Moral Judgements: The Pursuit of Comfort and its Justification

Abstract

This paper explores how the three most common ethical theories, utilitarianism, deontology (specifically Kantianism), and Aristotelian virtue ethics seem to fail to adequately account for what justifies the obligations that our moral judgments hold on us, and where these moral judgements arise. This is because it appears that each of the three theories seems to be a different justification for the narcissistic pursuit of one’s own individual comfort, meaning that, people only act in a way that gives them the most comfort and one’s moral judgements and actions are dictated by what an individual in comfortable with. This comfort is not fully individualized, though, in that is also contains a societal component that relates to one’s desire to not be ostracized. Thus, moral judgments are nothing more than one’s unrelentless pursuit of comfort.

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Conor Sullivan
Creighton University

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