Indian Philosophy

The article engages with the ideal of deliberation within the theoretical contours of deliberative democracy, situating its inquiry in the intellectual and political traditions of ancient India. Drawing upon canonical texts such as the Rig Veda, Atharva Veda, Arthashastra and Mahabharata, it interrogates the embedded deliberative practices characterised by dialogical engagement, rational reciprocity and consensus-oriented decision-making. These traditions underscore the centrality of deliberation as a normative principle in governance, reflecting a sophisticated understanding of its epistemic and procedural dimensions. Modern deliberative (...) democratic theory, predominantly rooted in Western intellectual traditions, often delineates a linear and prescriptive pathway for democratic deliberation. However, this emphasis risks marginalising alternative cultural and historical paradigms. This study contends that the deliberative practices of ancient India, with their distinct normative and procedural configurations, offer a fertile ground for rethinking and expanding the theoretical scope of deliberative democracy. The integration of these traditions addresses feasibility challenges, particularly in contexts marked by sociopolitical plurality and historical complexity. By tracing the continuity of deliberative ideals from ancient to contemporary India, this inquiry situates itself within a broader epistemological project that seeks to pluralise democratic theory. It underscores the capacity of Indian deliberative traditions to contribute to the conceptual enrichment and contextual adaptability of deliberative democracy in an increasingly diverse and globalised world. (shrink)

Publisher's preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The concept of a universal cause -- 3. The different schools of Vedāntic monism on the doctrine of causation -- 4. The doctrines of emancipation attendant on the doctrine of causation -- 5. The conception of the causality of Brahman in the sister schools of Vedānta -- Bibliography -- Index.

Maṇipravāḷa (maṇipravāḷa) can be characterized first of all as a linguistic act that draws significantly on two languages at once in the work of explicating a given body of (often sacred) texts. In the course of that interpretive work, the maṇipravāḷa practice leads to the composition of new texts indebted to the several languages involved, a new thinking through and within the frame of that linguistic complexity. For the most part, discussions of maṇipravāḷa have to do with various confluences of (...) the Sanskrit and Tamil languages, since the dynamic of maṇipravāḷa is notably evident in the incorporation of Sanskrit words and concepts into explications of Tamil religious poetry. It is apparent too in the citation of Sanskrit texts of various kinds in the interpretation of Tamil texts claimed to have the same overall meanings and purposes. The re-reading of Tamil texts in light of Sanskrit language and learning can therefore be fairly evaluated as an enhancement of a creditable Tamil theology of Viṣṇu, and not a distraction from an understanding otherwise of the TCV against a background of Tamil precedents. Deeper theological motives for maṇipravāḷa as a common and expected instrument of interpretation are worthy of further exploration. This essay will venture toward that further task by a close examination of the interpretation of the Tirucantaviruttam of Tirumalicai Pirān by the twentieth century Śrīvaiṣṇava commentator, Uttamūr Vīrarākavacāriya. The essay concludes by more speculative reflection on whether the twenty first century might witness the rise of new forms of maṇipravāḷa. (shrink)

Contributed research papers presented at Symposium on "Philosophy, Religion and Culture in Ancient and Medieval Indian Tradition" organized online on 3rd-4th September 2020 by Sanskrit Department, Subhas Chandra Bose Centenary College, Murshidabad.

Study of five sheath or Panch kosha refers to the concept in Yoga philosophy that there are five layers of awareness through which all experience is filtered.

Study on Ātman and ātmatattva; with a special reference to Indic philosophy.

Classical work with commentary and interpretation on Jaina Yoga philosophy.

Contributed research papers presented at three day National Seminar organized by Indian Council for Philosophical Research and Department of Philosophy, Veer Kunwar Singh University, Ara from March 13-15, 2021.

The Vedās are an oral collection of refined cosmic knowledge, and from the Vedās, we got various Darśan Śāstra. Vedās and Darśan Śāstra are the fountainhead of Indian culture and civilization. This paper is an assessment of the importance of Darśan Śāstra for any education. In this paper, I argue why Darśan Śāstra is necessary for a school or elementary education, not only for students but also for teachers and institutions. Keywords: NEP 2022, Education, Philosophy, Darśan Śāstra, Darśan Śāstra in (...) school education. (shrink)

Truth, love, and compassion are the essence of Universal Human Values. With these notions, this paper will centrally discuss SDG3 and SDG4 based on Indian Philosophical traditions. NEP2020 sets a holistic, value-based education policy, for that reason value education is an essential part of our education system. Apart from this, NEP2020 calls for the positive implementation of IKS, and Indian Philosophy is in the central position. I hope this paper will give an introductory notion about Sustainable development through the lens (...) of universal human values from Indian Philosophy. (shrink)

Study on debates, dialogues, and discussions in Indian intellectual discourses.

Classical work, with Sanskrit commentary on non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

Philosophical study of Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya, classical commentary on Brahmasūtra by Śaṅkarācārya.

Study of Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa with special reference to Advaita Vedanta philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya.

Telugu commentary of Sāṅkhyakārikā, a classical work by Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa Sanskrit author; includes original text.

On Yoga philosophy with Yogamañjarī auto-commentary.

Find your dharma, your inner calling, and learn to integrate ambition, work, and wellbeing to create a balanced, joyous life with this practical, life-changing guide from the beloved speaker, bestselling author, and co-founder of the Gross National Happiness Center.

Brahmanical culture, which elaborated the idea of dharma (or socio-cosmic order) and at the same time claimed to be founded on it, intended to base on this conception the construction of taxonomies through which to classify all reality. As far as human beings are concerned, they respond to dharmic norms to the extent that they can form pairs (mithunas) capable of generating. In this article, I will explore the case of certain queer individuals, who, as non-heteronormative, escape the possibility of (...) fertile pairings, and are therefore judged as a sterile presence. In order to do so, I will make use of some interpretative devices formulated by Deleuze and Guattari and by Foucault, to highlight how Brahmanical ideology in ancient India intended to classify, represent, control, and discipline people's bodies from conception. I will preliminarily focus on the analysis of some passages of texts by ancient Indian grammarians related to the notion of gender, to clarify how grammatical classifications come up against cases in which the grammatical gender does not correspond to the sexual gender exhibited by some individuals. Therefore, I will devote an extensive investigation to excerpts from classical works of Indian medicine, specifically delving into the analysis of two types of individuals, the vārtās and the tr̥ṇaputrikas, to shed light on how the identity of these individuals was ideologically framed as the result of pathological anomalies that deviate from the perimeter of the notion of dharma. (shrink)

1. Introduction and context of inquiry -- 2. The worldview of the Veda and Upaniṣads: the background for Sāṁkhya and Yoga -- 3. Sāṁkhya system: the conceptual framework of Patañjali's Yoga sūtras -- 4. Patañjali's eight-fold path (Aṣṭāṅga Yoga): general outline and basic concepts -- 5. The concept of afflictions (kleśas): Aand kriyā Yoga to deal with them -- 6. The transformation of consciousness in Samādhi (I): an account for inside the texts -- 7. The transformation of consciousness in Samādhi (...) (II): looking from outside in -- 8. Yoga as self-realization -- 9. Back to the context: where does Yoga psychology stand in psychology tody? (shrink)

American yoga is often (mis)understood as elitist and exclusionary-as a pursuit of fitness practiced by bendable, beautiful bodies. It is commodified and marketed as a variety of expensive brands and disposable trends. The focus on the physical overshadows yoga's elements of conscious breath, mindful meditation, deep philosophy, and transformative healing. Or, yoga is assumed to be a religious practice, or just a bunch of stretching, or unfettered appropriation. Despite its popularity in the U.S., we are mostly unaware of yoga's ancient (...) roots as well as its contemporary applications. Drawing from her experience as a professor and yoga teacher, the author of this book explores the marginalized, feminist, queer, grassroots, underground, interconnected, creative, innovative, and somatic elements of yoga that engage so many of us. The author offers exploratory embodied practices, mines diverse sources, and asks critical questions about identity, culture, and power. She asks us to consider what American yoga has to offer our individual and collective future and how we can leverage embodied practices toward transformation, on and off of our yoga mats. (shrink)

Classical text, on neo system of verbal testimony.

On Hindu philosophy of reincarnation; critical edition with notes and introduction.

An exploration of the development of modern forms of yoga, from traditional texts to contemporary practices, highlighting trends and teachers that have shaped this evolution.

On the various aspects of Indian philosophy.

Part one: Centering the tradition -- Yoga stewardship -- The Yamas: How you are with others -- The Niyamas: How you care for your spiritual self -- Asana, Pranayama, and Pratyahara: Vessels for voyage -- Dharana, Dhyana, and Samadhi: Mapping the inner landscape -- Part two: Heeding the Sadhaka's call -- Becoming an agent of spiritual possibility: Yoga as Spiritual Practice -- The Four Stages of Sadhana -- Step 1: Embracing the Call to Yoga -- Step 2: Choosing a Spiritual (...) Life -- Step 3: Honoring Relationships -- Step 4: Moving into conscious leadership -- Step 5: Self-care as we serve -- Step 6: Collaborating with allies on the path -- Step 7: Trusting your Yogic journey -- Step 8: Sharing yoga as a sacred practice. (shrink)

The question of Self-awareness is one of the key challenges of philosophical research. Phenomenological studies in particular should not rush towards making Self-awareness the object of conceptual provisions. Before such an endeavor they must accept the task of experiencing this phenomenon in a methodically reflected way. The present study shows that the phenomenologies of Husserl, Sartres, and Merleau-Ponty are theoretically at a loss when faced with this task. For the Advaita-Vedānta, in turn, the quandary this task provides is the prerequisite (...) and motive of its philosophical praxis. By means of the concept of impersonal subjectivity, those moments of Self-awareness are thus identified, which are accessible from a phenomenological perspective. But against the background of a vedāntic system they allow for a recapitulation of phenomenological theorizing. (shrink)

The _Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra_ (MPNMS) is arguably the earliest Buddhist scripture available to propound the doctrine of the _tathāgatagarbha_. However, the notion of “empty/emptiness” (_śūnya/śūnyatā_) in this important scripture has been underexplored. This paper identifies four distinct yet interrelated senses of the term “empty/emptiness” in the portion of the MPNMS shared between its two Chinese translations and the Tibetan translation. First, the term “empty” has the mundane sense of “desolate”, which describes how the world would appear to the Buddha’s disciples after his (...) passing. Second, “empty/emptiness” pertains to the idea of lacking a self and is considered an expedient or preliminary teaching to the ultimate doctrines on the self and the _tathāgatagarbha_ in the MPNMS. Third, “empty/emptiness” signifies non-existent/non-existence, which is sometimes termed “nothing whatsoever” (_ākiṃcanya_) or “absolute emptiness” (_atyantaśūnyatā_). This notion is vehemently rejected by the MPNMS as a proper description of the actual state of the Buddha and the _tathāgatagarbha_. Fourth, “empty” refers to the relational property of being free from certain contents. In particular, the liberation of buddhas is declared to be empty in that it is free from the entire _saṃsāra_, which is the only sense of the term that receives full endorsement in the MPNMS. (shrink)

In their respective works, Bhāviveka and Vinītadeva both refute the concepts of _ārambha(ka)_ and the _samavāya_ in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. The idea of _ārambha_ asserts that a new whole is created (_ā-√rabh_) from its parts, namely, the creative elements (_ārambhaka_); but the whole is a simple substance that is distinct from those parts. The relation of inherence (_samavāya_) is introduced to establish a connection between the whole and its parts, indicating that the whole resides in its parts, and the parts (...) serve as inherent causes for the whole (i.e., the effect). Vinītadeva argues that a whole cannot reside within its parts, either in their totality or through one of its aspects, as either case would negate its status as a simple substance. It is worth noting that similar arguments have been documented in the Nyāya-sūtra and its commentaries, and these debates also resonate in the _Tattva-saṅgraha_-_pañjikā_. The Naiyāyikas reject Buddhists’ arguments due to their divergent mereological perspective on the nature of a composite whole. The Naiyāyikas argue that using terms like ‘entirety’ or ‘partly’ to describe a unitary entity is semantically incorrect. Bhāviveka’s main arguments are also rooted in the Buddhist viewpoint, asserting that a composite object is nothing but an assemblage of its components and therefore cannot be a real and simple substance. Additionally, he questions the transitivity of parthood in a composite whole. This argument, I propose, reveals a mereological problem within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. (shrink)

The disagreement between _sākārajñānavādin_s, followers of the theory that cognitions are endowed with a form, and _nirākārajñānavādin_s, who advocate the theory of formless cognitions, is one of the central disagreements in Indian epistemology. This study focuses on the heretofore understudied position of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya. The view that can be termed representational realism has been traced by me in all extant classical Sāṃkhya texts. According to these texts, the cognitive subject, be it _puruṣa_ or the intellect (_buddhi_), experiences the (...) object not directly but through the object’s form assumed by the cognitive faculties. The main evidence is found in the _Yuktidīpikā_. It explicitly states that all cognitive organs_—_the senses (_buddhīndriya_), _manas_, _ahaṃkāra_, and _buddhi—_ sequentially, one after another_—_take on the form (_ākāra_, _rūpa_) of the cognitive object; that _puruṣa_ experiences the world through the _buddhi_’s forms; and that these forms can only figuratively be ascribed to changeless _puruṣa_. Also noteworthy is that within Brahmanical _darśana_s, the _Yuktidīpikā_ is one of the earliest texts that shows familiarity with the _nirākāra_–_sākāra_ problem; that the _Yuktidīpikā_ mentions the Buddhist opponent’s view that cognitions have the form of their object without trying to refute it; and that this commentary incites the Naiyāyika Bhaṭṭa Jayanta to say that the Sāṃkhya standpoint does not differ much from the _sākārajñānavāda_ of the Buddhists. Though it is hardly possible to definitely identify the Sāṃkhyas as _sākāravādin_s or _nirākāravādin_s, their strong inclination towards the _sākāravāda_ is conspicuous. According to Sāṃkhya, the _buddhi_’s forms (_ākāra_, _rūpa_) become conscious cognitions due to the proximity of _puruṣa_, from which it follows that cognitions are endowed with a form. The postclassical _Sāṃkhyasūtra_ and _Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti_, which aimed to revive the classical Sāṃkhya system of thought, confirm that the view that cognitions have a form is Sāṃkhyan. (shrink)

The _Sāṃkhyakārikā_ repeatedly emphasizes that _prakṛti_ (material nature) and her constituents exist solely for the sake of the _puruṣa_ (the self). And yet, since she is blind, she needs _puruṣa_ to see her full glory, and he needs to witness her actions to become liberated (21). Gauḍapāda explains their connection in terms of a pitcher filled with hot or cold liquid, which takes on that property, temporarily, through association. This article looks closely at commentarial passages to explore both the nature (...) of their conjunction and codependence (_saṃyoga_), which leads to mistaken identification, as well as the method given in the _Sāṃkhyakārikā_ for their ultimate separation and independence (_kaivalya_) through the practice of negation of the twenty-five true principles (_tattvābhyāsa_), which evolve from this association of _puruṣa_ and _prakṛti_, comparing this with similar ideas in the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_. While these concepts have been examined before, it has generally been from a rationalistic, masculine, and linear viewpoint that reduces _prakṛti_ to mere matter or one that goes to the other extreme, reading later concepts backward and glorifying her as a Tantric goddess. In a world of shifting gender paradigms, this article seeks to re-examine their entanglement through the perspective of _prakṛti_, to understand how this intimate union is of benefit to her too, and, in turn, what we can learn through understanding the world from this angle. (shrink)

One of the central concepts in understanding the spiritual goal of Pātañjala Yoga is _pratiprasava,_ which means a process of reversal. Yet disagreements persist over how _pratiprasava_ and _kaivalya_ (liberation) are to be interpreted. Two main lines of interpretation may be identified as the ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ approaches. According to the first interpretation, _pratiprasava_ means the literal dissolution of the empirical world, including one’s physical body and mind. According to the second, it means undoing of the misidentification of _puruṣa_ with (...) _prakṛti_. I will defend an interpretation that combines aspects of both of these approaches. I suggest that _pratiprasava_ has two sequential stages: the epistemological stage and the ontological stage. In the epistemological stage, _pratiprasava_ is the first stage of freedom (_kaivalya_) from all sorts of physical and mental bondages. This type of freedom is attained when all negative and positive effects of _prakṛti’s_ manifestation no longer affect the yogin while living in this physical body. In the subsequent ontological stage, _pratiprasava_ is final freedom from existence altogether, including the body and mind. Based on this understanding of the two stages of _pratiprasava_, I will contend that there are correspondingly two types of _kaivalya_: embodied and disembodied. (shrink)

According to the post-Śaṅkara commentators of Advaita Vedānta—and modern scholars alike—the _pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta_ (reflection analogy) is a metaphor/model that illustrates the nature and the relation between the singular _brahman_ and the multitude of _jīvas_. Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) hermeneutics contests the employment of the _dṛṣṭānta_ as an “explanatory device” on the grounds that it (a) reifies the _dṛṣṭānta_, and (b) contradicts the basic task of Upaniṣads as a _pramāṇa_ (instrument/ means) to know _brahman_: that of negation of ignorance. Contrarily, his hermeneutics (...) demonstrates—through a rigorous application of the method of _adhyāropa_ (deliberate superimposition) and _apavāda_ (subsequent retraction)—that within Śaṅkarācārya’s _prasthānatrayabhāṣya_, the _dṛṣṭānta_ serves (_solely_) to counter the erroneous notion that _brahman_ suffers/transmigrates, and in his _Upadeśasāhasrī_, it is used to carefully distinguish the Self and not-Self. In both cases, its purpose fulfilled, it stands rescinded. _Adhyāropāpavāda_ has hitherto not been recognized/employed as a method of hermeneutical analysis; it is SSS’ unique and important contribution. In this article, I use the _pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta_ as an exemplar to demonstrate how any—and every—construct of Advaita Vedānta can—and according to SSS, must—be read/analyzed according to the method of _adhyāropāpavāda_ to preclude its reification. (shrink)

This study addresses doctrinal inconsistencies arising from inconsistent statements within Yogācāra literature regarding the cessation or non-cessation of _ālayavijñāna_ upon achieving _nirvāṇa_. In _Yogācārabhūmi_, _ālayavijñāna_ is defined as a type of consciousness that supports and conceals itself within the practitioner’s body, serving as a foundational consciousness for the continuity of life during _nirodhasamāpatti_. As the doctrine evolves, _ālayavijñāna_ is understood as inherently polluted, and it is proposed that arhatship, signifying the eradication of all defilements, leads to its cessation. However, two (...) key doctrinal inconsistencies arise: the first concerns how an arhat, whose _ālayavijñāna_ has ceased, can still possess a living body during _nirodhasamāpatti_ in _nirvāṇa_ with remainder (_sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa_); the second pertains to how _jñeyāvaraṇa_ (the hindrance regarding what is to be known) —which renders the _nirvāṇa_ of arhats and pratyekabuddhas inferior to Buddhahood—can persist while they no longer possess either bodies nor minds in _nirvāṇa_ without remainder (_nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa_)_._ This study examines these doctrinal challenges by analyzing various Yogācāra texts, including the _Yogācārabhūmi_, _Mahāyānasaṃgraha_, _Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā_, as well as the commentaries of the latter two, and _Laṅkāvatārasūtra_, offering a comparative analysis of how these texts attempt to resolve the tensions surrounding _nirvāṇa_ and the ontological implications of the cessation of _ālayavijñāna_. (shrink)

The concept of _śīla-pāramitā_ (Pali. _sīlapāramī_), “the perfection of morality” is one of a collection of spiritual virtues accomplished by a bodhisattva for achieving Buddhahood. This paper explores the origin and development of _śīla-pāramitā_ by tracing its roots from early Buddhist scriptures to its later articulations in the _Cariyāpiṭaka_ and early Mahāyāna texts. In early Buddhist texts like the Nikāyas and Āgamas, _śīla_ primarily refers to moral discipline, encompassing rules for both laypeople and monastics. The paper then analyzes how _śīla_, (...) originally linked to the ethical conduct of monastics and lay followers alike, gradually evolved into a perfection (_pāramitā_) in Mahāyāna Buddhism, acquiring a central role in the Bodhisattva’s cultivation of virtues. In this process, the meaning and scope of _śīla-pāramitā_ underwent significant changes. By analyzing these developments, we gain a deeper understanding of the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism and provides valuable insights into its ethical and doctrinal progression. (shrink)

This book is a collection of six lectures culled from the first volume of the Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda. As the title suggests, it chiefly deals with the Vedanta philosophy and its different aspects, including Vedanta as a factor in civilization, influence of Vedanta, place of privilege in this philosophy, and the different steps in the march towards the highest Vedantic vision. An important book for all the students of Vedanta eager to learn the different implications and aspects of (...) this philosophy in brief. Published by Advaita Ashrama, a publication house of Ramakrishna Math, Belur Math, India. (shrink)

The concept of śīla-pāramitā (Pali. sīlapāramī), “the perfection of morality” is one of a collection of spiritual virtues accomplished by a bodhisattva for achieving Buddhahood. This paper explores the origin and development of śīla-pāramitā by tracing its roots from early Buddhist scriptures to its later articulations in the Cariyāpiṭaka and early Mahāyāna texts. In early Buddhist texts like the Nikāyas and Āgamas, śīla primarily refers to moral discipline, encompassing rules for both laypeople and monastics. The paper then analyzes how śīla, (...) originally linked to the ethical conduct of monastics and lay followers alike, gradually evolved into a perfection (pāramitā) in Mahāyāna Buddhism, acquiring a central role in the Bodhisattva’s cultivation of virtues. In this process, the meaning and scope of śīla-pāramitā underwent significant changes. By analyzing these developments, we gain a deeper understanding of the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism and provides valuable insights into its ethical and doctrinal progression. (shrink)

This study addresses doctrinal inconsistencies arising from inconsistent statements within Yogācāra literature regarding the cessation or non-cessation of ālayavijñāna upon achieving nirvāṇa. In Yogācārabhūmi, ālayavijñāna is defined as a type of consciousness that supports and conceals itself within the practitioner’s body, serving as a foundational consciousness for the continuity of life during nirodhasamāpatti. As the doctrine evolves, ālayavijñāna is understood as inherently polluted, and it is proposed that arhatship, signifying the eradication of all defilements, leads to its cessation. However, two (...) key doctrinal inconsistencies arise: the first concerns how an arhat, whose ālayavijñāna has ceased, can still possess a living body during nirodhasamāpatti in nirvāṇa with remainder (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa); the second pertains to how jñeyāvaraṇa (the hindrance regarding what is to be known) —which renders the nirvāṇa of arhats and pratyekabuddhas inferior to Buddhahood—can persist while they no longer possess either bodies nor minds in nirvāṇa without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa). This study examines these doctrinal challenges by analyzing various Yogācāra texts, including the Yogācārabhūmi, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā, as well as the commentaries of the latter two, and Laṅkāvatārasūtra, offering a comparative analysis of how these texts attempt to resolve the tensions surrounding nirvāṇa and the ontological implications of the cessation of ālayavijñāna. (shrink)

According to the post-Śaṅkara commentators of Advaita Vedānta—and modern scholars alike—the pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta (reflection analogy) is a metaphor/model that illustrates the nature and the relation between the singular brahman and the multitude of jīvas. Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) hermeneutics contests the employment of the dṛṣṭānta as an “explanatory device” on the grounds that it (a) reifies the dṛṣṭānta, and (b) contradicts the basic task of Upaniṣads as a pramāṇa (instrument/ means) to know brahman: that of negation of ignorance. Contrarily, his hermeneutics (...) demonstrates—through a rigorous application of the method of adhyāropa (deliberate superimposition) and apavāda (subsequent retraction)—that within Śaṅkarācārya’s prasthānatrayabhāṣya, the dṛṣṭānta serves (solely) to counter the erroneous notion that brahman suffers/transmigrates, and in his Upadeśasāhasrī, it is used to carefully distinguish the Self and not-Self. In both cases, its purpose fulfilled, it stands rescinded. Adhyāropāpavāda has hitherto not been recognized/employed as a method of hermeneutical analysis; it is SSS’ unique and important contribution. In this article, I use the pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta as an exemplar to demonstrate how any—and every—construct of Advaita Vedānta can—and according to SSS, must—be read/analyzed according to the method of adhyāropāpavāda to preclude its reification. (shrink)

One of the central concepts in understanding the spiritual goal of Pātañjala Yoga is pratiprasava, which means a process of reversal. Yet disagreements persist over how pratiprasava and kaivalya (liberation) are to be interpreted. Two main lines of interpretation may be identified as the ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ approaches. According to the first interpretation, pratiprasava means the literal dissolution of the empirical world, including one’s physical body and mind. According to the second, it means undoing of the misidentification of puruṣa with (...) prakṛti. I will defend an interpretation that combines aspects of both of these approaches. I suggest that pratiprasava has two sequential stages: the epistemological stage and the ontological stage. In the epistemological stage, pratiprasava is the first stage of freedom (kaivalya) from all sorts of physical and mental bondages. This type of freedom is attained when all negative and positive effects of prakṛti’s manifestation no longer affect the yogin while living in this physical body. In the subsequent ontological stage, pratiprasava is final freedom from existence altogether, including the body and mind. Based on this understanding of the two stages of pratiprasava, I will contend that there are correspondingly two types of kaivalya: embodied and disembodied. (shrink)

The Sāṃkhyakārikā repeatedly emphasizes that prakṛti (material nature) and her constituents exist solely for the sake of the puruṣa (the self). And yet, since she is blind, she needs puruṣa to see her full glory, and he needs to witness her actions to become liberated (21). Gauḍapāda explains their connection in terms of a pitcher filled with hot or cold liquid, which takes on that property, temporarily, through association. This article looks closely at commentarial passages to explore both the nature (...) of their conjunction and codependence (saṃyoga), which leads to mistaken identification, as well as the method given in the Sāṃkhyakārikā for their ultimate separation and independence (kaivalya) through the practice of negation of the twenty-five true principles (tattvābhyāsa), which evolve from this association of puruṣa and prakṛti, comparing this with similar ideas in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. While these concepts have been examined before, it has generally been from a rationalistic, masculine, and linear viewpoint that reduces prakṛti to mere matter or one that goes to the other extreme, reading later concepts backward and glorifying her as a Tantric goddess. In a world of shifting gender paradigms, this article seeks to re-examine their entanglement through the perspective of prakṛti, to understand how this intimate union is of benefit to her too, and, in turn, what we can learn through understanding the world from this angle. (shrink)

In their respective works, Bhāviveka and Vinītadeva both refute the concepts of ārambha(ka) and the samavāya in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. The idea of ārambha asserts that a new whole is created (ā-√rabh) from its parts, namely, the creative elements (ārambhaka); but the whole is a simple substance that is distinct from those parts. The relation of inherence (samavāya) is introduced to establish a connection between the whole and its parts, indicating that the whole resides in its parts, and the parts (...) serve as inherent causes for the whole (i.e., the effect). Vinītadeva argues that a whole cannot reside within its parts, either in their totality or through one of its aspects, as either case would negate its status as a simple substance. It is worth noting that similar arguments have been documented in the Nyāya-sūtra and its commentaries, and these debates also resonate in the Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā. The Naiyāyikas reject Buddhists’ arguments due to their divergent mereological perspective on the nature of a composite whole. The Naiyāyikas argue that using terms like ‘entirety’ or ‘partly’ to describe a unitary entity is semantically incorrect. Bhāviveka’s main arguments are also rooted in the Buddhist viewpoint, asserting that a composite object is nothing but an assemblage of its components and therefore cannot be a real and simple substance. Additionally, he questions the transitivity of parthood in a composite whole. This argument, I propose, reveals a mereological problem within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. (shrink)

The disagreement between sākārajñānavādins, followers of the theory that cognitions are endowed with a form, and nirākārajñānavādins, who advocate the theory of formless cognitions, is one of the central disagreements in Indian epistemology. This study focuses on the heretofore understudied position of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya. The view that can be termed representational realism has been traced by me in all extant classical Sāṃkhya texts. According to these texts, the cognitive subject, be it puruṣa or the intellect (buddhi), experiences the (...) object not directly but through the object’s form assumed by the cognitive faculties. The main evidence is found in the Yuktidīpikā. It explicitly states that all cognitive organs—the senses (buddhīndriya), manas, ahaṃkāra, and buddhi—sequentially, one after another—take on the form (ākāra, rūpa) of the cognitive object; that puruṣa experiences the world through the buddhi’s forms; and that these forms can only figuratively be ascribed to changeless puruṣa. Also noteworthy is that within Brahmanical darśanas, the Yuktidīpikā is one of the earliest texts that shows familiarity with the nirākāra–sākāra problem; that the Yuktidīpikā mentions the Buddhist opponent’s view that cognitions have the form of their object without trying to refute it; and that this commentary incites the Naiyāyika Bhaṭṭa Jayanta to say that the Sāṃkhya standpoint does not differ much from the sākārajñānavāda of the Buddhists. Though it is hardly possible to definitely identify the Sāṃkhyas as sākāravādins or nirākāravādins, their strong inclination towards the sākāravāda is conspicuous. According to Sāṃkhya, the buddhi’s forms (ākāra, rūpa) become conscious cognitions due to the proximity of puruṣa, from which it follows that cognitions are endowed with a form. The postclassical Sāṃkhyasūtra and Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti, which aimed to revive the classical Sāṃkhya system of thought, confirm that the view that cognitions have a form is Sāṃkhyan. (shrink)