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  1. Hume on the Nature of Morality by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (review).Avital Hazony Levi - 2024 - Hume Studies 49 (2):381-385.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume on the Nature of Morality by Elizabeth S. RadcliffeAvital Hazony LeviElizabeth S. Radcliffe. Hume on the Nature of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. 80. Softback. ISBN: 978-1108706568, £16.99.As scholarship on Hume’s moral theory has proliferated in the last few decades, it has become a daunting challenge to write a book that introduces an unfamiliar reader to the key concepts and arguments in Hume’s writing on (...)
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  2. Hume and the Unity of Reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2024 - In Scott Stapleford & Verena Wagner (eds.), Hume and contemporary epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Current debates about reasons and reasoning often draw comparisons between epistemic and practical reasons and reasoning and presuppose substantial unity between the practical and epistemic domains. This stance seems to conflict with a stark Humean contrast between the two domains: With respect to practical reasons and reasoning, Hume highlights the role of impressions, especially the passions, in motivating and rationalizing action, while apparently downplaying the potential relevance of beliefs, reason, or reasons. With respect to epistemic reasons and theoretical reasoning, he (...)
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  3. Instrumental Rationality in the Social Sciences.Katharina Nieswandt - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1):46-68.
    This paper draws some bold conclusions from modest premises. My topic is an old one, the Neohumean view of practical rationality. First, I show that this view consists of two independent claims, instrumentalism and subjectivism. Most critics run these together. Instrumentalism is entailed by many theories beyond Neohumeanism, viz. by any theory that says rational actions maximize something. Second, I give a new argument against instrumentalism, using simple counterexamples. This argument systematically undermines consequentialism and rational choice theory, I show, using (...)
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  4. The Sources of Normativity in Hume's Moral Theory.Tom L. Beauchamp - 2008 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 493–512.
    This chapter contains section titled: Normativity in the Science of Human Nature Normativity in Epistemology Normativity in Moral Philosophy Ask what Virtue is and Ask for a Model of the Honorable Man References Further Reading.
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  5. (1 other version)Hume's Metaethics: Is Hume a Moral Noncognitivist?Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2008 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 513–528.
    This chapter contains section titled: Morality Not a Matter of Fact? No Ought from an Is Morality an Object of Feeling A Problem Morality an Active Principle Conclusion References.
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  6. Hume's General Point of View and the Novels of Jane Austen.E. M. Dadlez - 2009-04-17 - In Dominic McIver Lopes & Berys Gaut (eds.), Mirrors to One Another. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 88–99.
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  7. Hume and Austen on Pleasure, Sentiment, and Virtue.E. M. Dadlez - 2009-04-17 - In Dominic McIver Lopes & Berys Gaut (eds.), Mirrors to One Another. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 58–75.
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  8. Hume as an Error Theorist.Rafael Graebin Vogelmann - 2020 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 22 (2):84-113.
    Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume concebe convicções morais como crenças causais a respeito do poder de traços de caráter de produzir certos sentimentos em espectadores apropriados). Sustento que as falhas dessas leituras mostram que Hume é mais bem compreendido como um teórico do erro, de acordo com quem embora convicções morais (...)
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  9. Mental Faculties and Powers and the Foundations of Hume’s Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2024 - In Sebastian Bender & Dominik Perler (eds.), Powers and Abilities in Early Modern Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge.
    With respect to the topic of “powers and abilities,” most readers will associate David Hume with his multi-pronged critique of traditional attempts to make robust explanatory use of those notions in a philosophical or scientific context. But Hume’s own philosophy is also structured around the attribution to human beings of a variety of basic faculties or mental powers – such as the reason and the imagination, or the various powers involved in Hume’s account of im- pressions of reflection and the (...)
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  10. Why ‘Is’ Must Entail ‘Ought’.Ardon Lyon - 2022 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (1):5-21.
    I argue below for the view that non-moral truths entail moral ones. I first argue that moral claims do have truth values which are objectively true or false. I then argue that this objectivism does not entail non-relativism. I produce a simple possible worlds argument for the entailment view. I then give some examples where p entails q but many intelligent people have thought it does not, and where it does not, but many intelligent people have thought that it does. (...)
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  11. Extending the Is-ought Problem to Top-down Artificial Moral Agents.Robert James M. Boyles - 2022 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 9 (2):171–189.
    This paper further cashes out the notion that particular types of intelligent systems are susceptible to the is-ought problem, which espouses the thesis that no evaluative conclusions may be inferred from factual premises alone. Specifically, it focuses on top-down artificial moral agents, providing ancillary support to the view that these kinds of artifacts are not capable of producing genuine moral judgements. Such is the case given that machines built via the classical programming approach are always composed of two parts, namely: (...)
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  12. A Reconciliation between Liberty and Necessity : The connection of morality, responsibility, and liberty in Hume`s philosophy.Seong-Min Choe - 2019 - Modern Philosophy 13:49-73.
  13. (1 other version)Hume and Kant on utility, freedom, and justice.Paul Guyer - 2022 - In Giovanni Pietro Basile & Ansgar Lyssy (eds.), System and freedom in Kant and Fichte. New York, NY: Routledge.
  14. The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion.Melvin Chen - 2021 - South African Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):254-264.
    Ever since its formulation by Hume, the idea of an inferential barrier between non-ethical (“is”) propositions and ethical (“ought”) propositions (also known as Hume’s is-ought thesis) has received much philosophical attention. Prior’s Paradox appears to demonstrate that the ban on “is”-“ought” inferences is violated in every possible instance, from which it follows that Hume’s is-ought thesis must be false. In this article, I will formulate a logically rigorous version of Hume’s is-ought thesis, introduce Prior-style counterexamples, and suggest how they might (...)
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  15. La ragione schiava delle passioni: Hume, Sade e un altro illuminista radicale.Natale Sansone - 2017 - Milano: Mimesis.
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  16. quasi-objetividade na teoria dos valores de David Hume.Carlota Salgadinho Ferreira - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e40224.
    O objetivo deste artigo consiste em responder à questão de saber se, na filosofia de Hume, o padrão para determinar o valor de verdade dos proferimentos sobre valores morais e estéticos pode ser considerado genuinamente objetivo. Para tal, começo por esclareço três posições que se pode adotar sobre a questão de saber se este padrão é ou não genuinamente objetivo, a saber, subjetivismo, intersubjetivismo e objetivismo. Em seguida, explico a pertinência da interpretação cognitivista e por que razão a interpretação realista (...)
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  17. (1 other version)David Hume and “Dunbar’s number”: an evolutionary approach to the foundations of morality.Marcelo de Araujo - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (1):89-106.
    The aim of this article is to characterize the concept of justice as an indispensable social convention for the emergence of moral duties in the context of groups that surpass the so-called “Dunbar’s number”. The article resumes, on the one hand, David Hume’s theory of justice, as it is discussed in the third section of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and on the other hand it resumes Robin Dunbar’s hypothesis relative to the maximum number of individuals with whom (...)
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  18. Moral Judgements and their Actions : A Reflection on the Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics.Anthony Öhnström - unknown
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  19. Death and Character: Further Reflections on Hume.Annette C. Baier - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
  20. Hume: sus aportes al análisis del lenguaje moral.Nicolás Zavadivker - 2017 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 20 (2).
    RESUMEN El objetivo de este trabajo es reconstruir los diferentes aportes realizados por David Hume al análisis del lenguaje moral y de la argumentación práctica, es decir, a las cuestiones que hoy se agrupan bajo de el nombre de Metaética. Muchas de sus puntualizaciones y argumentos son conocidos y tuvieron una notable influencia en la metaética contemporánea, pero otros pasajes de su obra no tuvieron tal atención, y es mi interés resaltarlos y destacar su importancia. En este artículo me ocuparé (...)
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  21. David Hume on Morals, Politics, and Society ed. by Angela Coventry and Andrew Valls. [REVIEW]Naohito Mori - 2021 - Hume Studies 43 (2):110-112.
    This is a fascinating collection of Hume's texts and essays by experts on Hume. It introduces students and general readers to a panorama of his moral and political philosophy in a readable and informative way. The collection consists of the following sections: Introduction by Andrew Valls, Index of Names, "Texts," and "Essays." The texts include the entirety of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and selected essays from "Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary." This is followed by four "interpretive essays" (...)
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  22. Hume's General Point of View, Smith's Impartial Spectator, and the Moral Value of Interacting with Outsiders.John McHugh - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):19-37.
    Here is an appealing position: one reason to pursue interaction with people from backgrounds that differ from our own is that doing so can improve our moral judgment. As some scholars have noticed, this position seems pedigreed by support from the famed philosophers of human sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith. But regardless of whether Hume or Smith personally held anything like the appealing position, neither might have had theoretically grounded reason to do so. In fact, both philosophers explain moral (...)
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  23. Stępiona gilotyna Hume’a?Paweł Dziliński - 2013 - Etyka 47:107-112.
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  24. (2 other versions)Hume on Practical Morality and Inert Reason.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:299-320.
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  25. Origini e sviluppo del concetto di carattere in David Hume.Elena Masin - 2010 - Esercizi Filosofici 5 (2):149-174.
  26. Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. : Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. xiv + 352, £74.00. [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):821-824.
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  27. In defense of common sense. David Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’.Szymon Osmola - 2017 - Semina Scientiarum 16:194-210.
    In the article the author rejects traditional, logical interpretation of the famous “Is-Ought Paragraph” from David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. He argues that most of the interpreters failed to grasp the wide philosophical background of the IsOP, which is, generally speaking, a passionate discussion between ethical rationalists and ethical anti-rationalists in the 17th and 18th century British philosophy. The author shows that the Hume’s main aim in the IsOP is to strengthen his previous arguments against ethical rationalism and (...)
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  28. Cohon, Rachel . Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 . Pp. 285. $75.00 (cloth).John Corvino - 2010 - Ethics 120 (4):846-851.
  29. Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory.Jack Woods & Barry Maguire - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4:419-440.
    It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer’s and Gillian Russell and Greg Restall’s accounts of Hume’s dictum, is of (...)
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  30. A Progress of Sentiments: reflections on Hume's Sentiments.Anice L. Araújo - 2003 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 44 (108):306-308.
  31. Peter Jones, "Hume's Sentiments, Their Ciceronian and French Context". [REVIEW]Donald W. Livingston - 1984 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (4):482.
  32. Remarks Concerning the Account of the Nature of Moral Evaluation in Hume's Treatise.Páll S. Árdal - 1964 - Philosophy 39 (150):341-345.
  33. The Interpretation of Hume.Antony Flew - 1963 - Philosophy 38:178.
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  34. (1 other version)Hume's "Ought" and "Is" Statement: A Radical Behaviorist's Perspective.Ernest A. Vargas - 1982 - Behavior and Philosophy 10 (1):1.
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  35. (3 other versions)Hume.Terence Penelhum - 1978 - Mind 87 (346):287-289.
  36. Virtue by consensus: the moral philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith, by Vincent Hope. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 1991 - Ethics 101 (4):873-875.
    ... In Virtue byConsensus Vincent Hope sets out to correct this "serious imbalance in the usual estimation of the relative merit of Hutcheson, Hume and Smith" (p. 3). He argues that "Hume has been given too much prominence and his importance has been exaggerated" (p. 3). Hope is especially concerned to place more emphasis on Smith who, he says, "has received far less attention than he deserves" (p. 3). Hope suggests that his claim to offer something new on the work (...)
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  37. (1 other version)Review of Francis Snare: Morals, Motivation, and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines[REVIEW]Henry R. West - 1992 - Ethics 103 (1):166-167.
  38. Review of R. J. Soghoian: The Ethics of G. E. Moore and David Hume: The 'Treatise as a Response to Moore's Refutation of Ethical Naturalism[REVIEW]J. M. Orenduff - 1980 - Ethics 91 (1):165-167.
  39. Hume on Passion, Reason, and the Reasonableness of Ends.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1994 - Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):1-11.
  40. Moral Skepticism and Moral Naturalism in Hume's Treatise.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2001 - Hume Studies 27 (1):3-83.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 27, Number 1, April 2001, pp. 3-83 Moral Skepticism and Moral Naturalism in Hume's Treatise NICHOLAS L. STURGEON Section I I believe that David Hume's well-known remarks on is and ought in his Treatise of Human Nature (T 469-70)1 have been widely misunderstood, and that in consequence so has their relation to his apparent ethical naturalism and to his skepticism about the role of reason in (...)
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  41. Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives.Rachel Cohon - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
    Do the moral sentiments move us to act, according to Hume? And if so, how? Hume famously deploys the claim that moral evaluations move us to act to show that they are not derived from reason alone. Presumably, moral evaluations move us because (as Hume sees it) they are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. So, it would seem that moral approval and disapproval are or produce motives to action. This raises three interconnected interpretive questions. First, on Hume's account, (...)
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  42. The Clarendon Edition of Hume's Treatise : Book 1.John Bricke - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (2):297-304.
  43. Feeling and Fabrication. [REVIEW]Sophie Botros - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):257-266.
    Hume's project, in Book 3 of the Treatise, of showing that virtue and vice are discerned by feeling, not reason, is notorious for its contradictions. Armies of Humean scholars have fought valiantly, ingeniously, but unsuccessfully, to resolve them, and in the first half of Hume's Morality, Cohon shows herself an admirably doughty follower in their footsteps. The second half concerns Hume's division between natural and artificial virtues. We learn how self-interest is redirected, and moral sentiment strengthened to provide artificial virtues (...)
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  44. A Very Brief Summary of Hume’s Morality.Don Garrett - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):253-256.
    Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication 1 is a most useful and agreeable book. It contains a wealth of analysis, argument, and insight about many of the most central elements of the moral theory of one of the greatest moral philosophers in human history: David Hume. The book is well-conceived, well-argued, stimulating, informative, clear, precise, thorough, balanced, nuanced, and ingenious, while evincing—especially in its concluding chapter, when considering possible extensions of Hume's theory—a certain subtle but pleasing "warmth in the cause of (...)
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  45. The Notion of Moral Progress in Hume's Philosophy: Does Hume Have a Theory of Moral Progress?Alix Cohen - 2000 - Hume Studies 26 (1):109-127.
    This paper aims to show that the notion of moral progress makes sense in Hume’s philosophy. And even though Hume suggests that this question is not central, in showing why it is not the case, I will conclude that, in concentrating on the question of the progress of civilisation, Hume was expressing a view on moral progress. To support this claim, I will begin by defending the claim that the notion of moral progress itself is consistent within Hume’s philosophical principles. (...)
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  46. Hume, Reason and Morality. [REVIEW]Alessio Vaccari - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):193-195.
  47. The Role of Political Economy in Hume’s Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]Carl Wennerlind - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):43-64.
    Hume insisted that property serve as the foundation of society because it best promotes the greatest amount of industry and therefore contributes to public utility. Industry thus plays a central role in Hume’s theory of justice. Given that Hume extensively discussed the social, political, cultural, and moral implications of industry in the Political Discourses, I suggest that Hume’s economic writings should be understood as an integral part of his overall philosophical project. In offering a parallel reading of the Enquiry Concerning (...)
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  48. Yet Another Look at Cognitive Reason and Moral Action in Hume’s Ethical System.Clarence Sholé Johnson - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:225-238.
    But for a very recent exception, Hume has generally been thought to deny that cognitive reason plays a distinctive role in morality. The cornerstone of this view has been his notorious remark that reason is and ought only to be the slave of passion and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey passion. But, this remark notwithstanding, Hume’s view about the significance of intention in moral processes suggests that he does assign to cognitive reason a (...)
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  49. Hume's Moral Epistemology. [REVIEW]David F. Norton - 1977 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 4:208-209.
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  50. The Ethics of G. E. Moore and David Hume. [REVIEW]Ronald J. Glossop - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):245-248.
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