This article presents the results of a rigorous critical interpretive review that maps the current literature on phronesis in medicine. The literature in this area involves varied disciplines, centuries, and conceptions and is extensive, but through a focused review, this study seeks to clarify definitions and key distinctions. It thereby aims to elucidate a depth of meaning and understanding regarding phronesis in medicine to inform future work on the topic. Specifically, 12 themes are inductively identified and analyzed from the literature, (...) and organized into three chronological categories of past, present, and future. A narrative summation of the literature to date is then offered, assessing the varied conceptual applications of phronesis to medical practice, the emerging literature on its applicability to organizations, prospects for empirical work on the concept, and its application in medical education. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Felix Bender (2024) argues that we should reject the notion of climate refugeehood because existing defenses of climate refugeehood cannot be squared with political realism, according to which refugees fulfill a specific function and possess a specific value for admitting states. On this view, refugees serve admitting states’ self-interest by allowing admitting states to undermine rival regimes whose illegitimate practices render their citizens refugees, thus enhancing admitting states’ domestic and international perceptions of legitimacy. This article argues (...) that the political autonomy account of refugeehood, an account of refugeehood Bender never examines, can accommodate climate refugees in a way that satisfies Bender’s political realist concerns. The broader implications of this argument are twofold: 1) such an account of refugeehood would limit the number of people who would count as climate refugees substantially more than most accounts that admit of the possibility of climate refugees; and 2) the fact that such an account of refugeehood can simultaneously accommodate the possibility of climate refugees while not being subject to Bender’s criticisms renders the political autonomy account especially plausible as a theory of refugeehood, whether one is a political realist or not. (shrink)

This paper studies Francisco Suárez's defence of the possibility of causal overdetermination. I show that, according to Suárez, the main arguments against the possibility of causal overdetermination rely on (i) a flawed conception of causal dependence and (ii) a flawed ontology of action. I argue that his objections to (i) and (ii) amount to a significant challenge to his opponents’ case against the possibility of causal overdetermination.

This paper examines Bird's account of restricted compositionality in terms of compression of information. Additionally, this paper proposes an alternative perspective (to Bird's) that links compositionality to the Free Energy Principle and the minimisation of collective entropy. Emphasising functional integration, this criterion provides a more focused and relatively more objective (patternist) account of composition.

Perceptual Confidence is the thesis that perceptual experiences can be probabilistic. This thesis has been defended and criticised based on a variety of phenomenological, epistemological, and explanatory arguments. One gap in these arguments is that they neglect the question of whether perceptual experiences satisfy the formal conditions that define the notion of probability to which Perceptual Confidence is committed. Here, we focus on this underexplored question and argue that perceptual experiences do not satisfy such conditions. But if they do not, (...) then ascriptions of perceptual confidence are undefined; and so, Perceptual Confidence cannot be true. (shrink)

Upon introspection, we judge that suffering feels bad. I argue there is no appearance-reality gap when it comes to introspective judgments about simple, intrinsic, nonrepresentational phenomenal states like itches, tingling, and suffering's feeling bad. On constitutivism about phenomenal introspection, there is no appearance-reality gap here because these judgments are literally constituted by the phenomenal states they are about. As a result, we are directly acquainted with the intrinsic properties of experience in having these judgments. Reflecting on our direct acquaintance with (...) intrinsic badness, we can know that our suffering instantiates this judgment-independent evaluative property. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that it is not a necessary condition of intentional agency that agents act on intentions with antecedently clear content. That is, some actions proceed on the basis of intentions which do not initially provide necessary conditions for performing those actions, and instead involve discovering at least some of these conditions in the course of performing them. To do this, I develop an account of problem-oriented agency, according to which agents may act in relation to problems (...) which at first resist adequate representation. This pushes us to recognize a dimension of open-ended inquiry in agency often neglected in rationalist accounts. Lastly, I argue that paradigmatically rational actions on determinate intentions which are not sensitive to potentially transformative feedback in the course of their execution can fall short of full agency in important ways. (shrink)

The problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in the contemporary literature. We will argue that this solution, which is in its general form independent of virtue (...) ethics, provides a plausible explanation of what makes some acts supererogatory and faces two important advantages over the most popular response to the problem of supererogation, The Sacrifice View. Unlike The Sacrifice View, The Cautionary Account can class acts of benevolence that advance the agent's own interests as supererogatory and easily explain why certain acts of sacrifice are neither permissible nor praiseworthy. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has recently argued that the applicability of classical mathematics in the natural and social sciences raises a problem for the endorsement, in non-mathematical domains, of a wide range of non-classical logics. We first reconstruct his argument and present its restriction to the case of quantum logic (QL). Then we show that there is no problematic tension between the applicability of classical mathematical models to quantum phenomena and the endorsement of QL in the reasoning about the latter. Once we (...) identify the premise in Williamson’s argument that turns out to be false when restricted to QL, we argue that the same premise fails for a wider variety of non-classical logics. In the end, we use our discussion to draw some general lessons concerning the relationship between applied logic and applied mathematics. (shrink)

A theory of blameworthiness must answer two fundamental questions. First, what makes a person blameworthy when they act? Secondly, what makes a person blameworthy after the time of action? Two main answers have been given to the second question. According to interminability theorists, blameworthiness necessarily doesn't even diminish over time. Terminability theorists deny this. In this paper, I argue against interminability and in favour of terminability. After clarifying the debate about whether blameworthiness is interminable or terminable, I argue there's no (...) positive case for interminability. I then respond to three objections to terminability. In doing so, I clarify the nature of blame, self-blame, and posthumous blame. I also give theoretical reasons in favour of the view that a person's blameworthiness for a minor wrong can not only diminish but also cease completely. (shrink)

This paper argues that no instances of acquiring knowledge from works of literary fiction are instances of the way we ordinarily learn from the testimony of others. The paper argues that the fictional status of a work is a defeater for the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of statements within that work, which must itself be defeated for such beliefs based on fiction to amount to knowledge. This marks a fundamental difference with learning from testimony, since regardless of (...) one's views on testimony and testimonial knowledge, the fact that your belief that p was based on someone's testimony that p is not in and of itself a defeater for your justification for believing that p. (shrink)

Oppressive ideology regularly misrepresents features of structural injustice as normal or appropriate. I argue that resisting such injustice therefore requires critical examination of the evaluative judgments encoded in shared concepts. I diagnose a mechanism of ideological misevaluation, which I call hermeneutical misfit. Hermeneutical misfit occurs when thick concepts, or concepts which both describe and evaluate, mobilise ideologically warped evaluative judgments which do not fit the facts (e.g. slutty). These ill-fitted thick concepts in turn are regularly deployed as if they merely (...) describe (hence ‘just the facts’). I argue that, via this descriptive masquerade, ill-fitted thick concepts smuggle in warped evaluative judgments alongside apparently value-neutral ‘mere facts’, a process which both reinforces those judgments and increases the difficulty of critique. I suggest that, to resist this process, we should develop collective consciousness and articulate ‘meta-hermeneutical resources,’ or thick concepts which encode critique of other, ill-fitted concepts (e.g. slut-shaming). (shrink)

Ground physicalism is the view that higher-level properties, such as phenomenal and normative properties, are fully grounded in the fundamental physical properties. Like other non-identity physicalists, ground physicalists face the causal exclusion problem. In this paper, I introduce a new worry for the ground physicalist: the metaphysical exclusion problem. According to the metaphysical exclusion problem, there is something deeply problematic about certain properties having more than one full ground. Furthermore, the causal and metaphysical exclusion problems are shown to work together (...) to create the strengthened exclusion problem, which is significantly more difficult to resist than the causal exclusion problem alone. I then set out a solution to the strengthened exclusion problem that draws on the underexplored notion of indeterministic grounding. I conclude that the ability of indeterministic grounding to solve the strengthened exclusion problem provides us with a new reason to accept indeterministic ground physicalism. (shrink)

In his article ‘Epistemic Injustice and Religion’, Ian James Kidd raises the possibility that some epistemic injustices might be deep. To spell out exactly what might be involved in deep epistemic injustices, especially those involving religious worldviews, an obvious place to look is Wittgenstein’s work on religion. Careful reflection on Wittgenstein’s remarks in the ‘Lectures on Religious Belief’ and his late work collected in On Certainty will have implications for how we are to understand the relationships between belief and evidence (...) and for the ways in which we might enrich our hermeneutical sensitivities, and so Wittgenstein’s remarks are helpful for understanding epistemic injustices more generally. This paper will focus on epistemic injustices involving Islamophobia since Islamophobia has, so far, been given little attention in the literature on epistemic injustice. (shrink)

The field of knowledge organization was originally developed from library and information science, although it is of more general philosophical interest. Today its influential school of domain analysis is based on pragmatist views, according to which any classification reflects particular perspectives and purposes. This implies that there are many alternative ways to identify real, natural kinds and to group them, none of which would be superior to the others. The same concepts, e.g. rice and bamboo, are indeed grouped in different (...) ways according to disciplinary contexts, e.g. biology or agriculture or economics. On the other hand, a principle of "unique definition" was identified in the 1960s by Jason Farradane and other members of the Classification Research Group to draft a general bibliographic classification based on phenomena (as opposed to disciplines): according to such principle, a concept can be defined at a specific level of organization then combined with concepts at other levels without losing its constant notation. Some classifications inspired by that research are currently under development. Classification structures are illustrated with some actual examples. It is shown how certain technical solutions developed for bibliographic organization of knowledge, including unique definition, may also offer contributions to address epistemological issues, suggesting a way towards the development of classifications that can serve as reference to reconnect different purposes. (shrink)

Biologists are increasingly documenting anthropogenic disruptions, both at the organism and ecosystem levels, indicating that these disruptions are a fundamental, qualitative component of the Anthropocene. Nonetheless, the notion of disruption has yet to be theorized. Informally, disruptions are direct or indirect consequences of specific causes that impair the contribution of parts of living systems to their ability to last over time. To progress in this theorization, we work here on a particular case. Even relatively minor temperature changes can significantly impact (...) plant-pollinator synchrony, disrupting mutualistic interaction networks. Understanding this phenomenon requires a specific rationale since models describing it use both historical and systemic reasoning. Specifically, history justifies that the ecosystem initially exists in a very narrow part of the possibility space where all its populations are viable, and the disruption leads to a more generic configuration where some populations are not viable. Building on this rationale, we develop a mathematical schema inspired by Boltzmann’s entropy, apply it to this situation, and provide a technical definition of disruption. (shrink)

Research on attitudes toward artificial intelligence (AI) painting tools lacks an examination of gender differences among creative workers from the perspective of creative labor. This study used a mixed-methods explanatory sequential design to survey general attitudes toward AI painting tools among creative workers in the fields of animation and gaming, with a focus on gender differences and the underlying reasons for their viewpoints. Quantitative analysis (N = 376) showed no significant gender differences in general attitudes when controlling for computer self-efficacy; (...) however, female participants reported more negative general attitudes under comparable AI anxiety levels. Qualitative interviews (N = 10) confirmed that anxiety about being replaced by AI painting tools drives resistance. Despite equitable knowledge access and the absence of gender segregation in labor division, male interviewees received more technical support, experimental opportunities, and positive social feedback, leading to more positive general attitudes toward AI painting tools. Such disparities might exacerbate general attitude polarization and contribute to broader gender segregation in creative fields. The findings underscore the need for equal support and resources for male and female creative workers, which is crucial for promoting gender equality and ensuring the fair, inclusive use of AI technologies in creative labor. (shrink)

The first implantation of a brain chip into a human paralysis patient by Neuralink demonstrated much potential for treating debilitating neurological diseases and injuries. Nevertheless, brain chips can also be implanted in healthy people to provide an interface between the human brain with computers, robotic machines, and novel artificial intelligence platforms, which generates new ethical issues. The focus here is on the development of brain chip implants that can significantly improve memory, intelligence, and cognition, thereby boosting performance in national examinations (...) for university admissions and securing civil service jobs, thus providing a “game-changer” and “shortcut” for many students and parents. Given that Islam is a major world religion, constituting a significant portion of the global population, it is crucial for the biomedical industry to comprehend Islamic perspectives on emerging medical technologies, which will enable it to more effectively cater to a substantial and growing demographic. We thus critically examine whether the application of brain chip technology to enhance academic performance in highly competitive examinations is consistent with Islamic principles. Based on the Islamic jurisprudential framework, such an application for intellectual enhancement of normal and healthy people without any mental impairment may conflict with the injunction to preserve intellect (Hifz al-Aql) and “consideration of consequences” (murāʿāt al-ma'ālāt) in Islam. It may also be viewed as tampering with Allah’s creation (Taghyir Khalq Allah). Gaining such unfair advantages in competitive examinations will likely be viewed as unethical, by transgressing the core Islamic precepts of Amanah (trustworthiness), Al-‘Adl (justice), Ikhlas (sincerity), and Mujahadah (striving). (shrink)

Philosophy traditionally deals with such lexicalized concepts as WISDOM, VIRTUE, REASON, WORLD VIEW, INFINITE UNIVERSE, and PHILOSOPHY. They trigger interest in philosophy, particularly because they are difficult to understand and explain. It is all the more surprising that many contemporary philosophers focus on such concepts as DOG, CHAIR, and FLIGHT to build their theories and provide examples. The article argues that to preserve topical equilibrium and avoid methodological problems, both classes of concepts should be involved in philosophical theorization and exemplification. (...) The first part critically discusses attempts at identifying these classes as ordinary vs. big (Gauker), empirical vs. pure (Kant), and concrete vs. abstract (contemporary psycholinguistics). It introduces the opposite pair simple empirical vs. complex demanding concepts as an alternative heuristic tool to evaluate concepts. The second part elaborates on the concept of concept and structural similarities between the two classes of concepts in semantic and ‘onomantic’ perspectives. The third part shows that despite structural similarities, such factors as the availability of empirical data, identification of the referent, historical and theoretical loadedness, complexity, and demandingness indicate that simple empirical and complex demanding concepts should be addressed in different ways. The final part elaborates on the notion of topical equilibrium as a philosophical method and norm and discusses two further examples (COW and ARTHRITIS) from contemporary debates in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

In current philosophy of science, extrapolation is seen as an inference from a study to a distinct target system of interest. The reliability of such an inference is generally thought to depend on the extent to which study and target are similar in relevant respects, which is especially problematic when they are heterogeneous. This paper argues that this understanding is underdeveloped when applied to extrapolation in ecology. Extrapolation in ecology is not always well characterized as an inference from a model (...) to a distinct target but often includes inferences from small-scale experimental systems to large-scale processes in nature, i.e., inferences across spatiotemporal scales. For this reason, I introduce a distinction between compositional and spatiotemporal variability. Whereas the former describes differences in entities and causal factors between model and target, the latter refers to the variability of a system over space and time. The central claim of this paper is that our understanding of heterogeneity needs to be expanded to explicitly include spatiotemporal variability and its effects on extrapolation across spatiotemporal scales. (shrink)

This special issue of Educational Philosophy and Theory originated from dialogic roundtables held at Manchester Metropolitan University where ideas and a plurality of views about democracy and education across the lifecourse were critically interrogated. The call for papers asked for contributions that revisit, challenge, provoke and reinvigorate the thinking, theorisation and practices of democracy in all education contexts, from early childhood through to lifelong learning. The interrogation of democracy as a fundamental purpose for, and practice of, education is timely and (...) urgent in the current context of converging global crises, neoliberalism and the domination of economic interests in education policy, practice and institutions. Papers in this special issue explore a variety of theories and practices of democracy in very different political, cultural and historical contexts. They grapple with complexity and problematise constructions of democracy and in common consider transformational possibilities for democratic practice and politics in education. (shrink)

Kripke thought that the meaning paradox articulated in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language arises due to a logical tension. This diagnosis, however, doesn’t account for the enduring controversy surrounding the paradox. I argue that the meaning paradox stems instead from a tension inherent in two conflicting philo- sophical methodologies: theoretical internalism and theoretical externalism. Inter- nalism, as a philosophical methodology, takes for granted the contents of our minds, whereas externalism takes for granted empirical data and shared notions of common (...) sense. Two of the constraints on a straight solution to the paradox—the Guidance Constraint and the Error Constraint—rely for their plausibility on theoretical inter- nalism and theoretical externalism, respectively. A straight solution thus rests on resolving the tension between these two conflicting philosophical methods. There are, accordingly, two ways to dodge the problem. Kripke’s skeptical solution favors theoretical externalism, but a skeptical solution favoring theoretical internalism is available as well. (shrink)

Functionalist theories of consciousness attribute consciousness to a system when it displays specific patterns of behaviors and state changes in response to perceptual events and its prior state. These patterns can be disrupted in ways that would intuitively not preclude consciousness. The challenge for functionalists is to explain why pattern-disrupting influences do not remove consciousness. This paper explores this issue in connection with a simple case. Bombs may make it unlikely that nearby brains will manifest typical behaviors. Non-exploding bombs do (...) not preclude consciousness within systems in their vicinity no matter how likely they are to go off. The challenge is trickier than it may first appear: this paper surveys possible responses and raises issues for each. (shrink)

This article aims to reconstruct the concept of “race” in Nietzsche's work, particularly in his late writings. We seek to test the hypothesis that Nietzsche attempted to reform the concept of race to overcome the descriptive and normative shortcomings of classical racialist theories, by making the notion (a) descriptively more accurate and (b) better suited to his normative agenda. Tosituate Nietzsche's views within a purely abstract space of conceptual possibilities, the first section outlines two contemporary approaches in the philosophy of (...) race, Kwame Appiah's naturalist-eliminativist approach and Sally Haslanger's constructivist approach, both in their original formulations. The subsequent sections examine Nietzsche's treatment of the problem of race, aiming to extract a definition of the concept and assess the extent to which it retains elements of the classical conception while proposing a reformed version of it. Nietzsche employs the term “race” in various ways, sometimes referring to nations and ethnic groups, sometimes to classes and social stratifications. While he rejects key presuppositions of the racialist view – denying that races are biologically discrete units – he replaces it with a proto-constructivist, culturalist and historicist notion in which races are made rather than innate. Nonetheless, he draws on Lamarck’s thesis of the inheritance of acquired characters as a means of preserving the concept’s explanatory ambitions without relying on essentialist assumptions. The final part of the article evaluates the strengths and limitations of this reformed concept of race from both an explanatory and normative perspective, using criteria internal and external to Nietzsche’s philosophical commitments. Although Nietzsche resolutely opposes antisemitism and intrinsic racism, he nonetheless makes racist generalizations and advocates a eugenic project aimed at breeding a“purified” European race, often with strong imperialist overtones. However, when disentangled from the more problematic aspects of his normative agenda, his approach may still offer valuable insights for both political and explanatory purposes. (shrink)

According to some, luck forms an inevitable part of admirable moral agency. According to others, it is incompatible with a basic principle of moral worth. What's the issue? Is there a ‘problem’ of moral luck; or are there many, or none? With reference to the practice of moral praise, I suggest that there is no single problem of moral luck as traditionally understood. Instead, there is a family of issues regarding the interpretation and assessment of moral performance. In the background (...) is a mixture of descriptive and normative issues, including how to understand the legitimacy of social expectations, the value of effort, and the duties of communities to enable their members to live good and virtuous lives. (shrink)

The article explores different ways in which the term ‘metaphilosophy’ or ‘philosophy of philosophy’ can be applied in the context of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. It is argued that despite the terminological differences partially caused by Fichte’s renaming of philosophy and the unclear meaning of ‘metaphilosophy,’ several options are available. The article suggests considering metaphilosophy as one of the many ‘meta-constructions’—such as the thinking of thinking, philosophizing about the philosophizing, and the metaphysics of metaphysics—that can be found throughout the history of philosophy (...) and in Fichte’s thought. They follow the figure of self-application, which is compatible with historical and contemporary translations of ‘meta’ as after, beyond, and about. The available options are the Wissenschaftslehre of philosophy, understood as the revision of philosophy and thematization of deficient or incomplete conceptions of philosophy from the standpoint of the Wissenschaftslehre; the Wissenschaftslehre of the Wissenschaftslehre as the propaedeutic self-reflection, successive reformulation, and picture that emerges with the completion of the system; and philosophy of the Wissenschaftslehre. The latter, the external view of Wissenschaftslehre as one philosophy among others, is almost not present in Fichte. However, it connects Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre with contemporary metaphilosophy, as demonstrated by Rescher’s topics, benefiting both Fichte scholars and contemporary metaphilosophers. (shrink)

We analyze Michael Heim’s significant concept of the metaphysics of virtual worlds and show that his concept does not meet the two basic metatheses of metaphysics understood as ontology. First, Heim defines virtual worlds as knowledge, more specifically as informational equivalents of physical things; and worlds understood in this way are not objects in the ontological sense of the term. Secondly, Heim claims that virtual worlds do not exist, and attributes to them various degrees of non-existence, and the metaphysics of (...) non-existent in various degrees virtual objects is extremely hard to accept. We propose replacing these two essential elements in Heim’s concept with others. In result, we form a metaphysics of existent and objectivized virtual worlds, on the basis of the ideas postulated by Heim. (shrink)

This paper argues that the so-called scaling-up problem (representation-hunger problem) can be resolved within the mechanistic framework of explanation. Emphasising the problem’s character as an empirical challenge for non-representationalists to provide explanations of cognitive phenomena involving sensitivity to the abstract and absent, the paper surveys and rejects prominent non-representationalist answers. An important epistemic aspect of the problem is identified: the need for general heuristics for formulating non-representational explanations of representation-hungry phenomena. In response, a strategy based on the idea of mechanistic (...) compositionality is introduced. Mechanistic compositionality means that the phenomenon exhibited by a mechanism depends solely on the component entities, activities, and the way they are organised. This strategy is shown to provide an important heuristic for formulating candidate mechanistic explanations for representation-hungry phenomena, and thus to resolve the epistemic aspect of the scaling-up problem. Parallels are drawn to the way in which representationalist theories of cognition resolve their version of the scaling-up problem by invoking semantic compositionality. Nevertheless, it is argued that mechanistic compositionality differs from semantic compositionality and relying on mechanistic compositionality to resolve the scaling-up problem does not imply acceptance of representationalism. (shrink)

Recent research and conventional wisdom suggest that behavioral demonstrations of trust by supervisors toward their subordinates are most effective when those demonstrations match subordinates’ desires. In the present research, we offer a more nuanced view by identifying one downside of a match between supervisors’ expressions and subordinates’ desired trusting behaviors (i.e., trust congruence). Namely, this situation may inadvertently encourage subordinates to engage in unethical acts with the intention of benefiting their supervisor (i.e., unethical pro-supervisor behavior; UPSB). Drawing on social exchange (...) theory and moral disengagement theory, we argue that trust congruence helps promote positive social exchange relationships between supervisors and subordinates. The desire to maintain or reinforce these relationships, in turn, leads subordinates to engage in UPSB indirectly via moral disengagement. We further argue that ethical leadership represents an important boundary condition regarding this process, as it guides subordinates’ social exchange responses and thus prevents them from engaging in behaviors that are not aligned with the ethical expectations of their supervisors. Our model is progressively supported by four main studies (an experiment and three time-lagged field studies) and two supplemental studies. This research improves our understanding of the ethical consequences of trust congruence and has practical implications for organizations seeking to support trust-building initiatives. (shrink)

Familism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism form three concentric circles in a person's life. Each of these respective human communities constitutes an independent good for the good life. The value of family life does not depend on the value of country, and the world. Nor does the value of patriotic life or cosmopolitan life depend on that of family life. Shifting allegiances between these circles entails reallocating loyalty and dedication, and thus both enriches one's life and incurs a cost to it. In (...) the view that I construct here, a philosophy of the good life articulates its own vision of the ideal allocation of loyalty and dedication among these three or more spheres. While cosmopolitanism has its own value and good, it also comes with a cost; proponents of cosmopolitanism-including Confucian cosmopolitansoften overlook such a cost. I argue for a "dynamic harmony" approach to cosmopolitanism that takes into account the cost it incurs on people's local commitments. (shrink)

According to the post-Śaṅkara commentators of Advaita Vedānta—and modern scholars alike—the pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta (reflection analogy) is a metaphor/model that illustrates the nature and the relation between the singular brahman and the multitude of jīvas. Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) hermeneutics contests the employment of the dṛṣṭānta as an “explanatory device” on the grounds that it (a) reifies the dṛṣṭānta, and (b) contradicts the basic task of Upaniṣads as a pramāṇa (instrument/ means) to know brahman: that of negation of ignorance. Contrarily, his hermeneutics (...) demonstrates—through a rigorous application of the method of adhyāropa (deliberate superimposition) and apavāda (subsequent retraction)—that within Śaṅkarācārya’s prasthānatrayabhāṣya, the dṛṣṭānta serves (solely) to counter the erroneous notion that brahman suffers/transmigrates, and in his Upadeśasāhasrī, it is used to carefully distinguish the Self and not-Self. In both cases, its purpose fulfilled, it stands rescinded. Adhyāropāpavāda has hitherto not been recognized/employed as a method of hermeneutical analysis; it is SSS’ unique and important contribution. In this article, I use the pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta as an exemplar to demonstrate how any—and every—construct of Advaita Vedānta can—and according to SSS, must—be read/analyzed according to the method of adhyāropāpavāda to preclude its reification. (shrink)

This study addresses doctrinal inconsistencies arising from inconsistent statements within Yogācāra literature regarding the cessation or non-cessation of ālayavijñāna upon achieving nirvāṇa. In Yogācārabhūmi, ālayavijñāna is defined as a type of consciousness that supports and conceals itself within the practitioner’s body, serving as a foundational consciousness for the continuity of life during nirodhasamāpatti. As the doctrine evolves, ālayavijñāna is understood as inherently polluted, and it is proposed that arhatship, signifying the eradication of all defilements, leads to its cessation. However, two (...) key doctrinal inconsistencies arise: the first concerns how an arhat, whose ālayavijñāna has ceased, can still possess a living body during nirodhasamāpatti in nirvāṇa with remainder (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa); the second pertains to how jñeyāvaraṇa (the hindrance regarding what is to be known) —which renders the nirvāṇa of arhats and pratyekabuddhas inferior to Buddhahood—can persist while they no longer possess either bodies nor minds in nirvāṇa without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa). This study examines these doctrinal challenges by analyzing various Yogācāra texts, including the Yogācārabhūmi, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā, as well as the commentaries of the latter two, and Laṅkāvatārasūtra, offering a comparative analysis of how these texts attempt to resolve the tensions surrounding nirvāṇa and the ontological implications of the cessation of ālayavijñāna. (shrink)

이 글은 아리스토텔레스 『니코마코스 윤리학』에서 언급되는 ‘우리에 관한 중용(to meson pros hemas)’ 개념에 대한 논의이다. 아리스토텔레스의 해당 ‘중용’ 개념과 관련하여 오래된 논쟁이 하나 있는데, 그것은 아리스토텔레스의 중용론에 대한 소위 중도론(Doctrine of Moderation)적 입장과 적절론(Doctrine of Appropriateness)적 입장간의 논쟁으로 도식화할 수 있다. 전자는 아리스토텔레스의 중용 개념이 양극단의 행위와 감정의 속성을 포함할 수 없다는 방식으로 아리스토텔레스의 중용론을 이해하려는 입장이다. 이 입장은 중용적 행위와 감정 즉 성격적 탁월함의 소유자의 행위와 감정은 어쨌든 과도함과 모자람 사이의 어떤 지점일 수 밖에 없다는 주장을 한다. 반면, 후자 (...) 즉 적절론적 입장은 행위와 감정의 양 혹은 정도는 아리스토텔레스가 중요하게 언급하는 중용 개념에 직접적 연관이 없다는 주장이다. 말하자면, 성격적 탁월함의 행위와 감정이 반드시 중도적이야 하는 필연적 이유는 없다는 것이다. 이 글은 이 엄슨(J. O. Urmson)의 적절론적 해석과 중도론에 대한 그의 비판의 맹점을 제시하면서, 중도론적 입장이 상대적으로 더 나은 해석임을 주장하는 방향으로 논의를 진행한다. (shrink)

스캔런은 좁은 의미의 도덕과 넓은 의미의 도덕이 구별되어야 한다고 주장한다. 스캔런의 계약주의가 주로 특징짓는 “우리가 서로에게 빚진 것”은 좁은 의미의 도덕에 해당하지만, 다른 종류의 가치, 즉 개인적 가치는 일반적으로는 넓은 의미의 도덕에 속한다. 그는 이런 주장을 도덕의 파편화라는 논제로 표현한다. 나는 넓은 의미의 도덕이 좁은 의미의 도덕과 어떻게 구별되는지 포괄적으로 설명하면서 이 논제를 더욱 정치하게 발전시킨다. 도덕의 파편화 논제는 도덕의 두 영역 사이에 충분히 유의미하고 합당한 구분이 가능함을 함축하지만, 라즈는 몇 가지 메타적 논증을 통해 그런 함축을 공격한다. 나는 라즈의 비판에 (...) 대하여 계약주의적 대응을 제시함으로써 도덕의 파편화 논제가 여전히 건재함을 보인다. (shrink)

In 2024, new legislation introduced significant changes to the rules, procedures and institutions governing research ethics in Brazil. One of its objectives was to limit sponsors’ post-trial access (PTA) obligations. However, a presidential veto weakened this reform. This veto maintained the sponsors’ indefinite duty to provide the tested intervention until it becomes available in the National Health System. In Brazil, where courts often order the public funding for treatments not included in the health system’s lists and protocols, a substantial reduction (...) in the sponsors’ PTA obligations would likely increase litigation seeking state-funded PTA. This dynamic adds an extra layer of complexity to the ethical analysis of the regulation of PTA in Brazil, as its distributive impact on the public health system must be considered. Therefore, any argument for reducing sponsors’ PTA obligations must go beyond simply demonstrating that sponsors do not owe participants an ethical obligation to provide them with indefinite access to the tested intervention or that such obligation discourages research. It must also make a compelling case for why the state, rather than sponsors, should bear the responsibility for funding PTA. (shrink)

Some scholars have lauded the decapitation tactics as a relevant approach by Nigeria, the United States of America and Israel in their struggle against the expansion and influence of terrorist groups. The decapitation strategy has, basically, three routes: killing, capturing, and capturing and then killing the leader(s) of terrorist cells. Through a critical analysis of the arguments for the decapitation strategy, this research contends that this approach will not stem the proliferation of terrorist groups. The elimination of the leader(s) of (...) terrorist groups does not necessarily play a colossal role in mitigating terrorism but has contributed to its surge in places like Africa with links to world-renowned cells like Al-Qaeda. Also, the study defends the position that it is morally unjustified to kill terrorist leaders without a fair trial in a competent court of law. Using Boko Haram and Hamas as illustrations, this study contends that targeted killings subvert the existence and essence of the criminal justice system. Taking inspiration from the deterrence theory of punitive justice, this research submits that the decapitation strategy has served as a basis for the escalation and proliferation of terrorist groups rather than serving as deterrence against the possibility of recurrence. (shrink)

An intuition about consciousness known as the 'Awareness Principle' states: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious only if S has an 'inner awareness' of M. Some have recently defended this principle by revising the 'memory argument' first offered by the sixth-century Buddhist philosopher Dignāga: from the fact that an experience can be episodically remembered, it should follow that a subject must have been aware of that experience. In response, I argue that defenders of the (...) memory argument haven’t convincingly established the episodic memorability of experience, because they haven’t defused a countervailing claim that conscious perceptual experience is phenomenologically 'transparent'. This claim, if true, would suggest that what one can episodically remember is just how the (external or internal) world appeared through one's 'outer awareness', rather than how the past experience itself appeared through one's inner awareness. I further argue that the memory argument can accommodate phenomenological transparency only at the expense of making the Awareness Principle trivial. The memory argument defender may then claim that there is some non-introspectible feature of a past experience that is episodically memorable, namely, that experience's subjective character or phenomenal 'for-me-ness'. In response, I develop an objection from the tenth-century Śaiva philosopher Utpaladeva against the possibility of recalling a past experience's subjective character as such. Overall, while the objections this paper raises cannot falsify the Awareness Principle directly, they may motivate its proponents to recall their support for the memory argument. (shrink)

We show that the class of contact join-semilattices introduced by Ivanova (Contact join-semilattices. Stud Log 2022;110:1219–41) is not finitely axiomatizable. On the other hand, a simple finite axiomatization exists for the class of those join-semilattices with a weak contact relation, which can be embedded into the reduct of a weak contact Boolean algebra (equivalently, distributive lattice).

Forty years ago, Niels Green-Pedersen listed five different accounts of valid consequence, variously promoted by logicians in the early fourteenth century and discussed by Niels Drukken of Denmark in his commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, written in Paris in the late 1330s. Two of these arguably fail to give defining conditions: truth preservation was shown by Buridan and others to be neither necessary nor sufficient; incompatibility of the opposite of the conclusion with the premises is merely circular if incompatibility is (...) analysed in terms of consequence. Buridan proposed to define consequence in terms of preservation of signifying as things are. John Mair pinpointed a sophism which threatens to undermine this proposal. Speaking anachronistically, Bradwardine turned it around: he suggested that a necessary condition on consequence was that the premises signify everything the conclusion signifies. Dumbleton gave counterexamples to Bradwardine’s postulates in which the conclusion arguably signifies more than, or even completely differently from the premises. Yet a long-standing tradition held that some species of validity depend on the conclusion being in some way contained in the premises. We explore the connection between signification and consequence and its role in solving the insolubles. (shrink)

The phenomenology of time-consciousness marks one of the high points of Blumenberg’s philosophy; the issue is broached in Lifetime and World Time (1986), on the one hand, and in the posthumously published works Description of Man (2006), Theory of the Life-World and Phenomenological Writings (2018), on the other hand. Setting out from Blumenberg’s critical analysis of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, this article endeavors to reconstruct and interpret the most important aspects of Blumenberg’s own descriptions of the structures of time-consciousness. Special attention (...) is paid to the concept of “presence” in Husserl’s lectures, whose metaphysical premises Blumenberg addresses, and to the concept of “recollection” (Erinnerung). (shrink)

It is often assumed that how we talk about the world matters a great deal. This is one reason why conceptual engineers seek to improve our linguistic practices by advocating novel uses of our words, or by inventing new ones altogether. A core idea shared by conceptual engineers is that by changing our language in this way, we can reap all sorts of cognitive and practical benefits, such as improving our theorizing, combating hermeneutical injustice, or promoting social emancipation. But how (...) do changes at the linguistic level translate into any of these worthwhile benefits? In this paper, we propose the nameability account as a novel answer to this question. More specifically, we argue that what linguistic resources are readily available to us directly affects our cognitive performance on various categorization‐related tasks. Consequently, our performance on such tasks can be improved by making controlled changes to our linguistic resources. We argue that this account supports and extends recent motivations for conceptual engineering, as categorization plays an important role in both theoretical and practical contexts. (shrink)

Constructivist theories of emotions and empirical studies have been increasingly stressing the role of contextual information and cultural conventions in emotion recognition. We propose a new account of emotion recognition and attribution that systematically integrates these aspects, and argue that emotion recognition is part of the general process of person impression formation. To describe the structural organization and the role of background information in emotion recognition and attribution, we introduce situation models and personal models. These models constitute the top-level structures (...) in a complex hierarchy of dimensions which considers different types of basic emotion cues. Thus, we propose a multidimensional account of emotion recognition which enables us to integrate the top-down and bottom-up processes involved: basic emotion cues in certain contexts can trigger situation models and person models, which influence emotion recognition which, in turn, reinforce or modify these models. We argue that this kind of loop deeply affects the way emotions enter our social interactions. Our account is in line with the “normative turn” of social cognition, that stresses the way social expectations actively shape the patterns we recognize, and make, in our social world. (shrink)

While scholars of, and participants in, social movements, electoral politics, and organized labor are deeply engaged in contrasting different theories of how political actors should organize, little recent philosophical work has asked what social organizing is. This paper aims to answer this question in a way that can make sense of typical organizing‐related claims and debates. It is intuitive that what social organizing does is bring about some kind of collectivity. However, I argue that the varieties of collectivity most amply (...) theorized by analytic philosophers in recent years, including grouphood and collective intentionality, are not the right kinds to embed in a theory of social organizing. I ultimately argue that the sort of collectivity that organizing characteristically brings about is a special kind of causal complementarity among agents' actions— and that while this can exist alongside grouphood and collective intentionality, it is not the same thing as either. The notion of social organizing that emerges is one that can clarify, without trivializing, a number of pressing contemporary debates about how normal people should conduct themselves as interconnected political actors. (shrink)

This paper studies the relationship between promoting people's welfare and respecting their autonomy of choice under risk. I highlight a conflict between these two aims. Given compelling assumptions, welfarists end up disregarding people's unanimous preference, even when everyone involved is entirely rational and only concerned with maximizing their own welfare. Non‐welfarist theories of social choice are then considered. They are shown to face difficulties, too: either they fail to respect the value of welfare in at least one important sense, or (...) they end up prioritizing different people's welfare differently in non‐risky choices, on the basis of their attitudes to risk, which are intuitively irrelevant in this context. (shrink)

According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty metatheory brings with it expressive deficiencies, we highlight here another complication arising from the use of a glutty metatheory, this time (...) evidential in nature. According to this countermodel problem, while the thoroughgoing dialetheist who embraces a glutty metatheory can justify their acceptance of a rule of inference's invalidity using countermodels, to justify their renunciation of an unwanted rule they actually require the means to warrant their rejection of the rule's validity—which cannot be supplied by countermodels based on a standard dialetheic semantics. We end by sketching out a possible solution for the thoroughgoing dialetheist using a bilaterialist semantics. (shrink)

Bilateralism is the view that the speech act of denial is as primitive as that of assertion. Bilateralism has proved helpful in providing an intuitive interpretation of formalisms that, prima facie, look counterintuitive, namely, multiple‐conclusion sequent calculi. Under this interpretation, a sequent of the form is regarded as the statement that it is incoherent, according to our conversational norms, to occupy the position of asserting all the sentences in and denying all the sentences in. Some have argued, based on this (...) interpretation, that the notion of invalidity is as conceptually primitive and important as the notion of validity: whereas the latter is couched in terms of what positions are incoherent and hence untenable, the former is couched in terms of what positions are coherent and hence tenable. My ultimate goal in this paper is to contest this view. Based on a novel technical account of the two notions—one that I find more accurate than the existing accounts in the literature—I shall argue that the notion of incoherence takes conceptual priority over the notion of coherence. (shrink)