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  1. Dynamically rational judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - manuscript
    Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light (...)
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  2. Viewpoint Convergence as a Philosophical Defect (work in progress, committed to volume Attitude in Philosophy, eds. Goldberg & Walker).Grace Helton - manuscript
    What can we know? How should we live? What is there? Philosophers famously diverge in the answers they give to these and other philosophical questions. It is widely presumed that a lack of convergence on these questions suggests that philosophy is not progressing at all, is not progressing fast enough, or is not progressing as fast as other disciplines, such as the natural sciences. Call the view that ideal philosophical progress is marked by at least some degree of convergence on (...)
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  3. WikiSilo: A Self-organizing, Crowd Sourcing System for Interdisciplinary Science [Supporting Paper].David Pierre Leibovitz, Robert L. West & Mike Belanger - manuscript
    WikiSilo is a tool for theorizing across interdisciplinary fields such as Cognitive Science, and provides a vocabulary for talking about the problems of doing so. It can be used to demonstrate that a particular cognitive theory is complete and coherent at multiple levels of discourse, and commensurable with and relevant to a wider domain of cognition. WikiSilo is also a minimalist theory and methodology for effectively doing science. WikiSilo is simultaneously similar to and distinct, as well as integrated and separated (...)
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  4. Jeffrey Pooling.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg - manuscript
    How should your opinion change in response to the opinion of an epistemic peer? We show that the pooling rule known as "upco" is the unique answer satisfying some natural desiderata. If your revised opinion will influence your opinions on other matters by Jeffrey conditionalization, then upco is the only standard pooling rule that ensures the order in which peers are consulted makes no difference. Popular proposals like linear pooling, geometric pooling, and harmonic pooling cannot boast the same. In fact, (...)
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  5. Epistemologia serviciilor de informaţii.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Despre analogia existentă între aspectele epistemologice şi metodologice ale activităţii serviciilor de informaţii şi unele discipline ştiinţifice, pledând pentru o abordare mai ştiinţifică a procesului de culegere şi analiză de informaţii din cadrul ciclului de informaţii. Afirm că în prezent aspectele teoretice, ontologice şi epistemologice, în activitatea multor servicii de informaţii, sunt subestimate, determinând înţelegere incompletă a fenomenelor actuale şi creând confuzie în colaborarea inter-instituţională. După o scurtă Introducere, care include o istorie a evoluţiei conceptului de serviciu de informaţii după (...)
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  6. Epistemic vice predicts acceptance of Covid-19 misinformation.Marco Meyer, Mark Alfano & Boudewijn De Bruin - 2021
    Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...)
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  7. Believing is said of groups in many ways (and so it should be said of them in none).Richard Pettigrew -
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What's more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. In the second half, I argue that this ambiguity often has bad consequences when a group belief ascription is heard and taken as testimony. And indeed it has these consequences even when the ascription is (...)
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  8. The Anti-Individualistic Turn in the Ethics of Collegiality: Can Good Colleagues Be Epistemically Vicious?Andrea Berber & Vanja Subotić - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-18.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the nascent field of ethics of collegiality may considerably benefit from a symbiosis with virtue and vice epistemology. We start by bringing the epistemic virtue and vice perspective to the table by showing that competence, deemed as an essential characteristic of a good colleague (Betzler & Löschke 2021), should be construed broadly to encompass epistemic competence. By endorsing the anti-individualistic stance in epistemology as well as context-specificity of epistemic traits, we show (...)
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  9. Group Epistemology and Structural Factors in Online Group Polarization.Kenneth Boyd - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists about group polarization, particularly with regards to political issues and scientific issues that have become markers of social identity, such as anthropogenic climate change and vaccine hesitancy. Online and social media environments in particular have received a lot of attention in these discussions, both because of people’s increasing reliance on such environments for receiving and exchanging information, and because such environments often allow individuals to selectively interact with those (...)
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  10. Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief: A DDL Approach.Proietti Carlo - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic.
  11. Real Life Collective Epistemic Virtue and Vice.Boudewijn de Bruin & Barend de Rooij - forthcoming - In Mark Alfano, Colin Klein & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. New York: pp. 396-423.
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  12. Collective Moral Agency and Self-Induced Moral Incapacity.Niels de Haan - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-22.
    Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary exempting conditions do not free an agent from diachronic responsibility once the agent (...)
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  13. Collective Understanding — A conceptual defense for when groups should be regarded as epistemic agents with understanding.Sven Delarivière - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2).
    Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need to (...)
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  14. Developing a Trusted Human-AI Network for Humanitarian Benefit.Susannah Kate Devitt, Jason Scholz, Timo Schless & Larry Lewis - forthcoming - Journal of Digital War:TBD.
    Humans and artificial intelligences (AI) will increasingly participate digitally and physically in conflicts yet there is a lack of trusted communications across agents and platforms. For example, humans in disasters and conflict already use messaging and social media to share information, however, international humanitarian relief organisations treat this information as unverifiable and untrustworthy. AI may reduce the ‘fog-of-war’ and improve outcomes, however current AI implementations are often brittle, have a narrow scope of application and wide ethical risks. Meanwhile, human error (...)
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  15. Could our epistemic reasons be collective practical reasons?Michelle M. Dyke - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Are epistemic reasons merely a species of instrumental practical reasons, making epistemic rationality a specialized form of instrumental practical rationality? Or are epistemic reasons importantly different in kind? Despite the attractions of the former view, Kelly (2003) argues quite compellingly that epistemic rationality cannot be merely a matter of taking effective means to one’s epistemic ends. I argue here that Kelly’s objections can be sidestepped if we understand epistemic reasons as instrumental reasons that arise in light of the aims held (...)
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  16. Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the (...)
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  17. Authority in the context of distributed knowledge.Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss - forthcoming - Common Knowledge.
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  18. Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Social Virtue Epistemology.
    I motivate three claims: Firstly, attentional traits can be cognitive virtues and vices. Secondly, groups and collectives can possess attentional virtues and vices. Thirdly, attention has epistemic, moral, social, and political importance. An epistemology of attention is needed to better understand our social-epistemic landscape, including media, social media, search engines, political polarisation, and the aims of protest. I apply attentional normativity to undermine recent arguments for moral encroachment and to illuminate a distinctive epistemic value of occupying particular social positions. A (...)
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  19. Bullshit in Politics Pays.Adam F. Gibbons - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Politics is full of people who don’t care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an account (...)
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  20. Group Lies and the Narrative Constraint.Säde Hormio - forthcoming - Episteme 19 (First View):1-20.
    A group is lying when it makes a statement that it believes to be untrue but wants the addressee(s) to believe. But how can we distinguish statements that the group believes to be untrue from honest group statements based on mistaken beliefs or confusion within the group? I will suggest a narrative constraint for honest group statements, made up of two components. Narrative coherence requires that a new group statement should not conflict with group knowledge on the matter, or beliefs (...)
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  21. Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook to Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 244-255.
    Since subjection to harm is an intrinsic feature of our social and epistemic lives, there is a perpetual need for individual and collective agents with the virtue of epistemic courage. In this chapter, I survey some of the main issues germane to this virtue, such as the nature of courage and of harm, the range of epistemic activities that can manifest courage, and the status of epistemic courage as a collective and as a professional virtue.
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  22. On Group Background Beliefs.Nate Lauffer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming):1-13.
    In this paper, I argue that the following claims are jointly inconsistent: (1) that an agent’s justification for belief, if it’s constituted by evidence, depends on the profile of her background beliefs, (2) that whether or not a group believes a proposition is solely dependent on whether the proposition is jointly accepted by its members, and (3) that prototypical group beliefs are justified. I also raise objections to attempts to resolve the tension by retaining (2) and (3). The upshot is (...)
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  23. Hayek and the “Use of Knowledge in Society”.Leslie Marsh - forthcoming - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.
    Encyclopedia entry: http://www.sagepub.com/books/Book234813#tabview=title.
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  24. Mindscapes and Landscapes: Hayek and Simon on Cognitive Extension.Leslie Marsh - forthcoming - In Roger Frantz & Robert Leeson (eds.), Hayek and Behavioral Economics. Palgrave.
    Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient (...)
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  25. Group Assertions and Group Lies.Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Topoi:1-16.
    Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to (...)
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  26. Optimizing Political Influence: A Jury Theorem with Dynamic Competence and Dependence.Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    The purpose of this paper is to illustrate, formally, an ambiguity in the exercise of political influence. To wit: A voter might exert influence with an eye toward maximizing the probability that the political system (1) obtains the correct (e.g. just) outcome, or (2) obtains the outcome that he judges to be correct (just). And these are two very different things. A variant of Condorcet's Jury Theorem which incorporates the effect of influence on group competence and interdependence is developed. Analytic (...)
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  27. Cults, Conspiracies, and Fantasies of Knowledge.Daniel Munro - forthcoming - Episteme:1-22.
    There’s a certain pleasure in fantasizing about possessing knowledge, especially possessing secret knowledge to which outsiders don’t have access. Such fantasies are typically a source of innocent entertainment. However, under the right conditions, fantasies of knowledge can become epistemically dangerous, because they can generate illusions of genuine knowledge. I argue that this phenomenon helps to explain why some people join and eventually adopt the beliefs of epistemic communities who endorse seemingly bizarre, outlandish claims, such as extreme cults and online conspiracy (...)
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  28. 3.2 Collective Quality: How to design collective standards of knowledge?Gloria Origgi - forthcoming - Common Knowledge: The Challenge of Transdisciplinarity.
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  29. The diversity-ability trade-off in scientific problem solving.Samuli Reijula & Jaakko Kuorikoski - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science (Supplement).
    According to the diversity-beats-ability theorem, groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. We argue that the model introduced by Lu Hong and Scott Page is inadequate for exploring the trade-off between diversity and ability. This is because the model employs an impoverished implementation of the problem-solving task. We present a new version of the model which captures the role of ‘ability’ in a meaningful way, and use it to explore the trade-offs between diversity and ability (...)
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  30. The Curious Case of the Jury-shaped Hole: A Plea for Real Jury Research.Lewis Ross - forthcoming - International Journal of Evidence and Proof.
    Criminal juries make decisions of great importance. A key criticism of juries is that they are unreliable in a multitude of ways, from exhibiting racial or gendered biases, to misunderstanding their role, to engaging in impropriety such as internet research. Recently, some have even claimed that the use of juries creates injustice on a large-scale, as a cause of low conviction rates for sexual criminality. Unfortunately, empirical research into jury deliberation is undermined by the fact that researchers are unable to (...)
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  31. Can Real Social Epistemic Networks Deliver the Wisdom of Crowds?Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we explain and showcase the promising methodology of testimonial network analysis and visualization for experimental epistemology, arguing that it can be used to gain insights and answer philosophical questions in social epistemology. Our use case is the epistemic community that discusses vaccine safety primarily in English on Twitter. In two studies, we show, using both statistical analysis and exploratory data visualization, that there is almost no neutral or ambivalent discussion of vaccine safety on Twitter. Roughly half the (...)
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  32. General-Purpose Institutional Decision-Making Heuristics: The Case of Decision-Making under Deep Uncertainty.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Recent work in judgment and decisionmaking has stressed that institutions, like individuals, often rely on decisionmaking heuristics. But most of the institutional decisionmaking heuristics studied to date are highly firm- and industry-specific. This contrasts to the individual case, in which many heuristics are general-purpose rules suitable for a wide range of decision problems. Are there also general-purpose heuristics for institutional decisionmaking? In this paper, I argue that a number of methods recently developed for decisionmaking under deep uncertainty have a good (...)
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  33. Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (1):30-46.
    How a group G can know that p has been the subject of much investigation in social epistemology in recent years. This paper clarifies and defends a form of non-supervenient, non-summative group knowledge: G can know that p even if none of the members of G knows that p, and whether or not G knows that p does not locally supervene on the mental states of the members of G. Instead, we argue that what is central to G knowing that (...)
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  34. 从“文化叠加性”的角度概述越南社会的“三教合流”.Ruining Jin & Quan-Hoang Vuong - 2023 - Osf Preprints.
    该研究简要介绍了儒家、佛教和道教在越南的起源和发展,以及它们如何通过 "文化叠加性 "来共存、互动、影响越南社会。基于文化叠加性的成本效益分析,本文进一步说明了儒家思想如何在越南社会中占主导地位,道教思想如何与儒家思想共存,以及为什么佛教影响力逐渐在越南民间消失。.
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  35. Collective vice and collective self-knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2023 - Synthese 201 (1):1-18.
    Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based (...)
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  36. Wise groups and humble persons: the best of both worlds?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-10.
    This paper is about a problem that can arise when we try to harness the “wisdom of the crowd” from groups comprised of individuals who exhibit a certain kind of epistemic humility in the way they respond to testimonial evidence. I begin by setting out the problem and then make some initial steps toward solving it. The solution I develop is tentative and may not apply in all circumstances, but it promises to alleviate what seems to me to be a (...)
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  37. Group Belief: Summativism in Non-summativist Cases.Youssef Aguisoul - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (3):231-243.
    The summativists generally analyze group belief in terms of belief of the majority. The non-summativists counterargue that it is possible for a group to believe that p even if “none” of its members believes that p. In doing so, they usually appeal to hypothetical cases in which groups are “structured” groups like committees, research groups, governments, as opposed to “collective” groups like Finns, America, Catholic Church. In this paper, I raise the objection that non-summativist cases involve summativism. While most contemporary (...)
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  38. Collective Epistemic Luck.Moisés Barba & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):99-119.
    A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic (...)
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  39. Optimizing Individual and Collective Reliability: A Puzzle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (4):516-531.
    Many epistemologists have argued that there is some degree of independence between individual and collective reliability (e.g., Kitcher 1990; Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks 2011; Dunn 2018). The question, then, is: To what extent are the two independent of each other? And in which contexts do they come apart? In this paper, I present a new case confirming the independence between individual and collective reliability optimization. I argue that, in voting groups, optimizing individual reliability can conflict with optimizing collective reliability. This (...)
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  40. Re-assessing Google as Epistemic Tool in the Age of Personalisation.Tanya de Villiers-Botha - 2022 - The Proceedings of SACAIR2022 Online Conference, the 3rd Southern African Conference for Artificial Intelligence Research.
    Google Search is arguably one of the primary epistemic tools in use today, with the lion’s share of the search-engine market globally. Scholarship on countering the current scourge of misinformation often recommends “digital lit- eracy” where internet users, especially those who get their information from so- cial media, are encouraged to fact-check such information using reputable sources. Given our current internet-based epistemic landscape, and Google’s dominance of the internet, it is very likely that such acts of epistemic hygiene will take (...)
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  41. Scientific Progress: By-Whom or For-Whom?Finnur Dellsén - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 97 (C):20-28.
    When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whom progress is made, i.e. the receivers rather (...)
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  42. Safety in numbers: how social choice theory can inform avalanche risk management.Philip A. Ebert & Michael Morreau - 2022 - Journal of Adventure Education and Outdoor Learning:1-17.
    Avalanche studies have undergone a transition in recent years. Early research focused mainly on environmental factors. More recently, attention has turned to human factors in decision making, such as behavioural and cognitive biases. This article adds a social component to this human turn in avalanche studies. It identifies lessons for decision making by groups of skiers from the perspective of social choice theory, a sub-field of economics, decision theory, philosophy and political science that investigates voting methods and other forms of (...)
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  43. A Knowledge-First Account of Group Knowledge.Domingos Faria - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (1):37-53.
    The aim of this paper is to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology no one has seriously applied and developed Williamson’s theory of knowledge-first approach to the case of group knowledge yet. For example, scholars of group knowledge typically assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief or acceptance, group justification, and so on. However, if Williamson’s theory of (...)
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  44. Diversity, Trust, and Conformity: A Simulation Study.Sina Fazelpour & Daniel Steel - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):209-231.
    Previous simulation models have found positive effects of cognitive diversity on group performance, but have not explored effects of diversity in demographics (e.g., gender, ethnicity). In this paper, we present an agent-based model that captures two empirically supported hypotheses about how demographic diversity can improve group performance. The results of our simulations suggest that, even when social identities are not associated with distinctive task-related cognitive resources, demographic diversity can, in certain circumstances, benefit collective performance by counteracting two types of conformity (...)
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  45. Scientific Testimony. Its roles in science and society.Mikkel Gerken - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Scientific Testimony concerns the roles of scientific testimony in science and society. The book develops a positive alternative to a tradition famously expressed by the slogan of the Royal Society Nullius in verba ("Take nobody's word for it"). This book argues that intra-scientific testimony—i.e., testimony between collaborating scientists—is not in conflict with the spirit of science or an add-on to scientific practice. On the contrary, intra-scientific testimony is a vital part of science. This is illustrated by articulating epistemic norms of (...)
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  46. Collective Practical Knowledge is a Fragmented Interrogative Capacity.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):180-199.
    What does it take for a group of people to know how to do something? An account of collective practical knowledge ought to be compatible with the linguistic evidence about the semantics for collective knowledge-how ascriptions, be able to explain the practicality of collective knowledge, be able to explain both the connection between individual and collective know-how and the possibility of a group knowing how to do something none of its members know, and be applicable to a suitably wide range (...)
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  47. Group Inquiry.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1099-1123.
    Group agents can act, and they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account faces two challenges: to make sense of how large-scale distributed activities might be a kind of group action, and to make sense of the kind of division of labour involved in collective inquiry. In the first part of the paper, I argue that existing accounts of group (...)
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  48. Outward-facing epistemic vice.Keith Raymond Harris - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-16.
    The epistemic virtues and vices are typically defined in terms of effects or motivations related to the epistemic states of their possessors. However, philosophers have recently begun to consider _other-regarding_ epistemic virtues, traits oriented toward the epistemic flourishing of others. In a similar vein, this paper discusses _outward-facing_ epistemic vices, properties oriented toward the epistemic languishing of others. I argue for the existence of both reliabilist and responsibilist outward-facing vices, and illustrate how such vices negatively bear on the epistemic prospects (...)
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  49. Ismail, Salah. 2022. "Introduction," in Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, translation into Arabic by Huda Alawaji, Al Rawafed Culture & Ibn Nadim, pp. 11-22.Salah Ismail - 2022 - In Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, translation into Arabic by Huda Alawaji, Al Rawafed Culture & Ibn Nadim. Beirut, Lebanon: pp. 11-22..
    شنت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية حربا على العراق عام 2003 بدعوى أن العراق يمتلك أسلحة دمار شامل، ثم تبين للعالم عدم صحة هذه الدعوى، وقال الناس: لقد كذبت الإدارة الأمريكية. كانت نظرية المعرفة التقليدية تنسب المعرفة إلى الذات العارفة الفردية، وتركز على الفاعلين الأفراد وحالاتهم الاعتقادية، مثل "يعتقد أحمد بقضية معينة". أما أن ننسب الحالات المعرفية إلى الجماعات مثل " كذبت الإدارة الأمريكية"، فهذا تحول في الإبستمولوجيا إلى الفاعل الجماعي. إبستمولوجيا الجماعات epistemology of groups حقل فرعي من الإبستمولوجيا الاجتماعية. يهدف إلى (...)
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  50. "Introduction," in Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, translation into Arabic by Huda Alawaji, Al Rawafed Culture & Ibn Nadim, pp. 11-22.Salah Ismail - 2022 - In Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, translation into Arabic by Huda Alawaji, Al Rawafed Culture & Ibn Nadim. Beirut, Lebanon: Al Rawafed Culture & Ibn Nadim. pp. 11-22.
    شنت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية حربا على العراق عام 2003 بدعوى أن العراق يمتلك أسلحة دمار شامل، ثم تبين للعالم عدم صحة هذه الدعوى، وقال الناس: لقد كذبت الإدارة الأمريكية. كانت نظرية المعرفة التقليدية تنسب المعرفة إلى الذات العارفة الفردية، وتركز على الفاعلين الأفراد وحالاتهم الاعتقادية، مثل "يعتقد أحمد بقضية معينة". أما أن ننسب الحالات المعرفية إلى الجماعات مثل " كذبت الإدارة الأمريكية"، فهذا تحول في الإبستمولوجيا إلى الفاعل الجماعي. إبستمولوجيا الجماعات epistemology of groups حقل فرعي من الإبستمولوجيا الاجتماعية. يهدف إلى (...)
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