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  1. Freedom to do Otherwise and the Contingency of the Laws of Nature.Jeff Mitchell - manuscript
    This article argues that the freedom of voluntary action can be grounded in the contingency of the laws of nature. That is, the possibility of doing otherwise is equivalent to the possibility of the laws being otherwise. This equivalence can be understood in terms of an agent drawing a boundary between self and not-self in the domains of both matter and laws, defining the extent of the body and of voluntary behaviour. In particular, the article proposes that we can think (...)
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  2. Active Powers of the Human Mind.Ruth Boeker - forthcoming - In Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, vol. 2. Oxford:
  3. Willpower and well-being.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    How is willpower possible? Which desires are relevant to well-being? Despite a surge of interest in both questions, recent philosophical discussions have not connected them. I connect them here. In particular, the puzzle of synchronic self-control says that synchronic self-control requires a contradiction, namely, wanting not to do what we most want to do. Three responses have been developed: Sripada’s divided mind view, Mele’s motivational shift thesis, and Kennett & Smith’s non-actional approach. These responses do not incorporate distinctions from desire-satisfaction (...)
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  4. Levinas and the Second Personal Structure of Free Will.Kevin Houser - forthcoming - In Michael Fagenblat & Melis Erdur (eds.), Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: Second-Personal Normativity and the Moral Life. Research in Phenomenology Series.
    Many suppose some form of free will is required to make moral responsibility possible. Levinas thinks this is backwards. Freedom does not make moral responsibility possible. Moral responsibility makes freedom possible. Free will is not a condition for morality. Free will is an aspect and expression of our moral condition. Key to Levinas’s argument is his rejection of free-will-individualism: the idea that free will is a power a single being could possess. A “contradiction” extracted from standard accounts, and related troubles (...)
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  5. A Shelter from Luck: The Morality System Reconstructed.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - In András Szigeti & Matthew Talbert (eds.), Morality and Agency: Themes from Bernard Williams. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 182-209.
    Far from being indiscriminately critical of the ideas he associated with the morality system, Bernard Williams offered vindicatory explanations of its crucial building blocks, such as the moral/non-moral distinction, the idea of obligation, the voluntary/involuntary distinction, and the practice of blame. The rationale for these concessive moves, I argue, is that understanding what these ideas do for us when they are not in the service of the system is just as important to leading us out of the system as the (...)
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  6. Proust and Schopenhauer.David Bather Woods - forthcoming - In Anna Elsner & Tom Stern (eds.), The Proustian Mind. London, UK:
    This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I identify the mentions of Schopenhauer in À la recherche du temps perdu. I use an implicit reference to Schopenhauer by Swann to open a discussion of Schopenhauer’s theory of music. I attempt to downplay its identification, suggested by some commentators, with both the views about music expressed in the novel and the form of the novel itself. In the second section, I discuss Proust’s references to Schopenhauer in his essay (...)
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  7. In Praise of Ambivalence.D. Justin Coates - 2023 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Ambivalence is a form of inner volitional conflict that we experience as being irresolvable without significant cost. Because of this, very few of us relish feelings of ambivalence. Yet for many in the Western philosophical tradition, ambivalence is not simply an unappealing experience that's hard to manage. According to Unificationists--whose view finds its historical roots in Plato and Augustine and is ably defended by contemporary philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard--ambivalence is a failure of well-functioning agency. The reasons (...)
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  8. The Life of Form: Practical Reason in Kant and Hegel.Thomas Khurana - 2022 - In Ways of Being Bound: Perspectives from post-Kantian Philosophy and Relational Sociology. Cham: pp. 47-70.
    This chapter investigates the Kantian idea that a rational life is a life of “mere form”—a life in which a “mere form” is the force or spring of action. I start by developing Kant’s practical notion of life—the capacity to be the cause of what one represents. In a second step, I investigate the way in which Kant characterizes a rational life—the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws and to determine ourselves by the mere form of (...)
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  9. Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence without Fear.Jobst Landgrebe & Barry Smith - 2022 - Abingdon, England: Routledge.
    The book’s core argument is that an artificial intelligence that could equal or exceed human intelligence—sometimes called artificial general intelligence (AGI)—is for mathematical reasons impossible. It offers two specific reasons for this claim: Human intelligence is a capability of a complex dynamic system—the human brain and central nervous system. Systems of this sort cannot be modelled mathematically in a way that allows them to operate inside a computer. In supporting their claim, the authors, Jobst Landgrebe and Barry Smith, marshal evidence (...)
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  10. What does it mean to inhibit an Action? A Critical Discussion of Benjamin Libet’s Veto in a Recent Study.Robert Reimer - 2022 - Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2021 Collocated Workshops. SEFM 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol 13230.
    In the 1980s, physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of ex-periments to test whether the will is free. Whilst he originally assumed that the will functions like an immaterial initiator of cerebral processes culminating in actions, he later began to think that it rather works like an immaterial veto inhib-iting unwanted actions by preventing unconsciously initiated cerebral processes from unfolding. Libet’s veto was widely criticized for its Cartesian dualist and interactionist implications. However, in 2016, Schultze-Kraft et al. adopted Libet’s idea (...)
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  11. The Tinkering Mind.Tillmann Vierkant - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
  12. Must God Create the Best Available Creatures?Mark J. Boone - 2021 - Philosophia Christi 23 (2):271-289.
    J. L. Mackie distinguished himself in twentieth-century philosophy by presenting an important objection to the traditional free will explanation for why God would allow evil: If evil is due to the free choice of creatures, why wouldn’t an omnipotent God simply create free creatures who would choose better? Alvin Plantinga, in turn, distinguished himself with his critique of Mackie. Plantinga’s main point is that Mackie made a mistake in assuming that it is within the power of omnipotence fully to create (...)
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  13. Sizing Up Free Will: The Scale of Compatibilism.Stuart Doyle - 2021 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 42 (3 & 4):271-289.
    Is human free will compatible with the natural laws of the universe? To “compatibilists” who see free actions as emanating from the wants and reasons of human agents, free will looks perfectly plausible. However, “incompatibilists” claim to see the more ultimate sources of human action. The wants and reasons of agents are said to be caused by physical processes which are themselves mere natural results of the previous state of the world and the natural laws which govern it. This paper (...)
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  14. Against the Illusory Will Hypothesis. A Reinterpretation of the Test Results in Danial Wegner and Thalia Wheatley’s I Spy Experiment.Robert Reimer - 2021 - Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2020 Collocated Workshops. SEFM 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
    Since Benjamin Libet’s famous experiments in 1979, the study of the will has become a focal point in the cognitive sciences. Just like Libet the scien-tists Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley came to doubt that the will is causally efficacious. In their influential study I Spy from 1999, they created an experi-mental setup to show that agents erroneously experience their actions as caused by their thoughts. Instead, these actions are caused by unconscious neural pro-cesses; the agent’s ‘causal experience of will’ (...)
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  15. Modernity in Antiquity: Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy in Heidegger and Arendt.Jussi Backman - 2020 - Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 24 (2):5-29.
    This article looks at the role of Hellenistic thought in the historical narratives of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. To a certain extent, both see—with G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen, and Eduard Zeller—Hellenistic and Roman philosophy as a “modernity in antiquity,” but with important differences. Heidegger is generally dismissive of Hellenistic thought and comes to see it as a decisive historical turning point at which a protomodern element of subjective willing and domination is injected into the classical heritage (...)
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  16. Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz on self‐control.Sergio Armando Gallegos‐Ordorica - 2020 - Philosophy Compass (10):1-10.
    The Novohispanic nun Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz has not been traditionally considered as a philosopher within the Anglophone philosophical sphere because her writings are primarily poems and plays. In the last three decades, only a few philosophers have engaged with Sor Juana's works. However, their scholarship has focused only on a narrow range of issues, such as Sor Juana's defense of the right of women to be educated, and has neglected other dimensions of her thought, such as her (...)
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  17. Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will.Nora Heinzelmann - 2020 - Philosophia 1 (1):255-269.
    This paper shows that our popular account of weakness of will is inconsistent with dilemmas. In dilemmas, agents judge that they ought to do one thing, that they ought to do something else, and that they cannot do both. They must act against either of their two judgments. But such action is commonly understood as weakness of will. An agent is weak-willed in doing something if she judges that she ought to and could do something else instead. Thus, it seems (...)
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  18. Nietzsche contra Sublimation.Eli I. Lichtenstein - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (4):755-778.
    Many commentators have claimed that Nietzsche views the “sublimation” (Sublimierung) of drives as a positive achievement. Against this tradition, I argue that, on the dominant if not universal Nietzschean use of Sublimierung and its cognates, sublimation is just a broad psychological analogue of the traditional (al)chemical process: the “vaporization” of drives into a finer or lighter state, figuratively if not literally. This can yield ennobling elevation, or purity in a positive sense—the intensified “sublimate” of an unrefined original sample. But it (...)
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  19. Causal Efficiency of Intentional Acts.Maria A. Sekatskaya - 2020 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 57 (1):79-95.
    Willusionists claim that recent developments in psychology and neuroscience demonstrate that consciousness is causally inefficient [Carruthers, 2007; Eagleman, 2012; Wegner, 2002]. In section 1, I show that willusionists provide two types of evidence: first, evidence that we do not always know the causes of our actions; second, evidence that we lack introspective awareness of the causal efficiency of our intentional acts.In section 2, I analyze the first type of evidence. Recent research in the field of social psychology has shown that (...)
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  20. On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.
    This morning I intended to get out of bed when my alarm went off. Hearing my alarm, I formed the intention to get up now. Yet, for a time, I remained in bed, irrationally lazy. It seems I irrationally failed to execute my intention. Such cases of execution failure pose a challenge for Mentalists about rationality, who believe that facts about rationality supervene on facts about the mind. For, this morning, my mind was in order; it was my action that (...)
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  21. THE CONTOURS OF FREE WILL SCEPTICISM.Simon Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - Dissertation, Oxford University
    Free will sceptics claim that we lack free will, i.e. the command or control of our conduct that is required for moral responsibility. There are different conceptions of free will: it is sometimes understood as having the ability to choose between real options or alternatives; and sometimes as being the original or true source of our own conduct. Whether conceived in the first or in the second way, free will is subject to strong sceptical arguments. However, free will sceptics face (...)
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  22. The Passions and Disinterest: From Kantian Free Play to Creative Determination by Power, via Schiller and Nietzsche.Eli I. Lichtenstein - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:249-279.
    I argue that Nietzsche’s criticism of the Kantian theory of disinterested pleasure in beauty reflects his own commitment to claims that closely resemble certain Kantian aesthetic principles, specifically as reinterpreted by Schiller. I show that Schiller takes the experience of beauty to be disinterested both (1) insofar as it involves impassioned ‘play’ rather than desire-driven ‘work’, and (2) insofar as it involves rational-sensuous (‘aesthetic’) play rather than mere physical play. In figures like Nietzsche, Schiller’s generic notion of play—which is itself (...)
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  23. Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal Combatibilist Account, by Scott Sehon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. xii + 239, £45. [REVIEW]Derek Baker - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):411-413.
    Baker reviews the book Free will and action explanation: A non-causal combatibilist account, by Scott Sehon.
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  24. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.Daniel Avi Coren - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):145-159.
    Harry Frankfurt Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–39 famously attacked what he called the principle of alternate possibilities. PAP states that being able to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. He gave counterexamples to PAP known since then as “Frankfurt cases.” This paper sidesteps the enormous literature on Frankfurt cases while preserving some of our salient pretheoretical intuitions about the relation between alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. In particular, I introduce, explain, and defend a principle that has so far been (...)
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  25. Intellectual Isolation.Jeremy David Fix - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):491-520.
    Intellectualism is the widespread view that practical reason is a species of theoretical reason, distinguished from others by its objects: reasons to act. I argue that if practical reason is a species of theoretical reason, practical judgments by nature have nothing to do with action. If they have nothing to do with action, I cannot act from my representation of reasons for me to act. If I cannot act from those representations, those reasons cannot exist. If they cannot exist, neither (...)
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  26. The Role of Judgment in Doxastic Agency.David Jenkins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):12-19.
    We take it that we can exercise doxastic agency by reasoning and by making judgments. We take it, that is, that we can actively make up our minds by reasoning and judging. On what I call the ‘Standard View’ this is so because judgment can yield belief. It is typical to take it that judgments yield beliefs by causing them. But on the resultant understanding of the Standard View, I argue, it is unclear how judgment could play its role in (...)
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  27. Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant.Wooram Lee - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant famously claims that it is analytic that whoever wills the end also wills the indispensably necessary means to it that is within his control. The orthodox consensus has it that the analytic proposition expresses a normative principle of practical reason. In this paper, I argue that this consensus is mistaken. On my resolute reading of Kant, he is making a descriptive point about what it is to will an end, and not (...)
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  28. Christoph Schröder: Evolutionstheorie und Willensmetaphysik. [REVIEW]Jens Lemanski - 2018 - Schopenhauer Jahrbuch 96:176-181.
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  29. Realizing Onself by Realizing What One Really Wants to Do.Yudai Suzuki - 2018 - In Andrea Altobrando, Takuya Niikawa & Richard Stone (eds.), The Realizations of the Self. Springer. pp. 185-197.
    I will explore the concept of self-realization by means of realizing what one really wants to do, i.e., by realizing the desires one is committed to. I briefly review views of three philosophers, Frankfurt, Watson, and Bratman, and contrast my view with theirs. Unlike Frankfurt and Bratman, I argue that higher order attitudes toward desires are not necessary for the commitment. I agree with Watson that value judgments on desires are necessary, but they are not sufficient for the commitment. My (...)
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  30. Amicitia and Eros: Seneca’s Adaptation of a Stoic Concept of Friendship for Roman Men in Progress.Jula Wildberger - 2018 - In Gernot Michael Müller & Fosca Mariani Zini (eds.), Philosophie in Rom – Römische Philosophie?: Kultur-, literar-, und philosophiegeschichtliche Perspektiven. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 387-425.
    Analyzes Seneca's conception of friendship as an innovative adaptation of Stoic eros to accommodate Roman social norms of equality and reciprocity and to define a form of non-defective friendship for fools who are making progess. -/- Also provides a new answer to the conundrum of "will" in Seneca by connecting it to the impulse types epibole ("effort," also the impulse type of eros) and prothesis attested in Greek Stoic sources, and shows the connection between progessor friendship as an effort to (...)
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  31. Action, Animacy, and Substance Causation.Janice Chik Breidenbach - 2017 - In William M. R. Simpson, Robert Charles Koons & Nicholas Teh (eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science. Routledge. pp. 235-260.
  32. Schelling on the Possibility of Evil: Rendering Pantheism, Freedom, and Time Consistent.G. Anthony Bruno - 2017 - SATS 18 (1):1-18.
    German idealism stems in large part from Fichte’s response to a dilemma involving the concepts of pantheism, freedom and time: either time is the form of the determination of modes of substance, as held by a pantheistic or ‘dogmatic’ person, or the form of acts generated by human freedom, as held by an idealistic person. Fichte solves the dilemma by refuting dogmatism and deducing time from idealism’s first principle. But his diagnosis is more portentous: by casting the lemmas in terms (...)
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  33. Deliberation.E. J. Coffman - 2017 - In Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy & Kevin Timpe (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge. pp. 590-599.
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  34. Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Disputatio (45):219-243.
    Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we (...)
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  35. Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.
    In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According (...)
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  36. G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action.Christopher Frey & Jennifer A. Frey - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):202-247.
    Philosophers of action and perception have reached a consensus: the term ‘intentionality’ has significantly different senses in their respective fields. But Anscombe argues that these distinct senses are analogically united in such a way that one cannot understand the concept if one focuses exclusively on its use in one’s preferred philosophical sub-discipline. She highlights three salient points of analogy: (i) intentional objects are given by expressions that employ a “description under which;” (ii) intentional descriptions are typically vague and indeterminate; and (...)
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  37. "Ich wird dich also an griffen / Das du mir nit mugist entwichen": Göttliche Aktivität, seelisches Leiden und die Rolle der Autonomie in Christus und die minnende Seele.Amber Griffioen - 2017 - In Benedikt Paul Göcke & Ruben Schneider (eds.), Handelt Gott in der Welt? Neue Ansätze aus Theologie und Religionsphilosophie. Regensburg, Germany: pp. 41-72.
    This article (in German) explores divine activity, human passivity, and the role played by grace in the medieval image-and-verse program "Christ and the Loving Soul". After discussing the historical context and target readers and laying out the story of CMS, I show how this popular piece of late medieval devotional literature expresses complex theological and philosophical ideas that central to understanding the narrative. I argue for a new way of reading CMS that places emphasis on movement and the notion of (...)
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  38. NDPR Book Review. [REVIEW]Kevin Houser - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
    Gabriela Basterra, The Subject of Freedom: Kant, Levinas, Fordham University Press, 2015, 197pp., $29.00 (pbk), ISBN 9780823265152. -/- Reviewed by Kevin Houser, Case Western Reserve University "What is a subject?" "In what sense is it free?" -/- If we ask Kant and Levinas these questions we expect incompatible answers -- an expectation encouraged by Levinas, who often deploys Kant as a foil for his own views about reason, morality, and freedom. The flash points are by now familiar. Kant supposes morality (...)
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  39. Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142 (4):529-548.
    In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, Franz Brentano is known mostly for his thesis that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental.’ Among Brentano scholars, there are also lively debates on his theory of consciousness and his theory of judgment. Brentano’s theory of will and emotion is less widely discussed, even within the circles of Brentano scholarship. In this paper, I want to show that this is a missed opportunity, certainly for Brentano scholars but also for contemporary philosophy of mind. (...)
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  40. Consciousness and Freedom: The Inseparability of Thinking and Doing. [REVIEW]Samuel Murray - 2017 - Review of Metaphysics 71 (4).
  41. Action, Knowledge and Will. ByHyman John . (Oxford : OUP , 2015 . Pp. xi + 272 . Price £35.00.). [REVIEW]Evgenia Mylonaki - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267).
    In this paper I show how John Hyman takes the traditional question whether we should give a physical, ethical, psychological or intellectual account of human action and stands it on its head. For Hyman argues that the real question is how to distinguish the physical, the ethical, the psychological and the intellectual dimensions of human action, and he thereby changes the landscape in the philosophy of action. Finally, I argue that Hyman's positive proposal fails by the lights of his own (...)
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  42. Freedom regained: The possibility of free will. [REVIEW]Anco Peeters - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):682-684.
    In Freedom Regained, Julian Baggini draws on a broad spectrum of disciplines to defend the notion that, yes, we do have free will. Baggini targets recent claims from scientists who argue that (neuro)science has supposedly proven there is no such thing as free will. Such arguments depend on mistaken conflations of the self, which is taken as the nexus for free will, with, for example, the brain, the conscious mind, or the rational mind. Such amalgams are then taken to clash (...)
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  43. Freedom of the Will (Doctrine).Garrett Pendergraft - 2017 - In The Jonathan Edwards Encyclopedia. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing.
    Edwards’s views on the nature of the human will demonstrate his unique ability to unite philosophical rigor and theological fervor. Edwards was a staunch defender of the Reformed doctrines of absolute divine sovereignty and meticulous providence, but he was also a proponent of the intellectual tools and methods of early modern philosophy (and of John Locke in particular). His ultimate statement of his doctrinal position, Freedom of the Will, is the masterful result of these dual commitments.
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  44. Le volontarisme doxastique et les raisons de la foi chez Thomas d’Aquin.Samuel Dishaw - 2016 - Ithaque 19:49-76.
    Autant dans la Somme Théologique que dans le De Veritate, Thomas d’Aquin développe une théorie de la foi religieuse au sein de laquelle la volonté occupe un rôle central. Ceci soulève la question exégétique de savoir si Thomas d’Aquin va jusqu’à endosser un volontarisme doxastique, c’est-à-dire la thèse selon laquelle il est possible de former certaines croyances volontairement. Dans cet article, je soulève quelques difficultés propres aux lectures de l’Aquinate qui ne lui attribuent pas un volontarisme doxastique. J’explique ensuite la (...)
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  45. ‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP.Greg Janzen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):646-657.
    Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ by the presence (...)
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  46. On Smilansky’s Defense of Prepunishment: A Response to Robinson.Vanessa Lam - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1367-1374.
    In a 2010 paper published in this journal, Robinson responded to Smilansky’s argument that compatibilists do not have a principled reason to reject prepunishment. Smilansky argues that, due to the nature of a compatibilist universe, offenders will actually carry out their intended offences and are rightfully held responsible for them. As a result, there is no moral demand to wait for the offence to occur before punishing the offender. Smilansky has responded to a number of objections, but has not addressed (...)
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  47. Wittgenstein and Free Will.Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2016 - In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 47-62.
    In this essay I to do three things. First, I discuss a statement from the Tractatus which says that our free will consists in our ignorance of future actions: “The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference.” (5.1362) I think this statement might well be inspired by a claim Moore made in connection with free (...)
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  48. Leibniz - A Freedom Libertarian.Ori Beck - 2015 - Studia Leibnitiana 47 (1):67-85.
    Leibniz's views about human freedom are much debated today. While traditionalists hold that Leibniz was a compatibilist about freedom, some commentators are now suggesting that Leibniz can be read as an incompatibilist. This exciting new reading is often based on Leibniz's "Necessary and Contingent Truths" (AVI, 4 B, 1514-1524; henceforth: NCT). This paper shall argue that NCT supports not only an understanding of Leibniz as a freedom incompatibilist, but more radically, as embracing a particularly intriguing kind of libertarianism. On this (...)
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  49. Review of Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, edited by Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  50. Kane is Not Able: A Reply to Vicens’ “Self-Forming Actions and Confl icts of Intention”.Gregg D. Caruso - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):21-26.
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