Normative Ethics, Miscellaneous

Xenotransplant patient selection recommendations restrict clinical trial participation to seriously ill patients for whom alternative therapies are unavailable or who will likely die while waiting for an allotransplant. Despite a scholarly consensus that this is advisable, we propose to examine this restriction. We offer three lines of criticism: (1) The risk–benefit calculation may well be unfavorable for seriously ill patients and society; (2) the guidelines conflict with criteria for equitable patient selection; and (3) the selection of seriously ill patients may (...) compromise informed consent. We conclude by highlighting how the current guidance reveals a tension between the societal values of justice and beneficence. (shrink)

Background: Exposomics, the study of the exposome, is flourishing, but the field is not well defined. The term “exposome” refers to all environmental influences and associated biological responses throughout the lifespan. However, this definition is very similar to that of the term “environment”—the external elements and conditions that surround and affect the life and development of an organism. Consequently, the exposome seems to be nothing more than a synonym for the environment, and exposomics a synonym for environmental research. As a (...) result, some have rebranded their “standard” environmental health research with the neologistic exposome term, whereas others ignore or seek to abandon the seemingly redundant concept of the exposome. -/- Objectives: We argue that exposomics needs to sharpen its mission focus to counteract this apparent redundancy. Exposomics should be defined as a research program in environmental health aimed at enabling a comprehensive and discovery-driven approach to identifying environmental determinants of human health. Similar to the aim of the Human Genome Project, exposomics aims to analyze the complete complexity of exposures and their corresponding biological responses. Exposomics’ primary premise is that the existence of undiscovered, potentially interconnected, nongenetic (environmental) risk factors for health necessitates a comprehensive discovery-driven analysis approach. -/- Discussion: We argue that exposomics researchers should adopt our reconceptualization of exposomics and focus on the productiveness and integrity of their research program: its purpose and principles. We suggest that exposomics researchers should coordinate the writing of reviews that assess the program’s productiveness and integrity, as well as provide a platform for exposomics researchers to define their vision for the field. (shrink)

The Moral Universe advances new answers to central questions in metaethics concerning the nature of moral reality, its fundamental laws, its relation to the natural world, and its practical importance. The book’s central thesis is that moral standards regarding what to do and how to be are not only objectively authoritative, but essentially so. Rather than arising from personal schemes or collective ideals, morality flows from the very nature of things.

This paper defends the view that the limits of compromise are identical with the moral principles that set limits to human action more generally. Moral principles that prohibit lying, stealing, or killing, for example, sometimes make it morally impermissible to accept a compromise proposal, for the simple reason that the proposal involves an act of lying, killing, or stealing. The same holds for any other moral principle that sets limits to human action. This may sound straightforward and, perhaps, trivial. Yet (...) in the philosophical literature, discussions of the limits of compromise have singled out more specific principles: Avishai Margalit proposes that the limits of compromise are set by the value of humanity, Simon May points at racial equality and more generally democratic legitimacy, Alexander Ruser and Amanda Machin appeal to the value of integrity, and a fourth at least initially plausible account invokes the idea of public justifiability. After discussing in greater detail what an account of the limits of compromise may be expected to do, the paper will show that none of these accounts is convincing. (shrink)

In this essay, I undergo the profound task of determining which of the following two epistemological positions are superior: Kant or Nietzsche's? I definitionally divide superiority into the categories of accuracy and practicality, and on this basis, I formulate my argument. Highlights of this work include the Homelander's neighborhood thought experiment as well as its beautiful aesthetic presentation.

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is traditionally formulated in terms of whether true counterfactuals of freedom about the future (true subjunctive conditionals concerning what someone would freely do in the future if they were in certain circumstances) even partly determine an agent's present moral obligations. But the very assumption that there are true counterfactuals of freedom about the future conflicts with the idea that freedom requires a metaphysically open future. We develop probabilism as a solution to the actualism/possibilism debate, a (...) solution that accommodates an open future requirement for freedom. We argue that probabilism resolves the conflicting intuitions that arise between actualists and possibilists and maintains certain distinct advantages over actualism and possibilism. (shrink)

This chapter consists of two main sections; the first comprises the epistemological analysis regarding the source of knowledge used in clinics, knowledge representation and management, inference capacity and decision-making, and the second section discusses the ethical problems caused by the epistemological differences between CDSS-integrated clinics, and conventional clinics, and normative concepts such as moral responsibility, attribution of responsibility and distribution of responsibility are briefly examined. It has been argued that to understand and evaluate the ethical problems that arise in CDSS-integrated (...) clinics, it is necessary to understand and clearly reveal the epistemological features and differences between the two types of clinical services. (shrink)

Yapay zekâ, 1950’lerden itibaren gelişen bir disiplin olmasına rağmen özellikle son yıllarda daha çok gündemimizde yer almaya başlamıştır. Bugün akıllı asistanlar, yüz tanıma sistemleri, çeviri programları, bilgisayar oyunları, robotik sistemler gibi teknolojilerle yapay zekâ, günlük hayatlarımıza dâhil olmuş durumdadır. Bu teknolojiler yaşamlarımızı, yaşamı algılayış biçimlerimizi ve dolayısıyla bizleri radikal bir şekilde dönüştürmektedir. Bu baş döndürücü dönüşüm ise dikkatli bir incelemeyi gerektirmektedir. Ne var ki yapay zekâ teknolojilerinin geleceğine yönelik ahlaki çıkarımlarda bulunmanın, spekülasyona oldukça açık bir alan olduğu için bizi hataya (...) sürükleyebileceğini dürüstçe kabul etmemiz gerekir. Ancak, geçmişteki gibi felaketlerin yaşanmaması için ahlaki bir farkındalık içinde olmamız da elzem görünmektedir. Kaldı ki günümüzde var olan yapay zekâ sistemleri de ahlaki sorunlardan azade değildir. Örneğin, yapay zekâ sistemleri ile dijital verilerimiz kullanılarak kararlarımızı etkileyebilecek manipülasyonlara her an maruz kalabilmekteyiz. Çin gibi ülkelerde yüz tanıma teknolojilerinin sosyal kontrol ve insanları ‘damgalama’ amaçlı kullanıldığı bilinmektedir. Veya sürücüsüz (otonom) araçlar konusunda yaşamı tehdit edebilecek etik ikilemlere henüz net bir cevap bulunabilmiş değildir. -/- Bütün bu sorunlardan hareketle, Türkçe literatürde yapay zekâ etiği ile ilgili münferit çalışmalar mevcut olsa da, yapay zekânın etiğine disiplinlerarası bir bakışla, farklı perspektiflerden yaklaşan ve bir bütün olarak ele alan pek az eserin olması bizi bu konuda bir çalışma yapmaya yönlendirmiştir. Elinizdeki kitap ile siz değerli okuyucularımıza bizleri ve yaşamlarımızı dönüştürmekte olan yapay zekâ teknolojilerinin etik boyutu hakkında birlikte düşünmeyi ve geleceğin tasarlanmasında söz sahibi olabilmek için de bu konudaki tartışmalarda aktif bir şekilde yer almayı teklif ediyoruz. (shrink)

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. (shrink)

It seems rather intuitive that if I can save either one stranger or five strangers, I must save the five. However, Kantian (and other non-consequentialist) views have a difficult time explaining why this is the case, as they seem committed to what Parfit calls “innumeracy”: roughly, the view that the values of lives (or the reasons to save them) don’t get greater (or stronger) in proportion to the number of lives saved. This chapter first shows that in various cases, it (...) is permissible to save fewer lives, contrary to what is implied by “numerate” views. Then it argues that in the cases in which it is intuitive that we must save the greater number, Kantians (and other deontologists) can not only deliver this verdict but also explain why it is correct, without presupposing that the value of our action depends on “adding up” the values of the lives saved. (shrink)

The primary objective of this anthology is to make intergenerational justice an issue for intercultural philosophy, and, conversely, to allow the latter to enrich the former. In times of large-scale environmental destabilization, fair- ness between generations is an urgent issue of justice across time, but it is also a global issue of justice across geographical and nation-state borders. This means that the future generations envisioned by the currently living also cross these borders. Thus, different philosophical cultures and traditions of thought (...) should converse to re ect on what is fair to future people. In the remainder of this introduction, we will detail these claims and give an overview of the volume’s chapters. (shrink)

Should people get vaccinated for the sake of others? What could ground—and limit—the normative claim that people ought to do so? In this paper, we propose a reasons-based consequentialist account of vaccination for the benefit of others. We outline eight harm-based and probabilistic factors that, we argue, give people moral reasons to get vaccinated. Instead of understanding other-directed vaccination in terms of binary moral duties (i.e., where people either have or do not have a moral duty to get vaccinated), we (...) develop a scalar approach according to which people can have stronger or weaker moral reasons to get vaccinated in view of the moral good of vaccination. One advantage of our approach is that it can capture why a person might have strong moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine A, but only weak moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine B. We discuss theoretical strengths of our approach and provide a case study of vaccination against COVID-19 to demonstrate its practical significance. (shrink)

In both The Right and the Good and The Foundations of Ethics, W. D. Ross maintains that any amount of the non-instrumental value of virtue outweighs any amount of the non-instrumental value of pleasure or avoidance of pain. The chapter raises two challenges to the status that Ross accords the value of virtue relative to the value of pleasure (pain). First, it argues that Ross fails to provide a good argument for thinking that virtue is always better than pleasure and (...) that it is in any case implausible to think that any amount of virtue (or avoidance of vice) is better than the avoidance of any amount of pain or suffering. Second, it argues that the inflexibility of Ross’s value theory exhibited in his claim about the relative value of virtue produces tension with and mars the attractive heterarchical structure of his theory of rightness or prima facie duties. (shrink)

En este artículo se argumenta que el procedimentalismo epistémico de Estlund, en tanto que modelo democrático, requiere de disposiciones éticas mínimas que no son explicitadas en la propuesta. Para mostrar este punto, aborda la propuesta de Estlund desde la noción de modelo democrático de Macpherson. Con esto, se advierte que las disposiciones éticas mínimas que configurarían una base ética implícita en el procedimentalismo epistémico serían tres: una disposición frente al conocimiento que involucra el proceso; otra frente al procedimiento democrático mismo; (...) y, finalmente, una frente al reconocimiento de la legitimidad de los resultados. (shrink)

Chinese (simplified character) translation of _A Relational Moral Theory_ by Nan Zhang.

Friedrich Karl Forberg is known mainly among scholars of German Idealism for his role as protagonist in the Atheismusstreit. This chapter examines the texts of that controversy, but presents Forberg as a positive contributor to the philosophy of action rather than as a mere iconoclast. I argue that Forberg's position on moral optimism is superior in some respects to the one defended by both Kant and Fichte.

Desire comes in two kinds: attraction and aversion. But contemporary theories of desire have paid little attention to the distinction, and some philosophers doubt that it is psychologically real. I argue that one reason to think there is a difference between the attitudes, and to care about it, is that attractions and aversions contribute in radically different ways to our well-being. Attraction-motivated activity adds to the good life in a way that aversion-driven activity doesn’t. I argue further that the value (...) of attraction-motivated activity is irreducible to the prudential value of pleasure or desire-satisfaction. Rather it contributes in a distinctive way to the felt meaningfulness of life. In the end I offer a hypothesis: when we are attracted to something, we see it as (non-comparatively) good; and it is only when we pursue the apparent good that we see ourselves as engaged with value that makes our lives and the universe worth maintaining. -/- . (shrink)

Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness – valenced or affective experience – is essential to consciousness’s moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects (...) for valence sentientism in light of Vulcans, beings who are conscious but without affect or valence of any sort. I think Vulcans pressure us to accept broad sentientism. But I argue that a consideration of explanations for broad sentientism opens up possible explanations for non-necessitarianism about the moral significance of consciousness. That is, once one leans away from valence sentientism because of Vulcans, one should feel pressure to accept a view on which consciousness is not necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value. (shrink)

This article will address the considerations that must be examined in the design of public policies and government programs to achieve an intercultural approach to the health of the Pu Mapuce Zomo (Mapuce women). In this sense, the proposed objective is to formulate three essential aspects that serve as a basis to promote adequate frameworks for public health policies oriented towards an intercultural approach. For this, methodologically, from a qualitative approach, the ethical, gender(s) and epistemic aspects that must be considered (...) in the configuration of health programs that favor the health care of indigenous women will be investigated. With this purpose, it begins by delimiting the unavoidable ethical-normative and gender approach to highlight the basic needs of Mapuce women. This approach seeks to establish a parameter about the obligations that States have in relation to the development of human capabilities. Finally, three aspects will be presented that the State must replicate in its health proposals to guarantee the construction of an intercultural approach to health, appropriate to the basic needs of Mapuce women in Argentina. (shrink)

In this chapter, the authors argue that the concept of “moral injury” needs regimentation: Current definitions are both too broad and too narrow. They are too broad because they ignore or conflate important differences between the kinds of moral conflicts discussed in the literature. They are too narrow because they exclude the possibility of moral injury in the absence of internal moral conflict. The authors argue that it is necessary to first develop a conception of moral health, and they propose (...) a Strawsonian conception of moral health as the ability to participate in the moral community. The account offered in this chapter thus includes some cases that are not recognized as moral injuries in the literature and rejects some cases that are commonly described as moral injuries. (shrink)

In this chapter I argue that the traditional interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is incorrect. On the standard interpretation of the commonly accepted view, lies are prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, whereas secrets are morally permissible. I argue that, when secrets are distinguished from mere acts of reticence and non-acknowledgement, as well as from acts of deception, so that they are defined as acts of not sharing believed-information while believing that the believed-information (...) is relevant, the correct interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is that secrets are also prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, albeit less morally wrong than lies. (shrink)

This chapter examines the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on lying. It it outlines the differences between different kinds of falsehoods in Plato (real falsehoods and falsehoods in words), the difference between myths and lies, the 'noble' (i.e., pedigree) lie in The Republic, and how Plato defended rulers lying to non-rulers about, for example, eugenics. It considers whether Socrates's opposition to lying is consistent with Socratic irony, and especially with his praise of his interlocutors as wise. Finally, it looks (...) at Aristotle's condemnation of lies, and asks whether lies to enemies, and self-deprecating lies by the magnanimous person, are not base. (shrink)

The chapter examines fifty years of philosophers working on lying - from the 1970s to the current day – focusing on how lying is defined (descriptively and normatively), whether lying involves an intention to deceive (Deceptionists) or not (Non-Deceptionists), why lying is wrong, and whether lying is worse than other forms of deception, including misleading with the truth. Philosophers discussed include Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan, Alan Donagan, Sissela Boy, Charles Fried, David Simpson, David Simpson, Bernard Williams, Paul Faulkner, Thomas (...) Carson, Roy Sorensen, Don Fallis, Jennifer Saul, Andreas Stoke, Jonathan Webber and Clea Rees. (shrink)

Friedrich Karl Forberg is known mainly among scholars of German Idealism for his role as protagonist in the Atheismusstreit. This chapter examines the texts of that controversy, but presents Forberg as a positive contributor to the philosophy of action rather than as a mere iconoclast. I argue that Forberg's position on moral optimism is superior in some respects to the one defended by both Kant and Fichte.

This paper presents some impossibility results for certain views about what you should do when you are uncertain about which moral theory is true. I show that under reasonable and extremely minimal ways of defining what a moral theory is, it follows that the concept of expected moral choiceworthiness is undefined, and more generally that any theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty must generate pathological results.

Drawing on recent work in psychology, I argue that there are not one but several distinct virtues pertaining to willpower or strength of will: (1) the disposition to exercise willpower; (2) a distinctively volitional kind of modesty, or moderation in exposing oneself to volitional strain; and (3) a distinctively volitional kind of confidence, or proper inattention to the possibility of volitional failure. A multiple-virtue conception of willpower, I argue, provides a useful framework for cultivating a good relationship to one’s own (...) volitional limitations; resists an unhealthy emphasis on ‘powering through’ volitional obstacles; and avoids controversial empirical assumptions without giving up on making progress in ethical thought about willpower. I answer objections that the latter two virtues are incompatible, and that they add little of value to hope or belief in success. I then argue that combining these virtues requires a kind of flexible attention which, while difficult, is both psychologically possible and desirable. (shrink)

In her Nobel speech in 2019, Olga Tokarczuk presented the category of tenderness as a new way of narrating the contemporary world. This article is a proposal for the analysis and interpretation of tenderness in ethical and aesthetic terms. (1) From an ethical perspective, tenderness is interpreted as an extension and complement of feminist relational ethics, i.e., the ethics of care. In the proposed approach, tenderness is a broader and more universal quality than care in the feminist understanding. This article (...) opens with a brief discussion of feminist interventions in ethics, with particular emphasis on the ethics of care. Next, the differences between care and tenderness are enumerated and described, in order to show how tenderness can serve as an extension and complement of the feminist ethic of care. These considerations are guided by the question of why tenderness is a better—more appropriate and more responsive to contemporary challenges—moral guidepost than care. (2) From the aesthetic perspective, tenderness is the negation of a contemplative, distanced, impersonal, and rational view of reality. As an aesthetic imperative, tenderness implies engaged experience of the beauty of reality in all of its manifestations. Therefore, in the last part of the article, existential tender attunement is described in aesthetic terms, as a position serving to sensitize others to the beauty and complexity of the post-anthropocentric world. (shrink)

This book is about permissive consent--the moral tool we use to give another person permission to do what would otherwise be forbidden. For instance, consent to enter my home gives you permission to do what would otherwise be trespass. This transformation is the very thing that philosophersidentify as consent--which is why we call it a normative power. It is something individuals can do, by choice, to change the moral or legal world. But what human acts or attitudes render consent? When (...) do coercive threats, offers, or lies undermine the transformative power of consent? What intentionsor conventions are necessary to render consent meaningful?This book develops a novel theory that explains the moral features of consent in some of the most central domains of human life--but that also serves as a study in how to theorize normative power. It argues that consent is a moral mechanism with exactly the set of features that, when triggered,prevents another person's behavior from constituting a certain kind of wrongdoing. What kind of wrongdoing? It depends on what sort of permission is being granted. Sometimes consent permits others to enter, occupy, or act within some bounded domain wherein the consent-giver holds moral authority. Inthese cases, consent operates to prevent what the book calls: Invasive Wrongdoing. By identifying the moral features that underlie this special wrongdoing, we can learn what it takes to render consent. (shrink)

I provide an overview of my work to date (Fall 2023), discuss some of the main themes that animate my work, and briefly describe some of my planned future projects.

Given the inevitability of scarcity, should public institutions ration healthcare resources so as to prioritize those who contribute more to society? Intuitively, we may feel that this would be somehow inegalitarian. I argue that the egalitarian objection to prioritizing treatment on the basis of patients’ usefulness to others is best thought of as semiotic: i.e. as having to do with what this practice would mean, convey, or express about a person’s standing. I explore the implications of this conclusion when taken (...) in conjunction with the observation that semiotic objections are generally flimsy, failing to identify anything wrong with a practice as such and having limited capacity to generalize beyond particular contexts. GPI Working Paper No. 3-2019. (shrink)

According to a common judgement, a social planner should often use a lottery to decide which of two people should receive a good. This judgement undermines one of the best-known arguments for utilitarianism, due to John C. Harsanyi, and more generally undermines axiomatic arguments for utilitarianism and similar views. In this paper we ask which combinations of views about (a) the social planner’s attitude to risk and inequality, and (b) the subjects’ attitudes to risk are consistent with the aforementioned judgement. (...) We find that the class of combinations of views that can plausibly accommodate this judgement is quite limited. But one theory does better than others: the theory of chance-sensitive utility. (shrink)

Some theorists of normative explanation argue that we can make sense of debates between first-order moral theories such as consequentialism and its rivals only if we understand their explanations of why the right acts are right and the wrong acts are wrong as generative (e.g. grounding) explanations. Others argue that the standard form of normative explanation is, instead, some kind of unification. Neither sort of explanatory monism can account for all the explanations of particular moral facts that moral theorists seek (...) to state and defend. This paper argues that we can do better if we accept normative explanatory pluralism, the view that at least some particular explananda in normative inquiry have more than one type of correct complete explanation. Such pluralism is supported by what goes on in actual moral inquiry, parallels an independently plausible form of pluralism about scientific explanation, and can offer principled responses to central objections. (shrink)

Portuguese translation by Igor Bessa dos Reis and Jordana Naves Ripoll Craveiro of ‘Toward an African Moral Theory’.

This chapter addresses a general question: What is responsible risking? It explores the notion of "responsible risking" as a thick moral concept, and it argues that the notion can be given moral content that could be action-guiding and add an important tool to our moral toolbox. To impose risks responsibly, on this view, is to take on responsibility in a good way. A core part of responsible risking, this chapter argues, is some version of a Forethought Condition. Such a condition (...) requires us to not make decisions or plans such that we could not deliver on our responsibility obligations. This chapter argues that three moral obligations can be derived from descriptive notions of responsibility. They are (1) the control condition, (2) the responsibility to fix condition, and (3) the responsibility to explain condition. The idea is that in order to impose risks responsibly we ought not act in ways that undermine our ability to remain in control over the risks, undermine our ability to sort out negative outcomes by reparations or compensation, or undermine our prospects of providing an explanation for our actions that also makes sense in hindsight and to those affected. This idea is then tried out on the case of germline gene editing. It is argued that such a moral notion of responsibility is also action-guiding when we do not know for certain what is the morally right or obligatory action all-things-considered due to epistemic gaps. (shrink)

The growth of positive psychology has birthed debate on the nature of what “positive” really means. Conceptualizations of positive attributes vary across psychological perspectives, and it appears these definitional differences stem from standards for “positive” espoused by three normative ethical frameworks: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. When definitions of “positive” do not align with one of these ethical schools, it appears researchers rely on preference to distinguish positive attributes. In either case, issues arise when researchers do not make their theoretical (...) alignment explicit, leading to value-laden, often subjective criteria being smuggled into science as a description of what is positive. To foster a deeper critical understanding of the different approaches, we examine how these conceptual definitions of positive attributes (mis)align with their ethical traditions or fail to align with an ethical school. (shrink)

In his 1972 paper “A Short Refutation Ethical Egoism,” Richmond Campbell purports to refute ethical egoism via a simple reductio. Although his argument has received critical attention, it has not been satisfactorily answered. In this paper I answer it, for reasons that go well beyond my immediate topic. Campbell’s argument calls for an answer partly because, as I show, if it succeeds against ethical egoism, then variations of it refute many other normative ethical theories, such as act utilitarianism.

The Golden Rule (“what you want done [or not done] to yourself, do [or don’t do] to others”) is the most widely accepted summary statement of human morality, and even today it continues to have philosophical supporters. This article argues that the Golden Rule suffers from four faults, the first two related to the ethics of justice and the second two related to the ethics of benevolence. One, it fails to explain how to deal with non-reciprocation. Two, it fails to (...) make clear that my obligations are obligations regardless of how I would wish to be treated by others. Three, it lacks any special value in explaining the right occasions for benevolence. And, four, it has no power to motivate benevolence. (shrink)

The concept of character has a long history in moral philosophy. Three fundamental versions can be identified: the Aristotelian, the Humean, and the Kantian. The Aristotelian concept of character is based on the model of the wise person, who shapes her feeling according to reason. The Humean character is based exclusively on feelings, having as a criterion the feeling of approval for virtue and disapproval for vice. The Kantian character is based on freedom as autonomy and on the feeling of (...) respect. I argue that the Kantian concept avoids the risk of depending on metaphysics (as the Aristotelian model does) and of lacking universal value (as the Humean model does). (shrink)

This paper develops an account of existential choices and their role in practical reasoning. In contrast to other views that attempt to make sense of existential choices as a type of rational choice, the proposed account takes them to be choices among the normative outlooks that determine the reasons we have, and as such are nonrational. According to the argument in the paper, existential choices bring to light a feature of all choices, that they are made against the backdrop of (...) a normative outlook, which grounds the rationality of the choice but is not itself rationally determined. (shrink)

La tradición filosófica de los enfoques morales se basa predominantemente en conceptos y teorías metafísicas y teológicas. Entre los conceptos tradicionales de la ética, el más destacado es la Teoría del Mandato Divino (DCT). Según TCD, Dios da fundamentos morales a la humanidad desde su creación ya a través de revelaciones. Así, la moral y la divinidad serían inseparables de la civilización más remota. Estos conceptos se sumergen en un marco teológico y son mayoritariamente aceptados por la mayoría de los (...) seguidores de las tres tradiciones Abrahámicas: judaísmo, cristianismo e islam, que abarcan la mayor parte de la población humana. Teniendo como fundamento la fe y la Revelación, las Teorías del Mandato Divino no están estrictamente sujetas a ningún tipo de demostración. Los opositores a la concepción moral del Mandato Divino, basados en la imposibilidad de demostrar sus supuestos metafísicos y religiosos, han intentado durante muchos siglos desvalorizar su importancia. Apoyan el argumento de que la teoría no muestra evidencia material y coherencia lógica y, por ello, no puede ser tenida en cuenta para fines científicos o filosóficos. Es solo una creencia y como tal debe entenderse. Además de estas posiciones extremas, muchos otros conceptos atacan las teorías del Mandato Divino, de una forma u otra, en parte o en su totalidad. Muchos filósofos y científicos sociales, desde la filosofía griega clásica hasta la actualidad, por ejemplo, sostienen que la moralidad es solo una construcción y, por lo tanto, culturalmente relativa y culturalmente determinada. Sin embargo, esto trae a colación muchas otras discusiones y plantea el desafío de determinar cuál es el sentido de la cultura, qué elementos de la cultura son moralmente determinantes y, finalmente, cuáles son los límites de esta relatividad. Los deterministas morales, por su parte, afirman que todo lo relacionado con el comportamiento humano, incluida la moralidad, está determinado en sus causas, ya que no existe el libre albedrío. Más recientemente, los pensadores modernos han argumentado que existe una ciencia rigurosa de la moralidad. Sin embargo, el método científico por sí solo, a pesar de explicar varios hechos y evidencias, no puede aclarar todo el contenido y significado de la ética. La comprensión moral requiere una visión más amplia y un acuerdo entre los filósofos, lo que nunca lograron. Todas estas preguntas tienen muchas configuraciones diferentes, dependiendo de cada línea filosófica, e inician análisis complejos y debates interminables, ya que muchos de ellos son recíprocamente conflictivos. Independientemente de la validez de alguno o todos los elementos de esta discusión y de su significado como universo filosófico de este trabajo, el objetivo de nuestro estudio es demostrar y justificar la existencia y el significado de los arquetipos morales prehistóricos que surgen directamente de principios fundamentales, necesita esfuerzos sociales y de supervivencia. Estos arquetipos son la definición del fundamento esencial de la ética, su agregación al inconsciente colectivo y su correspondiente organización lógica y transmisión a las etapas evolutivas del genoma humano y a las distintas relaciones espacio-temporales, independientemente de cualquier experiencia contemporánea de los individuos. El sistema definido por estos arquetipos compone un modelo social humano evolutivo. (shrink)

In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins’ argues that evolution, being a process of ruthless competition, results in selfish behavior. Human nature is short-sighted and amoral due to our genes. But he also insists humans have a unique capacity for moral behavior: Using reason we can suppress the natural instincts and act against our nature. In this chapter I show that Dawkins view is as old as the theory of evolution itself. It was first advocated by T.H. Huxley and criticized by (...) Peter Kropotkin. Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid builds upon Darwin and seeks to establish a naturalistic grounding of human morality in the social instincts necessary for all social animals. This avoids the dualism implied in Dawkins’ and Huxley’s theories. It also raises questions of biological essentialism and determinism which the chapter discusses. Finally, the chapter compares the thoughts of Dawkins and Kropotkin with those of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche would have rejected Dawkins’ version of atheism that retains Christian views of the wickedness of bodily instincts. He was also critical of egalitarian movements which he thought were based in ressentiment. I show that Kropotkin’s views were in some ways quite close to Nietzsche’s as both advocate an affirmation of life. (shrink)

This article is an introduction to the concept of dominion without a ruler, as is so often observable in digital contexts, i.e., the compulsion to be "always on" and to be constantly networking, leading to new norms and a new kind of relational subject position in the digital age.

In this paper, I propose a solution to a challenge formulated by Judith Jarvis Thomson: We have to explain why the moral asymmetry between doing and allowing harm is a deep feature of our moral thinking. In a nutshell, my solution is this: It could not be otherwise. Accepting the asymmetry is indispensable for the construction and maintenance of stable moral communities. -/- My argument centrally involves mental resource management. Moral communities depend on their members’ commitment to moral norms. And, (...) I argue, community members can only be committed to these norms in the required ways without overextending their mental resources if morality contains the doing/allowing asymmetry. -/- This has two noteworthy implications. Firstly, we can and should stop discussing the asymmetry in normative ethics and, instead, regard it as “moral axiom” we cannot but accept. Secondly, even consequentialists have to accept the asymmetry but, by doing so, their view loses part of its intuitive appeal. Lastly, I turn to an objection. One might think that my indispensability argument confuses issues in moral psychology with issues in normative ethics. I reject the objection on broadly pragmatist grounds. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by focusing on what I call ‘expectations-generating social factors’ such as social practices, cultural scripts, social roles, socially available self-conceptions, and political and legal institutions. I then bring my account (...) to bear on the debate about the exculpatory potential of moral ignorance. I show that a prominent position in this debate – the position that denies that moral ignorance exculpates – is grounded on an individualistic and acontextualist conception of moral capacities, moral cognition, and blameworthiness, and that this conception leads those philosophers who endorse it to make a number of questionable claims regarding the ability of ordinary agents to overcome their moral ignorance and the culpability they bear for the latter. I conclude by indicating how my socially situated account addresses the issue of moral ignorance. (shrink)

Die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens umfasst große Menschheitsfragen: Was hält die Welt im Innersten zusammen? Was wollen wir, und lohnt das, was wir wollen und was wir tun? Ist das Leben wert, gelebt zu werden? Und welche Rolle spielt, falls es ihn gibt, Gott?

A draft of my (positive) review of Adam Kirsch's book 'The Revolt Against Humanity: Imagining a Future Without Us'.

Kantian views of moral status can be summed up as those beings with moral agency have moral status. Several science fiction narratives offer an alternative to this view in which granting others moral status is what it means to have moral agency. This blog post looks at Orson Scott Card's novel "Speaker for the Dead" and examines how the narrative supports tis alternative view of the relationship between moral status and moral agency.