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  1. Moral and Moorean Incoherencies.Andrés Soria-Ruiz & Nils Franzén - forthcoming - Ergo.
    It has been argued that moral assertions involve the possession, on the part of the speaker, of appropriate non-cognitive attitudes. Thus, uttering 'murder is wrong' invites an inference that the speaker disapproves of murder. In this paper, we present the result of 4 empirical studies concerning this phenomenon. We assess the acceptability of constructions in which that inference is explicitly canceled, such as 'murder is wrong but I don't disapprove of it'; and we compare them to similar constructions involving 'think' (...)
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  2. Blameworthiness and Dependence.Randolph Clarke & Piers Rawling - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Some recent accounts of blameworthiness present this property as response-dependent: an agent is blameworthy, they say, if and only if, and (if so) in virtue of the fact that, it is fitting to respond to her with a certain blaming emotion. Given the explanatory aim of these views, the selected emotion cannot be said simply to appraise its object as blameworthy. We argue that articulation of the appraisal in other terms suggested by proponents yields a failure of the coextension required (...)
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  3. Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson: Heroes for Moral Realism?John Klasios - 2017 - Quillette.
  4. The disunity of moral judgment: Implications for the study of psychopathy.David Sackris - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1.
    Since the 18th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been “moral colorblindness” or an inability to form moral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying this moral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of “moral colorblindness” to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an inability to make moral judgments is because their research is premised on the assumption that (...)
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  5. Moral Disagreement and Practical Direction.Ragnar Francén - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23 (2):273-303.
    Whenever A judges that x-ing is morally wrong and B judges that x-ing is not morally wrong, we think that they disagree. The two standard types of accounts of such moral disagreements both presuppose that the class of moral wrong-judgments is uniform, though in different ways. According to the belief account, the disagreement is doxastic: A and B have beliefs with conflicting cognitive contents. This presupposes “belief-uniformity”: that the content of moral concepts is invariant in such a way that, whenever (...)
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  6. Acting on Behalf of Another.Alexander Edlich & Jonas Vandieken - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another’. To do this, acting on behalf is firstly distinguished from acting for the sake of another, the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call normative other- directedness, i.e. acting on the claims and duties of the other. Secondly, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness (...)
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  7. A Trilemma for Voparil. [REVIEW]Raff Donelson - 2022 - Contemporary Pragmatism 19 (4):410-416.
    This short review raises a trilemma for Chris Voparil’s reading of Richard Rorty. Voparil must deny one of three things. He must deny that Rorty affirmed a Jamesian approach to metaethics; he must deny that Rorty affirmed a version of Peircean realism; or, he must deny that Rorty treated all domains of discourse roughly the same. Because Rorty is quite clear in his commitment to the first and third theses and far less clear in affirming Peircean realism, I argue that (...)
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  8. Varieties of Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers pursue a number of different explanatory projects when explaining various sorts of normative phenomena. This chapter takes some steps towards understanding this variety. I lay some general ground about explanation. I describe some key axes of debate about explanations that first-order normative inquiry typically seeks to state and defend. And I briefly discuss how two other sorts of normative explanation that seem more concerned with the foundations of normative domains like ethics and practical reason might be understood and how (...)
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  9. Does Psychological Egoism Entail Ethical Egoism?John J. Tilley - 2022 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (1):115-133.
    Philosophers generally reject the view that psychological egoism (suitably supplemented with further premises) entails ethical egoism. Their rejections are generally unsatisfying. Some are too brief to win confidence; others employ an uncharitable statement of psychological egoism. This is unfortunate, for the view that psychological egoism entails ethical egoism is philosophically significant (and not without proponents). Although it ultimately deserves rejection, it warrants better treatment than it typically receives. I thus examine it in some detail. Among other things, I carefully consider (...)
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  10. Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony.Cathy Mason - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1125-1134.
    Recent discussions of moral testimony have focused on the acceptability of forming beliefs on the basis of moral testimony, but there has been little acknowledgement of the limits to testimony's capacity to convey moral knowledge. In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot be testimonially acquired.
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  11. The Concept of Moral Progress.Frauke Albersmeier - 2022 - Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter.
    Diese Reihe präsentiert innovative Studien in deutscher oder englischer Sprache, die aktuelle Themen der praktischen Philosophie aus analytischer Perspektive behandeln. Dazu gehören Fragen aus den Bereichen der Metaethik, der normativen und der,angewandten' Ethik ebenso wie Fragen der politischen Philosophie, der Rechtsphilosophie und der Handlungstheorie.
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  12. Korsgaard's Duties towards Animals: Two Difficulties.Nico Dario Müller - 2022 - Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism 1 (10):9-25.
    Building on her previous work (2004, 2012, 2013), Christine Korsgaard’s recent book Fellow Creatures (2018) has provided the most highly developed Kantian account of duties towards animals. I raise two issues with the results of this account. First, the duties that Korsgaard accounts for are duties “towards” animals in name only. Since Korsgaard does not reject the Kantian conception in which direct duties towards others require mutual moral constraint, what she calls duties “towards” animals are merely Kantian duties regarding animals, (...)
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  13. Epistemicism and Moral Vagueness.Hasen Khudairi - manuscript
    This essay defends an epistemicist response to the phenomenon of vagueness concerning moral terms. I outline a traditional model of -- and then two novel approaches to -- epistemicism about moral predicates, and I demonstrate how the foregoing are able to provide robust explanations of the source of moral, as epistemic, indeterminacy. The first model of epistemic indeterminacy concerns the extensions of moral predicates, as witnessed by the non-transitivity of a value-theoretic sorites paradox. The second model of moral epistemicism is (...)
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  14. Ethics and Objectivity [Chapter 6 of Objectivity].Guy Axtell - 2016 - In Objectivity. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press; Wiley open ebooks. pp. 172-206.
    In earlier chapters, we described debates between objectivists and relativists over methodology in the sciences, and over science and values. We have been led to talk about the role of value judgments in various areas of thought, but in this final chapter we turn more directly to the age – old question of the objectivity of values. Objectivists and relativists populate debate over this question just as we found them populating other questions we have addressed. There is a general, deep (...)
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  15. Should moral intuitionism go social?Marvin Backes, Matti Eklund & Eliot Michaelson - forthcoming - Noûs.
    In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which we take to raise some difficult (...)
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  16. The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:108-137.
    Some standards, such as moral and prudential standards, provide genuinely or authoritatively normative reasons for action. Other standards, such as the norms of masculinity and the mafia’s code of omerta, provide reasons but do not provide genuinely normative reasons for action. This paper first explains that there is a similar distinction amongst attitudinal standards: some attitudes (belief, desire) have standards that seem to give rise to genuine normativity; others (boredom, envy) do not. This paper gives a value-based account of which (...)
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  17. Christopher B. Kulp, Knowing Moral Truth. A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge.Artur Szutta - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (2):209-212.
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  18. Debunking What?Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, and Epistemology. Routledge.
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  19. Conocimiento Práctico.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2022 - Laguna. Revista de Filosofía 50:117-140.
    Sobre la base de un análisis de la distinción habermasiana entre ética y moral y a la vista de las críticas, por un lado, al tratamiento non-cognitivista de los temas éticos que impediría su consideración crítica, y, por otro, al proyecto fundamentalista y a-histórico de la ED, intento mostrar 1) que lo que determina el carácter propiamente moral no es si son normas o valores sino la fundamentalidad del objetivo, 2) que la prioridad de los objetivos morales resulta de forma (...)
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  20. Expressivism, Moral Fallibility, and the Approved Change Strategy.Michael Bukoski - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):115-129.
    Blackburn’s “quasi-realism” aims to show that expressivism can accommodate the sorts of claims about moral truth, facts, objectivity, and the like that are found in ordinary moral thought and discourse. Egan argues that expressivists cannot accommodate certain claims about the possibility that one’s own fundamental moral commitments are mistaken. He criticizes what I call the approved change strategy, which explains that judgment in terms of the belief that one might change one’s mind as a result of favored processes such as (...)
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  21. A Holist Balance Scale.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-21.
    Scale-based models of weighing reasons face challenges concerning the context-sensitivity of weight, the aggregation of weight, and the methodology for determining what the weights of reasons are. I resolve these challenges.
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  22. Human Rights and Political Toleration in India: Multiplicity, Self, and Interconnectedness.Ashwani Kumar Peetush - 2015 - In Ashwani Peetush & Jay Drydyk (eds.), Human Rights: India and the West. New Delhi, Delhi, India: pp. 205-228.
    I would argue that toleration is one of the cornerstones for a just social order in any pluralistic society. Yet, the ideal of toleration is usually thought to originate from within, and most often justified from a European historical and philosophical context. It is thought to be a response to societal conflict and the Wars of Religion in the West, which is then exported to the rest of the world, by colonialism (ironically), or globalization. The West, once again, calls upon (...)
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  23. The Normative, the Practical, and the Deliberatively Indispensable.Andrew Stewart - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-21.
  24. The Metaethics of Maat.Kevin DeLapp - 2019 - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. pp. 19-39.
    This essay attempts to recover the ancient Egyptian category of "maat" as a valuable resource for contemporary metaethics and particular attention is given to its affinity with versions of modern non-cognitivism.
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  25. Was ist Gewalt? Philosophische Untersuchung zu einem umstrittenen Begriff.Dietrich Schotte - 2020 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Vittorio Klostermann.
    Unlike other subjects of philosophy, violence is a familiar part of our everyday life, even if we usually encounter it primarily in the news. But does this mean that we already know what “violence” really is? So it would seem. Yet on second, philosophically mindful thoughts it becomes apparent that this seemingly trivial question is anything but easy to answer. This book offers a critical enquiry of the concept of violence, including detailed discussions of the concepts of collective and institutionalized (...)
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  26. The fittingness of emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.
    We often assess emotions as appropriate or inappropriate depending on certain evaluative aspects of the world. Often using the term ‘fittingness’ as equivalent to ‘appropriateness’, many philosophers of emotion take fittingness assessments of emotions to be a broadly representational matter. On this sort of view, an emotion is fitting or appropriate just in case there is a kind of representational match between the emotion and the object, a matching analogous to truth for belief. This view provides an account of the (...)
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  27. Don’t Stop Believing (Hold onto That Warm Fuzzy Feeling).Edward J. R. Elliott & Jessica Isserow - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):4-37.
    If beliefs are a map by which we steer, then, ceteris paribus, we should want a more accurate map. However, the world could be structured so as to punish learning with respect to certain topics—by learning new information, one’s situation could be worse than it otherwise would have been. We investigate whether the world is structured so as to punish learning specifically about moral nihilism. We ask, if an ordinary person had the option to learn the truth about moral nihilism, (...)
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  28. Errata: The Normative Stance.Marcus Arvan - manuscript
    Due to a production error, two block-quotations were originally omitted from the final publication. These passages have been corrected in the web-version on the journal’s website (DOI: 10.1111/phil.12282), but cannot be corrected in the print/PDF version. Readers of the PDF version, please note the two corrections herein.
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  29. Abolizionismo Morale.Mattia Cecchinato - 2021 - Aphex 23.
    According to the moral error theory, all moral propositions are false as they do not refer to any fact in the world. If this metaethics were correct, should we then abandon moral thinking or continue as if nothing happened? What would our lives be like if we stop moralizing each of our choices? Moral abolitionism argues that our lives would be greatly improved and proposes to eliminate moral practices. This paper presents a critical introduction to the abolitionist project, investigating its (...)
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  30. Ethical Emergentism and Moral Causation.Ryan Stringer - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (4):331-362.
    This paper focuses on a recently articulated, emergentist conception of ethical naturalism and its commitment to causal efficacy, or the idea that moral properties have causal powers, along with its supporting commitment to moral causation. After I reconstruct the theory, I explain how it offers some interesting theoretical benefits to moral realists in virtue of its commitment to causal efficacy. Then, after locating some examples of moral causation in support of this commitment, I present and respond to five objections to (...)
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  31. The Givenness of Other People: On Singularity and Empathy in Husserl.Matt Rosen - 2021 - Human Studies 2021 (3):1-18.
    Other people figure in our experience of the world; they strike us as unique and gen- uinely other. This paper explores whether a Husserlian account of empathy as the way in which we constitute an intersubjective world can account for the uniqueness and otherness of other people in our experience. I contend that it can’t. I begin by explicating Husserl’s theory of empathy, paying particular attention to the reduction to a purely egoic sphere and the steps that ostensibly permit a (...)
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  32. Wrongfulness rewarded?: A normative paradox.David O’Brien & Ben Schwan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6897-6916.
    In this paper, we raise and discuss a puzzle about the relationships among goods, reasons, and deontic status. Suppose you have it within your power to give someone something they would enjoy. The following claims seem platitudinous: you can use this power to reward whatever kind of option you want, thereby making that option better and generating a reason for that person to perform it; this reason is then weighed alongside and against the other reasons at play; and altogether, the (...)
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  33. Ethics and Language.Charles Leslie Stevenson - 1944 - Yale University Press.
    A book on the problems of ethics from the perspective of language and meaning.
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  34. The Moral Point of View, abridged edition.Kurt Baier - 1965 - Random House.
  35. Critical Notice of S. E. Toulmin's An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics.C. D. Broad - 1952 - Mind 61 (241):93-101.
  36. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1996 - Blackwell.
    Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the (...)
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  37. Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics.William H. Shaw - 1981 - In John Arthur (ed.), Morality and Moral Controversies: Readings in Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy. pp. 31-50.
  38. Letters Between the Late Mr. Gilbert Burnet, and Mr. Hutchinson, Concerning The true Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness (1735).Gilbert Burnet - unknown
  39. The Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice (1726).John Clarke - unknown
  40. Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3557-3586.
    According to much recent work in metaethics, we have a perceptual access to normative properties and relations. On a common approach, this access has a presentational character. Here, ‘presentational’ specifies a characteristic feature of the way aspects of the environment are apprehended in sensory experience. While many authors have argued that we enjoy presentations of value properties, thus far comparatively less effort has been invested into developing a presentational view of the apprehension of normative reasons. Since it appears that this (...)
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  41. Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.
    Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which are related (...)
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  42. The Incoherence of Moral Relativism.Carlo Alvaro - 2020 - Cultura 17 (1):19-38.
    Abstract: This paper is a response to Park Seungbae’s article, “Defence of Cultural Relativism”. Some of the typical criticisms of moral relativism are the following: moral relativism is erroneously committed to the principle of tolerance, which is a universal principle; there are a number of objective moral rules; a moral relativist must admit that Hitler was right, which is absurd; a moral relativist must deny, in the face of evidence, that moral progress is possible; and, since every individual belongs to (...)
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  43. Variance Theses in Ontology and Metaethics.Matti Eklund - 2020 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics.
  44. Who’s on first.Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.
    “X-Firsters” hold that there is some normative feature that is fundamental to all others (and, often, that there’s some normative feature that is the “mark of the normative”: all other normative properties have it, and are normative in virtue of having it). This view is taken as a starting point in the debate about which X is “on first.” Little has been said about whether or why we should be X-Firsters, or what we should think about normativity if we aren’t (...)
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  45. Moral Archetypes - Ethics in Prehistory.Roberto Arruda - 2019 - Terra à Vista - ISBN-10: 1698168292 ISBN-13: 978-1698168296.
    ABSTRACT The philosophical tradition approaches to morals have their grounds predominantly on metaphysical and theological concepts and theories. Among the traditional ethics concepts, the most prominent is the Divine Command Theory (DCT). As per the DCT, God gives moral foundations to the humankind by its creation and through Revelation. Morality and Divinity are inseparable since the most remote civilization. These concepts submerge in a theological framework and are largely accepted by most followers of the three Abrahamic traditions: Judaism, Christianity, and (...)
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  46. How It All Relates : Exploring the Space of Value Comparisons.Henrik Andersson - 2017 - Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis explores whether the three standard value relations, “better than”, “worse than” and “equally as good”, exhaust the possibilities in which things can relate with respect to their value. Or more precisely, whether there are examples in which one of these relations is not instantiated. There are cases in which it is not obvious that one of these relations does obtain; these are referred to as “hard cases of comparison”. These hard cases of comparison become interesting, since if it (...)
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  47. Personal and Impersonal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
    nvited talk at the Philosophy Club April 14th at University of St Andrews in which I Outline three positions regarding the distinction between good (period) and good-for and I then discuss Richard Kraut’s recent attack on Good, period and my own approach to the distinction. Eventually, this discussion develioped into the book The Value Gap (OUP 2021).
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  48. Smith's Advice to the Mad Tennis Player.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
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  49. Two kinds of Goodness.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - manuscript
    Invited talk at the so-called Thursday Lecture, Oct 25, at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte the International Programme at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Leuven, Belgium. Focus was on the distinction between good and good-for.
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  50. The Logical Consequence of a Fitting-attitude.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
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1 — 50 / 491