Moral Judgment

Edited by Leonard Kahn (Loyola University, New Orleans, US Naval Academy)
About this topic
Summary Internalism and Externalism about Moral Judgment are, very roughly, contending views about the relationship between making a moral judgment and being motivated to act in accordance with it. Internalists - again, quite roughly - hold that there is a necessary connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated to act appropriately. Externalists deny that the connection is necessary and hold that it is, instead, merely contingent. 
Key works In many ways, Michael Smith's The Moral Problem is the both the most important work on moral judgment and the best place for someone interested in the topic to begin thinking seriously. Smith, better than anyone else, sets out the problems which have dominated the philosophical agenda on moral judgment for the last two decades and presents a novel and powerful cognitivist, Humean, internalist solution to these problems. R.M. Hare's The Language of Morals offers the classic non-cogntivist statement of internalism, while David O. Brink's Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics provides a persuasive case for cognitivist externalism and Jonathan Dancy's Moral Reasons argues for cognitivist non-Humeanism. Dancy's work draws in important ways from Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism, and Russ Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism: A Defense is a worthwhile follow up on both works. Those who wish to approach the problem from a more historical direction may wish to begin with Book III of David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, and Chapter III of John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism. A more recent work which finds deep inspiration from Kant's work on moral motivation is Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity.
Introductions Connie Rosati, "Moral Motivation," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, especially Chapter 3 Alex Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, , especially Chapter 3
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  1. The effect of outcome severity on moral judgment and interpersonal goals of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders.Lisa Katharina Frisch, Markus Kneer, Joachim Israel Krueger & Johannes Ullrich - 2021 - European Journal of Social Psychology 51 (7):1158-1171.
    When two actors have the same mental state but one happens to harm another person (unlucky actor) and the other one does not (lucky actor), the latter elicits a milder moral judgement. To understand how this outcome effect would affect post-harm interactions between victims and perpetrators, we examined how the social role from which transgressions are perceived moderates the outcome effect, and how outcome effects on moral judgements transfer to agentic and communal interpersonal goals. Three vignette experiments (N = 950) (...)
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  2. A Scalar Approach to Vaccination Ethics.Steven R. Kraaijeveld, Rachel Gur-Arie & Jamrozik Euzebiusz - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-25.
    Should people get vaccinated for the sake of others? What could ground—and limit—the normative claim that people ought to do so? In this paper, we propose a reasons-based consequentialist account of vaccination for the benefit of others. We outline eight harm-based and probabilistic factors that, we argue, give people moral reasons to get vaccinated. Instead of understanding other-directed vaccination in terms of binary moral duties (i.e., where people either have or do not have a moral duty to get vaccinated), we (...)
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  3. Why Plan-Expressivists Can't Pick Up the Moral Slack.Margaret Shea - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    This paper raises two problems for plan-expressivism concerning normative judgments about non-corealizable actions: actions which cannot both be performed. First, plan-expressivists associate normative judgment with an attitude which satisfies a corealizability constraint, but this constraint is (in the interpersonal case) unwarranted, and (in the intrapersonal case) warranted only at the price of a contentious normative premise. Ayars (2021) holds that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘B should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A can φ (...)
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  4. Moral Perception and Phenomenal Contrast(道德感知與現象對比).Lian Jr-Jiun & 連 祉鈞 - 2023 - Dissertation, National Chung Cheng University
    This thesis is a defense of (a version of) moral perceptualism. Moral perceptualism (MP), as is generally understood, advocates the bold view that “moral properties can be perceptual content”; its supporters include Audi (2013, 2015), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2015), and Werner (2016, 2020b). In support of MP, Werner (2016) bolsters what he calls ‘phenomenal contrast arguments(PCAs)’. According to PCAs, the best explanation for inter-subjective phenomenal contrast between two subjects facing the same moral situation is that (...)
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  5. There is No Reliable Evidence to Pass Moral Judgment on Frauwallner.Eli Franco - forthcoming - NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin:1-30.
    ZusammenfassungDieser Beitrag befasst sich mit einer wenig bekannten Kontroverse zwischen Jakob Stuchlik und Walter Slaje über die Verstrickung von Erich Frauwallner, dem renommierten Gelehrten der indischen Philosophie (1898–1974), mit NS-Institutionen. Er wirft ein neues Licht auf diese Kontroverse und zeigt die arisch-supremistische Ideologie, die sich in Frauwallners Aufteilung der Geschichte der indischen Philosophie in eine arische und eine nichtarische Periode widerspiegelt. Im Großen und Ganzen stellt sich der Aufsatz auf die Seite von Stuchlik und entlarvt Slajes Versuch, Frauwallner und bestimmte (...)
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  6. Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2).
    In this paper I present an account of a distinctive form of ‘practical’ or ‘deliberative’ uncertainty that has been central in debates in both ethics and metaethics. Many writers have assumed that such uncertainty concerns a special normative question, such as what we ought to do ‘all things considered.’ I argue against this assumption and instead endorse an alternative view of such uncertainty, which combines elements of both metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. A notable consequence of this view is that even (...)
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  7. Within your rights: dissociating wrongness and permissibility in moral judgment.Samuel Murray, William Jiménez-Leal & Santiago Amaya - forthcoming - British Journal of Social Psychology.
    Are we ever morally permitted to do what is morally wrong? It seems intuitive that we are, but evidence for dissociations among judgment of permissibility and wrongness are relatively scarce. Across 4 experiments (N = 1,438), we show that people judge that some behaviors can be morally wrong and permissible. The dissociations arise because these judgments track different morally relevant aspects of everyday moral encounters. Judgments of individual rights predicted permissibility but not wrongness, while character assessment predicted wrongness but not (...)
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  8. An Explanation of the Essential Publicity of Practical Reasons.Alisabeth Ayars - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    This paper argues that practical reasons are essentially “public” in the following sense: If R is a reason for X to Φ, then R is also a reason for other people not to interfere with X’s Φ-ing. The paper derives the Publicity Thesis from an independently motivated non-cognitivist account of normative judgment that covers both should-judgments and judgments about reasons. This account “explains” the publicity thesis in the sense if the non-cognitivist view is correct, anyone who judges that R is (...)
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  9. The Consequentialist Scale: Translation and empirical investigation in a Greek sample.George Kosteletos, Ioanna Zioga, Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, Andrie Panayiotou, Konstantinos Kontoangelos & Charalabos Papageorgiou - 2023 - Heliyon 9 (7):e18386.
    The Consequentialist Scale (Robinson, 2012) [89] assesses the endorsement of consequentialist and deontological moral beliefs. This study empirically investigated the application of the Greek translation of the Consequentialist Scale in a sample of native Greek speakers. Specifically, 415 native Greek speakers completed the questionnaire. To uncover the underlying structure of the 10 items in the Consequentialist Scale, an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted. The results revealed a three-factor solution, where the deontology factor exhibited the same structure as the original (...)
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  10. Dual-process moral judgment beyond fast and slow.Joshua D. Greene - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e123.
    De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing “fast and slow” processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two intuitions? There remains strong evidence, most notably from lesion studies, that sacrificial dilemmas engage distinct cognitive processes generating conflicting emotional and rational responses. The dual-process theory gets much right, but needs revision.
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  11. In praise of animals.Rhys Borchert & Aliya R. Dewey - 2023 - Biology and Philosophy 38 (4):1-26.
    Reasons-responsive accounts of praiseworthiness say, roughly, that an agent is praiseworthy for an action just in case the reasons that explain why they acted are also the reasons that explain why the action is right. In this paper, we argue that reasons-responsive accounts imply that some actions of non-human animals are praiseworthy. Trying to exclude non-human animals, we argue, risks neglecting cases of inadvertent virtue in human action and undermining the anti-intellectualist commitments that are typically associated with reasons-responsive accounts. Of (...)
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  12. Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral Judgment.Charlie Blunden, Paul Rehren & Hanno Sauer - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. Abingdon / New York: Routledge. pp. 105-114.
    Implicit cognition is cognition that happens automatically and (typically) non-consciously. In moral psychology, implicit cognition is almost always understood in terms of dual process models of moral judgment. In this chapter, we address the question whether implicit moral judgment is usefully cashed out in terms of automatic (“type 1”) processes, and what the limitations of this approach are. Our chapter has six sections. In (1), we provide a brief overview of dual process models of domain-general (moral and non-moral) cognition. (2) (...)
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  13. The temporal dynamics of third-party moral judgment of harm transgressions: answers from a 2-response paradigm.Flora Schwartz, Anastasia Passemar, Hakim Djeriouat & Bastien Trémolière - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning.
    Recent work supports the role of reasoning in third-party moral judgment of harm transgressions. The dynamics of the underlying cognitive processes supporting moral judgment is however poorly understood. In two preregistered experiments, we addressed this issue using a two-response paradigm. Participants were presented with moral scenarios twice: they had to provide their first judgment about an agent under both time pressure and interfering load, and were then asked to respond a second time at their own pace. In Experiment 1, participants (...)
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  14. Dumbfounded by the Facts? Understanding the Moral Psychology of Sexual Relationships.Camilla Kronqvist & Natan Elgabsi - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (2):147-164.
    One of the standard examples in contemporary moral psychology originates in the works of social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. He treats people's responses to the story of Julie and Mark, two siblings who decide to have casual, consensual, protected sex, as facts of human morality, providing evidence for his social intuitionist approach to moral judgements. We argue that Haidt's description of the facts of the story and the reactions of the respondents as ‘morally dumbfounded’ presupposes a view about moral reasoning that (...)
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  15. Finding Wrong.Ragnar Francén - 2023 - Mind 132 (526).
    In his interesting article ‘Evaluative Discourse and Affective States of Mind’, Nils Franzén argues that non-cognitivism gets support from the fact that we use certain verbs when we attribute moral judgments. More specifically he argues that our use of the subjective attitude verb ‘finds’ – as in ‘he finds dancing morally wrong’ – provides reason to think that moral judgments are affective attitudes. While I agree that there might be things to learn from the way we attribute moral judgments, I (...)
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  16. Ressentiment and Self-deception in Early Phenomenology: Voigtländer, Scheler, and Reinach.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2023 - In Else Voigtländer: Self, Emotion, and Sociality. Springer, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences. pp. 103-121.
    This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...)
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  17. The role of emotional awareness in evaluative judgment: evidence from alexithymia.Rodrigo Díaz & Jesse Prinz - 2023 - Scientific Reports 13 (5183).
    Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of (...)
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  18. Coming to Terms with Wang Yangming’s Strong Ethical Nativism: On Wang’s Claim That “Establishing Sincerity” (Licheng 立誠) Can Help Us Fully Grasp Everything that Matters Ethically.Justin Tiwald - 2023 - Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture 39:65-90.
    In this paper, I take up one of Wang Yangming’s most audacious philosophical claims, which is that an achievement that is entirely concerned with correcting one’s own inner states, called “establishing sincerity” (licheng 立誠) can help one to fully grasp (jin 盡) all ethically pertinent matters, including those that would seem to require some ability to know or track facts about the wider world (e.g., facts about people very different from ourselves, facts about the needs of plants and animals). Wang (...)
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  19. Archétypes Moraux : l'éthique dans la préhistoire.Roberto Arruda (ed.) - 2023 - Sao Paulo: Terra à Vista.
    Les approches de la tradition philosophique de la morale reposent principalement sur des concepts et des théories métaphysiques et théologiques. Parmi les concepts éthiques traditionnels, le plus important est la théorie du commandement divin (DCT). Selon la DCT, Dieu donne des fondements moraux à l'humanité par sa création et par la Révélation. Morale et Divinité sont inséparables depuis la civilisation la plus lointaine. Ces concepts plongent dans un cadre théologique et sont principalement acceptés par la plupart des adeptes des trois (...)
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  20. Moral Judgements: The Pursuit of Comfort and its Justification.Conor Sullivan - manuscript
    This paper explores how the three most common ethical theories, utilitarianism, deontology (specifically Kantianism), and Aristotelian virtue ethics seem to fail to adequately account for what justifies the obligations that our moral judgments hold on us, and where these moral judgements arise. This is because it appears that each of the three theories seems to be a different justification for the narcissistic pursuit of one’s own individual comfort, meaning that, people only act in a way that gives them the most (...)
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  21. Ignorance and Moral Judgment: Testing the Logical Priority of the Epistemic.Parker Crutchfield, Scott Scheall, Cristal Cardoso Sao Mateus, Hayley Dawn Brown & Mark Rzeszutek - forthcoming - Consciousness and Cognition.
    It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...)
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  22. Morality Binds and Blinds.John Klasios - 2012 - Evolutionary Psychology 10 (4).
  23. Should editors with multiple retractions or a record of academic misconduct serve on journal editorial boards?Jaime A. Teixeira da Silva - 2022 - European Science Editing 48:e95926.
    In the academic world, despite their corrective nature, there is still a negative stigma attached to retractions, even more so if they are based on ethical infractions. Editors-in-chief and editors are role models in academic and scholarly communities. Thus, if they have multiple retractions or a record of academic misconduct, this viewpoint argues that they should not serve on journals’ editorial boards. The exception is where such individuals have displayed a clear path of scholarly reform. Policy and guidance is needed (...)
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  24. Moral Transformation, Identity, and Practice.Carissa Phillips-Garrett - 2021 - American Association of Philosophy Teachers Studies in Pedagogy 6:156-172.
    Standard ways of conceptualizing moral development and measuring pedagogical interventions in ethics classes privilege the growth of moral judgment over moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral habits by too often conflating improvement in moral judgment with holistic moral development. I argue here that if we care about students’ construction and cultivation of their ethical selves, our assessment design principles ought to take seriously the transformative possibilities of philosophy as a way of life and be based on a more robust and (...)
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  25. The disunity of moral judgment: Implications for the study of psychopathy.David Sackris - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1.
    Since the 18th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been “moral colorblindness” or an inability to form moral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying this moral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of “moral colorblindness” to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an inability to make moral judgments is because their research is premised on the assumption that (...)
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  26. How to weigh lives. A computational model of moral judgment in multiple-outcome structures.Neele Engelmann & Michael R. Waldmann - 2022 - Cognition 218 (C):104910.
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  27. Aner Govrin, Ethics and Attachment: How We Make Moral Judgment.Joel Backström - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):527-530.
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  28. Consult Your Heart: The Self as a Source of Moral Judgment.Mutaz al-Khatib - 2023 - In Mutaz Khatib (ed.), Ḥadīth and Ethics Through the Lens of Interdisciplinarity. Brill.
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  29. Thomas Pölzler, Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):78-86.
    Thomas Pölzler’s book offers the first detailed study that focuses explicitly on the promise of science-based arguments for and against moral realism (of both the natural and non-natural kind). His two central claims are that sound arguments bearing on the realism/anti-realism debate are possible, and, yet, that four central attempts to derive metaethical conclusions from science-based arguments uniformly fail. The book then provides several recommendations for future science-based contributions to the realism/anti-realism debate to do better. The book is a valuable (...)
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  30. Bioethics, Experimental Approaches.Jonathan Lewis, Joanna Demaree-Cotton & Brian Earp - 2023 - In M. Sellers & S. Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 1-8.
    This entry summarizes an emerging subdiscipline of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy (“x-phi”) which has variously been referred to as experimental philosophical bioethics, experimental bioethics, or simply “bioxphi”. Like empirical bioethics, bioxphi uses data-driven research methods to capture what various stakeholders think (feel, judge, etc.) about moral issues of relevance to bioethics. However, like its other parent discipline of x-phi, bioxphi tends to favor experiment-based designs drawn from the cognitive sciences – including psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics – to (...)
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  31. Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment.Alisabeth Ayars - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):42-61.
    This paper develops a new form of metaethical expressivism according to which the normative judgment that X should Φ consists in a decision that X Φ. When the judgment is first-personal—e.g., my judgment that I should Φ—the view is similar to Gibbard’s plan expressivism, though the state I call “decision” differs somewhat from a Gibbard-style plan. The deep difference between the views shows in the account of third-personal judgments. Gibbard construes the judgment that Mary should Φ as a de se (...)
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  32. Practical cognition as volition.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1077-1091.
    Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is the self-conscious will and that practical cognition is self-conscious volition. This essay addresses two puzzles for practical cognitivism. In akratic action, I act as I understand is illegitimate and not as I understand is legitimate. In permissible action, I act as I understand is legitimate and also do not act as I understand is legitimate. In both types of action, practical cognition seems to come apart from volition. How, then, can practical (...)
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  33. Practical cognition as volition.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1077-1091.
    Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is the self-conscious will and that practical cognition is self-conscious volition. This essay addresses two puzzles for practical cognitivism. In akratic action, I act as I understand is illegitimate and not as I understand is legitimate. In permissible action, I act as I understand is legitimate and also do not act as I understand is legitimate. In both types of action, practical cognition seems to come apart from volition. How, then, can practical (...)
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  34. Practical cognition as volition.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1077-1091.
    Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is the self-conscious will and that practical cognition is self-conscious volition. This essay addresses two puzzles for practical cognitivism. In akratic action, I act as I understand is illegitimate and not as I understand is legitimate. In permissible action, I act as I understand is legitimate and also do not act as I understand is legitimate. In both types of action, practical cognition seems to come apart from volition. How, then, can practical (...)
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  35. Practical cognition as volition.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1077-1091.
    Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is the self-conscious will and that practical cognition is self-conscious volition. This essay addresses two puzzles for practical cognitivism. In akratic action, I act as I understand is illegitimate and not as I understand is legitimate. In permissible action, I act as I understand is legitimate and also do not act as I understand is legitimate. In both types of action, practical cognition seems to come apart from volition. How, then, can practical (...)
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  36. Practical cognition as volition.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1077-1091.
    Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is the self-conscious will and that practical cognition is self-conscious volition. This essay addresses two puzzles for practical cognitivism. In akratic action, I act as I understand is illegitimate and not as I understand is legitimate. In permissible action, I act as I understand is legitimate and also do not act as I understand is legitimate. In both types of action, practical cognition seems to come apart from volition. How, then, can practical (...)
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  37. Moralization and Mismoralization in Public Health.Steven R. Kraaijeveld & Euzebiusz Jamrozik - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (4):655-669.
    Moralization is a social-psychological process through which morally neutral issues take on moral significance. Often linked to health and disease, moralization may sometimes lead to good outcomes; yet moralization is often detrimental to individuals and to society as a whole. It is therefore important to be able to identify when moralization is inappropriate. In this paper, we offer a systematic normative approach to the evaluation of moralization. We introduce and develop the concept of ‘mismoralization’, which is when moralization is metaethically (...)
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  38. Decision under normative uncertainty.Franz Dietrich & Brian Jabarian - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (3):372-394.
    While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the 'original position', where one's future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty -- normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle -- maximising expected value (`Expectationalism') -- has different formulations, namely (...)
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  39. Against Being For.James L. D. Brown - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23 (1):136-43.
    Expressivism is the view that normative claims express nondescriptive, practical attitudes. It is widely assumed that this involves denying that normative claims express beliefs, except in a minimal or deflationary sense. However, this assumption is increasingly being called into question. Instead, it is argued, expressivists can and should provide a robust, nondescriptive theory of belief in general which can explain the difference between ordinary descriptive beliefs and nondescriptive normative beliefs. This paper examines one such an attempt due to Mark Schroeder (...)
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  40. Practical Wisdom and the Value of Cognitive Diversity.Anneli Jefferson & Katrina Sifferd - 2022 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 92:149-166.
    The challenges facing us today require practical wisdom to allow us to react appropriately. In this paper, we argue that at a group level, we will make better decisions if we respect and take into account the moral judgment of agents with diverse styles of cognition and moral reasoning. We show this by focusing on the example of autism, highlighting different strengths and weaknesses of moral reasoning found in autistic and non-autistic persons respectively.
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  41. Does AI Debias Recruitment? Race, Gender, and AI’s “Eradication of Difference”.Eleanor Drage & Kerry Mackereth - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (4):1-25.
    In this paper, we analyze two key claims offered by recruitment AI companies in relation to the development and deployment of AI-powered HR tools: (1) recruitment AI can objectively assess candidates by removing gender and race from their systems, and (2) this removal of gender and race will make recruitment fairer, help customers attain their DEI goals, and lay the foundations for a truly meritocratic culture to thrive within an organization. We argue that these claims are misleading for four reasons: (...)
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  42. Rationalism and intuitionism : assessing three views about the psychology of moral judgment.Christian Miller - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
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  43. Nihilism and the epistemic profile of moral judgment.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
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  44. Moral judgment and the brain : a functional approach to the question of emotion and cognition in moral judgment integrating psychology, neuroscience and evolutionary biology.Kristin Prehn & Hauke R. Heekeren - 2009 - In Jan Verplaetse (ed.), The moral brain: essays on the evolutionary and neuroscientific aspects of morality. Springer.
  45. Moral judgment as reasoning by constraint satisfaction.Keith J. Holyoak & Derek Powell - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e156.
    May's careful examination of empirical evidence makes a compelling case against the primacy of emotion in driving moral judgments. At the same time, emotion certainly is involved in moral judgments. We argue that emotion interacts with beliefs, values, and moral principles through a process of coherence-based reasoning (operating at least partially below the level of conscious awareness) in generating moral judgments and decisions.
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  46. Moral Uncertainty, Noncognitivism, and the Multi‐Objective Story.Pamela Robinson & Katie Steele - forthcoming - Noûs.
    We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...)
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  47. Moral Judgement: An Introduction through Anglo-American, German and French Philosophy.Étienne Brown - 2022 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works on moral judge- ment stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world — many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make good moral decisions. -/- As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue, moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it is (...)
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  48. The Influence of Situational Factors in Sacrificial Dilemmas on Utilitarian Moral Judgments.Michael Klenk - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):593-625.
    The standard way to test alternative descriptive theories of moral judgment is by asking subjects to evaluate (amongst others) sacrificial dilemmas, where acting classifies as a utilitarian moral judgment and not acting classifies as a deontological moral judgment. Previous research uncovered many situational factors that alter subject’s moral judgments without affecting which type of action utilitarianism or deontology would recommend. This literature review provides a systematic analysis of the experimental literature on the influence of situational factors on moral judgments in (...)
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  49. Serotonin Selectively Influences Moral Judgment and Behavior through Effects on Harm Aversion.M. J. Crockett, L. Clark, M. D. Hauser & T. W. Robbins - 2010 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (40):17433–17438.
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  50. Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2503-2516.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for (1) is unsound, and (...)
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