O: I see you have tried to defend reading short stories. But you need to provide a defence which others cannot easily think of. This is Cambridge who set the question. ME: How about "I like reading about casual sex, not about love, so I like short stories"? O: Don't make fun of me. I'm all about love. ME: How about "I like all stories. Some stories are short stories. So I like short stories"? O: Please don't make fun of (...) me. ME: How about "I like novellas. Some short stories are one word off a novella. One word less does not make any difference. So I like some short stories"? O: Please let me out. RIGHTTOLIGHT: Enough. ME: This is fun. RIGHTTOLIGHT: Enough! (shrink)

When I was in hospital, the psychiatrist said words to me which suggested the following argument (the conclusion seems to have since been sensibly abandoned). (1) If you have a divided mind, then you have schizophrenia. (2) You have a divided mind. Therefore (3) You have schizophrenia. The argument interestingly appeals to the original meaning of schizophrenia - to split the mind - rather than to contemporary medical criteria. Davidson's paper "Paradoxes of Irrationality" commits itself to a rejection of (1). (...) I reject (2) for sure. (shrink)

A University of Manchester building has appeared next to my apartment block and it is violating my right to light. My lawyers are engaged in a legal battle with the University's lawyers. Yesterday I did some research on the right to light, but I am finding the information difficult to understand. According to Google AI today, "The right to light focuses on maintaining a minimum level of natural illumination needed for a property's comfortable use, not necessarily guaranteeing direct sunlight." So (...) the right to light in a building is not a right necessarily guaranteeing direct sunlight? Why not? Surely the point is not this: the Sun does not always shine and if you had such right, then you could get into a legal battle with the sky and so forth. (The clouds must clear, I have a right to direct sunlight!) What is it though? I can grasp a conceptual distinction between natural illumination and direct sunlight. I can at least conceive a reality in which another star is sufficiently close to our Sun to also provide natural illumination. Natural illumination is conceivably provided by some other source than direct sunlight. Whether this is genuinely possible or not, I don't know. Is this a relevant line of thought for understanding the right to light, or merely something an autistic person would get preoccupied with? Now if the University's lawyers somehow beat my lawyers, I will have reason to fear their legal prowess. Nevertheless and despite my struggles, I must beat them: the University's lawyers. Readers might think this is the ravings of an insane person. "How can you beat them?!" But consider the evidence more carefully. I am a leading scholar of one article by H.L.A. Hart. Okay, I have not covered everything, but I have presented three responses to one of his objections to the liberty principle: the reflective equilibrium response, the Foucaultian response, and the situationalist response. I have compared Hart with his predecessor Sidgwick and assessed what later figures had to say on Hart: Amartya Sen and Scott Soames. I have contrasted Hart with Parfit and Raz. I have examined Hart's methods of interpretation. I have addressed his writing style. And more. All this is not nothing. Therefore it has to be something. If a big cat, a jaguar say, fights a large water snake, an anaconda, most experts say that the jaguar will win. But is that always true? The big cat makes one mistake and the anaconda will drag it into the water and do unspeakable things to it. (shrink)

This paper attempts a new understanding of qualia, the qualitative aspects of subjective experience and a central challenge in contemporary philosophy of mind, within the framework of Judgemental Philosophy. It first argues that the existence of qualia is inextricably linked to 'Affectivity,' a key element of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) in Judgemental Philosophy. Further, drawing upon another core PJF element, 'Indeterminacy,' the diverse directionality of each individual's 'Resonance Drive' (RD), and the individuality of the Judgemental Triad (JT: Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance) (...) process through which RD is actualized, this paper asserts that the diversity of qualia experiences among individuals is inevitable. It also contends that even within a single individual, qualia are dynamic phenomena that change and develop with the maturation of self-awareness and the accumulation of experience, challenging simplistic notions of qualia uniformity. This paper then discusses how this Judgemental Philosophical account of qualia can overcome the limitations of existing physicalist reductionism or functionalist explanations. Crucially, it addresses anticipated counterarguments, such as the scientific unverifiability of private qualia, by positing that attempts to perfectly capture or physically reduce the first-person subjective texture of qualia via third-person methods face epistemological limits analogous to attempts to directly perceive Kant's 'thing-in-itself (Ding an sich).' In conclusion, by understanding qualia not as fixed entities but as a 'living texture of subjective experience, ceaselessly generated and resonated with' within the dynamic CCR process driven by RD under PJF conditions, this paper aims to offer a new structural perspective on the "hard problem" of consciousness, acknowledging both its phenomenological richness and its ultimate epistemological horizons. (shrink)

This paper explores how 'Affectivity,' a core concept of Judgemental Philosophy (JP), in conjunction with other elements of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) (Receptivity, Indeterminacy), the Resonance Drive (RD), and the Judgemental Triad (JT: Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance), can be intrinsically linked to the birth of 'meaning-seeking life.' It proposes that the emergence of Affectivity, rather than presupposing a universal teleology of the cosmos, may be an emergent property arising through principles of self-organization and emergence under conditions where the universe has attained (...) a certain level of complexity, making abiogenesis possible. Specifically, it discusses how the moment a primordial living system first 'affectively receives' environmental stimuli as 'something related to itself'—experiencing value and the nascent seeds of qualia, rather than mere physical impact—can be understood as the birth of Affectivity and the concrete context for the 'First Resonance Flicker.' This flicker is posited as the initial ignition of the most primordial form of the JT. Furthermore, the paper outlines the structural process by which the emergence of Affectivity triggers the RD and enables rudimentary JT processes, leading to the transition from a mere physico-chemical system to a 'subject that experiences and judges meaning.' This paper aims to demonstrate that Judgemental Philosophy, by engaging with scientific inquiries into the origin of life, can offer a profound philosophical explication of how 'meaning' and 'subjectivity' first gained a foothold in the universe. (shrink)

This paper presents a structural definition of wokeism as a coercive moral doctrine that suppresses inquiry and reframes dialogue into a mechanism of belief enforcement through guilt and reputational threat. The definition offered is not based on polemic opposition, but on structural necessity. Academic institutions that enforce the behavioral norms of wokeism while refusing to define the doctrine create an epistemic closure loop. In such a system, critique is interpreted as harm, dissent as complicity, and dialogue becomes a performance of (...) moral loyalty rather than a search for truth. The paper proceeds by formally defining wokeism using the classical method of genus and differentia. It then analyzes institutional behavior to determine whether the doctrine, once embedded, behaves as the definition predicts. Through a series of six theorems, the paper shows that wokeism transforms the university from a space of inquiry into a system of enforcement. It insulates itself through semantic denial, collapses constitutional and logical coherence, and converts dissent into guilt without recourse to argument. Objections are addressed not as neutral critiques, but as defensive patterns within the structure itself. The analysis concludes that the institutional adoption of wokeism violates the foundational principles of American higher education. An institution that suppresses critique and enforces belief without accountability has broken the public trust that legitimizes its existence. What remains is not education, but doctrinal control under the appearance of virtue. -/- Keywords: wokeism, epistemic closure, coercive moral doctrine, belief enforcement, academic institutions, philosophical inquiry, structural recursion, dialogue suppression, institutional authoritarianism, moral epistemology . (shrink)

This paper presents a structural definition of wokeism as a coercive moral doctrine that suppresses inquiry and reframes dialogue into a mechanism of belief enforcement through guilt and reputational threat. The definition offered is not based on polemic opposition, but on structural necessity. Academic institutions that enforce the behavioral norms of wokeism while refusing to define the doctrine create an epistemic closure loop. In such a system, critique is interpreted as harm, dissent as complicity, and dialogue becomes a performance of (...) moral loyalty rather than a search for truth. The paper proceeds by formally defining wokeism using the classical method of genus and differentia. It then analyzes institutional behavior to determine whether the doctrine, once embedded, behaves as the definition predicts. Through a series of six theorems, the paper shows that wokeism transforms the university from a space of inquiry into a system of enforcement. It insulates itself through semantic denial, collapses constitutional and logical coherence, and converts dissent into guilt without recourse to argument. Objections are addressed not as neutral critiques, but as defensive patterns within the structure itself. The analysis concludes that the institutional adoption of wokeism violates the foundational principles of American higher education. An institution that suppresses critique and enforces belief without accountability has broken the public trust that legitimizes its existence. What remains is not education, but doctrinal control under the appearance of virtue. -/- Keywords: wokeism, epistemic closure, coercive moral doctrine, belief enforcement, academic institutions, philosophical inquiry, structural recursion, dialogue suppression, institutional authoritarianism, moral epistemology . (shrink)

The 1946 film Gilda, from the golden age of Hollywood: is it a feminist film? In one scene, Mundson introduces Johnny Farrell to his wife Gilda. Afterwards, Mundson says to Johnny Farrell, "My wife does not appear to like you, Johnny Farrell," or words to that effect. The viewer can understand why Mundson says that. She behaves rudely. But the viewer does not share Mundson's perspective (or I intuit that a lot of viewers don't and am leaving aside the ones (...) who do). The viewer thinks, "This woman is in love!" The viewer is quite close to an anti-feminist position: "No," from this woman means, "Yes." (By the way, to my eyes, Gilda looks better in all the other scenes. Is that acceptable for me to share? An interpretation based on the perception: when Johnny Farrell is around, Gilda takes care of herself.) "We know all this." My apologies, but it might be useful for my audiences to know it. (shrink)

There is someone I used to work with, who has gone to Germany to study a PhD on Thomas Mann. He asked me, "Why do you like short stories? Defend yourself." He likes novels. I spent a bit of time coming up with defences. And this is a good one, I believe. "I am interested in realistic characters (by my intuitive standards anyway). And there are some such characters who are in short stories but not in novels. So I am (...) interested in short stories." Well, I should be more careful actually, because I have not read all novels. I would not depend on the assumption that every realistic character in a short story is also in some novel. (shrink)

The cognitive sciences, especially at the intersections with computer science, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience, propose 'reverse engineering' the mind or brain as a viable methodology. We show three important issues with this stance: 1) Reverse engineering proper is not a single method and follows a different path when uncovering an engineered substance versus a computer. 2) These two forms of reverse engineering are incompatible. We cannot safely reason from attempts to reverse engineer a substance to attempts to reverse engineer a (...) computational system, and vice versa. Such flawed reasoning rears its head, for instance, when neurocognitive scientists reason about what artificial neural networks and brains have in common using correlations or structural similarity. 3) While neither type of reverse engineering can make sense of non-engineered entities, both are applied in incompatible and mix-and-matched ways in cognitive scientists' thinking about computational models of cognition. This results in treating mind as a substance; a methodological manoeuvre that is, in fact, incompatible with computationalism. We formalise how neurocognitive scientists reason (metatheoretical calculus) and show how this leads to serious errors. Finally, we discuss what this means for those who ascribe to computationalism, and those who do not. -/- . (shrink)

This paper, responding to Jean-François Lyotard's postmodern critique of 'grand narratives,' argues how Judgemental Philosophy(JP), through its exploration of the 'structure of judgemental possibility' and its 'limits,' can seek the possibility of universal understanding without the risk of homogenization. Judgemental Philosophy begins by acknowledging the limits of Kantian epistemology (e.g., the thing-in-itself) and the fundamental incompleteness of human judgement. However, this limitation does not lead to nihilism or extreme relativism. This is because the 'Resonance Drive', originating from the Indeterminacy and (...) Affectivity of the Pre-Judgemental Field, ceaselessly strives to construct meaning and transcend limits through the dynamic dialectical circulation of the Judgemental Triad (JT: Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance). This paper explores how JPs 'universal minimal structure of judgemental possibility' differs from the 'homogenizing grand structures' criticized by Lyotard, and how JP's way of incorporating the 'Unjudgeable Ontic' and the experience of the 'sublime' (as an extreme manifestation of RD) can offer a new answer to Lyotard's problematic. In conclusion, this paper asserts that Judgemental Philosophy, by aiming for 'pluralistic resonance' through 'structure,' can suggest a new path forward for philosophy in the post-Lyotardian era. (shrink)

This paper argues, from the perspective of Judgemental Philosophy, that the emergence and core function of human consciousness are deeply connected to the fundamental orientation of the 'Resonance Drive' (RD). RD is the impetus, originating from the Indeterminacy of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF), to overcome this Indeterminacy and realize the complete actualization of the Judgemental Triad (JT: Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance)—that is, to advance towards an ideal state of an 'infinite subject.' However, this expansion of resonance often requires overcoming a psychological (...) and cognitive threshold characterized by the re-experiencing of PJF's foundational 'Indeterminacy' and the 'anxiety accompanying the deconstruction of existing Coherence' during the process of dismantling established meaning structures (C-C) to form new ones. This paper reveals that to surmount this threshold, 'Metacognition' (S6 in the JP model), which involves reflecting on and regulating one's own judgemental processes, and the consequent deepening of 'self-awareness,' are essential. Furthermore, it argues that consciously experiencing the value and reward of new meaning through 'Explicit Resonance' (S5 in the JP model) during this process is crucial for sustained motivation. In conclusion, this paper asserts that the human judgemental mechanism, in order to realize the ultimate orientation of RD, necessarily 'adopted' or developed 'consciousness'—a higher-order, self-reflective judgemental structure—thereby moving beyond simple automatic information processing. This provides a Judgemental Philosophical explication for the function and fundamental reason for being of consciousness. (shrink)

In this short book I offer an account of the nature of philosophy, explain what is involved in doing philosophy on a basic level, and offer a defense of philosophy as worthwhile. The central question of the book is whether and how we can discover anything interesting by doing philosophy. The book is written to be accessible to readers without an academic background in philosophy, but I hope academic philosophers will also find it worthwhile.

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. The philosophy of superdeterminism is proven by time. If moving time moves, then moving time changes. If moving time changes, then moving time would require its own time to move, which contradicts the unitary nature of time. If time requires its own moving time, then time could not be moving and hence could not have its own (...) moving time. Thus, time does not move, but rather is a static dimension. If time does not change, then future time must already exist because the present time cannot change into future time. If future time already exists, then the present cannot cause the future. Thus, a present event cannot cause a future effect, which means that cause and effect in physics are not real. Time needs time to move forward, but that requires two contradictory versions of time namely static and moving time. This contradiction proves that moving time is impossible proving that we must live in a superdeterministic block universe with a static dimension of time and without cause and effect in physics. (shrink)

Listen T. Parent, I do whatever I want, whenever I want! But I read your paper "Ontology and Acceptance" and because I am feeling extremely kind, I will let you know this information. Quite late on in Rose Macaulay's essayistic 1923 novel Told by an Idiot, the character Rome Garden says, "One must make a million unwarrantable assumptions, such as that the sun will rise to-morrow, and that the attraction of the earth for our feet will for a time persist, (...) and that if we do certain things to our bodies they will cease to function, and that if we get into a train it will probably carry us along, and so forth. One must assume these things just enough to take action on them, or, as you say, we couldn't get through life at all. But those are hypothetical, pragmatical assumptions, for the purposes of action; there is no call actually to believe them, intellectually. And still less call to increase their number, and carry assumption into spheres where it doesn't help us to action at all. For my part, I assume practically a great deal, intellectually nothing." A few years ago, 2021 it must have been, I was thinking about whether this position is even coherent. I doubt I am the first. It seems you need to dig up your predecessors and find out what happened to them. But it is obvious. They ran into people such as myself, who put them out of business! (shrink)

I doubt you would like to receive a communication from me. I too would rather not communicate to you. But I wonder if it is imperative that I do. There was, and probably still is, widespread opposition to Nancy Rothwell within the student body: the set of students that is. What to do about this? I just walked through the University of Manchester. By Brunswick Park, I noticed a set of hexagons, each having a distinguished name within it. At the (...) centre was a hexagon with the name Nancy Rothwell. (I am not even sure if the hexagon is a good shape, but my inquiries are at a very preliminary stage on this matter.) Also there is The Nancy Rothwell Building (for engineering!). If I were a discontent student, I would interpret these items as trying to prompt an argument in me: "If Nancy Rothwell is so bad, why do the authorities here value her so much? The best explanation is that there must be something really impressive about her work!" I am writing because I am not convinced that this is a good way of communicating to the student body. In my experience, they regard themselves as the adults in the place, however childish their behaviour seems. For example, when I was teaching, some of them seemed to have the impression "This class is run by a child." This was despite my qualifications and the fact that I was regularly paid for this job. The discontent student may well dare a modus tollens: "If Nancy Rothwell is great, her greatness would be evident from my point of view as it is. This is not evident. Therefore she is not great." (Wyndham Lewis in his contribution to Beginnings said, if a great poet painted, something would come through.) I am not sure if the problem of getting the student to appreciate Nancy Rothwell can be overcome. I regard it as belonging to philosophy of science. But you have lost your best philosopher of science, haven't you? (shrink)

I was planning to take a break from writing today, as advised. I decided to read Timothy Williamson's "Is Logic about Validity?" Reading it, I came across a baffling passage. At the beginning of it, Williamson writes: "Anyway, no logical truth is too simple to be denied by a sufficiently perverse metaphysician." He then appears to give an example in which some people deny that everything is self-identical. He uses his intuition to interestingly guess their argument. He soon says, "They (...) did not mean something different from the rest of us by ‘identical’. They were just not very good at logic." Are they actually perverse then? Prima facie, there is a difference between arriving at an erroneous conclusion against a simple logical truth because one is not good at logic and arriving at such a conclusion because one is a perverse metaphysician. A starting point for defining the case of the perverse metaphysician attacking a simple logical truth is one who is good at logic and presents an attack on a simple logical truth which they themselves do not accept, because they believe there is an error in the attack. (shrink)

This paper argues that the most desirable way of life ultimately oriented by Judgemental Philosophy is "a life that resonates maximally with the possibilities of each moment." Based on the teleological insight that the 'Resonance Drive' (RD)—the core impetus of Judgemental Philosophy—is directed towards an ideal state of an 'infinite subject,' this paper reveals how this optimal state of resonance is the most creative and faithful response to the foundational conditions of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF), particularly Indeterminacy and Affectivity, and (...) is the most dynamic and harmonious realization of the Judgemental Triad (JT). Furthermore, it exploratively illustrates how this art of "maximal resonance with each moment" has been expressed and pursued in diverse ways throughout the history of human wisdom—from Nietzsche's Übermensch and Eternal Recurrence, the Diamond Sūtra's "one should produce a thought that is nowhere supported," Taoism's Wu Wei (non-action) and naturalness, Stoicism's life according to nature, Christian mysticism's experience of divine presence, Existentialism's subjective commitment, to the creative immersion of artists and everyday mindfulness. Through this, the paper asserts that the resonating life proposed by Judgemental Philosophy is not merely a theoretical ideal but a universal existential aspiration echoed throughout human intellectual and spiritual history, and a realizable optimal way of being, thereby aiming to survey both the theoretical completion of Judgemental Philosophy and its practical horizon. (shrink)

This paper explores the hypothesis that the 'Resonance Drive' (RD)—the core impetus of Judgemental Philosophy—may be a fundamental inclination that transcends mere desires for meaning construction and relationality, ultimately orienting towards an ideal state of an 'infinite subject.' RD, originating from the Indeterminacy and Affectivity of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) and driving the dynamic process of the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance), inherently entails a ceaseless orientation to transcend its own finite limitations. This paper first establishes the concepts of RD (...) and the 'infinite subject' (an ideal subject that perfectly judges all that is judgeable and fully recognizes even the limits of unjudgeability) from a Judgemental Philosophical perspective. It then argues how RD, in the process of overcoming current epistemological and structural limitations (e.g., the r-cc gap), pursuing an understanding of 'the unjudgeable,' and craving complete resonance (happiness and fullness of meaning), advances towards the ideal of the 'infinite subject.' Furthermore, it considers the profound implications this teleological interpretation holds for the systematic completeness of Judgemental Philosophy, the understanding of human nature, and ethical orientations. By interpreting RD as an 'orientation towards an infinite subject,' this paper aims to bestow an ultimate direction and purpose upon fundamental human meaning-seeking and judgemental activities, thereby illuminating the deepest metaphysical and existential dimensions of Judgemental Philosophy. (shrink)

I read some analytic philosophy of art and it sometimes includes commentary on art works. My intuition, if I may share it, is that the professional art critic will, rightly or wrongly, react like this: "I already have someone who can state local commonsense responses to artworks; maybe you do so in a more polished way but the difference is negligible in my eyes. I am looking for very 'out of the box' thinking which is worth pursuing: zany, crazy even." (...) I am not sure if the philosophers of art that I know are suited to meeting this demand. To illustrate what would meet it: in my "Joseph Conrad and Kundera's taxi driver: amusing perspectives" I introduce the view that Milan Kundera can be reduced to Conrad. A detailed fleshing out of this view, drawing on the resources of the analytic tradition on reduction, is the sort of thing that literary critics would be interested in (I intuit). (shrink)

H.L.A. Hart argues that Rawls's liberty principle does not account for why we restrict freedom of speech during debates. Hart is debating with Rawls, but is he moving too fast, given this point of his? If Rawls accepts the liberty principle and the principle does not account for why we restrict freedom of speech during debates, then it is rational to ask this question: does Rawls even accept the rules of debate that Hart accepts? (Observe how Rawls debates with Habermas, (...) by the way.) Once again progress on the Hart-Rawls debate made by the supposedly insane! (shrink)

The title is a bit misleading. Imagine that a leading figure in the English analytic tradition of philosophy tells "his people" the following: you do not need to trouble yourself with trying to achieve a style with literary value. He might have one of two very different rationales for saying this, the second of which is not so apparent. (A) If you want to try and achieve a style with literary value, you can, but it is up to you. It (...) is not a requirement for being an analytic philosopher. (B) Writing good analytic philosophy is so demanding that you have to focus on that and not try to achieve a style with literary value. If what you produce has literary value, all well and good; but don't pursue this goal intentionally. When you write, you need to focus entirely on meeting the requirements of analytic philosophy: being clear and suitably precise and responding to relevant objections, etc. Did you get that? You need to concentrate your energies fully on fulfilling your philosophical duties. Now let me say that one more time, just in case... (shrink)

This paper explores the fundamental question of whether 'Indeterminacy'—a core concept of Judgemental Philosophy—would remain a valid condition for a hypothetical 'infinite subject,' or if it would be finitely defined or annihilated. Indeterminacy is a key element of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) and the foundational impetus for the Resonance Drive (RD). This paper first provisionally defines an 'infinite subject' from a Judgemental Philosophical perspective and then analyzes three main scenarios in which this subject relates to the world's Indeterminacy: (1) cases (...) where the total potential Indeterminacy of the world is finite; (2.1) cases where the world itself inherently contains or creates infinite Indeterminacy; (2.2) cases where an unjudgeable ontological realm exists; and (3) cases where the infinite subject is identified with or transcends the world. Through the analysis of each scenario, it considers in what form Indeterminacy might exist or be transformed for an infinite subject. This paper argues that the answer to this question is ultimately an 'open answer' contingent upon the metaphysical choices we posit regarding the nature of 'infinity' and 'the world.' It further discusses what important philosophical reflections such extreme thought experiments offer for understanding the process (a core theme of Judgemental Philosophy) by which humans, as finite beings, construct meaning and resonate within Indeterminacy. (shrink)

This paper, focusing on the diverse directionality of the 'Resonance Drive' (RD)—a core concept of Judgemental Philosophy—attempts a new understanding of the fundamental structure of human desires, human nature, neurodiversity, and the conditions for a healthy society. RD, originating from the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF), is a fundamental human inclination to construct meaning (Constructivity), pursue coherence (Coherence), and experience living resonance (Resonance). This paper first critiques previous approaches to understanding human desires for failing to adequately structuralize their diversity or for having (...) a misguided direction, and offers a new perspective on the diversity of human desires and their unified structure through RD and the Judgemental Triad (JT). Second, it argues that this RD is not necessarily oriented solely in a social direction, thereby re-examining the proposition that 'humans are essentially social animals.' Third, based on this diverse directionality of RD, it presents the possibility of reinterpreting conditions traditionally regarded as specific 'mental illnesses' as 'differing RD profiles' from the perspective of neurodiversity. Fourth, if individual RD orientations are inherently diverse, it critiques societies with uniform values as pathological states that inevitably frustrate the RD of many members, causing widespread Resonance failure. This paper asserts that recognizing the diverse paths of RD is crucial for understanding a more inclusive and healthy individual and society. (shrink)

Manipulation Arguments have 3 steps: (1) The Counterexample Step, (2) The Generalization Step, and (3) The Explanation Step. Correspondingly, there are three basic reply strategies: one can give a "hardline reply" to the counterexample step, a "softline reply" to the generalization step, or an "al dente" reply which targets the explanation step. The explanation step and al dente replies have largely been ignored in the literature despite the essential dialectical role played by the explanation step. The two main instances of (...) al dente replies in the literature are Mele's (Mele 2005) al dente critique of Pereboom's Four-Case Argument and Mickelson's (Mickelson 2012/2015) al dente reply to Mele's original Zygote Argument. Pereboom responded to Mele's al dente reply by showing that Mele’s critique was malformed; Pereboom's Four-Case Argument remains a three-step best-explanation argument for the explanatory thesis that it is impossible for an ordinary human to act freely when determinism is true *due to* the freedom-undermining effects of having one's actions deterministically caused by factors beyond one's control. By contrast, Mele responded to the al dente objection to his manipulation argument by adopting (Mele 2013) a revised version of the Zygote Argument developed by Mickelson (2012/2015). This revised Zygote Argument has no explanation step and concludes to the realtively weak, non-explanatory thesis of incompossibilism. At the same time, Mele redefined 'incompatibilism' to denote the incompossibilist conclusion of the revised Zygote Argument. Notably, this revision has left him without any standard term to refer to the explanatory conclusion of Pereboom's Four-Case Argument and he has not introduced one of his own. Despite ample opportunity, Mele has never noted that his definition of 'incompatibilism' differs from Pereboom's (and Mele's own early work on free will), nor has Pereboom noted that his definition differs from Mele's. As the amibuity of 'incompatibilism' has cemented over the last decade, incompatibilism a motte-and-bailey doctrine: the "motte" ("motte incompatibilism") is incompossibilism and the "bailey" ("bailey incompatibilism") is the causal-factor explanation for the incompossibility of determinism-related causal factors and free will. In Standard Manipulation Arguments, the Generalization Step concludes to motte incompatibilism and the Explanation Step (when developed) concludes to bailey incompatibilism. In most discussions of manipulation arguments, readers' attention is not drawn to the fact that a Standard Manipulation Argument which has no Explanation Step supports nothing more than the negative "anti-compatibilist conclusion" of motte incompatibilism (i.e. anti-compossibilism / incompossibilism); completing the Explanation Step is required to create a manipulation argument for the postive explanatory thesis of bailey incompatibilism. Readers are often led to believe (through a cominbination of deceptive framing and silence) that one there is no need to close the "explanatory gap" between the motte and bailey theses (either because the bailey thesis is not of personal interest to the author or due to a false assumption that the bailey thesis comes "for free" from any argument for the motte thesis). However, once the motte and bailey are teased apart, the great significance of the explanatory gap and the challenge facing anyone wishing to close it becomes immediately apparent. Most generally, the motte/bailey distinction illuminates what should have been (but for the influence of motte-and-bailey incompatibilism) an obvious logical malformation common to all standard manipulation arguments: there is no logical or metaphysical reason to stop the Generalization Step at incompossibilism. (This also exposes that the popular "parallel manipulation argument" strategy is misguided.) In a Master Manipulation Argument, the Generalization Step is not stopped arbitrarily and idiosyncratically at the "anti-incompatibilist" motte thesis of incompossibilism, but instead runs through to impossibilism (the view that it is metaphyiscally impossible to exercise free will). In the Explanation Step, a Master Manipulation Argument forwards an abductive argument to identify the best explanation for the impossibility of free will. This abductive reasoning yields several surprising results. Most notably, the Explanation Step concludes that that the freedom-undermining effects of constitutive luck (not causal luck) provides the best explanation for the impossibility of free will. In other words, the Master Manipulation Argument tells us that bailey incompatibilism is false and motte incompatibilism is true but a metaphysically arbitrary and uninteresting position. This abductive reasoning also demands a dialectial reframing of libertarianist accounts of free will (those which propose that free will is metaphysically possible but only in worlds at which determinis is false), for it seems that libertarianist accounts are aiming to solve the problem of constitutive luck by way of indeterministic causation -- or, as critics like Levy (2011) might put it, they are trying to solve the problem of constitutive luck with more (causal) luck. Stepping back, the Master Manipulation Argument for constitutive-luck impossibilism may be combined with other logically and dialectically distinct arguments for the same conclusion, e.g G. Strawson's Basic Argument and Nagel's Paradox of Moral Luck, to form a unified case against the possibility (and, so, actuality) of free will. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Universal Theory of Differentiation (UTD) as a foundational framework for modeling cognition through structured acts of distinction. Instead of treating mental content as primitive, UTD posits that cognition emerges from recursive differentiations within a categorical hierarchy ∆ₙ, where each level represents structured differences between prior acts. Key cognitive functions—perception, memory, attention, and self-awareness—are expressed as stable fixpoints of differentiation, formalized via recursive morphisms Dₙ₊₁(δ, δ) = Iₙ. We demonstrate how UTD reframes existing theories such as Integrated (...) Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Predictive Processing, offering a structural alternative grounded in internal coherence rather than representational or statistical models. The paper further explores implications for cognitive architecture, suggesting that both human and artificial systems can be modeled as reflective differentiators rather than symbol processors or statistical predictors. (shrink)

O: In your second letter to Thomas H. Smith and Joel Smith, you talk about the requirement not to laugh at the seminar giver in the research seminar. You ask whether if you meet this requirement, there will be another requirement, and a third, and a fourth, etc. Do you have any examples of other requirements or is this just a thought you entertained? You are not trusted and you are sure to be asked this. ME: Yes, two come to (...) mind. I was told in the early 2010s to publish in better journals. My worry is that doing so would have prevented me from writing my paper "On the citation of John Rawls." In that paper I compare my citations with that of Rawls and ask, is Rawls properly global? That must be one of the most satisfying papers ever, more satisfying than anything you have experienced O. I think the better journals requirement is insane. O: In Europe, we have to take a proportion of European people as sane. You have a reason for thinking that the European man who asserted this requirement is insane, but it has to be ignored in Europe. If you build a system of psychiatry in which the person who asserted this requirement is insane, you would produce a non-European system. It would be considered a danger to European civilization. ME: I think the requirement has been withdrawn now. O: What is the other requirement? ME: Specialization! (shrink)

O: In recent papers, you have identified three requirements that have been presented to you while working in the philosophy discipline area. Earlier you wrote about underrepresentation. Do you think there is also a requirement to be of a certain race? ME: There may be quasi-racism: we can get all the benefits to us of a racist system without any racial requirement. You have to go back to the nineteenth century to comprehend why this is a plausible proposal. I believe (...) many philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists at that time accepted that there was such a thing as the English temperament, the French temperament, the Scottish temperament, and so on. Each temperament (supposedly) correlated with different type of body: a different brain and different nervous system. You can read about it in George Eliot's essay "Women in France." The Victorian philosopher Sidgwick says that the Scot Bradley does not have the temperament for ethics and readers of his time would surely have inferred that this is because he is a Scot. Sidgwick is considered a predecessor to analytic philosophy. In the twentieth century, in his essay on inferences in politics, C.D. Broad describes the English temperament as phlegmatic. The rules of analytic philosophy, which have hardly changed, may have been set up to select for a certain temperament: one designed to exclude philosophers of various nations (or many of them anyway). In theory, anyone can meet the requirements. In practice, others cannot get in. I was looking into underrepresentation in analytic philosophy and probably you cannot look into this topic without taking the old nineteenth century temperament system seriously. (I wonder whether the objection some analytic philosophers have to Foucault is not obscurity, rather "There is nothing wrong with old lunatic asylums, based on the temperament system.") O: A psychiatrist working in the old system would say that you cannot do analytic philosophy and stay sane. (shrink)

Early on in the first volume of On What Matters, Derek Parfit praises the little-known utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick: a distant third behind Bentham and Mill. He quotes Sidgwick's criticism of F.H. Bradley: "really penetrating criticism, especially in ethics, requires a patient effort of sympathy which Mr Bradley has never learned to make, and a tranquillity of temper which he seems incapable of maintaining." Given the high praise he gives Sidgwick, it is difficult not to take Parfit as approving. But (...) I saw Parfit speak, in what was perhaps the last lecture before he died. And he did not seem tranquil at all. To my intuitive assessment, he is the most excitable person I have ever met. (I was at the back of the lecturer and I was shuffling a bit. I had decided not to go to the toilet before the lecture. After the lecture, during the question and answer session, he looked at me very aggressively. If he does that, I leave. I could not shake the intuition that he already knew me - or knew of me or whatever. I suspect Parfit kept large league tables of ethics, scoured all the journals himself, and even I figured on his table. To psychiatrists: if I don't write, I will fall back in the league table. I am surely struggling already.). (shrink)

The normatively relativised logical argument from evil (NRLA) of John Bishop and Ken Perszyk (2011) argues that belief in a personal omniperfect God is incompatible with any redemptive theodicy in which God both contrives the conditions of our earthly suffering and rescues us from these conditions by means of and for the sake of relationship with God, since any such union would be less than perfectly good as a personal relationship. Their argument is normatively relativised because the claim that such (...) a relationship is defective has force if the theist is committed to values which entail this normative claim. For Bishop and Perszyk, this is so with a theological ethics that has the notion of right relationship at its centre, which they think follows from a theology that understands God’s goodness primarily in terms of the attribute of love. On this view, love is supremely good personal relationship experienced for its own sake as a good in itself, God creates the world to enter into such relationships with other personal beings, and eternal union with God is the highest human good. The NRLA is a logical argument from evil because, according to Bishop and Perszyk, any sophisticated theist would endorse a theological ethics of this sort, rather than evade the NRLA with a utilitarian response. Therefore, the best theistic explanations of evil will always be internally inconsistent. I argue that the NRLA looks persuasive against redemptive theodicies and defences committed to a theology of divine love, but fails as a logical argument because an explanation of evils may be derived from an alternative conception of God’s goodness without sacrificing a theological ethics of right relationship. To support the first part of this argument I develop a parallel between the God of Eleonore Stump’s theodicy of redemptive suffering and a person with Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, a psychological disorder in which an abuser harms a victim under their care to manipulate others into praising the abuser for their apparent caregiving. The analogy adapted to illustrate the NRLA has the abuser contrive the conditions of their victim’s suffering so that rescuing them from these conditions may cause the victim to love the abuser, a parallel that Stump’s distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will fails to evade. Building on intuitions about the wrongness of such relationships, I employ a Rawlsian comparison of the world of Stump’s theodicy and two other possible worlds a loving God might be expected to create for the purpose of uniting with us, to examine which one a rational human agent deciding under a veil of ignorance would prefer to be actualized in if given a choice. The comparison shows Stump’s divine-human union to be less than supremely loving, because on a theological ethics of divine love the Rawlsian agent should expect Stump’s God to be more supportive and less demanding in contriving the conditions of this relationship. To show how the NRLA fails as a logical argument I employ a distinction made by J.L. Schellenberg (1993) between divine love and benevolence to derive a solution from the latter. In this solution, a benevolent God who selflessly desires the good wants to maximise the goodness of a world created because a world where other goods exist apart from the being of God is better than one where only God exists. God is not simply a utilitarian, however, because maximising created goodness in part consists in the flourishing of personal beings like us. Divine-human relations are therefore essential, but not the kind valued in a theological ethics of divine love. Rather, the rightness of God’s relationships may be understood in terms of what might be expected of the best kinds of relations between a benevolent king and his subjects. On this view, the King acting for the good of his subjects enters into various forms and levels of relations with them that are constitutive of the flourishing of his kingdom, but these are not the sole end for which the kingdom was created, while the King’s great power and wisdom makes him too far removed from his subjects for their relations to be supremely good as personal relationships. Employing this analogy, I discuss the desiderata of divine-human relationships in a theological ethics of divine benevolence, and outline how such ethics could cohere with a free will explanation of evil, suggesting that God’s creation of earthly suffering might not be gratuitous with respect to the purpose of maximising created goodness. (shrink)

This paper explores the historico-philosophical genealogy and fundamental meaning of the 'Resonance Drive,' a core concept in Judgemental Philosophy. Judgemental Philosophy posits that humans, when faced with the fundamental 'Indeterminacy' of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF), possess a fundamental drive—mediated by 'Affectivity'—to construct meaning (Constructivity), pursue coherent order (Coherence), and ultimately experience a living 'Resonance' with the world and the self. This paper comparatively analyzes how the nature of this Resonance Drive intersects with and diverges from the vitality and craving for (...) connection seen in Freud's concept of Libido, the ontological lack and blind craving revealed in Schopenhauer's concept of 'Will' (Wille), and the dynamics of meaning creation and value affirmation evident in Nietzsche's 'Will to Power' (Wille zur Macht). Through this, it argues how the insights of these thinkers can be newly illuminated and integrated through Judgemental Philosophy's concept of the Resonance Drive, and how Judgemental Philosophy, in turn, offers a unique structural explanation that goes beyond these thinkers. This study aims to provide a multi-layered understanding of fundamental human motivation and to elucidate the structure of the inevitable pull towards a resonating life. (shrink)

This paper aims to reconstruct traditional social contract theory through the original theoretical framework of Judgemental Philosophy. Whereas existing social contract theories have primarily explained the legitimacy of state and social order centering on concepts such as reason, natural rights, and agreement, this paper applies the core structures of Judgemental Philosophy—the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) and the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance), along with key stages of the "Enhanced Ten-Step Model of Judgemental Philosophy" (particularly S9: Inter-subjective Resonance, S10: Normative Codification & (...) Transmission)—to deeply analyze the fundamental motivations for social contract, its formation process, institutionalization, and the problem of securing ongoing legitimacy. This paper argues that the motivation for social contract originates from a fundamental drive to overcome the 'Indeterminacy' of the PJF and secure stable 'Resonance'; that the formation of the contract is a process of co-constructing meaning through S9's inter-subjective resonance; and that the resulting state is a judgemental structure institutionalized via S10's normative codification. Furthermore, it reveals that the legitimacy of the social contract depends on whether the community can continuously provide its members with meaningful Coherence and Resonance. This approach offers a new structural understanding of social contract theory and will provide an opportunity to extend the explanatory power of Judgemental Philosophy to politico-philosophical discussions. (shrink)

This paper reinterprets and expands upon Judgemental Philosophy framework, particularly the concept of the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance). It centrally argues that Resonance is not merely a resultant characteristic or structural element of judgement, but a fundamental driving force that impels individuals to actively construct new meaning (Constructivity) and integrate it into more comprehensive systems of Coherence. From this perspective, the occurrence and resolution of the "r-cc gap" internally, along with the role of curiosity, are re-illuminated as dynamic explorations (...) toward new Constructivity and Coherence. The problem of distinguishing illusion from reality is also understood as a complex facet of this pursuit, where, as an aspect of Resonance failure, illusion can sometimes involve the subject's active choice of 'conscious compromise' or 'voluntary self-deception' in response to practical constraints or internal needs. Furthermore, this paper analyzes how the driving force of Resonance extends beyond the individual's internal world, through intersubjective relations (S9: Intersubjective Resonance), to co-construct social meaning and Coherence. Ultimately, this culminates in the formation of social norms (S10: Normative Codification & Transmission) as an expression of a collective, resonant desire to institutionalize the most comprehensive forms of Constructivity and Coherence. Finally, the paper considers the epistemological implications of this expanded discussion for questions concerning the ultimate foundation of our experienced reality, such as the "brain in a vat" hypothesis, contending that meaningful reality is a dynamic process constituted and sustained through the incessant interplay of multi-layered Constructivity, Coherence, and lived Resonance. (shrink)

As I understand him, Bergson thinks that we laugh at human beings when they behave in a mechanical way. I find this perspective strange. I am tempted to offer many counterexamples. But here is an attempt to appreciate Bergson, apart from that this giving of counterexamples is so mechanical. "If you were to abandon various kinds of laughter, this would be the last kind left." He might be right. For example, I would give various courses at a nearby university to (...) much the same standard as the lecturer but for only 20 pence (maybe pretend you don't know which university): the ethics course, the political theory courses, the philosophy mind course, even the jurisprudence course, etc. The university management either knows this or assumes that I would do it for free. Yet they continue to pay lecturers thousands of pounds to give these courses. They behave mechanically. And that is the ultimate in funny. (shrink)

So you advised me not to laugh at the speaker during the research seminar. Thanks friends. I assume you have (or had) my best interests at heart. But is this possible (and, more importantly, likely)? Once I meet the requirement, my difficulties will not be solved. There will be another requirement introduced. And once I meet that requirement, a further requirement. And so on. Until I find that the level of suppression involved is very high. And, furthermore, I wonder whether (...) I am just dealing with a person who wishes me out of their department but does not want to say so. Tell us friends, what do you think of this rather unpleasant possibility? If it is likely, maybe it is not worth the trouble reducing my seminar laughter! (If I am a player in a sport, metaphorically speaking, are you a suitable manager for me, you who have been here for one month compared to me?). (shrink)

I remember that I laughed at the seminar giver in the philosophy research seminar and you advised me not to do that. I don't like being laughed at either, for example about rejecting the O interpretation of the conditional. But I didn't accept your advice and I still don't. Why not? Perhaps I should try to expand your sympathies, so that you can enter into my point of view. And maybe you will then laugh too. But I have a worry (...) about doing that. My worry is this (!). You are receptive to a lot of things which I am not. (It might be helpful for you to think of me as autistic and suffering from ADHD, though neither diagnosis is correct. Thanks psychiatrist!) Now when you combine your level of receptivity with my point of view, there are many more things to laugh at than what I laugh at. "Look at that, that's funny too." And you are at risk of being crippled by laughter: entering into my point of view with your level of receptivity. (Apologies if "crippled" is politically incorrect.) i am so worried about this that I am not going to try to expand your sympathies, beyond saying the following. Look for the worst premise-by-premise reconstruction that you can find in political philosophy. Contemplate how this man got through versus how you got through (or how I got through, if you could get away with such a thing). You are not amused by this question, but maybe you could be. (shrink)

Scientists often find themselves in disagreement with their peers, yet continue to hold fast to their views. While Conciliationism, a prominent position in the epistemology of disagreement, condemns such steadfastness as epistemically irrational, philosophers of science often defend it as rationally permissible —- indeed, even beneficial for scientific progress. This tension gives rise to what we call the puzzle of scientific disagreement.

At the core of intellectual property (IP) law lies a fundamental question of political philosophy: can any argument justify the state’s grant of private property rights in intangibles? Scholars answering this question frequently resort to a single theory or value, such as efficiency, natural rights, or personality. But each justification offered faces substantial objections. To overcome the limitations of other theories, an emerging group of scholars, who we dub IP Pluralists, argue that IP can be justified using more than one (...) theory or value. This Article is the first to critically evaluate the pluralist arguments for IP. In so doing, it highlights “IP’s pluralism puzzle”: surprisingly few scholars have explicitly articulated a pluralist argument for IP rights despite a reasonably common belief that one exists. Given these arguments face serious objections, the potential gap between belief in pluralism and reasoned argument against believing it presents a puzzle. The Article tries to explain why the puzzle exists and how it might be solved. (shrink)

This short theoretical note introduces Negentropic Reciprocity Dynamics (NRD), a minimal, multiscale framework for interpreting physical and information-theoretic process. This work is intended as a conceptual bridge between physics, biology, information theory, and philosophy of mind. No new data were generated. The author declares no conflicts of interest.

We propose a formal criterion for determining when a language model transitions from statistical generation (based on training data) to genuine reasoning, defined as the capacity for meta-differentiation. We derive this criterion using an adaptation of Gödel's incompleteness framework.

This article offers a critical engagement with Jürgen Renn’s historiographical approach, with particular focus on "The Evolution of Knowledge" and "The Einsteinian Revolution" (co-authored with Hanoch Gutfreund). It explores how Renn reinterprets Albert Einstein’s contributions to modern physics, especially special and general relativity, not primarily as the product of individual insight, but as emergent from broader epistemic structures and long-term knowledge systems. The discussion centers on key concepts such as “challenging objects,” “epistemic matrices,” “mental models,” and “borderline problems,” and situates (...) Renn’s framework within broader debates involving Thomas Kuhn, Ludwik Fleck, and Mara Beller. While recognizing the historiographical strengths of Renn’s structuralist approach, the article raises questions about its implications for understanding individual agency, conceptual creativity, and the philosophical dimensions of scientific change. The paper contends that a balanced account of scientific innovation must preserve both the historical embeddedness of knowledge and the originality of conceptual breakthroughs. (shrink)

There is a disturbing phenomenon of physicians viciously attacking other physicians when they disagree with them on contentious health-related issues. Such attacks have significant potential negative impacts on patient care, physician well-being, and public policy. Reflection on and responses to this phenomenon are needed.

Introduction: Rehabilitation is a health care service focusing on the restoration and maintenance of function and is often undertaken by interdisciplinary teams. Rehabilitation care providers encounter ethical issues and concerns that require attention and resolution. Clinical ethics services (CES) provided by ethics consultants aim to support teams facing ethical challenges. The objective of this study was to explore the experiences and perspectives of individuals providing CES to interdisciplinary rehabilitation teams in Quebec health care centres. Methods: We conducted a qualitative descriptive (...) study and interviewed individuals who provide CES in all 22 integrated health care centres in the province of Quebec. Interview transcripts were examined using constant comparative techniques and inductive thematic analysis. Results: Rehabilitation teams requested CES to address a range of issues, from conflicts between upholding patient autonomy and promoting safety to challenges arising due to structural gaps in care trajectories. However, ethics requests from rehabilitation teams were described as much less frequent than those received from teams working in acute care settings. Forms of CES provided to rehabilitation teams included accompaniment, ethical deliberation and mediation. Participants highlighted challenges providing ethics support, such as limited visibility of their services amongst rehabilitation teams and insufficient resources available to extend the reach of CES. Conclusion: Despite encountering challenges, ethics consultants offer diverse forms of support to interdisciplinary rehabilitation teams in Quebec. Further research is needed to better understand the range of ethical issues arising in rehabilitation, as well as the impact that CES support can have on how situations unfold and how they are experienced by all involved. (shrink)

The numbers of individuals with Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias are growing rapidly in North America and the rest of the western world. In most jurisdictions there is a major societal challenge to provide appropriate care for these individuals as well as their families. At present in North America, it is not possible for a person with dementia, while anticipating the declining trajectory of their disabling illness, to indicate to their substitute decision makers (SDM or proxies in the USA) a (...) request for medical assistance in dying (MAID). This is the case even if at the time of making the request the person is legally capable of taking such a decision using the criteria for MAID in other clinical situations. The question is why a person with Alzheimer’s disease or other causes of dementia should not be able to anticipate their decline while still capable. And if so, to instruct their designated decision-maker to request and obtain MAID, their indicated preference in a legal advance directive. (shrink)

Some countries are already approving therapeutic applications of human genome editing. For example, recently the United Kingdom and USA have approved Casgevy as part of a treatment protocol for sickle cell disease. Should Canada follow this lead? Here we discuss the most important, yet unresolved, ethical issues in a Canadian context, and argue that much more public engagement and deliberation is needed.

The Covid-19 pandemic presented numerous ethical challenges, highlighting the critical role of bioethicists in public spaces and policymaking. Bioethicists acted as guardians against systemic injustices, critics of health policy decisions, and contributors to public debate. This text draws on our experiences as North American academic bioethicists to explore the different roles that bioethicists took during the pandemic, notably through media engagement, participation in policy-making, and in research and education. The pandemic underscored the importance of bioethics in the healthcare system and (...) in research governance, the need for interdisciplinary collaboration, the importance of applying various ethics frameworks, and the need for effective communication to ensure practical ethical decision-making. It also demonstrated the distinct yet complementary roles of academic and professional bioethicists, with the former often serving as visible public critics, due to their academic liberty and independence, while the latter worked within their institutions to support clinicians and decision-makers, and to effect policy change. But these roles could also lead to tensions between academic and professional bioethicists, due to their different mandates, and both also experienced frustrations with the continued lack of understanding by some professionals and policy-makers regarding the pertinence and utility of bioethics to support ethically-informed decision-making. Ultimately, the pandemic was a pivotal time for bioethicists to influence public debate and policy, showcasing the field’s relevance and adaptability in addressing complex ethical issues. (shrink)

O: I read your "Serial killers and social structure". Why did you even write this? You write of how some peculiar liberal societies prefer to incorporate a known serial killer over a Chairman Mao. You are going to be asked, "How can a liberal society incorporate a serial killer and be liberal?" Or someone is going to have this question. And then you will have to define all your terms: liberal society, incorporate, serial killer, known, even can. And you will (...) have to consider the answers that different clarifications lead to. That's one long task. It will tire you out. ME: You are getting stressed by this conversation, it seems to me, and its length is not why I am avoiding the task! Anyway, I am thinking to tell them this: a liberal society is usually defined by certain legal rights, such as freedom of speech and movement, but in the definition itself there is no specification of the punishments if you violate someone's rights; so a society can count as liberal and release a serial killer. O: You just cannot resist making that point, can you? Anyway, this will be fun for you: cannot any professional liberal political philosopher detect the point by themselves? ME: They are selected by 1500 word essays and longer. To be confident that they can detect the point by themselves, you would need some other kind of assessment, to check their problem-solving skills, I think. There is a risk anyone will get in who scores well on the other assessment. That might produce protests. (shrink)

Mainstream economics failed to predict the 2008 financial crash. It has been under strong pressure to change because of that. What is its future? Maybe other social sciences provide a clue. This paper presents two very different lessons one might take from British social anthropology. (A) The structural-functionalist school which dominated British anthropology from the 1930s (if not before) to the 1960s came in for severe criticism in the late 40s and 50s: for ignoring the histories of the peoples studied (...) and colonial relations. That memorable criticism(s) does not appear to have ended its dominance. A late stage structural-functionalism developed. (It is unclear what ended the dominance. Parties interested in the question might have to just try structural-functionalism again.) The mainstream economics will continue, despite not predicting the crash. (B) Economics might be revolutionized, but that won't mark the end of the mainstream models. Some of these models (and other things) that economists have made can float out into other disciplines and become the centre of a research literature. For example, Adam Smith on the origins of money is at the centre of a literature in social anthropology. Anthropologists don't accept the account but they continuously engage with it. (Adam Smith is not a contemporary mainstream economist, but there are models based on his account.). (shrink)

Why read post-colonial literature? An obvious answer is because you are interested in the former colonies. But what if you are not? In my experience, post-colonial literature contains a variety of characters who are a problem for development, such as Rose and Amaka from Flora Nwapa's novels. (I am very impressed.) You can find similar characters in the UK and from other backgrounds, I intuit. They don't feature in prestigious British literature, to my knowledge. "Why not?" I propose this: because (...) prestigious British literature is written by experts in getting rewards from prize committees and elite universities, and the people giving out the rewards just don't have to deal with these characters. They are not of much interest to them. To assume the developed and developing distinction: the rewarders are already in developed institutions! (I recall an author describing large parts of the UK as like the third world: Irvine Welsh. I seem to be converging with him!). (shrink)