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  1. Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson: Heroes for Moral Realism?John Klasios - 2017 - Quillette.
  2. Response‐dependence and normativity.Yifan Sun - 2022 - Theoria 88 (6):1128-1143.
    A non-normative, response-dependent view about morality can avoid metaphysical extravagance and explain why the extension of some non-normative concepts can non-accidentally match the extension of moral concepts. These features make it a plausible reductive account of moral properties. However, some philosophers believe that a response-dependent account of morality must contain an irreducibly normative component. I argue that it is impossible to defend such a position while retaining the response-dependent nature of morality in the ordinary sense. However, I believe that philosophers' (...)
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  3. Thomas Pölzler, Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):78-86.
    Thomas Pölzler’s book offers the first detailed study that focuses explicitly on the promise of science-based arguments for and against moral realism (of both the natural and non-natural kind). His two central claims are that sound arguments bearing on the realism/anti-realism debate are possible, and, yet, that four central attempts to derive metaethical conclusions from science-based arguments uniformly fail. The book then provides several recommendations for future science-based contributions to the realism/anti-realism debate to do better. The book is a valuable (...)
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  4. My Life Gives the Moral Landscape its Relief.Marc Champagne - 2023 - In Sam Harris: Critical Responses. Carus Books. pp. 17–38.
    Sam Harris (2010) argues that, given our neurology, we can experience well-being, and that seeking to maximize this state lets us distinguish the good from the bad. He takes our ability to compare degrees of well-being as his starting point, but I think that the analysis can be pushed further, since there is a (non-religious) reason why well-being is desirable, namely the finite life of an individual organism. It is because death is a constant possibility that things can be assessed (...)
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  5. Blackburn’s Wittgenstein: The Quasi-Realist.Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - In Ali Hossein Khani & Gary N. Kemp (eds.), Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (Volume I). London: Routledge.
  6. Ahlaktan Tanrı'ya Ulaşılabilir mi? Enis Doko'nun “Allah'sız Ahlak Mümkün mü?” Kitabı Üzerine Bir İnceleme. [REVIEW]Hasan G. Bahçekapili - 2022 - Ahlak 2 (2):55-64.
    Enis Doko bu kitapta 1) ahlakın doğasından hareketle nesnel ahlaki olguların varlığına (ahlaki gerçekçilik), 2) ahlaki gerçekçilikten hareketle ahlaki olguların doğal olgular olamayacağına, 3) doğal olmayan ahlaki olguların varlığından hareketle de Tanrı'nın varlığına ulaşmaya çalışıyor. Göreceğimiz gibi bu üç adımın her biriyle ilgili ciddi sorunlar var.
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  7. No Authority Problem for Normative Non-Naturalism.Paul Nedelisky - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (2):153-157.
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  8. A FALÁCIA NATURALISTA E A DERIVAÇÃO DE SEARLE.Daniel Pires Nunes - 2022 - Perspectiva Filosófica 2 (49):133-147.
    In this article we intend to characterize the issue of the so-called naturalistic fallacy and to evaluate how John Searle approaches it. To do this, we will briefly approach the arguments of David Hume and G. E. Moore and then analyze how Searle's objections to the alleged fallacy relate to such approaches and if have been successful.
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  9. How to explain the possibility of wholesale moral error: a reply to Akhlaghi.Daan Evers - 2022 - Ratio 35 (2):146-150.
    Farbod Akhlaghi (2021) argues that noncognitivists and naturalists cannot explain the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This would show that noncognitivism and naturalism are false. I argue that noncognitivists and naturalists have no trouble explaining the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and that the requirement to explain this possibility is plausible only on one particular conception of epistemic possibility.
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  10. How to explain the possibility of wholesale moral error: a reply to Akhlaghi.Daan Evers - 2022 - Ratio 35 (2):146-150.
    Farbod Akhlaghi (2021) argues that noncognitivists and naturalists cannot explain the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This would show that noncognitivism and naturalism are false. I argue that noncognitivists and naturalists have no trouble explaining the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and that the requirement to explain this possibility is plausible only on one particular conception of epistemic possibility.
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  11. On What Matters: Volume Three by Derek Parfit. [REVIEW]Farbod Akhlaghi - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
  12. From rational self-interest to liberalism: a hole in Cofnas’s debunking explanation of moral progress.Marcus Arvan - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Michael Huemer argues that cross-cultural convergence toward liberal moral values is evidence of objective moral progress, and by extension, evidence for moral realism. Nathan Cofnas claims to debunk Huemer’s argument by contending that convergence toward liberal moral values can be better explained by ‘two related non-truth-tracking processes’: self-interest and its long-term tendency to result in social conditions conducive to greater empathy. This article argues that although Cofnas successfully debunks Huemer’s convergence argument for one influential form of moral realism – Robust (...)
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  13. Etica e storia della filosofia.Francesco Allegri - 2016 - Roma, Italia: Aracne.
  14. Richard Price e la fallacia definizionistica.Francesco Allegri - 2003 - In Rosaria Egidi, Mario De Caro & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), Normativity, Facts, and Values. Macerata, Italia: Quodlibet. pp. 261-268.
  15. Richard Price e la fallacia definizionistica.Francesco Allegri - 2003 - In M. Dell’Utri R. Egidi (ed.), Normatività, Fatti, Valori. Macerata, Italia: Quodlibet. pp. 261-268.
  16. Parfit on Moral Disagreement and The Analogy Between Morality and Mathematics.Adam Greif - 2021 - Filozofia 9 (76):688 - 703.
    In his book On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a version of moral non-naturalism, a view according to which there are objective normative truths, some of which are moral truths, and we have a reliable way of discovering them. These moral truths do not exist, however, as parts of the natural universe nor in Plato’s heaven. While explaining in what way these truths exist and how we discover them, Parfit makes analogies between morality on the one hand, and mathematics and (...)
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  17. Truth in Ethics and Epistemology: A Defense of Normative Realism.Nathan Nobis - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    In this work I defend moral realism, the thesis that there are objective moral truths, by defending “epistemic realism.” Epistemic realism is the thesis that epistemic judgments, e.g., judgments that some belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or known or should be held, are sometimes true and made true by stance-independent epistemic facts and properties. -/- One might think that epistemic realism needs no defense because it is obviously true and nearly universally accepted. But there are influential arguments against moral (...)
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  18. Metafísica y Moral.Samuele Chilovi - forthcoming - In Ética Filosófica: Concepciones, Problemas, Proyecciones.
  19. Evolution and Autonomy.Paul Studtmann & Shyam Gouri-Suresh - manuscript
    The use of evolutionary game theory to explain the evolution of human norms and the behavior of humans who act according to those norms is widespread. Both the aims and motivation for its use are clearly articulated by Harms and Skyrms (2008) in the following passage: "A good theory of evolution of norms might start by explaining the evolution of altruism in Prisoner’s Dilemma, of Stag Hunting, and of the equal split in the symmetric bargaining game. These are not well-explained (...)
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  20. Ethical Emergentism and Moral Causation.Ryan Stringer - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (4):331-362.
    This paper focuses on a recently articulated, emergentist conception of ethical naturalism and its commitment to causal efficacy, or the idea that moral properties have causal powers, along with its supporting commitment to moral causation. After I reconstruct the theory, I explain how it offers some interesting theoretical benefits to moral realists in virtue of its commitment to causal efficacy. Then, after locating some examples of moral causation in support of this commitment, I present and respond to five objections to (...)
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  21. Theistic Moral Realism, Evolutionary Debunking Arguments, and a Catholic Philosophy of Nature.Michael Rauschenbach - 2021 - 2019 Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments, whether defended by Street (2006), Joyce (2006), or others against moral realism, or by Plantinga (1993, 2011) and others against atheism, seek to determine the implications of the still-dominant worldview of naturalism. Examining them is thus a critical component of any defense of a theistic philosophy of nature. Recently, several authors have explored the connection between evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism (hence: EDAs) and Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalistic atheism (hence: EAAN). Typically, responses in this vein (...)
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  22. Varieties of Theism and Explanations of Moral Realism.Anne Jeffrey - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1):25-50.
    Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. “Theism” leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God’s existence would make to moral facts. Arguments like the explanans-driven argument for theistic moral realism and the explanationist argument for naturalist moral realism both require extra substantive assumptions about God in order to be (...)
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  23. Einleitung.Frank Brosow & T. Raja Rosenhagen - 2013 - In Frank Brosow & T. Raja Rosenhagen (eds.), Moderne Theorien Praktischer Normativität: Zur Wirklichkeit und Wirkungsweise des praktischen Sollens. mentis. pp. 7-24.
    Diese Einleitung liefert eine Skizze der Genese des Bandes, eine Einführung in die im Sammelband diskutierten Themenkomplexe und Fragestellungen sowie Zusammenfassungen aller in ihm enthaltenen Beiträge.
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  24. What Would Lewis Do?Daniel Nolan - forthcoming - In Helen Beebee & Anthony Fisher (eds.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Oxford University Press.
    David Lewis rejected consequentialism in ethics. However, two aspects of his meta-ethical views make it a challenge to see how consequentialism could be resisted. Lewis endorses a maximising conception of rationality, where to be rational is to maximise value of a certain sort; he appears to think it is possible to be both rational and moral; and yet he rejects conceptions of moral action as acting to maximise moral value. The second tension in Lewis's views arises from his meta-ethics. Lewis's (...)
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  25. Entre a normatividade e a descrição: uma discussão sobre naturalismo e não-naturalismo em metaética.Matheus de Mesquita Silveira & Luca Nogueira Igansi - 2020 - Dissertatio 51:103-131.
    Este artigo visa compreender o estado da arte do naturalismo contemporâneo a partir da discussão com posições não naturalistas, em especial as de Moore e Rawls. Parte-se da análise do argumento central destas abordagens no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresenta-se a discussão entre o naturalismo e o não-naturalismo moral como, respectivamente, estandartes das perspectivas descritivas e prescritivas da moralidade. (...)
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  26. Why Metaethics Needs Empirical Moral Psychology.Jeroen Hopster & Michael Klenk - 2020 - Critica 52 (155).
    What is the significance of empirical moral psychology for metaethics? In this article we take up Michael Ruse’s evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and reassess it in the context of the empirical state of the art. Ruse’s argument depends on the phenomenological presumption that people generally experience morality as objective. We demonstrate how recent experimental findings challenge this widely-shared armchair presumption and conclude that Ruse’s argument fails. We situate this finding in the recent debate about Carnapian explication and argue (...)
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  27. Přirozený zákon ve filosofii 20. století a jeho zdroje.Miroslav Vacura - 2011 - E-Logos 18 (1):1-20.
    Přirozený zákon je jednou z nejvýznamnějších idejí, která stojí v základech evropského filosofického, etického a právního myšlení. Předložený článek podává stručnou expozici vývoje ideje přirozeného zákona ve filosofickém myšlení s důrazem na jeho klíčové momenty a vyjádření nosných tezí, které předurčily rozumění tomuto pojmu v následujících obdobích. Jeho cílem není detailní probádání některé z jednotlivých etap či některého z autorů, ale naopak podat souhrnný a přehledný obraz vývoje této ideje. Východiskem je zde stručné načrtnutí hlavních zdrojů ideje přirozeného zákona v (...)
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  28. Big History, Value, and the Art of Continued Existence.Brendan Cline - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):901-930.
    There has lately been substantial interest in scrutinizing our evaluative attitudes in light of our evolutionary history. However, these discussions have been hampered by an insufficiently expansive vantage. Our history did not begin ex nihilo a few million years ago with the appearance of hominins, or apes, or primates—those are very recent chapters of a much larger story that spans billions of years. This paper situates the mechanisms underlying normative thought within this broader context. I argue that this historical perspective (...)
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  29. The Driving Forces of Metaethics.Andrew Forcehimes - 2017 - In Steven M. Cahn & Andrew T. Forcehimes (eds.), Foundations of Moral Philosophy. New York, NY, USA: pp. 3-19.
    This essay serves as a general introduction to metaethics, highlighting the ideas that drive us toward or away from the various theories.
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  30. Foundations of Moral Philosophy: Readings in Metaethics.Steven M. Cahn & Andrew T. Forcehimes (eds.) - 2016 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Foundations of Moral Philosophy: Readings in Metaethics is a comprehensive collection of fifty-six contemporary readings and historical sources on major issues in metaethics. It focuses on the meaning of moral terms, the nature of moral psychology, whether we can know moral truths (if there are any), and the role of moral reasons. The book features unparalleled representation of women philosophers, with one-third of the contemporary articles authored or coauthored by women. Wherever appropriate, the articles have been carefully edited to ensure (...)
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  31. Parfit : l'âge de la raison de la morale.Yann Schmitt - 2019 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 1 (43).
    Figure majeure de la philosophie morale, Derek Parfit (1942-2017) reste encore peuconnu en France. Cette introduction vise à montrer l'ampleur des thématiques abordées de Parfit en les rattachant au projet d'une éthique rationnelle, tandis que le numéro dansson ensemble, sans prétendre être exhaustif, propose des présentations et discussions de différents éléments clefs de sa philosophie.
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  32. Streumer on Non-Cognitivism and Reductivism About Normative Judgement.Daan Evers - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):707-724.
    Bart Streumer believes that the following principle is true of all normative judgements: When two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of them is correct. Streumer argues that noncognitivists are unable to explain why is true, or our acceptance of it. I argue that his arguments are inconclusive. I also argue that our acceptance of is limited in the case of instrumental and epistemic normative judgements, and that the extent to which we do accept for such judgements can (...)
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  33. A Relação Entre Norma e Valor em Nicolai Hartmann.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2011 - Phainomenon – Revista de Fenomenologia 23:445-469.
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  34. Contre Parfit: une défense du naturalisme.Stéphane Lemaire - 2019 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 43:59-95.
  35. Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie (2):1-23.
    Moral philosophy continues to be enriched by an ongoing empirical turn,mainly through contributions from neuroscience, biology, and psychology. Thusfar, cultural anthropology has largely been missing. A recent and rapidly growing‘ethical turn’ within cultural anthropologynow explicitly and systematically studiesmorality. This research report aims to introduce to an audience in moral philosophyseveral notable works within the ethical turn. It does so by critically discussing theethical turn’s contributions to four topics: the definition of morality, the nature ofmoral change and progress, the truth of (...)
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  36. Reply to Bykvist and Olson.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (3):347-349.
    Reply to Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson's review of Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP, 2017) in Utilitas.
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  37. Survival of Defeat - Evolution, Moral Objectivity, and Undercutting.Michael Klenk - 2018 - Dissertation, Utrecht University
    Evidence from biology and psychology suggests that our moral views depend on our evolutionary history. For example, if we humans would have evolved to live like hive bees, we would probably think very differently about moral questions such as whether we have a duty to care for our children. The findings from biology and psychology threaten to ‘debunk’ the justification of judgements about objective moral truths. Objective moral truths are always the same and they do not vary with our contingent (...)
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  38. Naturalizing ethics.Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian & David Wong - 2016 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. London, UK: pp. 16-33.
    In this essay we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies—Hume’s and Moore’s—that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why nihilism about value is not an especially worrisome for (...)
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  39. Evolution and Moral Disagreement.Michael Klenk - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).
    Several philosophers have recently argued that evolutionary considerations undermine the justification of all objectivist moral beliefs by implying a hypothetical disagreement: had our evolutionary history been different, our moral beliefs would conflict with the moral beliefs of our counterfactual selves. This paper aims at showing that evolutionary considerations do not imply epistemically relevant moral disagreement. In nearby scenarios, evolutionary considerations imply tremendous moral agreement. In remote scenarios, evolutionary considerations do not entail relevant disagreement with our epistemic peers, neither on a (...)
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  40. Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the Evolutionary Objection: Rethinking the Relevance of Empirical Science.Parisa Moosavi - 2018 - In John Hacker-Wright (ed.), Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 277-307.
    Neo-Aristotelian metaethical naturalism is a modern attempt at naturalizing ethics using ideas from Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics. Proponents of this view argue that moral virtue in human beings is an instance of natural goodness, a kind of goodness supposedly also found in the realm of non-human living things. Many critics question whether neo-Aristotelian naturalism is tenable in light of modern evolutionary biology. Two influential lines of objection have appealed to an evolutionary understanding of human nature and natural teleology to argue against (...)
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  41. Evoluce morálky.Tomas Hribek - 2011 - In Vladimir Havlik & Tomas Hribek (eds.), Z evolučního hlediska: Pojem evoluce v současné filosofii. Praha, Česko: pp. 171-206.
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  42. Darwinistická metaetika.Tomas Hribek - 2016 - In Jakub Jirsa (ed.), Přístupy k etice III. Praha, Česko: pp. 297-345.
    [Darwinian Metaethics] A critical analysis of the recent theories of metaethics that take the Darwinian picture of our origin seriously. The contents: 1. Evolution of altruism; 2. Biology in ethics; 3. Moore and a critique of naturalism; 4. Darwinian non-cognitivism; 5. Darwinian cognitivist realism and constructivism; 6. Darwinian cognitivist anti-realism; 7. Darwinian fictionalism.
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  43. Normative Reasons and Theism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2018 - Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
    Normative reasons are reasons to do and believe things. Intellectual inquiry seems to presuppose their existence, for we cannot justifiably conclude that we exist; that there is an external world; and that there are better and worse ways of investigating it and behaving in it, unless there are reasons to do and believe such things. But just what in the world are normative reasons? In this book a case is made for believing normative reasons are favouring relations that have a (...)
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  44. Exclusion in Morality.Lei Zhong - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):275-290.
    Recently some philosophers suggested an exclusion problem for moral non-naturalism, which is similar to the exclusion problem in philosophy of mind. In this article, the author aims to advance the discussion of exclusion in morality by investigating two influential solutions to the exclusion problem: the autonomy solution and the overdetermination solution. The author attempts to show that the moral non-naturalist can solve the exclusion problem in a way that is different from the approach to solving mental-physical exclusion. First, the author (...)
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  45. What Is Conventionalism about Moral Rights and Duties?Katharina Nieswandt - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):15-28.
    A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individual rights and duties. The reason why I must not break my promise to you, for example, should lie in the damage to you—rather than to the practice of promising or to all other participants in that practice. Common targets of this objection include the theories of Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker, Binmore, and Rawls. I argue that the conventionalism of these theories is superficial; genuinely conventionalist theories are (...)
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  46. Distinguere uno Stato da una banda di ladri. Etica e diritto nel XX secolo.Daniela Tafani (ed.) - 2014 - Bologna: Il Mulino.
    Che cosa distingue, concettualmente, l’esattore delle tasse che esiga da un uomo, a pena di sanzioni, una determinata somma di denaro, dal bandito che gli intimi, sotto la minaccia di un’arma, di consegnargli la medesima somma? È sul soddisfacimento del requisito della giustizia che si fonda, come sostenne Agostino, l’eterogeneità tra uno Stato e un’accolita di furfanti? «Se non è rispettata la giustizia, che cosa sono gli Stati, se non delle grandi bande di ladri? Perché le bande di briganti che (...)
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  47. Les attitudes appropriées verbatim.Fabrice Teroni & Julien Deonna - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):151-170.
    Fabrice Teroni,Julien Deonna | : Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette analyse. Le défi psychologique exige de l’analyse qu’elle fasse appel à des attitudes qui soient à même d’éclairer nos concepts évaluatifs, tout en ne présupposant pas la maîtrise de ces mêmes concepts. Le défi normatif réclame quant à lui que la (...)
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  48. Accounting for Similarities and Differences in Moral Belief (Atheism).Thaddeus Metz - 2019 - In Joseph W. Koterski & Graham Oppy (eds.), Theism and Atheism: Opposing Viewpoints in Philosophy. Gale. pp. 472-477.
    A chapter composed largely for undergraduate and postgraduate students that considers whether general facts about morality and our ability to make moral judgements count in favor of either theism or atheism.
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  49. Aquinas On Happiness: A Defence.David W. Ardagh - 1979 - New Scholasticism 53 (4):428-459.
  50. Reductionist Moral Realism and the Contingency of Moral Evolution.Max Barkhausen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):662-689.
    Reductionist forms of moral realism, such as naturalist realism, are often thought immune to epistemological objections that have been raised against nonnaturalist realism in the form of reliability worries or evolutionary debunking arguments. This article establishes that reductionist realist views can only explain the reliability of our moral beliefs at the cost of incurring repugnant first-order conclusions.
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