Moral Motivation
Edited by Joshua May (University of Alabama, Birmingham)
About this topic
Summary | Questions in moral motivation are broad, but often focus on the source and content of one's motivation to do what one judges to be right. For example, is the source of moral motivation more of a cognitive matter, involving reasoning or belief? Or is it primarily a matter of sentiment, desire, or emotion? Is the content of moral motivation, say, a desire to do whatever one believes is right. Or is it something more direct, such as empathy or a concern for features that make the action right? Related questions dealt with in other areas as well concern the apparently internal connection between moral judgments and moral motivation (internalism) and whether benevolent action is always ultimately self-interested (egoism). The notion of "right" throughout may encompass more than morality, since often philosophers interested in moral motivation have a broader concern for what we might call "normative motivation." This involves, for example, motivation to do what one believes one has most reason to do, whether these reasons are moral or not. Familiar questions can then arise, such as whether it's possible for us to judge that following a strict diet is most prudent, yet lack any motivation to do it. |
Key works | Many of the issues in moral motivation dealt with in contemporary literature spring from Hume & Macnabb 1738 and Kant 1785. More recently, Nagel 1970, Korsgaard 1986, and Smith 1994 address the source and structure of moral motivation and have spurred much of the subsequent literature. Herman 1981 provides a key starting point for contemporary discussion of the content of moral motivation---there in connection with the motive of duty (see also Smith 1994, ch. 3). |
Introductions | The entry by Rosati 2006 provides a detailed introduction; Wallace 1998 is more brief but equally useful. Some of the relevant empirical work is summarized in May 2017 and Schroeder et al 2010. Wallace 1990 provides a fairly lengthy but excellent introduction to key arguments for the role of desire in moral motivation. |
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Related categories
Siblings:
- Internalism and Externalism about Moral Judgment (278)
- Internalism and Externalism about Reasons (306)
- Moral Judgment (1,105 | 305)
- Moral Concepts (86)
- Moral Enhancement (19)
- Moral Rationality (310)
- Moral Reasons (339)
- Moral Reasoning and Motivation, Misc (277)
- Desire and Reason (303)
- Weakness of Will (266)
- Amoralists (86)
- Moral Worth (125)
- Altruism and Psychological Egoism (253)
- Experimental Philosophy: Ethics (722 | 25)
- Motivation (205)
- Desire and Motivation (274)
- The Good Will and Moral Worth (139)
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