About this topic
Summary Discussions of moral reasons and reasoning occur in action theory, moral epistemology, meta-ethics, and normative ethics. The papers listed here as laying claim to this categorization therefore represent a broad array of ongoing conversations in philosophy. They ask questions like the following: how do agents apprehend and respond to (weigh, sort, disregard) moral reasons when deliberating about what to do? What is the best way of modeling reasoning in situations of moral conflict? Does moral reasoning include learning from experience, inculcating habits, or changing one's mind? Are moral reasons and their uptake meaningfully distinct from other sorts of practical reasons, and if so, how might this matter?
Key works Some of the most important conversations about moral reasons have been initiated and continued by the work of Joseph Raz, especially (Raz 1975Raz 1999, and Raz 2001).
Introductions The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Moral Reasoning (Richardson 2013) provides an overview of some key issues.
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  1. Is partial compliance with reason always better than non-compliance?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Joseph Raz claims that there can be reason to do the impossible; but partial compliance with reason is better than non-compliance and the closer one gets to complying with reason, the better. I propose some exceptions.
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  2. Going in, moral, circles: A data-driven exploration of moral circle predictors and prediction models.Hyemin Han & Marja Graham - manuscript
    Moral circles help define the boundaries of one’s moral consideration. One’s moral circle may provide insight into how one perceives or treats other entities. A data-driven model exploration was conducted to explore predictors and prediction models. Candidate predictors were built upon past research using moral foundations and political orientation. Moreover, we also employed additional moral psychological indicators, i.e., moral reasoning, moral identity, and empathy, based on prior research in moral development and education. We used model exploration methods, i.e., Bayesian model (...)
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  3. Rethinking Measuring Moral Foundations in Prisoners: Validity Concerns and Implications.Hyemin Han & Mariola Paruzel-Czachura - manuscript
    Prisoners, those who probably engaged in criminal activities, might possess different perceptions and notions of moral foundations than non-prisoners. Thus, assessing such foundations among the population without testing the validity of the measure may produce biased outcomes. To address the potential methodological issue, we examined the validity of the measurement model for moral foundations among prisoners and community members, i.e., non-prisoners. We conducted the measurement invariance test and measurement alignment to test whether the model was consistently valid across the groups. (...)
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  4. Hypotheticalism and the objectivity of morality.Kelly Heuer - manuscript
    Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the Passions defends a version of the Humean Theory of Reasons he calls “Hypotheticalism,” according to which all reasons an agent has for action are explained by desires that are in turn explained by reference to her psychology. This paper disputes Schroeder’s claim that his theory has the potential to allay long-standing worries about moral objectivity and normativity within a Humean framework because it fails to attain the requisite level of agent-neutrality for moral reasons. The particular (...)
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  5. Rights and the second-person standpoint: A challenge to Darwall's account.Kelly Heuer - manuscript
    Stephen Darwall’s The Second Person Standpoint is built around an analysis of the “second-person standpoint,” which he argues builds in a series of presuppositions which help shape (and perhaps even give content to) morality. This paper argues that there is a kind of paradox tied up in the two central claims at the heart of this project – that second-personal address directs one practically rather than epistemically by giving reasons for action one otherwise would not have had, and that all (...)
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  6. Morality by Tacit Agreement: A Contribution from the Economics of Emotions toward Moral Judgments.Kazuo Kadokawa - manuscript
    Current research on morality is divided into rationalist and intuitionist theories. This study shows that when individuals make rational choices, they are inevitably guided by the moral foundation of intuitionism. Especially to pursue self-interest, individuals must agree with others in society. They must keep their opinions constant to agree with others. To maintain a constant opinion, the individual assigns an opinion that can improve the utility of the other person and place both of them in the same situation. The actions (...)
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  7. Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought.Benjamin Kiesewetter - manuscript
    According to the Balancing View of Ought, we ought to perform an action if and only if performing the action is most strongly supported by the balance of our reasons. The Balancing View faces the objection from exclusionary reasons, which are second-order reasons not to act for certain other reasons. According to Joseph Raz, the existence of exclusionary reasons undermines the Balancing View: a reason might tip the balance in favour of performing an act but at the same time be (...)
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  8. All Reasons Are Moral.Daniel Muñoz - manuscript
    Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.
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  9. Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to (...)
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  10. Counterfeit self: A confirmatory factor analysis among Indonesians.Juneman Abraham, Bagus Takwin & Julia Suleeman - forthcoming - Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences:1-8.
    It is questionable whether counterfeiting in many areas of life contributes to unethical behavior to a wider extent. If the notion is supported by data, then the moral damage in a society could be prevented by reducing the counterfeit self and behavior to a bare minimum. This study aimed at empirically testing the measurement model of counterfeit self of Wood et al. (2008) among Indonesians as well as theoretically reviewing counterfeit self roles in unethical behavior. The participants of this study (...)
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  11. Genealogical Inquiry and Universal Moral Values.G. Cavallo - forthcoming - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2017.
    Inspired by american pragmatism and Hans Joas' proposal of an affirmative genealogy, I argue in this paper that a genealogical inquiry (both on the biografical and on the historical level) can explain what motivates individuals to moral agency better than Kantian moral philosophy, without renouncing an historically-informed conception of universal moral values.
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  12. Giving Up Gratitude.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Resentment is a negative reaction to expressions of bad will. Gratitude is a positive reaction to expressions of good will. To give up resentment, when someone has wronged you, is to forgive them. We might expect an analog for giving up gratitude. The practice features in some ordinary and extraordinary moments in our lives. But it is unnamed and unstudied. I clarify what giving up gratitude is. I identify three types of ordinary and important cases. I then attend to implications; (...)
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  13. Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard.J. J. Cunningham - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
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  14. Compensated Altruism and Moral Autonomy.Theron Pummer - forthcoming - Social Philosophy and Policy.
    It is sometimes morally permissible not to help others even when doing so is overall better for you. For example, you are not morally required to take a career in medicine over a career in music, even if the former is both better for others and better for you. I argue that the permissibility of not helping in a range of cases of “compensated altruism” is explained by the existence of autonomy-based considerations. I sketch a view according to which you (...)
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  15. Internalism from the Ethnographic Stance: From Self-Indulgence to Self-Expression and Corroborative Sense-Making.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    By integrating Bernard Williams’s internalism about reasons with his later thought, this article casts fresh light on internalism and reveals what wider concerns it speaks to. To be consistent with Williams’s later work, I argue, internalism must align with his deference to the phenomenology of moral deliberation and with his critique of ‘moral self-indulgence’. Key to this alignment is the idea that deliberation can express the agent’s motivations without referring to them; and that internalism is not a normative claim, but (...)
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  16. Rules, Rights, and Hedges.John Schwenkler & Marshall Bierson - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    One is sometimes, but only sometimes, justified in pursuing a suboptimal course of action due to a concern that, in attempting the ideal course, one might fail to follow through and so make the situation even worse. This paper explains why such hedging is sometimes justified and sometimes not. -/- The explanation we offer relies on Elizabeth Anscombe’s distinction between reasons and logoi. Reasons are normative considerations that identify something good or bad that an act will secure or avoid, while (...)
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  17. The normative significance of God’s self.Troy Seagraves - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    This paper argues that God plausibly has facts of self that function as modifiers of the normative reasons that apply to him. Facts of self are subjective facts like the fact that one has certain commitments, the fact that one has a certain character, the fact that one has a certain practical identity, the fact that one has certain projects. There is a widespread intuition (the normative significance of self) that facts of self influence what an agent’s sufficient reasons are. (...)
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  18. "From Outside of Ethics" review, John Gibbons, *The Norm of Belief* (OUP, 2013). [REVIEW]Daniel Star - forthcoming - Ethics.
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  19. Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. I show that there are, in fact, two different reasons for/against distinctions, and I provide an account of the relationship between the various kinds (...)
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  20. Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This entry explains what the issue of weighing reasons is about and then discusses a number of theories concerning weighing reasons. The general issue concerns how reasons (or considerations or pros and cons) systematically interact to determine the normative status of some action, belief, or attitude. For example, it concerns how reasons determine whether an action is permissible, required, or what ought to be done. The general issue also concerns how reasons aggregate or themselves result from systematic interactions with the (...)
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  21. Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action.Elizabeth Ventham - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-13.
    Contemporary literature criticises a necessary link between empathy and actions that demonstrate genuine moral worth. If there is such a necessary link, many argue, it must come in the developmental stages of our moral capacities, rather than being found in the mental states that make up our motivating reasons. This paper goes against that trend, arguing that critics have not considered how wide-ranging the mental states are that make up a person’s reasons. In particular, it argues that empathy can play (...)
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  22. Reasons to Respond to AI Emotional Expressions.Rodrigo Díaz & Jonas Blatter - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1):87-102.
    Human emotional expressions can communicate the emotional state of the expresser, but they can also communicate appeals to perceivers. For example, sadness expressions such as crying request perceivers to aid and support, and anger expressions such as shouting urge perceivers to back off. Some contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) systems can mimic human emotional expressions in a (more or less) realistic way, and they are progressively being integrated into our daily lives. How should we respond to them? Do we have reasons (...)
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  23. The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism, by Theron Pummer. [REVIEW]Daniel Muñoz - 2025 - Mind 134 (533).
  24. Revenge in Martin Scorsese’s Taxi Driver (1976) - Is revenge ever morally justified?Nicholas Norman Adams - 2024 - Phlexible Philosophy 3.
    Martin Scorsese’s 1976 film Taxi Driver is widely considered a cinematic masterpiece. Existing scholarly deconstructions focus on prevalent themes of masculinity, violence, and exploitation. This work reinterprets the central narrative as a revenge story in three parts, using cinematic context; the occurrences and actions of the protagonist – the eponymous taxi driver Travis Bickle - to answer the question of whether revenge is ever morally justifiable.
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  25. Scoring Individual Moral Inclination for the CNI Test.Yi Chen, Benjamin Lugu, Wenchao Ma & Hyemin Han - 2024 - Stats 7 (3):894-905.
    Item response theory (IRT) is a modern psychometric framework for estimating respondents’ latent traits (e.g., ability, attitude, and personality) based on their responses to a set of questions in psychological tests. The current study adopted an item response tree (IRTree) method, which combines the tree model with IRT models for handling the sequential process of responding to a test item, to score individual moral inclination for the CNI test—a broadly adopted model for examining humans’ moral decision-making with three parameters generated: (...)
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  26. Consistent desires and climate change.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):241-255.
    Philosophers have described the human perspective on climate change as a perfect moral storm. I take a new angle on that storm: I argue that our relevant desires feature a particularly problematic case of seemingly consistent but genuinely inconsistent desires. We have, first, non‐indexical desires such as a desire to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our environment at some point. We have, second, indexical desires such as a desire not to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our (...)
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  27. The Procedure of Morality.Ori Herstein & Ofer Malcai - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (1).
    Does morality have a procedure? Unlike law, morality is arguably neither posited nor institutional. Thus, while morality undeniably prescribes various procedures, that morality itself has a procedure is less obvious. Indeed, the coexistence of procedural moral norms alongside substantive moral norms might seem paradoxical, given that they often yield contradictory prescriptions. After all, one may wonder, is morality not substantive all the way down? Nevertheless, the paper argues that morality has a “procedural branch” containing numerous norms that are themselves procedural. (...)
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  28. The Fundamentals of Reasons.Nathan Robert Howard & Mark Schroeder - 2024 - Oxford University Press.
    The concept of a reason is now central to many areas of contemporary philosophy. Key theses in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of the emotions, among others, have come to be framed in terms of reasons. And yet, despite their centrality, theorists seem to take inconsistent things for granted about how reasons work, what kinds of things can be reasons, what reasons favor, and more. Somehow reasons have come to be both indispensable and impenetrable. -/- (...)
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  29. Market Failures and Moral Failures: A Dilemma.Olof Leffler - 2024 - Public Affairs Quarterly 38 (2):153-171.
    I present a dilemma for the market failures approach to business ethics. On an orthodox interpretation, it takes moral requirements for businesses to require them not to profit from market failures to approximate Pareto efficiency. On a moralized interpretation, it also incorporates other considerations. However, the orthodox approach is extensionally inadequate, for it is legitimate to profit from many of the allegedly ruled-out market failures. The moralized approach does better but fails to be sufficiently comprehensive. First, it has not been (...)
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  30. Must I Honor Your Convictions? On Laura Valentini’s Agency-Respect View.Katharina Nieswandt - 2024 - Analyse & Kritik 46 (1):51-65.
    Laura Valentini’s novel theory, the Agency-Respect View, says that we have a fundamental moral duty to honor other people’s convictions, at least pro tanto and under certain conditions. I raise doubts that such a duty exists indeed and that informative conditions have been specified. The questions that Valentini faces here have a parallel in Kant’s moral philosophy, viz. the question of why one has a duty to value the other’s humanity and the question of how to specify the maxim of (...)
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  31. The Balancing View of Ought.Thomas Schmidt - 2024 - Ethics 134 (2):246-267.
    I defend a novel way of working out the Balancing View of Ought, that is, the view that whether one ought to take some action depends on nothing but the balance of the reasons for the action and those against it or for its alternatives. I show that the Balancing View needs to be complemented by certain principles of reason transmission, at least one of which might seem rather surprising. The result is an attractive theoretical package that allows for compelling (...)
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  32. When Should the Master Answer? Respondeat Superior and the Criminal Law.Kenneth Silver - 2024 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (1):89-108.
    Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine conferring liability from one party onto another because the latter stands in some relationship of authority over the former. Though originally a doctrine of tort law, for the past century it has been used within the criminal law, especially to the end of securing criminal liability for corporations. Here, I argue that on at least one prominent conception of criminal responsibility, we are not justified in using this doctrine in this way. Firms are not (...)
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  33. Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.Caj Strandberg - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):256-273.
    According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent (...)
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  34. Paternalism and Exclusion.Kyle van Oosterum - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (3).
    What makes paternalism wrong? I give an indirect answer to that question by challenging a recent trend in the literature that I call the exclusionary strategy. The exclusionary strategy aims to show how some feature of the paternalizee’s normative situation morally excludes acting for the paternalizee’s well-being. This moral exclusion consists either in ruling out the reasons for which a paternalizer may act or in changes to the right-making status of the reasons that (would) justify paternalistic intervention. I argue that (...)
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  35. Beyond reasons and obligations: A dual-role approach to reasons and supererogation.Knoks Aleks & Streit David - 2023 - In Juliano Maranhão, Clayton Peterson, Christian Straßer & van der Torre Leendert (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 16th International Conference (DEON2023, Trois-Rivières). College Publications. pp. 119-137.
    Dual-role approaches to reasons say, roughly, that reasons can relate to actions in two fundamentally different ways: they can either require conformity, or justify an action without requiring that it be taken. This paper develops a formal dual-role approach, combining ideas from defeasible logic and practical philosophy. It then uses the approach to shed light on the phenomenon of supererogation and resolve a well-known puzzle about supererogation, namely, Horton’s All or Nothing Problem.
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  36. Moralische Archetypen: Ethik in der Vorgeschichte.Roberto Arruda Thomas - 2023 - São Paulo: Terra à Vista.
    Die philosophischen, traditionellen Ansätze zur Moral beruhen hauptsächlich auf metaphysischen und theologischen Konzepten und Theorien. Unter den traditionellen Ethikkonzepten ist die göttliche Befehlstheorie die prominenteste (DCT). Gemäß der DCT gibt Gott der Menschheit moralische Grundlagen durch ihre Schöpfung und durch Offenbarung. Moral und Göttlichkeit sind seit der fernsten Zivilisation untrennbar. Diese Konzepte tauchen in einen theologischen Rahmen ein und werden hauptsächlich von den meisten Anhängern der drei abrahamitischen Traditionen angenommen: Judentum, Christentum und Islam: dem bedeutendsten Teil der menschlichen Bevölkerung. Die (...)
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  37. The Nurturing Stance, Moral Responsibility, and the (Implicit) Bias Blind Spot.René Baston - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):1-20.
    Can we hold agents responsible for their implicitly biased behavior? The aim of this text is to show that, from the nurturing stance, holding subjects responsible for their implicitly biased behavior is justified, even though they are not blameworthy. First, I will introduce the nurturing stance as Daphne Brandenburg originally developed it. Second, I will specify what holding somebody responsible from the nurturing stance amounts to. Third, I show how and why holding responsible can help a subject develop an impaired (...)
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  38. An Adam Smithian Account of Humanity.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (32):908-936.
    In The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard argues for what can be called “The Universality of Humanity Claim” (UHC), according to which valuing humanity in one’s own person entails valuing it in that of others. However, Korsgaard’s reliance on the claim that reasons are essentially public in her attempt to demonstrate the truth of UHC has been repeatedly criticized. I offer a sentimentalist defense, based on Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, of a qualified, albeit adequate, version of UHC. In particular, valuing my (...)
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  39. The Relation Between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement.Brendan de Kenessey - 2023 - Erkenntnis.
    What is the relation between moral reasons and moral requirement? Specifically: what relation does an action have to bear to one’s moral reasons in order to count as morally required? This paper defends the following answer to this question: an action is morally required just in case the moral reasons in favor of that action are enough on their own to outweigh all of the reasons, moral and nonmoral, to perform any alternative. I argue that this decisive moral reason view (...)
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  40. Pro Tanto Rights and the Duty to Save the Greater Number.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13:190-214.
    This paper has two aims. The first is to present and defend a new argument for rights contributionism – the view that the notion of a moral claim-right is a contributory (or pro tanto) rather than overall normative notion. The argument is an inference to the best explanation: it is argued that (i) there are contributory moral factors that contrast with standard moral reasons by way of having a number of formal properties that are characteristic of rights, even though they (...)
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  41. On the Concept and Ethics of Vaccination for the Sake of Others.Steven R. Kraaijeveld - 2023 - Dissertation, Wageningen University and Research
    This dissertation explores the idea and ethics of vaccination for the sake of others. It conceptually distinguishes four different kinds of vaccination—self-protective, paternalistic, altruistic, and indirect—based on who receives the primary benefits of vaccination and who ultimately makes the vaccination decision. It describes the results of focus group studies that were conducted to investigate what people who might get vaccinated altruistically think of this idea. It also applies the different kinds of vaccination to ethical issues surrounding COVID-19, such as lockdown (...)
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  42. A Scalar Approach to Vaccination Ethics.Steven R. Kraaijeveld, Rachel Gur-Arie & Jamrozik Euzebiusz - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 28 (1):145-169.
    Should people get vaccinated for the sake of others? What could ground—and limit—the normative claim that people ought to do so? In this paper, we propose a reasons-based consequentialist account of vaccination for the benefit of others. We outline eight harm-based and probabilistic factors that, we argue, give people moral reasons to get vaccinated. Instead of understanding other-directed vaccination in terms of binary moral duties (i.e., where people either have or do not have a moral duty to get vaccinated), we (...)
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  43. The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism.Theron Pummer - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    When do you have to sacrifice life and limb, time and money, to prevent harm to others? When must you save more people rather than fewer? These questions might arise in emergencies involving strangers drowning or trapped in burning buildings, but they also arise in our everyday lives, in which we confront opportunities to donate time or money to help distant strangers in need of food, shelter, or medical care. With the resources available, we can provide more help--or less. -/- (...)
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  44. Second‐Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation.Janis David Schaab - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (3):1 - 11.
    According to second‐personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second‐personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second‐personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second‐personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their (...)
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  45. Can't Kant count? Innumerate Views on Saving the Many over Saving the Few.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13:215-234.
    It seems rather intuitive that if I can save either one stranger or five strangers, I must save the five. However, Kantian (and other non-consequentialist) views have a difficult time explaining why this is the case, as they seem committed to what Parfit calls “innumeracy”: roughly, the view that the values of lives (or the reasons to save them) don’t get greater (or stronger) in proportion to the number of lives saved. This chapter first shows that in various cases, it (...)
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  46. Under- and Overspecification in Moral Foundation Theory. The Problematic Search for a Moderate Version of Innatism.Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich - 2022 - Rhv. An International Journal of Philosophy 19:163-179.
    Jonathan Haidt’s _Moral Foundation Theory _has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, _i) _it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the triggering (...)
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  47. Moral judgement: an introduction through Anglo-American, German and French philosophy.Étienne Brown - 2022 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
    This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works on moral judgement stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world – many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make good moral decisions. As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue, moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it is by identifying (...)
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  48. Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.
    I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to (...)
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  49. (1 other version)Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective.David Heering - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):665-684.
    Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In this paper, (...)
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  50. Introduction.Ulrike Heuer - 2022 - In Joseph Raz & Ulrike Heuer (eds.), The Roots of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-19.
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