goodness-Character Threshold for Praiseworthiness.Blake Harris - manuscript
    In this paper, I seek to offer a threshold for when an agent is praiseworthy for an action: that is, an account of what factors need to be present in an agent’s action for the agent to deserve praise. I first argue that praise is not just the opposite of blame and thus, that a theory of blameworthiness is insufficient for a comprehensive theory of praiseworthiness. Given this, I then offer my threshold for praiseworthiness that I call the “Goodness-Character Threshold.” (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Symmetry and Responsibility.Matt King - manuscript
    IN THIS PAPER, I observe a set of symmetries exposed by examining cases of excused blameworthiness and mitigated praiseworthiness, and argue that a prominent contemporary approach to explaining moral responsibility is ill-suited to explaining why the symmetry obtains. The view I have in mind has a distinctive explanatory strategy: an agent S’s being responsible, on this view, is to be explained in terms of the appropriateness of holding S responsible. This explanatory strategy, whatever its other merits, cannot adequately explain the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Let's See You Do Better.Patrick Todd -
    In response to criticism, we often say – in these or similar words – “Let’s see you do better!” Prima facie, it looks like this response is a challenge of a certain kind – a challenge to prove that one has what has recently been called standing . More generally, the data here seems to point a certain kind of norm of criticism: be better . Slightly more carefully: One must: criticize x with respect to standard s only if one (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Never Forget Your Friends or Their Explanatory Priority.Devlin Russell - manuscript
    of (from British Columbia Philosophy Graduate Conference) This paper attempts to argue for an interpretation of Peter Strawson�s account of moral responsibility that successfully eliminates the threat of determinism. The goal is to capture the spirit of Strawson�s view and elucidate that spirit. I do this by emphasizing an aspect of Strawson�s account that others, like Paul Russell, may find insignificant, and then I demonstrate how this aspect is meant to quash the threat of determinism. Specifically, I claim that Strawson (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Nudges and Other Moral Technologies in the Context of Power: Assigning and Accepting Responsibility.Mark Alfano & Philip Robichaud - forthcoming - In David Boonin (ed.), Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy. Palgrave.
    Strawson argues that we should understand moral responsibility in terms of our practices of holding responsible and taking responsibility. The former covers what is commonly referred to as backward-looking responsibility , while the latter covers what is commonly referred to as forward-looking responsibility . We consider new technologies and interventions that facilitate assignment of responsibility. Assigning responsibility is best understood as the second- or third-personal analogue of taking responsibility. It establishes forward-looking responsibility. But unlike taking responsibility, it establishes forward-looking responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Disclaiming Responsibility, Voicing Disagreements, Negotiating Boundaries.Carla Bagnoli - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7.
    This essay introduces the novel category of “disclaimers” – distinctive normative acts which challenge third-party attributions of responsibility in a community governed by norms of mutual accountability. While the debate focuses on evasive and wrongful refusals to take responsibility for one’s wrongs, this essay argues that disclaimers are fundamental modes of exercising normative powers, whose main functions are demanding recognition, responding to wrongs, voicing disagreement, exiting alienating conditions, and calling for a fair redistribution of specific responsibilities. In particular, understood as (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. One Among Many: Responsibility and Alienation in Mass Action.Carla Bagnoli - forthcoming - In Chiara Valentini Teresa Marquez (ed.), Collective Action, Philosophy and the Law. London: Routledge.
    This chapter argues that some paradigmatic cases of collective action, called mass-action, build upon alienation. Individual alienation qualifies as a coordinative mechanism, which explains collective actions performed by large groups. Alienation requires individuals to detach from their personal stance, and bracket their personal attachments and motivations. Differently from strategic and normative coordinative devices, alienation bypasses strategic normative regulations, such as law and enforcement. However, individuals retain moral responsibility for mass action, which are aligned to delegated actions.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. The Significance of Epistemic Blame.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    One challenge in developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame is to explain what differentiates epistemic blame from mere negative epistemic evaluation. The challenge is to explain the difference, without invoking practices or behaviors that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. In this paper, I examine whether the most sophisticated recent account of the nature of epistemic blame—due to Jessica Brown—is up for the challenge. I argue that the account ultimately falls short, but does so in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  11. Deserved Guilt and Blameworthiness Over Time.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - forthcoming - In Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility.
  12. Shame and Attributability.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - forthcoming - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 6.
    Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  13. Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion: Comments on Bruce Waller’s The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - forthcoming - Syndicate Philosophy 1 (1).
    In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most ardent supporters of moral responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. True Blame.Randolph Clarke & Piers Rawling - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    A true-emotion view of blameworthiness holds that one is blameworthy for an offense just in case one is a fitting target of a blaming emotion in response to that offense, and a blaming emotion is fitting just in case it truly represents things. Proportionality requires that fitting blame be of the right size, neither an overreaction nor an underreaction to the offense. Here it is argued that this requirement makes trouble for a true-emotion view. Instances of blaming emotions can differ (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Resentment, Parenting, and Strawson’s Compatibilism.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Is moral responsibility compatible with determinism? Peter Strawson’s first answer is: I do not know what the thesis of determinism is. His second answer seems to be: Yes, it is, and we can see this by looking to relevant pockets of our ordinary practices and attitudes, especially our responses (resentment, anger, love, forgiveness) to quality of will. His second answer has shaped subsequent discussions of moral responsibility. But what exactly is Strawson’s compatibilism? And is it a plausible view? By attending (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Freedom, Responsibility, and Value: Essays in Honor of John Martin Fischer.Taylor W. Cyr, Andrew Law & Neal Tognazzini (eds.) - forthcoming - New York: Routledge.
    This volume celebrates the career of John Martin Fischer, whose work on a wide range of topics over the past forty years has been transformative and inspirational. Fischer’s semicompatibilist view of free will and moral responsibility is perhaps the most widely discussed view of its kind, and his emphasis on the significance of reasons-responsiveness as the capacity the underlies moral accountability has been widely influential. Aside from free will and moral responsibility, Fischer is also well-known for his work on freedom (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral Standing.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel J. Miller - forthcoming - Ergo.
    Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Responsibility for Forgetting To Do.Thor Grünbaum - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Assuming that an agent can be morally responsible for her forgetting to do something, we can use recent psychological research on prospective memory to assess the psychological assumptions made by normative accounts of the moral responsibility for forgetting. Two accounts of moral responsibility have been prominent in recent debates about the degree to which agents are blameworthy for their unwitting omissions. This paper highlights the psychological assumptions concerning remembering and forgetting that characterise the accounts. The paper then introduces and reviews (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. The Out of Character Objection to the Character Condition on Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman & Benjamin Matheson - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the character condition, a person is morally responsible for an action A only if a character trait of hers non-accidentally motivates her performing A. But that condition is untenable according to the out of character objection because people can be morally responsible for acting out of character. We reassess this common objection. Of the seven accounts of acting out of character that we outline, only one is even a prima facie counterexample to the character condition. And it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Agency and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - forthcoming - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. Routledge.
    I first sketch the different things we might have in mind, when thinking about responsibility. I then relate each of those to possible investigations of human agency. The most interesting such relation, in my opinion, is that between agency and what I call “responsibility as mattering.” I offer some hypotheses about that relation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Reactive Attitudes, Relationships, and Addiction.Jeanette Kennett, Doug McConnell & Anke Snoek - forthcoming - In S. Ahmed & Hanna Pickard (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Addiction. London, UK: Routledge.
    In this chapter we focus on the structure of close personal relations and diagnose how these relationships are disrupted by addiction. We draw upon Peter Strawson’s landmark paper ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (2008, first published 1962) to argue that loved ones of those with addiction veer between, (1) reactive attitudes of blame and resentment generated by disappointed expectations of goodwill and reciprocity, and (2) the detached objective stance from which the addicted person is seen as less blameworthy but also as less (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Responsibility-Foundation: Still Needed and Still Missing.Stephen Kershnar & Robert M. Kelly - forthcoming - Science, Religion and Culture.
    Responsibility is impossible because there is no responsibility-maker and there needs to be one if people are morally responsible. The two most plausible candidates, psychology and decision, fail. A person is not responsible for an unchosen psychology or a psychology that was chosen when the person is not responsible for the choice. This can be seen in intuitions about instantly-created and manipulated people. This result is further supported by the notion that, in general, the right, the good, and virtue rest (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. N-1 Guilty Men.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In The Future of Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    We discuss the difficulties that arise for standard reasons-first theories by looking at a case in which an agent who seems initially to know that n individuals are responsible for wrongdoing learns that n-1 are guilty. On the one hand, if this agent can retain their initial knowledge, it seems the agent should be able to believe in at least n-1 cases that the relevant subject is culpable, blame this agent for wrongdoing, and punish accordingly. Since we're not primarily interested (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Review of Brandon Warmke, Dana Kay Nelkin, and Michael McKenna (Eds.), 'Forgiveness and its Moral Dimensions' (OUP, 2021). [REVIEW]Abraham Mathew - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
  25. Computing and Moral Responsibility.Merel Noorman - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  26. Toward a Reactive Attitudes Theodicy.Garrett Pendergraft - forthcoming - In Peter Furlong & Leigh Vicens (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. pp. 231–50.
    According to the argument from gratuitous evil, if God were to exist, then gratuitous evil wouldn’t; but gratuitous evil does exist, so God doesn’t. We can evaluate different views of divine providence with respect to the resources they are able to bring to bear when encountering this argument. By these lights, theological determinism is often seen as especially problematic: the determinist is seen as having an impoverished set of resources to draw from in her attempts to respond to the argument (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Situationism, Subjunctive Hypocrisy and Standing to Blame.Adam Piovarchy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    A number of philosophers have that argued subjects who act wrongly in the situationist psychology experiments are morally responsible for their actions, and therefore blameworthy. In this paper, I argue that though the obedient subjects in Milgram’s obedience to authority experiments are blameworthy, it is inappropriate for most of us to blame them. This is because most of us lack the standing to blame these subjects since we would have acted in the same manner they did. On Todd’s (2019) recent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  28. A Comprehensive Account of Blame: Self-Blame, Non-Moral Blame, and Blame for the Non-Voluntary.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge:
    Blame is multifarious. It can be passionate or dispassionate. It can be expressed or kept private. We blame both the living and the dead. And we blame ourselves as well as others. What’s more, we blame ourselves, not only for our moral failings, but also for our non-moral failings: for our aesthetic bad taste, gustatory self-indulgence, or poor athletic performance. And we blame ourselves both for things over which we exerted agential control (e.g., our voluntary acts) and for things over (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  29. Control, Attitudes, and Accountability.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    It seems that we can be directly accountable for our reasons-responsive attitudes—e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions. Yet, we rarely, if ever, have volitional control over such attitudes, volitional control being the sort of control that we exert over our intentional actions. This presents a trilemma: (Horn 1) deny that we can be directly accountable for our reasons-responsive attitudes, (Horn 2) deny that φ’s being under our control is necessary for our being directly accountable for φ-ing, or (Horn 3) deny (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  30. A Shelter From Luck: The Morality System Reconstructed.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - In András Szigeti & Matthew Talbert (eds.), Morality and Agency: Themes from Bernard Williams. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 182-209.
    Far from being indiscriminately critical of the ideas he associated with the morality system, Bernard Williams offered vindicatory explanations of its crucial building blocks, such as the moral/non-moral distinction, the idea of obligation, the voluntary/involuntary distinction, and the practice of blame. The rationale for these concessive moves, I argue, is that understanding what these ideas do for us when they are not in the service of the system is just as important to leading us out of the system as the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Free Will and the Tragic Predicament: Making Sense of Williams.Paul Russell - forthcoming - In Morality and Agency: Themes from Bernard Williams. New York, NY, USA: pp. 163-183.
    Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams -/- The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. A Kantian Quality of Will Account of Excuses.Matthé Scholten - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-27.
    It is a common picture that Kant is committed to an uncompromising account of moral responsibility that leaves no room for excuses. I argue that this picture is mistaken. More specifically, I reconstruct a Kantian quality of will account of excuses according to which an agent is excused for performing a morally wrong (or omitting a morally obligatory) action if and only if the action (or omission) does not manifest a lack of good will on the part of the agent. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Partial Desert.Tamler Sommers - forthcoming - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Theories of moral desert focus only on the personal culpability of the agent to determine the amount of blame and punishment the agent deserves. I defend an alternative account of desert, one that does not focus only facts about offenders and their offenses. In this revised framework, personal culpability can do no more than set upper and lower limits for deserved blame and punishment. For more precise judgments within that spectrum, additional factors must be considered, factors that are independent of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Don't Suffer in Silence: A Self-Help Guide to Self-Blame.Hannah Tierney - forthcoming - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
    There are better and worse ways to blame others. Likewise, there are better and worse ways to blame yourself. And though there is an ever-expanding literature on the norms that govern our blaming practices, relatively little attention has been paid to the norms that govern expressions of self-blame. In this essay, I argue that when we blame ourselves, we ought not do so privately. Rather, we should, ceteris paribus, express our self-blame to those we have wronged. I then explore how (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Consequentialism and Our Best Selves.Miles Tucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    I develop and defend a maximizing theory of moral motivation: I claim that consequentialists should recommend only those desires, emotions, and dispositions that will make the outcome best. I advance a conservative account of the motives that are possible for us; I say that a motive is an alternative if and only if it is in our psychological control. The resulting theory is less demanding than its competitors. It also permits us to maintain many of the motivations that we value (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Free Will Skepticism and Criminals as Ends in Themselves.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. New York:
    This chapter offers non-retributive, broadly Kantian justifications of punishment and remorse which can be endorsed by free will skeptics. We lose our grip on some Kantian ideas if we become skeptical about free will, but we can preserve some important ones which can do valuable work for free will skeptics. The justification of punishment presented here has consequentialist features but is deontologically constrained by our duty to avoid using others as mere means. It draws on a modified Rawlsian original position (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. The Epistemic Condition.Jan Willem Wieland - forthcoming - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press.
    This introduction provides an overview of the current state of the debate on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In sect. 1, we discuss the main concepts ‘ignorance’ and ‘responsibility’. In sect. 2, we ask why agents should inform themselves. In sect. 3, we describe what we take to be the core agreement among main participants in the debate. In sect. 4, we explain how this agreement invites a regress argument with a revisionist implication. In sect. 5, we provide an (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  39. Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2475-2505.
    The New Evil Demon Problem presents a serious challenge to externalist theories of epistemic justification. In recent years, externalists have developed a number of strategies for responding to the problem. A popular line of response involves distinguishing between a belief’s being epistemically justified and a subject’s being epistemically blameless for holding it. The apparently problematic intuitions the New Evil Demon Problem elicits, proponents of this response claim, track the fact that the deceived subject is epistemically blameless for believing as she (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Participant Reactive Attitudes and the Puzzle of Free Will.Piers Benn - 2022 - The Philosophers' Magazine 97:66-73.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Blame, Deserved Guilt, and Harms to Standing.Gunnar Björnsson - 2022 - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-blame and moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press. pp. 198–216.
    Central cases of moral blame suggest that blame presupposes that its target deserves to feel guilty, and that if one is blameworthy to some degree, one deserves to feel guilt to a corresponding degree. This, some think, is what explains why being blameworthy for something presupposes having had a strong kind of control over it: only given such control is the suffering involved in feeling guilt deserved. This chapter argues that all this is wrong. As evidenced by a wider range (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Diversity and Moral Address.Daphne Brandenburg - 2022 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 39 (4):631-644.
    This article evaluates communicative approaches to responsibility within the Strawsonian tradition. These approaches consider reactive attitudes to be forms of moral address and consider responsiveness to moral address a condition on responsible agency. The article consists of a critical and a positive part. In the first part, I identify a risk for these theories. They often provide an overly narrow account of how we can communicate with others about perceived moral disregard. I argue that, when read this way, a conversational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility.Andreas Carlsson (ed.) - 2022 - New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Self-blame is an integral part of our lives. We often blame ourselves for our failings and experience familiar unpleasant emotions such as guilt, shame, regret, or remorse. Self-blame is also what we often aim for when we blame others: we want the people we blame to recognize their wrongdoing and blame themselves for it. Moreover, self-blame is typically considered a necessary condition for forgiveness. However, until now, self-blame has not been an integral part of the theoretical debate on moral responsibility. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. A Review of Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy. [REVIEW]Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):215-221.
    In this review, I summarize Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy and raise some worries concerning three aspects of her book: her account of the knowledge condition on moral responsibility, her notion of blame and its justification as well as Mason’s conception of extended blameworthiness.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Precis of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 (46):120-125.
  46. Retributivism, Free Will Skepticism, and the Public Health-Quarantine Model: Replies to Kennedy, Walen, Corrado, Sifferd, Pereboom, and Shaw.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 (46):161-216.
  47. Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Reason to Feel Guilty.Randolph Clarke & Piers Rawling - 2022 - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 217-36.
    Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, S, is blameworthy for performing an act of A-ing. We advance a slightly qualified version of the following thesis: -/- (Reason) F is (at some time) a reason for S to feel guilty (to some extent) for A-ing. -/- Leaving implicit the qualification concerning extent, we claim as well: -/- (Desert) S's having this reason suffices for S’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing. -/- We also advance a third (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Taking the Straight Path. P.F. Strawson's Later Work on Freedom and Responsibility.Benjamin De Mesel - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (12):1-17.
    I highlight three features of P.F. Strawson’s later, neglected work on freedom and responsibility. First, in response to a criticism by Rajendra Prasad, Strawson explicitly rejects an argument put forward in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ against the relevance of determinism to moral responsibility. Second, his remarkable acceptance of Prasad’s criticism motivates him to take the ‘straight path’, that is, to be straightforward about the relation between determinism, freedom, the ability to do otherwise and the conditions of responsibility. He claims that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Artificial Intelligence Systems, Responsibility and Agential Self-Awareness.Lydia Farina - 2022 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2021. Berlin, Germany: pp. 15-25.
    This paper investigates the claim that artificial Intelligence Systems cannot be held morally responsible because they do not have an ability for agential self-awareness e.g. they cannot be aware that they are the agents of an action. The main suggestion is that if agential self-awareness and related first person representations presuppose an awareness of a self, the possibility of responsible artificial intelligence systems cannot be evaluated independently of research conducted on the nature of the self. Focusing on a specific account (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 396