Moral Character

Kant’s rational religion has been described as a failure because his idea of redemption contains contradictory appeals to human responsibility and divine assistance. For example, John Hare has argued that Kant cannot explain how human beings can bridge a moral gap between an ideal state of virtue and an imperfect disposition. In this paper, I defend Kant from this criticism, arguing that his rational religion is coherent: human agency and divine assistance may each contribute to redemption without inconsistency. I argue (...) that divine grace may be operative for Kant through the gradual process of character formation, in addition to the instantaneous change of heart, providing an alternative explanation of how the moral gap may be bridged. I compare this account with Erasmus’s account of free will and divine grace, arguing that each account employs a similar strategy and structure to explain the operation of grace. Though Kant’s position is not identical with historical (orthodox) Christianity, he holds that reason is necessarily religious in orientation and must remain open to the possibility that divine grace is necessary for moral improvement. (shrink)

Kant’s rational religion has been described as a failure because his idea of redemption contains contradictory appeals to human responsibility and divine assistance. For example, John Hare has argued that Kant cannot explain how human beings can bridge a moral gap between an ideal state of virtue and an imperfect disposition. In this paper, I defend Kant from this criticism, arguing that his rational religion is coherent: human agency and divine assistance may each contribute to redemption without inconsistency. I argue (...) that divine grace may be operative for Kant through the gradual process of character formation, in addition to the instantaneous change of heart, providing an alternative explanation of how the moral gap may be bridged. I compare this account with Erasmus’s account of free will and divine grace, arguing that each account employs a similar strategy and structure to explain the operation of grace. Though Kant’s position is not identical with historical (orthodox) Christianity, he holds that reason is necessarily religious in orientation and must remain open to the possibility that divine grace is necessary for moral improvement. (shrink)

Understanding the virtue of perseverance requires differentiating it from the skill of grit, the vice of pertinacity, and the related virtues of patience and constancy. The key feature of perseverance as persistence in the difficult good is carved out in this essay through reflection on the pagan and Christian history of reflection on perseverance (with particular attention to the context of martyrdom), Alasdair MacIntyre's questionable claims about constancy as a peculiarly modern virtue, and about Jane Austen as its exemplar, and (...) Angela Duckworth's influential popular account of grit. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

This chapter examines Ross’s account of moral virtue as one of his four intrinsic goods and argues that in key respects it’s superior to the better-known accounts of Aristotle and Kant. Among the topics covered are: (1) Ross’s treatment of virtue as a secondary or derivative good, one that consists in fitting attitudes to other, independently given values or duties—this in contrast with many virtue-ethical views; (2) his sharp separation between the right and the morally good, so a wrong act (...) can be virtuous and good; (3) his recognizing both de dicto and de re forms of virtue; (4) his making the primary locus of moral value occurrent attitudes rather than, as in Aristotle, dispositions; (5) his (unpersuasive) arguments that virtue is the greatest intrinsic good and the motive of duty the best motive; and (6) his interesting accounts of the moral worth of actions done from multiple motives or not done from a good motive that should be present and effective but isn’t. (shrink)

This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...) view that a benevolent person must be affectively disposed in morally relevant ways; instead, being disposed to perform benevolent actions is enough. (shrink)

This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...) view that a benevolent person must be affectively disposed in morally relevant ways; instead, being disposed to perform benevolent actions is enough. (shrink)

Ang tradisyong pilosopikal sa paglapit sa moralidad ay pangunahing nakabatay sa mga konsepto at teoryang metapisikal at teolohikal. Sa mga tradisyunal na konsepto ng etika, ang pinakaprominente ay ang Divine Command Theory (DCT). Ayon sa DCT, ang Diyos ang nagbibigay ng moral na pundasyon sa sangkatauhan sa pamamagitan ng paglikha at Rebelasyon. Ang moralidad at pagka-Diyos ay hindi mapaghihiwalay mula pa noong pinakalumang sibilisasyon. Ang mga konseptong ito ay nakalubog sa isang teolohikal na balangkas at malawakang tinatanggap ng karamihan sa (...) mga tagasunod ng tatlong tradisyong Abrahamiko: Hudaismo, Kristiyanismo, at Islam, na bumubuo sa malaking bahagi ng populasyon ng tao. Dahil nakabatay sa pananampalataya at Rebelasyon, ang mga Divine Command Theories ay hindi mahigpit na nasasaklaw ng demonstrasyon. Ang mga kalaban ng Divine Command na konsepto ng moralidad, na nakabatay sa imposibilidad ng demonstrasyon ng mga metapisikal at relihiyosong palagay nito, ay sinubukan sa loob ng maraming siglo (bagamat hindi matagumpay) na bawasan ang kahalagahan nito. Inihain nila ang argumento na wala itong maipakitang materyal na ebidensya at lohikal na pagkakaugnay, at dahil dito, hindi ito maaaring isaalang-alang para sa mga layuning maka-agham o pilosopikal. Isa lamang itong paniniwala at, bilang ganoon, dapat itong unawain. Bukod sa mga matinding pagtutol na ito, maraming iba pang konsepto ang sumasalungat sa mga teorya ng Divine Command, sa isa o ibang paraan, bahagya o ganap. Maraming mga pilosopo at sosyal na siyentipiko, mula sa klasikal na pilosopiyang Griyego hanggang sa kasalukuyan, halimbawa, ang nagsasabing ang moralidad ay isang konstrak lamang, kaya’t ito ay kultural na relatibo at kultural na natutukoy. Gayunpaman, nagdadala ito ng maraming iba pang talakayan at nagpapataw ng hamon na tukuyin kung ano ang kahulugan ng kultura, kung aling mga elemento ng kultura ang moral na mapagpasya, at sa wakas, ano ang mga hangganan ng naturang relatibidad. Ang mga moral determinist ay nagsasabing ang lahat ng may kaugnayan sa pag-uugali ng tao, kabilang ang moralidad, ay natutukoy, sapagkat ang malayang kalooban ay hindi umiiral. Kamakailan lamang, ipinahayag ng mga modernong palaisip na mayroong mahigpit na agham ng moralidad. Gayunpaman, ang pamamaraang maka-agham lamang, sa kabila ng pagpapaliwanag ng ilang mga katotohanan at ebidensya, ay hindi kayang liwanagan ang buong nilalaman at ganap na kahulugan ng etika. Ang pag-unawa sa moralidad ay nangangailangan ng mas malawak na pananaw, at isang kasunduan sa mga pilosopo, na hindi pa nila kailanman naabot. Ang lahat ng mga tanong na ito ay may iba’t ibang anyo depende sa bawat pilosopikal na pananaw, at nagsisimula ng masalimuot na pagsusuri at walang katapusang mga debate, habang marami sa mga ito ay magkakasalungatan. Ang uniberso at ang atmospera na pumapalibot sa tesis na ito ay ang mga saklaw ng lahat ng mga konseptwal na tunggaliang ito, na sinusuri mula sa isang layunin at ebolusyonaryong pananaw. Sa kabila ng kalagayang ito at ng likas na kahalagahan nito, gayunpaman, ang mga tanong na ito ay malayo sa metodolohikal na paglapit ng isang analitikal na talakayan tungkol sa layunin ng moralidad, na siyang tunay na layunin at saklaw ng gawaing ito. Dapat nating muling balikan ang mga kilalang tradisyunal na teorya dahil ang tesis na ito ay sumisilong sa isang paghahambing na pag-aaral, at ang mga palagay nito ay hindi bababa sa ganap na naiiba mula sa lahat ng tradisyunal na teorya. Samakatuwid, nagiging kinakailangan ang pag-aalok ng direktang at tiyak na mga elemento ng paghahambing sa mambabasa, para sa wastong kritisismo, nang hindi nangangailangan ng mga nakakaantala na pananaliksik. Gayunpaman, kahit na muling binabalikan ang mga tradisyunal na teorya para sa layunin ng paghahambing at kritikal na pagpapahayag, mananatili silang nasa gilid ng ating pangunahing mga alalahanin, bilang “aliena materia.” Sa kabila ng bisa ng alinman o lahat ng mga elemento ng talakayang ito, at ng kanilang kahulugan bilang pilosopikal na uniberso ng tesis na ito, ang layunin ng gawaing ito ay ipakita at bigyang-katwiran ang pag-iral at kahulugan ng mga sinaunang moral na arketipo na lumitaw nang direkta mula sa pinakaunang mga pangangailangang panlipunan at pagsisikap para sa kaligtasan. Ang mga arketipong ito ang kahulugan ng mahalagang pundasyon ng etika, ang pagsasama nito sa kolektibong walang malay at kaukulang lohikong organisasyon at transmisyon sa mga yugto ng ebolusyon ng genome ng tao at iba’t ibang ugnayang espasyo-panahon, anuman ang anumang kontemporaryong karanasan ng mga indibidwal. Ang sistemang tinukoy ng mga arketipong ito ay bumubuo ng isang ebolusyonaryong panlipunang modelo ng tao. Ito ba ay isang metaetikal na posisyon? Oo, ito ay ganoon. Bukod dito, tulad ng sa anumang metaetikal na pangangatwiran, dapat nating maingat na tingnan ang pinakamahusay at lohikal na mga ruta, tulad ng iniaalok ng Analitikal na Pilosopiya. Kaya, ang gawaing ito ay makatwirang dapat ipakita na ang moralidad ay hindi isang produktong kultural ng mga sibilisadong tao o modernong lipunan at na sa kabila ng pagiging nasasaklaw ng ilang kultural na relatibong pagsasama at pagbabawas, ang mga mahalagang pundasyon nito ay arketipal at hindi kailanman nagbago sa estruktura. Ang pangangatwirang ito ay nagpapahiwatig na ang moralidad ay isang orihinal na katangian ng “homo sapiens”; ito ay hindi isang ari-arian o isang aksidente: ito ay bahagi ng kakanyahan ng tao at kabilang sa saklaw ng ontolohikal na pagkakakilanlang pantao. Ang penomenang pantao ay isang tuluy-tuloy na proseso, ginagampanan ang papel nito sa pagitan ng random na pagtukoy at malayang kalooban, at kailangan nating tanungin kung paano nagsimula ang moralidad at paano ito dumating sa atin sa kasalukuyan. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I investigate the resources for Neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy to address social and ethical issues that arise in the use of technologies that rely on digital environments. The theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation represent efforts from contemporary philosophers to re-engineer the theories of Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle for the present. I offer my own contribution to this tradition in the context of the ethics and philosophy of technology. I aim to answer the following question: what moral and social (...) issues arise in 21st-century digital environments that Neo-Aristotelian philosophy can address? I propose that Neo-Aristotelian philosophy, inspired by the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, is particularly well-suited to addressing the issues in digital environments that users regularly experience. This dissertation contributes to scholarship within Neo-Aristotelian ethics of technology, MacIntyrean approaches to virtue theory, and the ethics of technology more broadly. (shrink)

This book explores the virtues of good character, and includes well-illustrated accounts of generosity, gratitude, compassion, forgivingness, truthfulness, patience, courage, justice, and a sense of duty - relating these traits to human concerns and the emotions that express them in the circumstances of life.

Many philosophers claim that we have a duty to know our motives. However, prominent theories of the mind suggest that we can’t. Such scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives is based on psychological evidence. I show that this evidence only mandates scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives if we rely on a mistaken assumption which I call ‘the myth of the one true motive’. If we reject this myth, we see that there is space to plausibly interpret the empirical data (...) such that knowledge of one’s motives is difficult, but not impossible. (shrink)

The author has been a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the US Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, the Commission on Presidential Scholars, and the White House Commission on Crime. This study presents his analysis of character.

The received view is that Kant denies all moral luck. But I show how Kant affirms constitutive moral luck in passages concerning radical evil from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. First, I explicate Kant’s claims about radical evil. It is a morally evil disposition that all human beings have necessarily, at least for the first part of their lives, and for which they are blameworthy. Second, since these properties about radical evil appear to contradict Kant’s even more famous (...) claims about imputation, ‘ought implies can’, and free will, I unpack Henry Allison’s proof of radical evil and show how it is consistent with interpretations of Kant’s broader views about morality. Third, I define and illustrate the category of constitutive moral luck and argue that Kant embraces the existence of constitutive moral luck given Allison-style interpretations of radical evil. This provides a reason for philosophers to reject the received view, and it creates an occasion for Kantians and Kant scholars to check their reasons if they deny moral luck. (shrink)

(DRAFT: I'll update when the book is published.) This started as a book about desire. I was hoping to complement what I had said about belief in my (2022). To believe something, I argued, is to be positioned to do, think and feel things in light of a possibility whose obtaining would make one right. I argued that believing is not representational, that belief states are not causes or causal powers, and that the objects of belief are ways the world (...) might be and not representations of things. Believing is not so much a response to the world as a way of being positioned in it, a way of having an environment, as Frege put it. (Frege 1956, 306) I was trying to put the believer as a rational agent positioned in a world at the heart of my account. I hoped an account of desire could round out this picture of a rational agent’s psychology. But as I thought about desire, I came to see that two ideas about the nature of goodness, one negative and one positive, were really at the heart of my thinking. The negative idea is that there is no such thing as what philosophers have variously called intrinsic goodness or simple goodness or absolute value. I guess I am a nihilist about that. The positive idea is that our world is rich in what I will call sortal quality, what others have called goodness-of-a-kind or attributive goodness. I came to think that sortal quality is at the heart not just of desire but also of pleasure and moral worth. A picture of moral psychology had come into view. And so I re-organised the book. I still say a lot about the nature of desire, or ‘wanting’ as I prefer to call it, and I think my view does complement my externalist view of belief. Wanting, I will argue, is a matter of falling short relative to a standard one falls under, failing to be as good as one could be. If believing is about having an environment to respond to, then desire is about fitting into it well. And so my book offers a comprehensive picture of a moral agent in a world where nothing is simply or absolutely good but where many kinds of things, including people, can be very good and even splendid. (shrink)

In this bold book, Ann Hartle, one of the most important interpreters of sixteenth-century French philosopher Michel de Montaigne, explores the modern notion of civility--the social bond that makes it possible for individuals to live in peace in the political and social structures of the Western world--and asks, why has it disappeared? Concerned with the deepening cultural divisions in our postmodern, post-Christian world, she traces their roots back to the Reformation and Montaigne's Essays. Montaigne's philosophical project of drawing on ancient (...) philosophy and Christianity to create a new social bond to reform the mores of his culture is perhaps the first act of self-conscious civility. After tracing Montaigne's thought, Hartle returns to our modern society and argues that this framing of civility is a human, philosophical invention and that civility fails precisely because it is a human, philosophical invention. She concludes with a defense of the central importance of sacred tradition for civility and the need to protect and maintain that social bond by supporting nonpoliticized, nonideological, free institutions, including and especially universities and churches. What Happened to Civility is written for readers concerned about the deterioration of civility in our public life and the defense of freedom of religion. The book will also interest philosophers who seek a deeper understanding of modernity and its meaning, political scientists interested in the meaning of liberalism and the causes of its failure, and scholars working on Montaigne's Essays"-- From back cover. (shrink)

This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works on moral judgement stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world – many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make good moral decisions. As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue, moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it is by identifying (...) the obligations tied to the multiple dimensions of our identities (e.g., friend, teacher, romantic partner, citizen) that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act. Yet, Aristotle and Kant also remind us that doing so requires the acquisition of moral virtues which allow us to better discern practical reasons in concrete situations. (shrink)

The place of emotions in morality is the subject of widespread and divisive philosophi- cal controversies. This is hardly a peculiarity of present debates; as the history of moral philosophy shows, the relation between morality and the emotions has always been problematic. This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to the cluster of problems about the emotions and their relation to morality. The task of this Introduction is to motivate this conviction by highlighting (...) some aspects of the novelties and peculiarities that characterize current debates. 1. The Retrieval of Emotions in Moral Philosophy 1.1 Bernard Williams’ diagnosis of the neglect of emotions 1.2 One step back: Iris Murdoch and the demand for moral psychology 1.3 Aristotelian themes: emotions and practical reason 1.4 Humean themes: emotions and motivation 1.5 The Kantian approach to moral psychology 2. The Emergence of the Cognitive Sciences: Some Methodological Issues 2.1 The status of moral psychology: some methodological issues 2.2 The question of the normative relevance 2.3 New challenges to the place of emotions in morality 3. Morality and the Emotions: New Assessments 3.1 Emotions, practical reason, and moral agency 3.2 Emotions as modes of valuing 3.3 Emotions, responsibility, and moral identity. (shrink)

The great Christian existentialist thinker Paul Tillich describes the dilemma of modern man and points a way to the conquest of the problem of anxiety. This edition includes a new introduction by Harvey Cox that situates the book within the theological conversation into which it first appeared and conveys its continued relevance in the current century.

What is a human being? What does it mean to be human? How can you lead your life in ways that best fulfill your own nature? In The Human Paradox, Ralph Heintzman explores these vital questions and offers an exciting new vision of the nature of the human. The Human Paradox aims to counter or correct several contemporary assumptions about the nature of the human, especially the tendency of Western culture, since the seventeenth century, to identify the human with rationality (...) and the rational mind. Using the lens of the virtues, The Human Paradox shows how rediscovering the nature of the human can help not just to understand one's own paradoxical nature but to act in ways that are more consistent with its full reality. Offering accessible insight from both traditional and contemporary thought, The Human Paradox shows how a fuller, richer vision of the human can help address urgent contemporary problems, including the challenges of cultural and religious diversity, human migration and human rights, the role of the market, artificial intelligence (AI), the future of democracy, and global climate change. This fresh perspective on the Western past will guide readers into what it means to be human and open new possibilities for the future. (shrink)

Si l'on peine à trouver chez les historiens une définition de la dignité car elle semble relever du domaine de la morale, voire du droit, l'honneur n'est devenu un concept que récemment. Pourtant ce sont deux notions qui font agir a priori les mêmes ressorts psychologiques, l'estime de soi et une forme d'orgueil. Les sciences sociales se sont emparées de la notion d'honneur et l'ont analysée au prisme des "sociétés méditerranéennes", lui donnant une définition anthropologique dont la compétition, l'obsession de (...) la pureté sexuelle féminine et la violence vengeresse sont les principaux aspects. En réponse à l'injure, à la violence, à la séduction et au viol de la femme, ce modèle exigeant un acte réparateur est-il applicable au monde antique gréco-romain? Y retrouve-t-on cette obsession du sang et du sexe qui est au cœur du "modèle anthropologique"? L'ouvrage vise à resituer dans leur contexte historique les deux notions d'honneur et de dignité depuis l'époque archaïque jusqu'à celle de l'Antiquité tardive. Il les envisage selon quatre points de vue : le rapport entre l'individu et sa communauté politique, la nature de l'honneur familial et féminin en particulier, la violence, enfin, les formes du déshonneur."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Drawing creatively upon religious ethics and moral and political philosophy, Ranganathan argues here that affluent people have demanding and immediate obligations, through institutional reform and interpersonal giving, to assist severely impoverished people. An essential book for scholars of religion, ethics, developmental studies, and theology.