17th/18th Century Philosophy > 17th/18th Century German Philosophy > Immanuel Kant > Kant: Ethics > Kant: Moral Psychology > Kant: Respect
Kant: Respect
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Edited by Michael Walschots (Martin Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg)
About this topic
Summary | The concept of respect (Achtung – previously translated as ‘reverence’) is one of the most characteristic, and controversial, features of Kant’s moral philosophy. At its core, respect is two things: an attitude and a feeling. The attitude of respect is directed towards three objects in Kant’s philosophy: 1) the moral law, 2) human beings insofar as they exemplify the moral law, and 3) human beings simply insofar as they are human, ends in themselves, and possessors of dignity. These two ‘aspects’ of respect are described by Kant as being identical; to have the attitude is to have the feeling. Kant’s understanding of the attitude of respect for persons as such has been particularly influential, and is considered by many to be one of, if not the, central concepts of his moral philosophy. The feeling of respect is extremely controversial. Kant describes the feeling of respect as different in kind from all other sensible feelings, namely as a feeling that is produced by reason rather than sensibility. Famously, it is this ‘rational’ feeling that Kant describes as the ‘incentive’ of moral action. Interpreters are divided with respect to what role this feeling plays in moral motivation, if it plays one at all. |
Key works | Some of the most important discussions of respect in the history of Kant scholarship are those by Rehberg 1788 and Henrich 1963. More recent influential interpretations of the feeling of respect are those by Broadie & Pybus 1975, Reath 1989, and McCarty 1993. Key works on Kant and respect for persons as such are E. Hill 1980, Korsgaard 1996, Sensen 2011, Wood 1999. For a discussion of Kant’s understanding of respect for persons insofar as they exemplify the law, see Darwall 2008. For Kant on self-respect, see Massey 1983. |
Introductions | In addition to the works mentioned above, for discussions of the various objects of respect see Gregor 1963, Allison 2011, and Klimchuk 2004. A good first point of contact are the articles on respect/Achtung in Wuerth 2021 and Willaschek et al 2015. |
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Related categories
Siblings:
- Kant: Maxims (41)
- Kant: Moral Motivation (109)
- Kant: Moral Psychology, Misc (142)
- Kant: Moral Motivation (109)
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