Moral Epistemology

Edited by Christopher Michael Cloos (University of California at Santa Barbara)
About this topic
Summary

Moral epistemology concerns moral knowledge and things related to moral knowledge. Is it possible for one to know that torturing babies for fun is wrong? Can one know that slavery is unjust? Moral skeptics doubt the possibility of moral knowledge and doubt its veracity. Some argue that the persistence of wide-spread moral disagreement among peoples, such as differing views on the morality of infanticide, abortion, and capital punishment, suggests there is no fact of the matter regarding moral claims. Some moral theorists argue for the possibility of justified moral beliefs sufficient to yield moral knowledge. Moral coherentists claims that moral beliefs are justified in virtue of being part of a coherent body of beliefs. Reflective equilibrium is a method of moral justification that is often regarded as a form of moral coherentism. It is a way of resolving conflicts between intuitive moral judgments and moral principles that seek to capture those judgments. Intuitionism is an alternative approach to the justification of moral beliefs. On this theory, moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified. Additionally, some theorists endorse moral rationalism. On this view, it is possible to have moral knowledge even when that knowledge is not based on sense experience. Moral knowledge is often compared to mathematical knowledge. Lastly, moral agents always operate under moral uncertainty. It is impossible to perfectly predict the moral goodness or value that will result from a given course of action. Various approaches try to deal with moral uncertainty, often by incorporating the calculation of expected utility into moral choice situations.

Key works

Brink 1989 argues that coherence between a moral belief and one’s other beliefs can justify that moral belief. Sayre-McCord 1996 also endorses this view but argues that things other than one’s beliefs can factor into coherence and justification. Audi 2004 and Huemer 2005 defend comprehensive accounts of moral intuitionism, but Sinnott-Armstrong 2006 argues that moral beliefs are not justified non-inferentially. McGrath 2008 argues that moral disagreement can prevent one from obtaining moral knowledge when one’s peer shares one’s basic moral commitments, yet Wedgwood 2007 argues against this position. Peacocke 2003 and Setiya 2012 defend accounts of moral rationalism involving the possession of moral concepts. Rawls ms articulates the method of reflective equilibrium in defending how one can arrive at the best conception of justice. Daniels 1996 extends the method of reflective equilibrium to include background theories of human nature and social stability.

Introductions For online introductions to moral epistemology see Tramel 2005 and Campbell 2014. For general overviews of the topic see Arrington 1989, Audi 1999, Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, and Zimmerman 2010.
Related categories

2337 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 2337
Material to categorize
  1. Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson: Heroes for Moral Realism?John Klasios - 2017 - Quillette.
  2. Moral principles as generics.Ravi Thakral - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    I argue that moral principles involve the same sort of generalization as ordinary yet elusive generic generalizations in natural language such as 'Tigers are striped' or 'Peppers are spicy'. A notable advantage of the generic view is that it simultaneously allows for pessimism and optimism about the role and status of moral principles in our lives. It provides a new perspective on the nature of moral principles on which principles are not apt for determining the moral status of particular actions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The moral epistemology of intuitionism: neuroethics and seeming states.Hossein Dabbagh - 2022 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism. His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.
    Several anti-debunkers have argued that evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs fail to meet a necessary condition on undermining defeat called modal security. They conclude that evolution, therefore, does not debunk our moral beliefs. This article shows that modal security is false if knowledge is virtuous achievement. New information can undermine a given belief without providing reason to doubt that that belief is sensitive or safe. This leads to a novel conception of undermining defeat, and it shows that successful debunking (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Worldviews, Moral Seemings, and Moral Epistemology.C. Stephen Evans - 2020 - Review of Metaphysics 73 (4):815-836.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony.Cathy Mason - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1125-1134.
    Recent discussions of moral testimony have focused on the acceptability of forming beliefs on the basis of moral testimony, but there has been little acknowledgement of the limits to testimony's capacity to convey moral knowledge. In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot be testimonially acquired.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Attentional Moral Perception.Jonna Vance & Preston J. Werner - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):501-525.
    Moral perceptualism is the view that perceptual experience is attuned to pick up on moral features in our environment, just as it is attuned to pick up on mundane features of an environment like textures, shapes, colors, pitches, and timbres. One important family of views that incorporate moral perception are those of virtue theorists and sensibility theorists. On these views, one central ability of the virtuous agent is her sensitivity to morally relevant features of situations, where this sensitivity is often (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Moral epistemology and professional codes of ethics.Alan Goldman - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Moral epistemology and liberation movements.Lauren Woomer - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Foundationalism and coherentism in moral epistemology.Noah Lemos - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Relativism and pluralism in moral epistemology.David Wong - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Contemporary moral epistemology.Rob Shaver - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Modern moral epistemology.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Ancient and medieval moral epistemology.Matthias Perkams - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Inwiefern sind philosophische Erfahrungen epistemisch transformativ?Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 70 (5):809-822.
    Drawing on Laurie A. Paul’s notion of “transformative experience”, this paper explores transformative philosophical experiences and analyses the structure of the attitude underlying them. It is argued that these experiences have to be explained not in cognitive terms but as a change in our affective attitude. More precisely, these experiences lead us to feel values in a novel manner. However, in order to make the philosophical experience epistemically transformative and provide a new perspective from which we can acquire new philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2503-2516.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for (1) is unsound, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Conscientious Utilitarianism; or, the Utilitarians Who Walk Away from Omelas.Andrew Dennis Bassford - forthcoming - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy.
    This essay offers a revisionist defense of classical utilitarianism from an infamous objection to it, which is derived from American science fiction writer, Ursula Le Guin’s, short story, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas.” To that effect, the reply takes inspiration from Le Guin and John Stuart Mill in appealing to the natural law theoretical concept of conscience. I argue that a conscientious utilitarian ethic can escape Le Guin’s objection more satisfactorily than other popular utilitarian ethics. Along the way, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Why Natural Moral Certainties Exist: A Response to Fairhurst.Samuel Laves - 2020 - Ethical Perspectives 27 (3):297-315.
    Recently there has been a growing literature on the concept of moral certainty. This concept, which is inspired by Wittgenstein’s reflections in On Certainty, is most prominently argued for by Nigel Pleasants. Pleasants contends that there is a meaningful parallel to be drawn between the epistemic certainties discussed by Wittgenstein and moral certainties. These moral certainties are unreflective, non-propositional, and show in the ways that we act. In addition, these certainties cannot be doubted by a reasonable moral agent. In a (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Reasons of Love and Conceptual Good-for-Nothings.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - In Michael Frauchiger & Markus Stepanians (eds.), Themes from Susan Wolf. Berlin: De Gruyter.
    What reasons do we have to use certain concepts and conceptions rather than others? Approaching that question in a methodologically humanistic rather than Platonic spirit, one might seek “reasons for concept use” in how well concepts serve the contingent human concerns of those who live by them. But appealing to the instrumentality of concepts in meeting our concerns invites the worry that this yields the wrong kind of reasons, especially if the relevant concerns are nonmoral ones. Drawing on Susan Wolf’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Not a Negation? A Logico-Philosophical Perspective on the Ugaritic Particles lā/ ’al.Cristina Barés Gómez & Matthieu Fontaine - 2022 - Topoi 41 (3):515-526.
    The negative particles lā/ ’al in Ugaritic change from positive to negative in modal contexts, conditional, questions, disjunctions, etc. They have usually been studied from a Semitic and linguistic points of view. On the basis of their occurrence in Ugaritic texts, we pretend to explain their uncommon behaviour from a philosophical and logico-semantic perspective. Is it possible to translate this linguistic structure in our Modern languages? Starting from a general view of their use in Ugaritic language, we claim that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. The moral epistemology of trust and trustworthiness.Emma C. Gordon & Mona Simion - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Moorean Arguments Against the Error Theory: A Defense.Eric Sampson - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage highly revisionary philosophical views, such as nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it’s true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in ethics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Informed Consent, Error and Suspending Ignorance: Providing Knowledge or Preventing Error?Arnon Keren & Ori Lev - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):351-368.
    The standard account of informed consent has recently met serious criticism, focused on the mismatch between its implications and widespread intuitions about the permissibility of conducting research and providing treatment under conditions of partial knowledge. Unlike other critics of the standard account, we suggest an account of the relations between autonomy, ignorance, and valid consent that avoids these implausible implications while maintaining the standard core idea, namely, that the primary purpose of the disclosure requirement of informed consent is to prevent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Ubuntu and Moral Epistemology: The Case of the Rhodes Must Fall Movement.Luis Rodrigues - 2020 - Philosophia Africana 19 (1):40-63.
    ABSTRACT One of the key ethical and political issues in South Africa today is the decolonization of education. In 2015, a movement called Rhodes Must Fall was born in South Africa precisely with the purpose of engaging in activism to promote this decolonization. The Rhodes Must Fall movement to further this purpose engaged in some violent protests. The objective of this article is to assess whether South Africans are justified to believe that these protests can or cannot be morally justified (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Exploiting the Epistemic Value of Crises.Matthew Adams & Fay Niker - 2021 - In Fay Niker & Aveek Bhattacharya (eds.), Political Philosophy in a Pandemic Routes to a More Just Future.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. The Hesitant Empiricist: Why Moral Epistemology Needs Real History.Nicholas Smyth - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):190-200.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. The Introspective Model of Genuine Knowledge in Wang Yangming.Harvey Lederman - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (2):169-213.
    This article presents a new interpretation of the great Ming dynasty philosopher Wang Yangming’s celebrated doctrine of the “unity of knowledge and action”. Wang held that action was not unified with all knowledge, but only with an elevated form of knowledge, which he sometimes called “genuine knowledge”. I argue for a new interpretation of this notion, according to which genuine knowledge requires freedom from a form of doxastic conflict. I propose that, in Wang’s view, a person is free from this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Optimizing Political Influence: A Jury Theorem with Dynamic Competence and Dependence.Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    The purpose of this paper is to illustrate, formally, an ambiguity in the exercise of political influence. To wit: A voter might exert influence with an eye toward maximizing the probability that the political system (1) obtains the correct (e.g. just) outcome, or (2) obtains the outcome that he judges to be correct (just). And these are two very different things. A variant of Condorcet's Jury Theorem which incorporates the effect of influence on group competence and interdependence is developed. Analytic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Christopher B. Kulp, Knowing Moral Truth. A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge.Artur Szutta - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (2):209-212.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Scheler and Zambrano: on a transformation of the heart in Spanish philosophy.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Karolina Enquist Källgren - 2022 - History of European Ideas 47.
    This paper compares the concept of the heart in the works of Max Scheler and María Zambrano. Both authors use the heart as a metaphor for distinct human affective phenomena that have a central anthropological, epistemological, and ontological significance. The comparison between authors’ use of the metaphor is organised around three main topics: the order of the heart; the idea of a primordial feeling and its place in the affective life; and the primacy of love in relation to negative affective (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. How to explain the possibility of wholesale moral error: a reply to Akhlaghi.Daan Evers - 2022 - Ratio 35 (2):146-150.
    Farbod Akhlaghi (2021) argues that noncognitivists and naturalists cannot explain the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This would show that noncognitivism and naturalism are false. I argue that noncognitivists and naturalists have no trouble explaining the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and that the requirement to explain this possibility is plausible only on one particular conception of epistemic possibility.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. How to explain the possibility of wholesale moral error: a reply to Akhlaghi.Daan Evers - 2022 - Ratio 35 (2):146-150.
    Farbod Akhlaghi (2021) argues that noncognitivists and naturalists cannot explain the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This would show that noncognitivism and naturalism are false. I argue that noncognitivists and naturalists have no trouble explaining the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and that the requirement to explain this possibility is plausible only on one particular conception of epistemic possibility.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Feeling as Consciousness of Value.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):71-88.
    A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Sensitive to Reasons: Moral Intuition and the Dual Process Challenge to Ethics.Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Dissertation,
    This dissertation is a contribution to the field of empirically informed metaethics, which combines the rigorous conceptual clarity of traditional metaethics with a careful review of empirical evidence. More specifically, this work stands at the intersection of moral psychology, moral epistemology, and philosophy of action. The study comprises six chapters on three distinct (although related) topics. Each chapter is structured as an independent paper and addresses a specific open question in the literature. The first part concerns the psychological features and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Conocimiento Práctico.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2022 - Laguna. Revista de Filosofía 50:117-140.
    Sobre la base de un análisis de la distinción habermasiana entre ética y moral y a la vista de las críticas, por un lado, al tratamiento non-cognitivista de los temas éticos que impediría su consideración crítica, y, por otro, al proyecto fundamentalista y a-histórico de la ED, intento mostrar 1) que lo que determina el carácter propiamente moral no es si son normas o valores sino la fundamentalidad del objetivo, 2) que la prioridad de los objetivos morales resulta de forma (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. The Contingency of the Cultural Evolution of Morality, Debunking, and Theism vs. Naturalism.Matthew Braddock - 2021 - In Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz (eds.), Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics. Synthese Library. Springer - Synthese Library. pp. 179-201.
    Is the cultural evolution of morality fairly contingent? Could cultural evolution have easily led humans to moral norms and judgments that are mostly false by our present lights? If so, does it matter philosophically? Yes, or so we argue. We empirically motivate the contingency of cultural evolution and show that it makes two major philosophical contributions. First, it shows that moral objectivists cannot explain the reliability of our moral judgments and thus strengthens moral debunking arguments. Second, it shows that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Deliberation and the Problems of Exclusion and Uptake: The Virtues of Actively Facilitating Equitable Deliberation and Testimonial Sensibility.Sarah Sorial - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):215-231.
    In this paper, I suggest that one of the ways in which problems of exclusion from deliberation and uptake within deliberation can be ameliorated is to develop a more robust account of the deliberative virtues that socially privileged speakers/hearers ought to cultivate. Specifically, privileged speakers/hearers ought to cultivate the virtue of actively facilitating equitable and inclusive deliberative exchanges and the deliberative virtue of training their ‘testimonial sensibility’ to correct for prejudicial judgments about other speakers.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Admiration, Affectivity, and Value: Critical Remarks on Exemplarity.Wojciech Kaftanski - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-18.
    By spelling out the affective dimension of admiration, this paper challenges the view of admiration as a trustworthy means of detecting morally desirable qualities in exemplars. Such a view of admiration, foundational for the current debate on exemplars in moral education, holds that admiration is a self-motivating emotion essentially oriented toward the good and the excellent. I demonstrate that this view ignores the affective aspects of admiration explored widely in the history of philosophy on which the debate on moral exemplars (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Moral Knowledge Without Knowledge of Moral Knowledge.David Kaspar - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):155-172.
    Most people believe some moral propositions are true. Most people would say that they know that rape is wrong, torturing people is wrong, and so on. But despite decades of intense epistemological study, philosophers cannot even provide a rudimentary sketch of moral knowledge. In my view, the fact that we have very strong epistemic confidence in some fundamental moral propositions and the fact that it is extremely difficult for us to provide even the basics of an account of moral knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. Confused Entailment.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2022 - Topoi 41 (1):207-219.
    Priest argued in Fusion and Confusion (Priest in Topoi 34(1):55–61, 2015a) for a new concept of logical consequence over the relevant logic B, one where premises my be “confused” together. This paper develops Priest’s idea. Whereas Priest uses a substructural proof calculus, this paper provides a Hilbert proof calculus for it. Using this it is shown that Priest’s consequence relation is weaker than the standard Hilbert consequence relation for B, but strictly stronger than Anderson and Belnap’s original relevant notion of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Confabulations in the Case of Gaslighting Are Not Epistemically Beneficial, But They Are Instructive. A Commentary on Spear, A. (2020). Gaslighting, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence. [REVIEW]Maja Białek - 2022 - Topoi 41 (1):227-233.
    This commentary is a response to Spear’s :229–241, 2020) remarks on the difficulty of qualifying confabulations in gaslighting as epistemically innocent. I propose a way to improve on the currently employed definition of epistemic benefit and show that if it is supplemented with a pragmatic and enactive understanding of “epistemic functioning”, we can easily and intuitively grasp why such confabulations are not epistemically beneficial.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Ressentiment and Self-deception in Early Phenomenology: Voigtländer, Scheler and Reinach.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (ed.), Else Voigtländer: Self, Emotion, and Sociality.
    This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Das Gedächtnis als epistemisches Element zum Verständnis der Menschenwürde.José Antonio Santos & José-Antonio Santos - 2021 - In Paul Tiedemann Ulfrid Neumann (ed.), Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. Beiheft 165. Baden-Baden, Alemania: pp. 219-229.
    The article aims to define and analyze from a hermeneutical perspective the concept of memory and human dignity in the post-metaphysical era. The section I presents a brief introduction to the topic. The section II provides a concise overview of the concept of memory understood as historical consciousness, which is analyzed from a conception characterized by the fact that the present decisions have your foundations in the past. It is understood from a reasonable past in line with the political equality (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. On the Analogy between the Sensing of Secondary Qualities and the Feeling of Values: Landmann-Kalischer’s Epistemic Project, Its Historical Context, and Its Significance for Current Meta-Ethics.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Beatrice Centi, Faustino Fabbianelli & Gemmo Iocco (eds.), Philosophy of Value. The Historical Roots of Contemporary Debate: An Overview. De Gruyter.
    This paper explores Landmann-Kalischer’s analogy between the sensing of secondary qualities and the feeling of values in her work “Philosophie der Werte” (Philosophy of Values) (1910). Attention is paid to the epistemic motivation of the analogy, the distinction between pure feelings and affects, and the relation of pure feelings to value judgments. Her account is contrasted with two other accounts of the Brentanian tradition: Scheler’s approach within early phenomenology and Meinong’s account within the Graz School. I demonstrate that Landmann-Kalischer’s pioneering (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Tajarrī as Religious Luck.Amir Mohammad Emami & Mirza Mohammad Kazem Askari - 2019 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World. Berlin, Germany: pp. 195-204.
    Suppose you are in a situation where you are morally obligated to tell the truth, but choose to say something that is opposed to your beliefs. Later on, it turns out that what you said was true, unbeknownst to you. We might say that you attempted to lie, but failed. Morally speaking, is your situation like that of someone who expressed a true belief with the intention to be honest? Or like someone who intentionally and successfully uttered a falsehood? Such (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Harnessing Moral Psychology to Reduce Meat Consumption.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    How can we make moral progress on factory farming? Part of the answer lies in human moral psychology. Meat consumption remains high, despite increased awareness of its negative impact on animal welfare. Weakness of will is part of the explanation: acceptance of the ethical arguments doesn’t always motivate changes in dietary habits. However, we draw on scientific evidence to argue that many consumers aren’t fully convinced that they morally ought to reduce their meat consumption. We then identify two key psychological (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Waving away waivers: an obligation to contribute to ‘herd knowledge’ for data linkage research?Owen M. Bradfield - 2021 - Sage Publications Ltd: Research Ethics 18 (2):151-162.
    Research Ethics, Volume 18, Issue 2, Page 151-162, April 2022. In today’s online data-driven world, people constantly shed data and deposit digital footprints. When individuals access health services, governments and health providers collect and store large volumes of health information about people that can later be retrieved, linked and analysed for research purposes. This can lead to new discoveries in medicine and healthcare. In addition, when securely stored and de-identified, the privacy risks are minimal and manageable. In many jurisdictions, ethics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Richard Price e la fallacia definizionistica.Francesco Allegri - 2003 - In Rosaria Egidi, Mario De Caro & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), Normativity, Facts, and Values. Macerata, Italia: Quodlibet. pp. 261-268.
  49. Richard Price e la fallacia definizionistica.Francesco Allegri - 2003 - In M. Dell’Utri R. Egidi (ed.), Normatività, Fatti, Valori. Macerata, Italia: Quodlibet. pp. 261-268.
  50. Attention in Iris Murdoch (1919–1999).Silvia Caprioglio Panizza - 2020 - In Ruth Waithe & Mary Ellen Hagengruber (eds.), Encyclopedia of Concise Concepts by Women Philosophers.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 2337