Free Will

Introducing the issues -- Alternative possibilities -- The importance of sourcehood.

Are free will and moral responsibility possible in a world where choices are the inevitable consequences of past causes governed by physical law? Both libertarian and hard incompatibilist theories suggest not. By contrast, this paper develops an account of freedom as self-government, motivated by the need to address key challenges: the need for a broad understanding of free will beyond the limitation of liability, the charge that it proceeds by equivocation, the problem of the lawful causal origins of choice, the (...) recognition of degrees of freedom and moral responsibility, and the risk of conformist functionalism. The framework of freedom as self-government integrates five key ideas. One, it recognizes a wider realm of autonomy for which freedom is relevant, anchored in non-domination. It holds that it is identified by the cognitive and practical role it has in liberation movements against domination, which aims to protect and secure wide capacities for choice. Two, it does not proceed by equivocation, but rather is grounded in a robust compatibilist tradition of thinking about free will from Plato onwards, present in both common and expert circles today. Three, it acknowledges that relative to all causes governed by physical law, no person has free will and moral responsibility. However, drawing from the model of the physical relativity of motion, it argues that the frame of reference of freedom as self-government is also valid, that relative to it people can be free, and that this frame of reference is the more relevant to adopt. Four, the view presented also suggests that in contrast to libertarian and hard incompatibilist doctrines, it can parsimoniously acknowledge degrees of freedom and proportional responsibility. And five, the present view suggests that the functionalist methodological component of freedom as self-government does not have to lead to conformity with de facto evil, if coupled with moral realism. (shrink)

Freedom and the Unfolding of Being A Process that Runs through all Reality -/- This essay investigates the ontological foundation of freedom through the late metaphysical writings of F.W.J. Schelling, focusing on his `Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom` and the `Ages of the World`. It argues that freedom is not primarily a function of rational subjectivity, but an expression of the deeper structure of being itself — a being that unfolds through tension, contradiction, and becoming. Schelling’s concept (...) of freedom emerges from a divine duality: a dark, unconscious ground and a conscious, self-revealing spirit. The tragic potential for evil and fragmentation is not accidental but intrinsic to this structure. The world is not a finished order but a site of becoming, where spirit actualizes itself through nature and history. This vision is crystallized in Schelling’s ontological formula: “Nature is visible Spirit; Spirit is invisible Nature.” Nature and spirit are not separate substances, but two expressions of a single, dynamic unfolding. The essay thus repositions freedom as a metaphysical rhythm — the movement through which being becomes manifest in time, embodiment, and ethical responsiveness. The study situates Schelling in dialogue with Kant, Hegel, and contemporary phenomenology, offering a powerful reinterpretation of freedom as the visible and invisible motion of being — a unification of spirit, nature, and temporal existence. -/- . (shrink)

Authors of scholarly papers usually express their gratitude for the comments of their colleagues in a footnote. It is a privilege that I can express mine in the main text, and right at the beginning. In what follows I do my best to respond to many important critical remarks about a work the main purpose of which was to convince readers that the traditional conditional account of free will is not yet defunct and that it can provide the best framework (...) for discussing important issues about agency and responsibility. But whether or not I have managed to convince my readers is not the issue here. I am grateful for the opportunity, in trying to respond to my critics, to restate, and hopefully sharpen, some of my claims on the perennial problem of freedom of the will. (shrink)

The notion of free will as used by philosophers is a term of art. More often than not, such terms—such as substance, form, intentionality, reasons etc.—are introduced in philosophy in order to single out a problem rather than to solve it. Contrary to the opinion of many modern philosophers, who have been critical of the use of such terms, they can indeed help identify a cluster of problems that are not merely created by the introduction of the technical concept itself. (...) Philosophical discussions often revolve around some such concept. But this does not mean that the problem is only conceptual. Many genuine philosophical issues can be made more easily approachable by sharpening our understanding of such technical concepts. -/- However, even if the introduction of such technical terms is unavoidable and useful for philosophy, they can lead to confusion unless we carefully circumscribe the task for which we want to use them. It seems to me that sometimes this is exactly the case with the philosophical concept of free will. For there are many different notions of free will which are often used in philosophy, but which set at least partially incompatible tasks for those who want to provide a theory about it. In what follows i shall argue, first, that we have reasons to accept one of the most traditional concepts of free will, one that might be called the metaphysical conception of free will. Then i shall briefly present and defend a particular theory about the freedom of the will so understood. (shrink)

Resultant moral luck is typically considered to be the most problematic type of moral luck. Arguably the most popular response to the problem of resultant moral luck is the idea that resultant luck affects the scope but not the degree of responsibility. Call this the ‘Degree Scope Response’ (DSR). Philosophers also use DSR in responding to other types of moral luck and in contexts outside moral luck. In this paper, I argue that DSR fails. Then I suggest that we should (...) hold that resultant luck affects neither the degree nor the scope of responsibility. Put differently, consequences are metaphysically irrelevant to responsibility. Further, I discuss various advantages of this view and show its various implications on questions about free will, theories of causation, and responsibility in contexts outside moral luck. I also defend this view against the worry that it is too revisionary. (NOTE: Email me for a copy.). (shrink)

Understanding consciousness and agency, particularly regarding free will, remains a significant challenge. This paper introduces the Attention-Agency Theory (AAT), a novel framework designed to integrate these phenomena. AAT posits Universal Attention (UA) as a fundamental property and Attentional Copies (ACs) as the core mechanism generating both subjective experience and agentic control. By directly linking attentional dynamics to the causal efficacy of an agent, the theory aims to bridge the explanatory gap between physical processes, phenomenal awareness, and purposeful action. Drawing on (...) interdisciplinary insights from philosophy, cognitive science, and physics, AAT offers a new perspective on the nature of agency and its relation to conscious states. It explores potential compatibilist solutions to the free will problem and suggests connections to other frameworks like the Free Energy Principle via attentional mechanisms. AAT provides a structured, though theoretical, foundation for future investigation into the mind's active role. (shrink)

Subsumption theodicies aim to subsume apparent cases of natural evil under the category of moral evil, claiming that apparently natural evils result from the actions or omissions of free creatures. Subsumption theodicies include Fall theodicies, according to which nature was corrupted by the sins of the first humans, demonic-action theodicies, according to which natural evils are caused by the actions of fallen angels, and simulation theodicies, according to which our universe is a computer simulation, with its apparent natural evils caused (...) by the free actions of simulators in the next universe up. We propose a new subsumption theodicy: the omission theodicy. According to the omission theodicy, apparently natural evil, including pre-human animal suffering, results from the omissions of free creatures who had the ability to prevent it, but culpably failed to do so. We argue that the omission theodicy avoids the main problems with existing subsumption theodicies and deserves a respectable place among leading hypotheses about why God might allow the apparent natural evils we find in our world. (shrink)

Free Will as an Emergent Chaotic System [Your Name] Independent Researcher [Your Email] [Date] --- Abstract This paper argues that free will emerges from deterministic yet chaotic neural processes, allowing for practically unpredictable and functionally autonomous decisions. Drawing on chaos theory, neuroscience, and cognitive science, we propose a novel compatibilist framework where free will is an emergent property of self-organizing, nonlinear systems rather than mere unpredictability. This approach reconciles determinism with autonomy, demonstrating that chaotic attractors in neural networks create structured (...) yet flexible decision patterns. We explore moral responsibility, legal accountability, and artificial intelligence applications, suggesting that chaotic free will preserves agency within a deterministic structure. Finally, we propose empirical methods—such as neural complexity analysis and moral decision variability testing—to test this theory. This perspective advances both philosophical and scientific debates, positioning free will as a real, emergent cognitive phenomenon. (shrink)

The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of 'desire', and that Sidgwick rejects the thesis concerning both action and desire. It then considers why Green accepts the thesis, and assesses Sidgwick's criticism of Green. Despite the appearance (...) of a mere clash of intuitions, an interesting rationale for the thesis can be found in Green’s theory of free will and moral responsibility, of which I defend a broadly compatibilist interpretation. (shrink)

The causal explanation of human action has received increasing attention in social studies since the latter half of the twentieth century. A key question in this context is whether Aristotle’s framework of the four causes originally applied to natural phenomena, can also be extended to human actions. Concerning a compatible perspective between free will and causality, we contend that the Scholastic contributions offer a significant advancement in addressing this question. They demonstrate that the four causes, as interpreted by Scholastic thinkers, (...) provide a robust explanatory tool for analyzing human affairs and their dynamics. Moreover, we argue that their contributions go beyond theoretical analysis, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding how causal principles can be applied to various aspects of human experience. (shrink)

This paper proposes The theory of the Pivot of the Dao (Daoshulun,DSL), aiming to investigate certain issues through the lens of recursivity and non-recursivity. The paper is divided into two main sections: -/- The first section systematically expounds the theoretical foundation of the D-P framework, defining the dialectical relationship between recursivity (P) and non-recursivity (D). Through five core propositions, DSL asserts that the essence of hierarchical evolution lies in the eternal game of recursive chains. -/- The second section explores DSL’s (...) division of rationality, the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) under DSL, and an interpretation of the latent laws governing scientific development. -/- The D-P framework offers a unified explanation for the hierarchical interactions, limitations, and evolutionary patterns of complex systems. Its methodological discussions encompass AI ethics, philosophy of science, and social governance. -/- © 蒋柯帆 2025. This is a preprint version licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0). This version supersedes all previous versions uploaded prior to March 13, 2025, which did not carry an explicit license. You are free to share and adapt this material for non-commercial purposes, provided you give appropriate credit to the author. For commercial use, please contact the author. If you need to make any adjustments to the existing categories, please notify me by email in advance so we can coordinate accordingly. (shrink)

"From the complex mesh of relationships Spinoza develops in the ‘Ethics’ arises what remains perhaps the most controversial and long-standing polemic in God studies. Human freedom and ‘free-will’, he asserts categorically, are “feigned seats and dwelling places” humans believe they enjoy but which are rendered inoperative in all but in name under what he calls ‘the sole causality of God’.".

This paper aims to vindicate the expertise defense in light of the experimental philosophy of free will. My central argument is that the analogy strategy between philosophy and other domains is defensible, at least in the free will debate, because philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuition by enabling expert philosophers to understand philosophical issues correctly and to have philosophical intuitions about them. This paper will begin by deriving two requirements on the expertise defense from major criticisms of (...) it. First, precisely how philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions requires explanation (Contribution); second, it must be explained how philosophical training immunizes philosophical intuitions from distorting factors (Immunity). I shall argue that the Contribution requirement is crucial for the expertise defense and that this requirement can be satisfied at least in the domain of free will: recent research shows that most novices are unable to understand determinism correctly, suggesting that having intuitions about determinism requires philosophical expertise. I then discuss how this proposal can be applied to other philosophical disciplines. (shrink)

Science, explanation, and dogma -- Freud and Sartre : the property of freedom -- Hegel, action, and avoiding the death without meaning -- Marx and Marcuse : alienation and critical reflection -- Rawls and Vattimo : pluralism and postmodern liberation.

Ang tradisyong pilosopikal sa paglapit sa moralidad ay pangunahing nakabatay sa mga konsepto at teoryang metapisikal at teolohikal. Sa mga tradisyunal na konsepto ng etika, ang pinakaprominente ay ang Divine Command Theory (DCT). Ayon sa DCT, ang Diyos ang nagbibigay ng moral na pundasyon sa sangkatauhan sa pamamagitan ng paglikha at Rebelasyon. Ang moralidad at pagka-Diyos ay hindi mapaghihiwalay mula pa noong pinakalumang sibilisasyon. Ang mga konseptong ito ay nakalubog sa isang teolohikal na balangkas at malawakang tinatanggap ng karamihan sa (...) mga tagasunod ng tatlong tradisyong Abrahamiko: Hudaismo, Kristiyanismo, at Islam, na bumubuo sa malaking bahagi ng populasyon ng tao. Dahil nakabatay sa pananampalataya at Rebelasyon, ang mga Divine Command Theories ay hindi mahigpit na nasasaklaw ng demonstrasyon. Ang mga kalaban ng Divine Command na konsepto ng moralidad, na nakabatay sa imposibilidad ng demonstrasyon ng mga metapisikal at relihiyosong palagay nito, ay sinubukan sa loob ng maraming siglo (bagamat hindi matagumpay) na bawasan ang kahalagahan nito. Inihain nila ang argumento na wala itong maipakitang materyal na ebidensya at lohikal na pagkakaugnay, at dahil dito, hindi ito maaaring isaalang-alang para sa mga layuning maka-agham o pilosopikal. Isa lamang itong paniniwala at, bilang ganoon, dapat itong unawain. Bukod sa mga matinding pagtutol na ito, maraming iba pang konsepto ang sumasalungat sa mga teorya ng Divine Command, sa isa o ibang paraan, bahagya o ganap. Maraming mga pilosopo at sosyal na siyentipiko, mula sa klasikal na pilosopiyang Griyego hanggang sa kasalukuyan, halimbawa, ang nagsasabing ang moralidad ay isang konstrak lamang, kaya’t ito ay kultural na relatibo at kultural na natutukoy. Gayunpaman, nagdadala ito ng maraming iba pang talakayan at nagpapataw ng hamon na tukuyin kung ano ang kahulugan ng kultura, kung aling mga elemento ng kultura ang moral na mapagpasya, at sa wakas, ano ang mga hangganan ng naturang relatibidad. Ang mga moral determinist ay nagsasabing ang lahat ng may kaugnayan sa pag-uugali ng tao, kabilang ang moralidad, ay natutukoy, sapagkat ang malayang kalooban ay hindi umiiral. Kamakailan lamang, ipinahayag ng mga modernong palaisip na mayroong mahigpit na agham ng moralidad. Gayunpaman, ang pamamaraang maka-agham lamang, sa kabila ng pagpapaliwanag ng ilang mga katotohanan at ebidensya, ay hindi kayang liwanagan ang buong nilalaman at ganap na kahulugan ng etika. Ang pag-unawa sa moralidad ay nangangailangan ng mas malawak na pananaw, at isang kasunduan sa mga pilosopo, na hindi pa nila kailanman naabot. Ang lahat ng mga tanong na ito ay may iba’t ibang anyo depende sa bawat pilosopikal na pananaw, at nagsisimula ng masalimuot na pagsusuri at walang katapusang mga debate, habang marami sa mga ito ay magkakasalungatan. Ang uniberso at ang atmospera na pumapalibot sa tesis na ito ay ang mga saklaw ng lahat ng mga konseptwal na tunggaliang ito, na sinusuri mula sa isang layunin at ebolusyonaryong pananaw. Sa kabila ng kalagayang ito at ng likas na kahalagahan nito, gayunpaman, ang mga tanong na ito ay malayo sa metodolohikal na paglapit ng isang analitikal na talakayan tungkol sa layunin ng moralidad, na siyang tunay na layunin at saklaw ng gawaing ito. Dapat nating muling balikan ang mga kilalang tradisyunal na teorya dahil ang tesis na ito ay sumisilong sa isang paghahambing na pag-aaral, at ang mga palagay nito ay hindi bababa sa ganap na naiiba mula sa lahat ng tradisyunal na teorya. Samakatuwid, nagiging kinakailangan ang pag-aalok ng direktang at tiyak na mga elemento ng paghahambing sa mambabasa, para sa wastong kritisismo, nang hindi nangangailangan ng mga nakakaantala na pananaliksik. Gayunpaman, kahit na muling binabalikan ang mga tradisyunal na teorya para sa layunin ng paghahambing at kritikal na pagpapahayag, mananatili silang nasa gilid ng ating pangunahing mga alalahanin, bilang “aliena materia.” Sa kabila ng bisa ng alinman o lahat ng mga elemento ng talakayang ito, at ng kanilang kahulugan bilang pilosopikal na uniberso ng tesis na ito, ang layunin ng gawaing ito ay ipakita at bigyang-katwiran ang pag-iral at kahulugan ng mga sinaunang moral na arketipo na lumitaw nang direkta mula sa pinakaunang mga pangangailangang panlipunan at pagsisikap para sa kaligtasan. Ang mga arketipong ito ang kahulugan ng mahalagang pundasyon ng etika, ang pagsasama nito sa kolektibong walang malay at kaukulang lohikong organisasyon at transmisyon sa mga yugto ng ebolusyon ng genome ng tao at iba’t ibang ugnayang espasyo-panahon, anuman ang anumang kontemporaryong karanasan ng mga indibidwal. Ang sistemang tinukoy ng mga arketipong ito ay bumubuo ng isang ebolusyonaryong panlipunang modelo ng tao. Ito ba ay isang metaetikal na posisyon? Oo, ito ay ganoon. Bukod dito, tulad ng sa anumang metaetikal na pangangatwiran, dapat nating maingat na tingnan ang pinakamahusay at lohikal na mga ruta, tulad ng iniaalok ng Analitikal na Pilosopiya. Kaya, ang gawaing ito ay makatwirang dapat ipakita na ang moralidad ay hindi isang produktong kultural ng mga sibilisadong tao o modernong lipunan at na sa kabila ng pagiging nasasaklaw ng ilang kultural na relatibong pagsasama at pagbabawas, ang mga mahalagang pundasyon nito ay arketipal at hindi kailanman nagbago sa estruktura. Ang pangangatwirang ito ay nagpapahiwatig na ang moralidad ay isang orihinal na katangian ng “homo sapiens”; ito ay hindi isang ari-arian o isang aksidente: ito ay bahagi ng kakanyahan ng tao at kabilang sa saklaw ng ontolohikal na pagkakakilanlang pantao. Ang penomenang pantao ay isang tuluy-tuloy na proseso, ginagampanan ang papel nito sa pagitan ng random na pagtukoy at malayang kalooban, at kailangan nating tanungin kung paano nagsimula ang moralidad at paano ito dumating sa atin sa kasalukuyan. (shrink)

This paper seeks to elucidate self-constancy as the creative and formative dimension of moral responsibility, through an exploratory review of Fischer’s semi-compatibilist view of freedom. It underscores the value of artistic self- expression by highlighting the narrative meaning of one’s actions, seen as a cohesive sequence for storytelling rather than a mere chronological order. Self-constancy reflects the agent’s capacity to own their actions, making them a reliable and accountable person. In this light, the value of acting freely—akin to the value (...) of artistic self-expression—can be understood as the agent’s conscious effort to live a life of personal meaning, marked by epistemic awareness and creativity, whether life is determined or not. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the act of consciousness called empathy, as proposed by Husserl in Ideas II. By applying Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, I evidence three moments that constitute empathy: first, to recognize the other Ego; second, to open myself up to the other Ego; and third, to feel with the other Ego. I investigate these eidetic universalities [Wesenallgemeinheiten] within the limits of pure intuition (HUA III, 146). To recognize the other Ego is an involuntary act that happens in consciousness (...) when I come face-to-face with another human being. To open myself up to the other Ego is a spiritual act derived from freedom. I can decide whether or not to open myself up. If I do not, empathy is interrupted, incomplete, and I can react either affectionately or distressfully, or I can make a hasty judgement and decide either to distance myself from the other or to act. If I open myself up to the other Ego, I can react affectionately or distressfully, without much information. Another possibility is to comprehend, reflect, judge, agree or disagree, and decide either to distance myself from the other or to act in either a compassionate or a confrontational way. In this regard, empathy does not imply agreeing or acting compassionately. In short, I present a mental map of this reasoning and conclude by pointing out the need to develop empathy and the importance of having time to empathise appropriately. (shrink)

This paper explores whether human proactivity can be considered an expression of free will. The discussion involves two paradigms, which are mutually complementary and encompass psychological proactivity and reactivity. Both paradigms raise the question of linear and non-linear determinism, which inevitably leads to the issue of free will. The analysis attempts to find a compromise between linear and non-linear determinism through the approach of human dialectical complexity (Lebed & Bar-Eli, 2013). This refers to the relationships of two types of complex (...) subsystems within a human: the perceptual-motor dynamic system (PMDS), which is mostly determined by linear impacts and expressed through reactive behavior, and the “free-will”Footnote1 complex system (FCS), which is mostly determined by non-linear redundant determinism and expressed through proactive dynamics. In summary, it is concluded that there cannot be a categorical assertion of the permanent existence of free will in human functioning. The human dialectical complexity expressed by both proactivity and reactivity causes the “floating” presence of free will depending on the prevalence of proactive control factors and the non-linear determination of a living human system. (shrink)

The most popular position in the moral luck debate is to reject resultant moral luck while accepting the possibility of other types of moral luck. But it’s unclear whether this position is stable. Some argue that luck is luck and if it’s relevant for moral responsibility anywhere, it’s relevant everywhere, and vice versa. Some argue that given the similarities between circumstantial moral luck and resultant moral luck, there’s good evidence that if the former exists, so does the latter. The challenge (...) is especially pressing for the large group that exclusively deny resultant moral luck. I argue that rejecting resultant moral luck alone is a stable and plausible position. This is because, in a nutshell, the other types of luck can but the results of an action cannot affect what makes one morally responsible. (NOTE: Email me for a copy.). (shrink)

In this paper I investigate where the boundaries of conscious mental life lie in Cavendish’s theory, and why. Cavendish argues for a wholly material yet wholly thinking universe. She claims that all matter is capable of “self-knowledge” and “perception” (OEP, p. 138), so that every part of nature “must have its own knowledge and perception, according to its own particular nature” (OEP, p. 141). It is unclear, however, whether the universal capacity of matter to know and perceive also implies the (...) presence of consciousness. I show that Cavendish’s use of the notions of “self-knowledge” and “perception” implies the attribution of consciousness to all bodies. I identify one condition under which the ubiquitous presence of consciousness is intuitively required in Cavendish’s system: namely the presence of intentional agency in every part of nature, which Cavendish conceives as necessary, alongside the capacity of self-motion, to account for the orderly behavior of any body. (shrink)

Any adequate theory of agency demands an account of what it is for an agent to have an action as an option, or of what I call the freedom relation. My dissertation develops just such an account. I argue, first, that attempts to reduce the freedom relation to something more basic fail, and therefore that we should be ontological primitivists about freedom; second, that attempts to give inferential justification for claims about the freedom relation fail, and therefore that we should (...) be epistemic primitivists about freedom. I then sketch an account that satisfies both of these constraints. On this account, freedom is a simple relation which is immediately perceived by agents, through familiar mechanisms of bodily awareness. I finally turn to the contentious question of whether freedom is compatible with determinism. I argue that the most defensible principle in traditional compatibilism is an epistemic one, according to which claims about freedom never provide justification for claims about a posteriori scientific hypotheses. Once we accept a perceptual account of the freedom relation, the truth of this principle turns on some subtle issues in the epistemology of perception. I discuss these issues and conclude that the compatibilist principle is one we should accept. (shrink)

Why are computers so smart these days? And why are humans apparently still a bit smarter? Does this have something to do with the difference between data and meaning? Does this in turn mean that at least some abstract entities, such as numbers, exist independently of human thought? Wouldn’t that require an expansion of our scientific world view? And would that at all be compatible with what we know about our world from physics and chemistry, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and the (...) theory of evolution? Finally, what would this tell us about ethical and aesthetic value theories? These and related questions will be discussed in this book. We will find that the difference between data and meaning, i.e. quantitative and qualitative information, does indeed appear to be of central importance for understanding both artificial and natural intelligence. And then the independent existence of abstract entities not only appears to be a particularly promising hypothesis, but also one that is entirely compatible with the sum of our scientific knowledge, especially with regard to value theories. The book thus arrives at the exploration of a scientifically tenable, panpsychistically inspired, objective idealism that can be derived from our most fundamental intuitions as subjects that perceive qualities, but that can also take into account the structuring of the world already at the micro-scale, found in the modern natural sciences. The result is a Platonic, but in a second step also a scientific realism and a naturalism in the sense that it is informed by the natural sciences in terms of an inductive metaphysics. An objective idealism, not in a rationalistic maximum form, but in a pragmatic minimum form; without eternal truths, but dependent on the continued philosophical-scientific and also philosophicalsocial dialog. The proposed model could offer interesting solutions to a number of problems at and near the mind/matter boundary: Proposals are being considered for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the problem of molecular symmetry, the neuronal code and the binding problem in neuroscience, mental causation, a more holistic understanding of mental processes, and so on and so forth. However, the extent to which the model threatens to promise far too much is also being discussed. In sum, the core question is how we can imagine human thinking beyond physically conceived information processing. An alternative model of human thinking is then put up for discussion, for which not only machine-like cognitive performance, but above all the intentional perception of qualitative information, i.e. of abstract entities, would be central, as well as the free, ultimately creative linking of patterns of quantitative information (signals, data) with such qualities (meanings). (shrink)

While there has been much discussion of whether AI systems could function as moral agents or acquire sentience, there has been very little discussion of whether AI systems could have free will. I sketch a framework for thinking about this question, inspired by Daniel Dennett’s work. I argue that, to determine whether an AI system has free will, we should not look for some mysterious property, expect its underlying algorithms to be indeterministic, or ask whether the system is unpredictable. Rather, (...) we should simply ask whether we have good explanatory reasons to view the system as an intentional agent, with the capacity for choice between alternative possibilities and control over the resulting actions. If the answer is “yes”, then the system counts as having free will in a pragmatic and diagnostically useful sense. (shrink)

In this paper—Part 2 of 3—we discuss one of the two main types of soft-line responses to manipulation cases, which we refer to as manipulator-focused views. Manipulator-focused views hold, roughly, that the reason that Victim lacks responsibility (or lacks full responsibility) is because of the way the action is related to the Manipulator. First, we introduce these views generally, and then we survey some detailed versions of such views. We then introduce cases of natural forces, often taken to be a (...) problem for such approaches in general, followed by a discussion of various sorts of cases—accidental results, lucky manipulators, and parallel cases—that present challenges for some of the detailed versions of such views. We conclude with some thoughts about the prospects for manipulator-focused views going forward. (shrink)

A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typical agent in a deterministic universe, responsibility is (...) not compatible with the truth of determinism. This paper introduces some key types of manipulation cases, the schema for a manipulation argument against compatibilism, the hard-line/soft-line categories of responses to manipulation arguments, and various issues that have become important in discussions of manipulation cases and arguments. (shrink)

... having succeeded in protecting and prolonging the life of many around the world for reasons which seem natural and intrinsically good to all, we are once again faced with the dilemma of confronting our patent inability to cure it all. -/- Faced with this recurring predicament, we somehow backtrack in our steps and decide the next best thing to assuage suffering is assisted dying and euthanasia. -/- No matter how many reasons we conjure up in their favour, both assisted (...) dying and euthanasia remain a stab into the unknown, into the supernatural, by patients, by its proponents, and by its practitioners both lay and medical. (shrink)

हम सोच कर दुनिया नहीं बनाते। दुनिया को समझ कर हम सोचना सीखते हैं। कॉस्मोविज़न एक ऐसा शब्द है जिसका मतलब नींव का एक समूह होना चाहिए जिससे ब्रह्मांड, जीवन के रूप में इसके घटकों, जिस दुनिया में हम रहते हैं, प्रकृति, मानवीय घटनाओं और उनके संबंधों की एक व्यवस्थित समझ उभरती है। इसलिए, यह विज्ञान द्वारा पोषित विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन का एक क्षेत्र है, जिसका उद्देश्य हम जो हैं और जो हमारे चारों ओर है, और जो किसी भी तरह से (...) हमसे संबंधित है, उसके बारे में यह एकत्रित और ज्ञानमीमांसीय रूप से स्थायी ज्ञान है। यह मानव विचार जितना ही पुराना है, और वैज्ञानिक ब्रह्मांड विज्ञान के तत्वों का उपयोग करने के अलावा, यह दर्शन और विज्ञान में ब्रह्मांड और जीवन को संदर्भित करने वाली हर चीज को शामिल करता है। एक कॉस्मोविज़न विचारों, परिकल्पनाओं और मान्यताओं का एक समूह नहीं है, बल्कि अवलोकन, विश्लेषण, साक्ष्य और प्रदर्शन पर आधारित एक प्रणाली है। कोई भी कॉस्मोविज़न परिभाषित करने, स्थापित करने या प्रस्तावित करने का इरादा नहीं रखता है, बल्कि केवल समझने, विश्लेषण करने और व्याख्या करने का इरादा रखता है। हममें से प्रत्येक व्यक्ति अपने सोच और व्यवहार के लिए पृष्ठभूमि के रूप में, रूपों को स्थापित किए बिना, जीवन भर अपने कॉस्मोविज़न का निर्माण और परिवहन करता है। भाषाई रूप से, "कॉस्मोविज़न" शब्द जर्मन से लिया गया है, जो कई दार्शनिकों द्वारा इस्तेमाल किए गए "वेल्टनशाउंग" की अवधारणा के बराबर है। हालाँकि, यह भाषाई संबंध लागू नहीं होता है क्योंकि यह हमारे द्वारा प्रस्तावित ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि के विपरीत है। यह जर्मन शब्द वास्तविकता के एक पूर्व-तार्किक या प्रोटो-प्रयोगात्मक दृष्टिकोण को संदर्भित करता है, जिसमें एक सहज संदर्भ होता है और आलोचनात्मक ज्ञान से बहुत दूर होता है जो इसके निर्माण के समय भी अस्तित्व में नहीं था। निस्संदेह, ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि, जिस अर्थ में हम उन्हें समझते हैं, इन प्रोटो-प्रयोगात्मक या पूर्व-तार्किक तत्वों को समाहित करता है और उनका उपयोग करता है जिसमें इतिहास, सामूहिक अचेतन और हमारे द्वारा धारण किए जाने वाले सभी मूलरूप शामिल हैं। हालाँकि, जिस अवधारणा को हम यहाँ लागू करते हैं, उसमें ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि इस सामग्री से बहुत आगे निकल जाती है, सबसे पहले इसे लगातार वर्तमान आलोचनात्मक सोच के अधीन करके, और अंत में विश्लेषणात्मक अनुभव (और न कि विचार या अंतर्ज्ञान) को अपना वास्तविक ब्रह्मांड बनाकर। एंटोनियो लोपेस इस विषय-वस्तु की व्यापकता को उजागर करते हैं: "ब्रह्मांडीय दर्शन विचार की उपज नहीं हैं। वे जानने की सरल इच्छा से उत्पन्न नहीं होते हैं। वास्तविकता की समझ इसकी संरचना में एक महत्वपूर्ण क्षण है, लेकिन फिर भी, यह केवल एक है। यह जीवन के मूल्यांकन के अनुभव से, और हमारी मानसिक समग्रता की संरचना से, जीवन को वास्तविकता के ज्ञान में, मूल्यांकन में, और इच्छाधारी वास्तविकता में चेतना तक ऊपर उठाना वह धीमा और कठिन कार्य है जो मानवता ने जीवन की अवधारणाओं के विकास में किया है।" -/- . (shrink)

The received view is that Kant denies all moral luck. But I show how Kant affirms constitutive moral luck in passages concerning radical evil from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. First, I explicate Kant’s claims about radical evil. It is a morally evil disposition that all human beings have necessarily, at least for the first part of their lives, and for which they are blameworthy. Second, since these properties about radical evil appear to contradict Kant’s even more famous (...) claims about imputation, ‘ought implies can’, and free will, I unpack Henry Allison’s proof of radical evil and show how it is consistent with interpretations of Kant’s broader views about morality. Third, I define and illustrate the category of constitutive moral luck and argue that Kant embraces the existence of constitutive moral luck given Allison-style interpretations of radical evil. This provides a reason for philosophers to reject the received view, and it creates an occasion for Kantians and Kant scholars to check their reasons if they deny moral luck. (shrink)

This paper introduces Holistic Free Will (HFW), a transformative framework that reconceptualizes autonomy as a dynamic, relational, and ethically aspirational process embedded within structured realities. Distinct from traditional theories like libertarian free will and compatibilism, HFW integrates interdisciplinary insights from neuroscience, moral philosophy, and cultural traditions to provide a comprehensive understanding of free will that aligns individual agency with systemic and relational contexts. HFW emphasizes structured reality as comprising four dimensions—natural laws, human constructs, social norms, and personal histories—that act not (...) as constraints but as enablers of ethical autonomy and moral development. Central to the framework are mechanisms such as reflective veto, self-reflection, and virtue cultivation, which empower individuals to navigate deterministic influences and align actions with enduring ethical principles like justice, empathy, and humility. HFW’s practical applications across governance, education, and social systems, demonstrating its capacity to address global challenges such as social justice, environmental sustainability, and relational harmony. Case studies illustrate how structured realities foster personal and collective growth, positioning HFW as a tool for bridging theoretical insights and actionable strategies. By advancing autonomy as a relational and developmental process, HFW offers a groundbreaking model for ethical agency and societal transformation. (shrink)

In this study, we conducted large-scale experiments with novel descriptions of determinism. Our goal was to investigate the effects of desires for punishment and comprehension errors on people’s intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in deterministic scenarios. Previous research has acknowledged the influence of these factors, but their total effect has not been revealed. Using a large-scale survey of Japanese participants, we found that the failure to understand causal determination (intrusion) has limited effects relative to other factors and that (...) the conflation of determinism and epiphenomenalism (bypassing) has a significant influence, even when controlling for other variables. This leads to the increased prevalence of incompatibilist responses. Furthermore, our results demonstrated a close association between the attribution of free will/responsibility and retributive desire. While further research is needed to establish the causal relationship between these factors, this association is consistent with Cory Clark and colleagues' study that increased desire contributes to increased compatibilist responses and their claim that a definitive intuition about free will may be elusive. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate where the boundaries of conscious mental life lie in Cavendish’s theory, and why. Cavendish argues for a wholly material yet wholly thinking universe. She claims that all matter is capable of “self-knowledge” and “perception” (OEP, p. 138), so that every part of nature “must have its own knowledge and perception, according to its own particular nature” (OEP, p. 141). It is unclear, however, whether the universal capacity of matter to know and perceive also implies the (...) presence of consciousness. I show that Cavendish’s use of the notions of “self-knowledge” and “perception” implies the attribution of consciousness to all bodies. I identify one condition under which the ubiquitous presence of consciousness is intuitively required in Cavendish’s system: namely the presence of intentional agency in every part of nature, which Cavendish conceives as necessary, alongside the capacity of self-motion, to account for the orderly behavior of any body. (shrink)

The issue of whether humans are free to make their own decisions has long been debated, and it continues to be controversial today. In Free Will: The Basics Meghan Griffith provides a clear and accessible introduction to this important but challenging philosophical problem. She addresses the questions central to the topic including: Does free will exist? Or is it illusory? Can we be free even if everything is determined by a chain of causes? If our actions are not determined, does (...) this mean they are just random or a matter of luck? In order to have the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility, must we have alternatives? What can recent developments in science tell us about the existence of free will? These questions are discussed without prejudicing one view over others, and all technical terminology is clearly explained. This second edition has been revised and updated throughout, with the addition of new sections on dispositionalism, free will as self-organization, and situationism in psychology. Up-to-date suggestions for further reading and a glossary are also included, making Free Will: The Basics an ideal introduction for anyone coming to the subject for the first time. (shrink)

Das Thema der Alteritat ist von grosser systematischer, religionsphilosophischer und politischer Bedeutung. Bei Hermann Cohen, dem Begrunder des Marburger Neukantianismus, zeigt sich der Andere in verschiedenen begrifflichen Ausgestaltungen. Inwieweit sich ein zentraler Alteritatsbegriff niederschlagt, untersucht Deborah Epstein anhand der zwei Hauptwerke Cohens "Ethik des reinen Willens" und "Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums". Die Autorin gibt einen spannenden Einblick in die Auseinandersetzung Cohens mit der unaufhebbaren Alteritat des Anderen und beweist eine grosse Sensibilitat fur die judischen Elemente in (...) der Ethik und Religionsphilosophie Cohens sowie fur die Bedeutung des Themas Alteritat fur die Gegenwart. (shrink)

Any given society will be comprised of multiple forms of life. That is to say, people will adhere to diverse patterns of organizing and justifying how they make use of their time. One might think that for all of us, time is divided by seconds, minutes, and hours and thus we all live in the same form of life. We are all given 24 hours in a day, and it is up to us all, individually, to decide how best to (...) maximize the value we can squeeze out of the time that we are given. In this view, abstract and homogenous time is the "natural" state of the world. Some people may want to spend their time by focusing on their careers, families, or volunteering, for example. What matters is that we are all free to choose what we will do with the finite seconds, minutes, and hours that we have. The assumed naturalness of "clock time", as Lewis Mumford describes it, allows us to develop a sense of injustice as the unjustified control or evaluation of another's time. To impose one form of life onto another is to violate their dignity as a self-determining agent who has their own reasons for shaping the pattern of their life in light of their own values and goals. So, preliminarily, we might distinguish between forms of life by examining how a bundle of social practices normatively shape the use of time. (shrink)

Libertarianism -- Compatibilism -- Hard Incompatibilism -- Revisionism.

I argue that Hegel’s concept of freedom requires the dissolution of dichotomies between history and nature. Ultimately, dissolving them would lead to an embodied concept of agency, whereby the singularity of each concrete organism finds normative expression within a free form of life. For that, I suggest that the dialectical thesis of speculative identity intertwines social critique with the critique of philosophical language. I shall call this procedure a “grammatical critique”, revealing Hegel’s shift to a vital normativity as its therapeutic (...) moment. That will allow me to present the social pathologies of dualistic forms of life as a withholding of the fluidity of organic nature, instantiated in the body-mind split. I then turn to Adorno’s notion of “recording nature”, arguing that it fulfils the dialectical criteria for a free form of life, that is: one in which its agents are able to reflexively enact their vital normativity. (shrink)

This paper argues that decision theory presupposes free will. Although decision theorists seldom acknowledge this, the way decision theory represents, explains, or rationalizes choice behaviour acquires its intended interpretation only under the assumption that decision-makers are agents capable of making free choices between alternative possibilities. Without that assumption, both normative and descriptive decision theory, including the revealed-preference paradigm, would have to be reinterpreted in implausible ways. The hypothesis that decision-makers have free will is therefore explanatorily indispensable for decision theory. If (...) we regard explanatory indispensability as an indicator of reality in science, decision theorists should embrace the idea of free will. (shrink)