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  1. Putting the Agency in Agent-Regret.Jake Wojtowicz - 2025 - American Journal of Bioethics 25 (2):21-22.
    In “Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents,” Bernard Williams sketches what it means to be a mature agent. This mature agent tries to make sense of their own life, which is a life that is shared wit...
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  2. (1 other version)Unreliable emotions and ethical knowledge.James Hutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    How is ethical knowledge possible? One promising answer is Moral Empiricism: we can acquire ethical knowledge through emotional experiences. But Moral Empiricism faces a serious problem. Our emotions are unreliable guides to ethics, frequently failing to fit the ethical status of their objects, so the habit of basing ethical beliefs on one's emotions seems too unreliable to yield knowledge. I develop a new, virtue-epistemic solution to this problem, with practical implications for how we approach ethical decision-making. By exploiting a frequently (...)
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  3. Shames and Selves: On the Origins and Cognitive Foundations of a Moral Emotion.Charlie Kurth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    This paper develops an evolutionary account of shame and its moral value. In so doing, it challenges the standard thinking about shame. Typically, those who approach shame from an evolutionary perspective deny that it is a morally valuable emotion, focusing instead on its social significance. And those who see shame as morally valuable typically set aside questions about shame’s biological origins, if they see them as relevant at all. On my account, shame is an emotion that sensitizes us to self-originating (...)
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  4. Honing the Haptics of the Heart: A New Defence of the Perceptual Theory of Emotion.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    According to the perceptual theory of emotion, emotions are evaluative perceptions. However, emotions involve us in a way that regular perception does not and this has led to two influential objections to the perceptual theory have emerged. According to the first objection, the perceptual theory is false because the phenomenology of emotion is the phenomenology of response. According to the second objection, the perceptual theory is false because emotions are susceptible to evaluations of rationality and reason-responsiveness. In this essay, I (...)
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  5. Werterfahrung und ‚moralische Reife‘. Philosophische Überlegungen zum Zugang zu Werten.Moritz von Kalckreuth - 2023 - In Katarina Weilert (ed.), Werteerziehung durch die Schule: Begriffliche Grundlagen, staatstheoretische Basis und institutionelle Ziele. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck. pp. 23-44.
  6. Werterfahrung, Wertbindung und personaler Lebenszusammenhang.Moritz von Kalckreuth - 2024 - Zeitschrift Für Didaktik der Philosophie Und Ethik 2024 (2):27-35.
    The aim of this paper is to show that value-experiences and -attachments are to be understood as interwoven within the structure of a person’s life. Whereas the assumption of value-experiences as isolated mental states often fails to explain why we do not experience given values, referring to the person’s life allows to understand that our value-experiences are favoured, made difficult or excluded by other emotional phenomena or shared life forms. This model, though, differs from biological or psychological models by referring (...)
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  7. Grievance Politics and Identities of Resentment.Paul Katsafanas - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Does it make sense to say that certain evaluative outlooks and political ideologies are essentially negative or oppositional in structure? Intuitively, it seems so: there is a difference between outlooks and ideologies that are expressive of hatred, resentment, and contempt, on the one hand, and those expressive of more affirmative emotions. But drawing this distinction is more difficult than it seems. It requires that we find a way of maintaining the following claim, which I call Negative Orientation: although you claim (...)
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  8. In Defence of Despair about Climate Breakdown.Anh-Quân Nguyen - 2025 - In Ondřej Beran, Laura Candiotto, Niklas Forsberg, Antony Fredriksson & David Rozen (eds.), The philosophy of environmental emotions: grief, hope, and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Both within the climate movement and in academic circles, it has become common advice to avoid despair. Despair about the climate crisis is the opposite of hope and should be avoided on grounds of both rational aptness and pragmatic considerations. Despair about climate breakdown is only rationally apt if it is impossible for our actions to make a difference. As our actions do make a difference, despair is not a fitting response to climate change). Further, we have pragmatic reasons to (...)
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  9. The rhetoric of climate change. [REVIEW]Charlie Kurth - 2024 - Metascience:1-4.
    This is a review of Debra Hawhee's book, A Sense of Urgency. The uncertainty and magnitude of climate change make it difficult to talk about its impact in ways that can help us understand and confront what we face. Hawhee's example-driven book aims to show how the rhetoric of climate change is changing rhetoric itself for the better. While there is much to learn from Hawhee's discussion, the book carries a misplaced optimism about how climate change rhetoric is being used--and (...)
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  10. Aposterioryczny intuicjonizm etyczny a percepcja moralna.Ignacy Kłaput - forthcoming - Filozofia Nauki.
    A posteriori ethical intuitionism is a view according to which our ethical beliefs can be justified non-inferentially, and we acquire such justification through experience. To give credence to this view, one can refer to moral perception as an ability that allows us to perceive moral properties and thus provides perceptual justification for our ethical beliefs. In this paper, I analyze various approaches to moral perception and their possible application to the foundationalist project of a posteriori ethical intuitionism. The result of (...)
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  11. Character and Emotion.Charles Starkey - 2015 - In Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson (eds.), Character: New Perspectives in Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 192-211.
    Despite the tremendous growth of interest in both emotion and character in recent years, little has been said about the relation between the two. I argue that emotions have a proximal and fundamental role in determining character. The proximal role consists in the effects of emotion on the way that a person perceives and ensuingly cognizes the object of emotion. This plays a significant part in determining character-relevant actions. The fundamental role consists in the function that emotions have in sustaining (...)
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  12. When is Jealousy Appropriate?Arina Pismenny - 2021 - Dialectica 75 (3):333-360.
    What makes romantic jealousy rational or fitting? Psychologists view jealousy’s function as preserving a relationship against a “threat” from a “rival”. I argue that its more specific aim is to preserve a certain privileged status of the lover in relation to the beloved. Jealousy is apt when the threat to that status is real, otherwise inapt. Aptness assessments of jealousy must determine what counts as a “threat” and as a “rival”. They commonly take for granted monogamous norms. Hence, compared with (...)
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  13. Sympathetic Joy.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3275-3285.
    Unlike Yiddish (_fargin_) and Sanskrit (_muditā_), English has no single word to describe the practice of sharing someone else’s joy at their success. Sympathetic joy has also escaped attention in philosophy. We are familiar with schadenfreude, begrudging, envy, jealousy, and other terms describing either (a) pleasure at someone else’s misfortune or (b) displeasure at someone else’s good fortune. But what, exactly, is sympathetic joy? I argue that it is a short-term or long-term feeling of great delight at another’s good fortune, (...)
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  14. 'In Examining Others We Know Ourselves': Joanna Baillie on Sympathetic Curiosity, Moral Education, and Drama.Lauren Kopajtic - 2024 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 6.
    This paper argues that Joanna Baillie’s ‘Introductory Discourse’ to her Plays on Passions offers a theory of moral education based on an epistemology of passion—an account of how we come to know and understand the passions—both of which deserve further philosophical attention. Like her fellow Scots, David Hume and Adam Smith, Baillie offers a sentimentalist approach to human psychology, focusing on affective states as the primary constituents of character and determinants of action. She also shares a spectatorial approach to moral (...)
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  15. Fear as Preventer.Tim Kearl & Robert H. Wallace - forthcoming - In Ami Harbin (ed.), The Philosophy of Fear: Historical and Interdisciplinary Approaches. Bloomsbury.
    Fear is a preventer, sometimes robustly so. When fear robustly prevents, it changes or diminishes what an agent is able to do. Various popular conceptions of fear focus on its negative role: fear sometimes prevents us from acting as we should, as in certain cases of akrasia. But by the same token, fear sometimes prevents us from acting as we shouldn’t, as in certain other cases of inverse akrasia. We end with a plea on behalf of fear, both in light (...)
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  16. Do Good People Love Themselves? On Rational Self-love in Kant.Bas Tönissen - 2024 - Kant Studien 115 (4):433-453.
    Kant is frequently read as saying that all self-love is bad, and the virtuous agent is one who suppresses self-love as much as possible. This paper argues that this is mistaken and that the right kind of self-love – what Kant calls rational self-love – plays an important role in a successful moral life. It shows how Kant provides a detailed taxonomy of different kinds of self-love. He contrasts the (practical) incentive of self-love with the (pathological) feeling of it, self-love (...)
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  17. (1 other version)Interpersonal Hope and Loving Attention.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Imagine that your lover or close friend has embraced a difficult long-term goal, such as advancing environmental justice, breaking a bad habit, or striving to become a better person. Which stance should you adopt toward their prospects for success? Does supporting our significant others in the pursuit of valuable goals require ignoring part of our evidence? I argue that we have special reasons – reasons grounded in friendship – to hope that our loved ones succeed in their difficult goals. I (...)
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  18. Unfair Emotions: Their Morality and Blameworthiness.Jonas Blatter - forthcoming - New York: Routledge.
    Emotions are an integral part of our moral practices. While the links between emotions and morality have received much philosophical attention recently, the phenomenon of unfair emotions remains under-explored. This book examines an everyday phenomenon: that we often perceive other people’s emotions as unfair, in a similar way as if they acted unfairly. It argues that the notion of unfairness combines elements of the unfittingness and of the moral relevance of an emotion. In the first half of the book, the (...)
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  19. : The Routledge Comprehensive Guide Volume II: Theories of Specific Emotions and Major Theoretical Challenges.Andrea Scarantino (ed.) - 2024 - Routledge.
  20. Oppressive Fear.Barrett Emerick - forthcoming - In Ami Harbin (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Fear. Bloomsbury.
    This paper explores some of the ways that fear can be both a manifestation of and major contributor to oppression. It argues for a pluralistic account of the reasons that justify feeling fear or working to let go of fear and provides a framework to grapple fruitfully with the question of when someone should work to let go of fear and work to avoid contributing to the fear of others. Part 1 argues that emotions are an appropriate target of moral (...)
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  21. How anger helps us possess reasons for action.Steven Gubka - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    I argue that anger helps us possess reasons to intervene against others. This is because fitting anger disposes us to intervene against others in light of reasons to do so. I propose that anger is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize such interventions, in much the same way that perceptual experience is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize our judgements about our environment. In this way, anger can help us possess reasons that make specific actions rational (...)
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  22. Being Seen and Being with Others: Shame and Interpersonal Relationships.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    I seek to vindicate heteronomous shame: shame that one experiences in response to a judgment from another that one does not accept. I suggest that such experiences are instances of interpersonal shame. This is shame that involves a sensitivity to interpersonal ideals, whose instantiation depends partly on the attitudes of others. I defend the importance of such shame by showing how vulnerability to others is a constitutive part of rich interpersonal relationships. The account both casts light on and vindicates the (...)
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  23. A Social Practice Account of Responsible Persons.Miguel Egler & Alfred Archer (eds.) - 2024 - Tilburg, The Netherlands: Open Press Tilburg University.
    “The Descartes Lectures” is a biennial event at Tilburg University that invites a distinguished philosopher to deliver a series of three lectures, each followed by commentaries from other experts in the field. In 2022, Tilburg University had the honor of hosting Cheshire Calhoun for a series of talks on the important philosophical question of what it means to be a responsible person. The commentators for the lectures were Gunnar Björnsson, Jules Holroyd, and Heidi Maibom. This book is a compilation of (...)
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  24. National Humiliation: Emotion, Narrative and Conflict.Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    National humiliation is increasingly being used as a way of explaining certain kinds of international conflict. In this paper, I argue that while such explanations are presented on the back of plausible assumptions about emotion, such assumptions also make it unlikely that humiliation can play the myriad of explanatory roles attributed to it, e.g., to explain the rise of Hitler, growing Chinese antagonism towards the West, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, etc. In response, I consider some other ways humiliation may play (...)
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  25. (DRAFT) Can Moral Propositions Serve as Perceptual Content?Jr-Jiun Lian - 2021 - Taiwanese Philosophical Association Annual Conference 2021. Translated by Jr-Jiun Lian.
    Contentful Moral Perceptualists such as Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), and Werner (2016, 2018) claim that moral propositions can serve as the content of perception for moral subjects. However, in my original interpretation, recent critics of moral perceptualism, such as Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), and Chudnoff (2015), subtly suggest that it is more reasonable to claim that moral propositions are the content of cognition rather than perception. Faraci, Väyrynen, and Chudnoff argue that the (...)
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  26. 道德感知與現象對比.Jr-Jiun Lian - 2023 - Dissertation, 國立中正大學 Translated by 祉鈞 連.
    道德感知主義(moral perceptualism)主張「(至少有一些)道德性質(moral properties)可以是主體感知內容(perceptual content)的一部分」,其中的支持者包含了Audi (2013, 2015); Lord (2018); McNaughton (1988); McBrayer (2010a, 2010b); Cowan (2015); Werner (2016, 2020b)。其中,Werner (2016)認為他所提出的「現象對比論證(Phenomenal Contrast Arguments, PCAs)」可以用來證立道德感知主義。此論證強調了某些道德情境中有「跨主體的現象對比」(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast)的存在;換句話說,兩個主體面對同一場景時,其經驗各別顯現出不同的現象特性/現象特徵(phenomenal character)。此論證認為對於「跨主體間的現象對比(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast)」的最佳解釋說明是兩個不同主體在道德感知經驗上有所差異(contrast in moral perceptual experience)。簡言之,根據此論證,跨主體的現象對比的最佳解釋是:某個主體感知到了道德性質,但另一個主體則缺乏這種感知。若此解釋成立,則其蘊含,主體的確可以感知到道德性質 (至少其中一個主體的確感知到了道德性質),也因此,道德感知主義就可以被證立。然而,Werner (2016)所擁護的現象對比論證與道德感知主義,卻遭受許多哲學家的質疑與抨擊,尤以Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人為代表。他們也分別提供了各自對於「跨主體間的現象對比」的相競替代解釋方案,並嘗試論證他們的說法相較於Werner (2016)的道德感知主義解釋方案來得更有解釋效力、且更為合理。本篇論文的主要目標是,剖析與回應以下兩個問題:(I)上述質疑者的替代解釋方案是否說得通?它們是否較之道德感知主義的解釋方案來得更好呢?( II)道德感知主義者是否能恰當回應質疑者的挑戰呢?倘若Werner (2016, 2020b)的說法不足以回應質疑者的話,道德感知主義者是否能夠有其他的解套方案呢?針對問題(I),筆者將論證,Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人對於道德感知主義的質疑大致上言之成理,可和Werner (2016)的理論成為具有同等解釋力的相競解釋方案。但針對問題(II),筆者將指出Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人頂多只能說明「對錯好壞」這類的整體道德性質(overall moral properties)無法作為感知的內容,但並未排除掉道德主體仍舊可以感知到「道德顯著性」(moral salience)這類初步確定道德性質(pro-tanto moral properties)的可能性。也因此,這並未排除一種本論文所擁護的改良版本的道德感知主義。根據此改良版本的道德感知主義,雖然對錯好壞這類的整體道德性質本身也許無法做為感知的內容,然而道德顯著性仍然可 以是感知內容。筆者將此改良版本稱之為「道德顯著性感知主義」(moral salience perceptualism)。為了突顯此版本的優點,筆者將進一步論述,此改良版的道德感知主義可以恰當地解釋跨主體間的現象對比(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast),並可規避原來Werner (2016)版本所招來的質疑。 -/- 關鍵詞:道德感知主義、現象對比論證、道德顯著性、道德經驗與道德判斷、道德教育 .
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  27. Review Essay: A Deeper Understanding of Moral Standing. [REVIEW]Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel J. Miller - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Hypocrites, we are told, lack the moral standing to blame. But what is this standing to blame? Why would hypocrisy undermine it? Do any other conditions compromise standing to blame? Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s The Beam and the Mote offers the first book-length treatment on such complex questions. Yet the book admirably pushes even further, extending the scope of standing into other normative domains, such as praise, forgiveness, and encouragement. In our review, we critically engage with four of the book’s central topics: (...)
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  28. Loving a Narrator.Pilar Lopez-Cantero - 2024 - Passion: Journal of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotion 2 (1):48-63.
    We love people because of who they are, but can the idea of “who they are” be explained through a property that everyone has, such as agency? David Velleman believes this to be the case, and argues that love is an appraisal of a person’s incomparable value, which disarms the lover’s emotional defences. Modelling love on Kantian respect, Velleman claims that love is a response to a person’s rational nature, indirectly perceived though her empirical persona—her observable traits and behaviours, which (...)
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  29. The Heart and Its Attitudes.Stephen Darwall - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book is a systematic treatment-perhaps the first-of “attitudes of the heart”-remorse (versus guilt), love, trust, gratitude, personal anger (versus righteous anger), jealousy, and others-and their role in mediating personal relationship, attachment, and connection. This is obviously interesting in its own right, but it also shows how heartfelt attitudes mirror more extensively studied “reactive attitudes” of guilt, resentment, and blame (“attitudes of the will”). Whereas the latter mediate moral relations of mutual respect and accountability, attitudes of the heart are the (...)
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  30. Hate: toward a Four-Types Model.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):441-459.
    Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental (...)
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  31. What’s so bad about fanaticism?Paul Katsafanas - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-18.
    Fanaticism involves a robust and epistemically peculiar form of commitment: the fanatic is willing to sacrifice himself and others for the sake of his goal, and the fanatic is unable or unwilling to adjust his commitment in light of critical reflection. But is this always morally bad? While Cassam (Extremism: a philosophical analysis, Routledge, New York, 2022b) and Katsafanas (Philos Imprint 19:1–20, 2019; Philosophy of devotion: the longing for invulnerable ideals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2023a) have offered accounts of fanaticism (...)
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  32. Admiration, Affectivity, and Value: Critical Remarks on Exemplarity.Wojciech Kaftanski - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (2):197-214.
    By spelling out the affective dimension of admiration, this paper challenges the view of admiration as a trustworthy means of detecting morally desirable qualities in exemplars. Such a view of admiration, foundational for the current debate on exemplars in moral education, holds that admiration is a self-motivating emotion essentially oriented toward the good and the excellent. I demonstrate that this view ignores the affective aspects of admiration explored widely in the history of philosophy on which the debate on moral exemplars (...)
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  33. Planescape: Torment as Philosophy: Regret Can Change the Nature of a Man.Steven Gubka - 2022 - In David Kyle Johnson (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Popular Culture as Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1847-1864.
    In Planescape: Torment, players assume the role of the Nameless One, an immortal being who suffers from amnesia. By making choices for the Nameless One, players decide not only what happens to the Nameless One but also the development of his moral character. In this way, Planescape: Torment invites its players to consider “what can change the nature of a man.” In the game’s canonical ending, the Nameless One regrets the great harm he inflicted on others, and he gives up (...)
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  34. Philosophical Acts of Wonder in Bioethics.Alexander Zhang - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (3):221-232.
    Two sources of possible disagreement in bioethics may be associated with pessimism about what bioethics can achieve. First, pluralism implies that bioethics engages with interlocutors who hold divergent moral beliefs. Pessimists might believe that these disagreements significantly limit the extent to which bioethics can provide normatively robust guidance in relevant areas. Second, the interdisciplinary nature of bioethics suggests that interlocutors may hold divergent views on the nature of bioethics itself—particularly its practicality. Pessimists may suppose that interdisciplinary disagreements could frustrate the (...)
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  35. The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons.Marilie Coetsee - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15. Oxford University Press. pp. 24-48.
    Huckleberry Finn believes that by helping Miss Watson’s slave Jim escape to freedom, he is doing something wrong. But Huck does it anyway—and many want to give him moral credit for this choice. If Huck is to be worthy of such moral esteem, however, it seems there must be some implicit way of appreciating and responding to considerations as moral reasons that does not involve explicitly believing that those considerations are moral reasons. This chapter argues that an agent like Huck (...)
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  36. Cringe.Thomas J. Spiegel - 2023 - Social Epistemology 1 (1).
    While shame and embarrassment have received significant attention in philosophy and psychology, cringe (also sometimes called ‘vicarious embarrassment’ and ‘vicarious shame’) has received little thought. This is surprising as the relatively new genre of cringe comedy has seen a meteoric rise since the early 2000s. In this paper, I aim to offer a novel characterization of cringe as a hostile social emotion which turns out to be closer to disgust and horror than to shame or embarrassment, thus disclosing ‘vicarious shame’ (...)
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  37. Moral Gratitude.Romy Eskens - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    There are many examples of persons who appear to be grateful to other people's benefactors. In at least some of these examples, such third-party gratitude also seems fitting. However, these observations conflict with a widespread assumption in the philosophical literature about gratitude: that only beneficiaries can be fittingly grateful to benefactors. In this article, I argue that third-party gratitude exists and can be fitting, and that the assumption is therefore mistaken. More specifically, I defend two claims: (i) that there exists (...)
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  38. A Moral Account of Empathy and Fellow Feeling.Lawrence Blum - 2017 - In Neil Roughley & Thomas Schramme (eds.), Forms of Fellow Feeling: Empathy, Sympathy, Concern and Moral Agency. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 142-162.
  39. Centering an Environmental Ethic in Climate Crisis.Charlie Kurth & Panu Pihkala - 2024 - In Sheron Fraser-Burgess, Jessica Heybach & Dini Metro-Roland (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Ethics and Education. Cambridge University Press. pp. 734-757.
    This paper sketches an emotion-aware model of environmental ethics education. The proposal draws on insights from feminists scholars, moral sentimentalism, as well as work in the pedagogy of discomfort traditions. It identifies and defends four core elements of climate change ethic, noting how they shed new light on the aims and challenges of environmental ethics education.
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  40. Sexism is Exhausting: Nietzsche and the Emotional Dynamics of Sexist Oppression.Kaitlyn Creasy - 2024 - In Rebecca Bamford & Allison Merrick (eds.), Nietzsche and Politicized Identities. Albany: State University of New York Press.
    In this paper, I examine a set of theoretical tools Nietzsche offers for making sense of the emotional dynamics and psychophysiological impacts of sexist oppression. Specifically, I indicate how Nietzsche’s account of the social and cultural production of emotional experience (i.e. his account of the transpersonal nature of emotional experience) can serve as a conceptual resource for understanding the detrimental emotional impacts of social norms, beliefs, and practices that systematically devalue certain of one’s ends and interests.
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  41. The Bellwether of Oppression: Anger, Critique, and Resistance.Jasper Friedrich - 2024 - Hypatia.
    Feminists have long argued that emotions have a rightful place in politics. Anger, specifically, is often said to play a crucial role in alerting people to oppression and motivating resistance. The task of this paper is to elaborate these claims and to outline a conception of the political value of anger. In doing so, I argue against the view that anger is valuable if and because it expresses a sound moral judgment. Instead, we should see rage, in the first place, (...)
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  42. Origins of Moral Relevance: The Psychology of Moral Judgment, and its Normative and Metaethical Significance.Benjamin Huppert - 2015 - Dissertation, Universität Bayreuth
    This dissertation examines the psychology of moral judgment and its implications for normative ethics and metaethics. Recent empirical findings in moral psychology, such as the impact of emotions, intuitions, and situational factors on moral judgments, have sparked a debate about whether ordinary moral judgments are systematically error-prone. Some philosophers, such as Peter Singer and Joshua Greene, argue that these findings challenge the reliability of moral intuitions and support more "reasoned", consequentialist approaches over deontological ones. The first part of the dissertation (...)
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  43. A Tempered Rationalism for a Tempered Yuck Factor—Using Disgust in Bioethics.Konstantin Eckl & Konstantin Deininger - 2024 - Asian Bioethics Review 16 (4):575-594.
    When it comes to invasive manipulation of animals on the biological level, reactions of disgust are common and often influential on people’s moral judgments. As a case in point, the Belgian Blue, a breed of hyper-enhanced cattle which will serve as a case study for the present article, has historically been met with revulsion. Traditionally, in bio- and animal ethics, this ‘yuck factor,’ has been denied any productive role in proper moral justification, since rationalism is still a dominant paradigm in (...)
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  44. Morality by Tacit Agreement: A Contribution from the Economics of Emotions toward Moral Judgments.Kazuo Kadokawa - manuscript
    Current research on morality is divided into rationalist and intuitionist theories. This study shows that when individuals make rational choices, they are inevitably guided by the moral foundation of intuitionism. Especially to pursue self-interest, individuals must agree with others in society. They must keep their opinions constant to agree with others. To maintain a constant opinion, the individual assigns an opinion that can improve the utility of the other person and place both of them in the same situation. The actions (...)
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  45. One-to-One Fellow-Feeling, Universal Identification and Oneness, and Group Solidarities.Lawrence Blum - 2017 - In Philip J. Ivanhoe, Owen Flanagan, Victoria S. Harrison, Hagop Sarkissian & Eric Schwitzgebel (eds.), The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self. New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press. pp. 106-119.
    Unusual among Western philosophers, Schopenhauer explicitly drew on Hindu and especially Buddhist traditions inhis moral philosophy. He saw plurality, especially the plurality of human persons, as a kind of illusion; in reality all is one, and compassionate acts express an implicit recognition of this oneness. Max Scheler retains the transcendence of self aspect of compassion but emphasizes that the subject must have a clear, lived sense of herself as a distinct individual in order for that transcendence to take place properly. (...)
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  46. Experiencing the Conflict: The Rationality of Ambivalence.Dario Cecchini - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):1-12.
    Ambivalence, i.e., the simultaneous holding of negative and positive evaluations toward the same object, is an empirically well-documented phenomenon and an important aspect of ordinary experience. However, it has not received sufficient philosophical attention. This essay accomplishes two aims: first, a comprehensive and empirically informed account of ambivalence is provided; second, the rationality of ambivalence in practical and nonpractical contexts is defended.
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  47. Admiration and the Development of Moral Virtue.Alan T. Wilson - 2019 - In Alfred Archer & André Grahle (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 201-215.
    Philosophers and psychologists have recently been focusing on the important question of how positive character traits are developed. Within philosophy, these positive character traits are referred to as virtues. In this chapter, I examine one intuitively appealing proposal concerning virtue development - the idea that the path to moral virtue can begin with the experience of admiration for a moral exemplar. My aim is to provide a model of how this process might work by identifying the different stages it would (...)
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  48. A Modest Defence of Somewhat Selective Outrage.Adam Piovarchy & Scott Siskind - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Many people think there is something objectionable about ‘selective outrage’. After investigating how to best characterise what selective outrage is and what these objections target, this paper argues that many cases of supposedly selective outrage actually have important positive effects. Because we often have limited resources with which to enforce norms, it can be collectively prudent to prioritise enforcing norms that are well-established or collectively recognisable over those that are not. This will sometimes require responding to individual wrongs that seem (...)
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  49. Regolazione dell'empatia: una prospettiva kantiana.Stefano Pinzan - 2023 - Balthazar 1 (6):45-59.
    Nel presente paper, propongo un argomento kantiano per giustificare la necessità della coltivazione dell’empatia e il ruolo moralmente rilevante che essa può svolgere per l’agente una volta coltivata. Infatti, riferendosi al testo kantiano, è possibile mostrare che l’empatia è un sentimento insito nella natura umana e che orienta l’agente nel processo di deliberazione morale. Nonostante ciò, essa non può determinare direttamente la volontà dell’agente, ma deve essere vagliata criticamente dalla ragion pratica. Quest’ultima però non si limita a vagliare il sentimento; (...)
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  50. On Willing Surrender as Virtuous Self-Constitution.Bennett Gilbert - 2024 - Consecutio Rerum: Rivista Critica Della Postmodernità 14:199-217.
    Our cultural situation is to seek a moral form of self-constitution, rather than an ontological or epistemological foundation. Such a moral ground lies in the paradox of willing surrender of the will to do wrong or dysfunctional acts in order to enter temporally-extended processes of moral change. But the paradox of willing surrender of the will requires analysis. The propositional form of it cannot be sustained and must instead give way to willingness as an ongoing choice. The self-reflexivity of the (...)
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