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Summary

Every variant of virtue epistemology holds to two basic resolutions: (1) that epistemology is a normative discipline and (2) that “intellectual agents and communities are the primary source of epistemic value and the primary focus of epistemic evaluation” (Greco and Turri, 2011). The former amounts to a rejection of Quine's proposal in “Epistemology Naturalized” (1969) that epistemologists should give up on attempts to discern what is reasonable to believe in favor of projects within cognitive psychology and a call for epistemologists to “focus their efforts on understanding epistemic norms, value and evaluation”. To better understand the second resolution think of virtue ethics. For the two titans of moral philosophy, Kantian deontology and utilitarianism, the starting place for moral evaluation is action. For Kantians and for utilitarians, the question to ask when doing ethics is “What should I do?”  For virtue ethicists, the starting place for moral evaluation is the agent—his or her character—and subsequently the virtue ethicist asks a different question, “How should I live?”.  Instead of focusing on the beliefs of agents (whether or not they are justified, safe, etc.), virtue epistemologists predominantly focus on the agent f—on whether he or she has the right sort of epistemic character, the right sort of cognitive faculties, whether he or she is epistemically virtuous or not. Other theories of knowledge will give some account of epistemic virtues—good memory, intellectual courage, etc.—but usually in terms of knowledge; the radical claim that virtue epistemology makes is that knowledge is defined in terms of virtue.

Key works

A virtue-theoretic approach to epistemology was first suggested in Sosa 1980. Since then, virtue epistemology has developed by and large into two schools:  agent-reliabilism and responsibilism or neo-Aristotelianism.The primary difference between the schools is their application of “virtue” terminology. Agent-reliabilism, being modeled along reliabilist lines, focuses on the reliable functioning (virtuous functioning) of a given agent’s cognitive faculties. A few seminal agent-reliabilist works include Plantinga 1993, Sosa 2007, and Greco 2010. Neo-Aristotelianism, on the other hand, applies virtue terminology in a way we are perhaps more familiar with—in terms of specific character traits such as open-mindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual perseverance, etc. A few seminal Neo-Aristotelian works include Code 1987, Montmarquet 1993, and Zagzebski 1996.

Introductions Encyclopedia articles include Turri et al 1999 and Baehr 2004.
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  1. Thinking Twice about Virtue and Vice.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    [FREE PUBLISHED VERSION AT LINK BELOW]. This chapter provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Alfano’s the-ses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. It also develops a Nar-row-Broad Spectrum of agency-ascriptions in reply to Olin and Doris’ ‘trade-off problem.’ In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between VE and dual-process theories (DPT) in cognitive psychology. A genuine (...)
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  2. Believing in Love: Intellectual Humility and Well-Being.Reuben L. Lillie - manuscript
    In this project, I claim that intellectual humility requires love. Recent discussions within epistemology consider intellectual humility as a virtue, but many leave room for vice—even violence. I argue that any view of intellectual humility must also account for love. Otherwise, at best, one is flirting with another virtue, say, intellectual temperance or intellectual diligence. I conclude that, to count as genuine humility, one must hold and express one’s beliefs in love. -/- Funding for this project is provided by Olivet (...)
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  3. Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond) [Long Version, Draft].Kurt Sylvan - manuscript
  4. Anonymous Arguments.Andrew Aberdein - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-13.
    Anonymous argumentation has recently been the focus of public controversy: flash points include the outing of pseudonymous bloggers by newspapers and the launch of an academic journal that expressly permits pseudonymous authorship. However, the controversy is not just a recent one—similar debates took place in the nineteenth century over the then common practice of anonymous journalism. Amongst the arguments advanced by advocates of anonymous argumentation in either era is the contention that it is essential if the widest range of voices (...)
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  5. The Epistemic Virtue of Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
    To the consequentialist, virtues are dispositions producing beneficial consequences. After outlining a consequentialist theory of epistemic virtue, I offer an account of an epistemic virtue of deference, manifested to the extent that we are disposed to defer to, and only to, people who speak the truth. I then look at what informed sources can do to instill such virtues of deference, in light of social-psychological evidence on compliance. It turns out that one way of doing so is through a complementary (...)
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  6. Can people be virtuous?Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Current Controversies in Virtue Theory. Routledge.
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  7. Honesty Isn’t Always a Virtue.Heather Battaly - forthcoming - Analysis.
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  8. The Anti-Individualistic Turn in the Ethics of Collegiality: Can Good Colleagues Be Epistemically Vicious?Andrea Berber & Vanja Subotić - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry (x):1-18.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the nascent field of ethics of collegiality may considerably benefit from a symbiosis with virtue and vice epistemology. We start by bringing the epistemic virtue and vice perspective to the table by showing that competence, deemed as an essential characteristic of a good colleague (Betzler & Löschke 2021), should be construed broadly to encompass epistemic competence. By endorsing the anti-individualistic stance in epistemology as well as context-specificity of epistemic traits, we show (...)
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  9. Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Naturalizing Virtue Epistemology. Synthese Library.
  10. Is lucky belief justified?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The main lesson from Gettier cases is that while one cannot know a proposition by luck, one can hold a lucky true belief justifiedly. Possibly because the latter is taken for granted, the relationship between epistemic justification and epistemic luck has been less discussed. The paper investigates whether luck can undermine doxastic justification, and if so, how and to what extent. It is argued that, as in the case of knowledge, beliefs can fall short of justification due to luck. Moreover, (...)
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  11. How to Use Thought Experiments.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Thought experiments figure prominently in contemporary epistemology. Beyond that humdrum observation, controversy abounds. The aim of this paper is to make progress on two fronts. On the descriptive front, the aim is to illuminate what the practice of using thought experiments involves. On the normative front, the aim is to illuminate what the practice of using thought experiments should involve. Thought experiments result in judgments that are passed on to further philosophical reasoning. What are these judgments? What is the point (...)
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  12. "I'm, Like, a Very Smart Person" On Self-Licensing and Perils of Reflection.Joshua DiPaolo - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    Epistemic trespassing, science denial, refusal to guard against bias, mishandling higher-order evidence, and the development of vice are troubling intellectual behaviors. In this paper, I advance work done by psychologists on moral self-licensing to show how all of these behaviors can be explained in terms of a parallel phenomenon of epistemic self-licensing. The paper situates this discussion at the intersection of three major epistemological projects: epistemic explanation and intervention (the project of explaining troubling intellectual phenomena in the hopes of deriving (...)
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  13. Intellectual Patience: Controlling Temporally-Charged Urges in the Life of the Mind.Josh Dolin & Jason Baehr - forthcoming - In Nathan L. King (ed.), Endurance.
    In this chapter, we analyze intellectual patience as a character trait. We look at the contexts that call for patience and at what patience demands in those contexts. Together these constitute our account of patience, though the focus is on patience in the life of the mind. We also consider how patience and perseverance differ, which offers a better understanding of the former and sheds light on how character traits can cooperate. We then consider how to become virtuously patient. We (...)
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  14. Naturalizing Virtue Epistemology.Abrol Fairweather (ed.) - forthcoming - Synthese Library.
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  15. "Epistemic Dexterity: A Ramseyian Account of Agent Based Knowledge".Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor - forthcoming - In Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue.
    “Epistemic Dexterity: A Ramseyian Account of Epistemic Virtue” by Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor: A modification of F.P. Ramsey’s success semantics supports a naturalized theory of epistemic virtue that includes motivational components and can potentially explain both epistemic reliability and responsibility with a single normative-explanatory principle. An “epistemic Ramsey success” will also provide a better account of the “because of” condition central to virtue-reliabilist accounts of knowledge from Greco, Sosa and Pritchard. Ramsey said that the truth condition of a belief (...)
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  16. Epistemic Competence and Agency in Sosa and Xunzi.Chris Fraser - forthcoming - In Sosa and Chinese thought.
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  17. The Limits of Virtue?: Replies to Carter and Goldberg.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen De Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology.
    My essay ‘Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention’ is the lead essay in a symposium. Adam Carter and Sandy Goldberg each respond to the ‘Attunement’ essay. This is my rejoinder. -/- (i.) Carter argues that resources from virtue reliabilism can explain the source of attention normativity. He modifies this virtue reliabilist AAA-framework to apply to attentional normativity. I raise concerns about Carter’s project. I suggest that true belief and proper attentional habits are not relevantly similar. -/- (ii.) Goldberg claims (...)
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  18. Virtue Epistemology and Explanatory Salience.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
    Robust virtue epistemology holds that knowledge is true belief obtained through cognitive ability. In this essay I explain that robust virtue epistemology faces a dilemma, and the viability of the theory depends on an adequate understanding of the ‘through’ relation. Greco interprets this ‘through’ relation as one of causal explanation; the success is through the agent’s abilities iff the abilities play a sufficiently salient role in a causal explanation of why she possesses a true belief. In this paper I argue (...)
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  19. Hybrid Virtue Epistemology and the A Priori.Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis - forthcoming - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), The A Priori: Its Significance, Sources, and Extent. Oxford University Press.
    How should we understand good philosophical inquiry? Ernest Sosa has argued that the key to answering this question lies with virtue-based epistemology. According to virtue-based epistemology, competences are prior to epistemic justification. More precisely, a subject is justified in having some type of belief only because she could have a belief of that type by exercising her competences. Virtue epistemology is well positioned to explain why, in forming false philosophical beliefs, agents are often less rational than it is possible to (...)
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  20. Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook to Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 244-255.
    Since subjection to harm is an intrinsic feature of our social and epistemic lives, there is a perpetual need for individual and collective agents with the virtue of epistemic courage. In this chapter, I survey some of the main issues germane to this virtue, such as the nature of courage and of harm, the range of epistemic activities that can manifest courage, and the status of epistemic courage as a collective and as a professional virtue.
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  21. The Truth in Gnosticism.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica.
    The paper discusses some challenges to veritism, the view that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It looks like the best way to meet these challenges might be to appeal to some of Sosa's ideas about the value of achievements, but I argue that the performance normativity framework only gives us part of what we want. What we need is a more radical break with the veritist approach. We need to embrace gnosticism, the view that knowledge is the fundamental epistemic (...)
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  22. Epistemic Arrogance and Political Dissent.Michael Lynch - forthcoming - In Voicing Dissent. New York: Routledge.
    In this essay, I examine four different reasons for thinking that political dissent has epistemic value. The realization of this epistemic value hinges in part on what I’ll loosely call the epistemic environment, or the environment in which individuals come to believe, reason, inquire, and debate. In particular, to the degree that our social practices encourage and even embody an attitude of epistemic arrogance, the epistemic value of dissent will be difficult to realize. Ironically, it is precisely then that dissent (...)
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  23. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds), A Companion to Epistemology.K. Magill - forthcoming - Radical Philosophy.
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  24. Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief. Virtue-epistemology and the temporal objection.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - In Chris Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Epistemology. Cambridge, Royaume-Uni:
    According to Sosa’s virtue epistemological account, an instance of (animal) knowledge is a belief that instantiates the property of being apt. The purpose of this contribution is, first, to show why this claim is, without further clarification, problematic. Briefly, an instance of knowledge cannot be identified to an apt belief because beliefs are states and aptness is a property that only actions —and no states— can exemplify. Second, I present the metaphysical amendment that the tenants of virtue epistemology can adopt (...)
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  25. Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem.Lisa Miracchi - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.
    I extend my direct virtue epistemology to explain how a knowledge-first framework can account for two kinds of positive epistemic standing, one tracked by externalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate lacks justification, the other tracked by internalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate has justification, and moreover that such justification is not enjoyed by the vicious duplicate. It also explains what these kinds of epistemic standing have to do with each other. I argue that all justified beliefs are good (...)
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  26. Predicting attitudinal and behavioral responses to COVID-19 pandemic using machine learning.Tomislav Pavlović, Flavio Azevedo, Koustav De, Julián C. Riaño-Moreno, Marina Maglić, Theofilos Gkinopoulos, Patricio Andreas Donnelly-Kehoe, César Payán-Gómez, Guanxiong Huang, Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, Michèle D. Birtel, Philipp Schönegger, Valerio Capraro, Hernando Santamaría-García, Meltem Yucel, Agustin Ibanez, Steve Rathje, Erik Wetter, Dragan Stanojević, Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Eugenia Hesse, Christian T. Elbaek, Renata Franc, Zoran Pavlović, Panagiotis Mitkidis, Aleksandra Cichocka, Michele Gelfand, Mark Alfano, Robert M. Ross, Hallgeir Sjåstad, John B. Nezlek, Aleksandra Cislak, Patricia Lockwood, Koen Abts, Elena Agadullina, David M. Amodio, Matthew A. J. Apps, John Jamir Benzon Aruta, Sahba Besharati, Alexander Bor, Becky Choma, William Cunningham, Waqas Ejaz, Harry Farmer, Andrej Findor, Biljana Gjoneska, Estrella Gualda, Toan L. D. Huynh, Mostak Ahamed Imran, Jacob Israelashvili & Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko - forthcoming - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences: Nexus.
    At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from (...)
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  27. Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment.Eva Schmidt - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy:1-22.
    In this paper, I explicate pragmatic encroachment by appealing to pragmatic considerations attenuating, or weakening, epistemic reasons to believe. I call this the ‘Attenuators View’. I will show that this proposal is better than spelling out pragmatic encroachment in terms of reasons against believing – what I call the ‘Reasons View’. While both views do equally well when it comes to providing a plausible mechanism of how pragmatic encroachment works, the Attenuators View does a better job distinguishing practical and epistemic (...)
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  28. Scientists are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination.Michael T. Stuart - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-22.
    Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that present different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally (...)
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  29. Responsibilism within Reason.Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge, UK:
    According to ambitious responsibilism (AR), the virtues that are constitutive of epistemic responsibility should play a central and fundamental role in traditional projects like the analysis of justification and knowledge. While AR enjoyed a shining moment in the mid-1990s, it has fallen on hard times. Part of the reason is that many epistemologists—including fellow responsibilists—think it paints an unreasonably demanding picture of knowledge and justification. I agree that such worries undermine AR's existing versions. But I think the curtains have been (...)
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  30. Beyond Intuitive Know-How.Cheng-Hung Tsai - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    According to Dreyfusian anti-intellectualism, know-how or expertise cannot be explained in terms of know-that and its cognates but only in terms of intuition. Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus do not exclude know-that and its cognates in explaining skilled action. However, they think that know-that and its cognates (such as calculative deliberation and perspectival deliberation) only operate either below or above the level of expertise. In agreement with some critics of Dreyfus and Dreyfus, in this paper, I argue that know-that and (...)
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  31. Review of John Greco, Achieving Knowledge. [REVIEW]John Turri - forthcoming - Mind.
    A review of "Achieving Knowledge" by John Greco.
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  32. Judgment's aimless heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.
    It's often thought that when we reason to new judgments in inference, we aim at believing the truth, and that this aim of ours can explain important psychological and normative features of belief. I reject this picture: the structure of aimed activity shows that inference is not guided by a truth‐aim. This finding clears the way for a positive understanding of how epistemic goods feature in our doxastic lives. We can indeed make sense of many of our inquisitive and deliberative (...)
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  33. The Virtue of Open-Mindedness.Aladdin M. Yaqub - forthcoming - Philosophy Study.
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  34. ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact.Guido Cassinadri - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (14):1-28.
    According to virtue epistemology, the main aim of education is the development of the cognitive character of students (Pritchard, 2014, 2016). Given the proliferation of technological tools such as ChatGPT and other LLMs for solving cognitive tasks, how should educational practices incorporate the use of such tools without undermining the cognitive character of students? Pritchard (2014, 2016) argues that it is possible to properly solve this ‘technology-education tension’ (TET) by combining the virtue epistemology framework with the theory of extended cognition (...)
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  35. What's Wrong With Testimony? Defending the Epistemic Analogy between Testimony and Perception.Peter Graham - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter states the contrast between presumptivism about testimonial warrant (often called anti-reductionism) and strict reductionism (associated with Hume) about testimonial warrant. Presumptivism sees an analogy with modest foundationalism about perceptual warrant. Strict reductionism denies this analogy. Two theoretical frameworks for these positions are introduced to better formulate the most popular version of persumptivism, a competence reliabilist account. Seven arguments against presumptivism are then stated and critiqued: (1) The argument from reliability; (2) The argument from reasons; (3) the argument from (...)
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  36. Empathy, Timeliness, and Virtuous Hearing.Seisuke Hayakawa - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Research 49.
    ***This paper is published along with Professor Amy Coplan's commentary, "Response to "Empathy, Timeliness, and Virtuous Hearing."" *** This paper aims to demonstrate how the notion of timeliness enriches our understanding of empathy and its associated virtuous hearing as discussed in liberatory virtue epistemology. I begin by showing how timeliness is relevant to empathy. Next, I apply this insight to the idea of virtuous hearing, in which empathy plays a significant role. I thus broaden the liberatory-epistemological conception of virtuous hearing (...)
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  37. The Value Problem for Knowledge and Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology.오희철 ) - 2023 - Journal of the Society of Philosophical Studies 68:81-104.
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  38. The Value Problem for Knowledge and Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology.오희철 ) - 2023 - Journal of the Society of Philosophical Studies 68:239-276.
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  39. Exploring intellectual humility through the lens of artificial intelligence: Top terms, features and a predictive model.Ehsan Abedin, Marinus Ferreira, Ritsaart Reimann, Marc Cheong, Igor Grossmann & Mark Alfano - 2023 - Acta Psychologica 238 (103979).
    Intellectual humility (IH) is often conceived as the recognition of, and appropriate response to, your own intellectual limitations. As far as we are aware, only a handful of studies look at interventions to increase IH – e.g. through journalling – and no study so far explores the extent to which having high or low IH can be predicted. This paper uses machine learning and natural language processing techniques to develop a predictive model for IH and identify top terms and features (...)
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  40. The Fallacy Fallacy: From the Owl of Minerva to the Lark of Arete.Andrew Aberdein - 2023 - Argumentation 37 (2):269-280.
    The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. Hence a (...)
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  41. Virtues Suffice for Argument Evaluation.Andrew Aberdein - 2023 - Informal Logic 44 (1):543-559.
    The virtues and vices of argument are now an established part of argumentation theory. They have helped direct attention to hitherto neglected aspects of how we argue. However, it remains controversial whether a virtue theory can contribute to some of the central questions of argumentation theory. Notably, Harvey Siegel disputes whether what he calls ‘arguments in the abstract propositional sense’ can be evaluated meaningfully within a virtue theory. This paper explores the prospects for grounding an account of argument evaluation in (...)
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  42. Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists.James R. Beebe & Jonathan Matheson - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3):426-449.
    Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or ‘sticking to one's guns’ in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual humility, (...)
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  43. An Explanationist Defense of Proper Functionalism.Kenneth Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, we defend an explanationist version of proper functionalism. After explaining proper functionalism’s initial appeal, we note two major objections to proper functionalism: creatures with no design plan who appear to have knowledge (Swampman) and creatures with malfunctions that increase reliability. We then note how proper functionalism needs to be clarified because there are cases of what we call warrant-compatible malfunction. We then formulate our own view: explanationist proper functionalism, which explains the warrant-compatible malfunction cases and helps to (...)
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  44. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Responsibility.Berit Brogaard - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 213–246.
    Virtue epistemologies about knowledge have traditionally been divided into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Initially, what set them apart was that virtue responsibilism took intellectual character virtues and responsible agency to be necessary to knowledge acquisition, whereas virtue reliabilism took reliable cognitive faculties to be constitutive of it instead. Despite recent concessions between these camps, there are residual disagreements. Chapter 8 focuses primarily on Linda Zagzebski’s account of virtue responsibilism and John Greco’s and Ernest Sosa’s defenses of virtue (...)
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  45. Virtue Epistemology and the Analysis of Knowledge.Ian M. Church - 2023 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
    This book centers on two trends in contemporary epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of the (...)
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  46. Epistemic Value, Seemings, and God: The Intersection of Virtue Epistemology, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Religious Experience.Thomas William Duttweiler - 2023 - Dissertation, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary
  47. Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.
    Intellectual courage requires acting to promote epistemic goods despite significant risk of harm. Courage is distinguished from recklessness and cowardice because the expected epistemic benefit of a courageous action outweighs (in some sense) the threatened harm. Sometimes, however, inquirers pursue theories that are not best supported by their current evidence. For these inquirers, the expected epistemic benefit of their actions cannot be explained by appeal to their evidence alone. The probability of pursuing the true theory cannot contribute enough to the (...)
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  48. A Virtue Reliabilist Error-Theory of Defeat.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2449-2466.
    Knowledge defeat occurs when a subject knows that _p_, gains a defeater for her belief, and thereby loses her knowledge without necessarily losing her belief. It’s far from obvious that externalists can accommodate putative cases of knowledge defeat since a belief that satisfies the externalist conditions for knowledge can satisfy those conditions even if the subject later gains a defeater for her belief. I’ll argue that virtue reliabilists can accommodate defeat intuitions via a new kind of error theory. I argue (...)
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  49. Gatekeeping the Mind.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 2023:1-24.
    This paper proposes that we should think of epistemic agents as having, as one of their intellectual activities, a gatekeeping task: To decide in light of various criteria which ideas they should consider and which not to consider. When this task is performed with excellence, it is conducive to the acquisition of epistemic goods such as truth and knowledge, and the reduction of falsehoods. Accordingly, it is a worthy contender for being an intellectual virtue. Although gatekeeping may strike one simply (...)
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  50. Balancing Freedom and Restraint: The Role of Virtue in Legal Analysis.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2023 - Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 32:315-353.
    Even if one sees the law as “a self-contained system of legal reasoning” from which we deduce “neutral,” non-political conclusions from “general principles and analogies among cases and doctrines” (including formalist claims that judges simply call “balls and strikes” like umpires in a baseball game), one should still consider certain characteristics of the party making such deductions or calling such “balls and strikes.” [Relevant citations to quoted language are in the Article.] If such decision maker has questionable motivations, lacks proper (...)
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