This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

7921 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 7921
Material to categorize
  1. Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge (Under Contract, Oxford University Press).Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming
    The expression ‘aware of the fact that’ is a commonplace, not at all a philosopher’s term of art. We often criticize, excuse, admonish, and inform each other by relying on expressions of the form ‘S is (not) aware of the fact that p’ and such uses presuppose the existence of a state of awareness that one can be in or fail to be in with regard to some fact. Here lies the phenomenon of factual awareness. It is conventional in epistemology (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. How to Reason About Religious Beliefs.Daniele Bertini - 2021 - Dialogo Journal 8 (1):179-193.
    Intractable disagreements are commonly analyzed in terms of the semantic opposition of (at least) couples of disputed beliefs (purely epistemic view, from here on PEV). While such a view seems to be a very natural starting point, my intuitions are that such an approach is misleadingly unrealistic, and that an empirical modeling towards how individuals hold beliefs in intractable opposition constitutes a strong defeater for PEV. My work addresses disagreements within the religious domain. Accordingly, I will be concerned with developing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.
    Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exemplify what is called the exploration/exploitation trade-off. In computer science and psychology, this trade-off has fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents or systems make choices over time. This article extends the trade-off to belief. We can be torn between two ways of believing, one of which is expected to be more accurate in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Can Arbitrary Beliefs Be Rational?Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Episteme.
    When a belief has been influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer’s own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed proposition, we can say that the belief has been, in a sense, arbitrarily formed. Can such beliefs ever be rational? It might seem obvious that they can’t. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” But many epistemologists have come to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, indeed, be rational. In this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Defeaters and the Generality Problem.Tim Loughrist - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13845-13860.
    Consider a simple form of process reliabilism: S is justified in believing that p if and only if S’s belief that p was formed through a reliable process. Such accounts are thought to face a counter-example in the form of defeaters. It seems possible that a belief might result from a reliable belief forming process and yet be unjustified because one possesses a defeater with respect to that belief. This counter-example is merely apparent. The problem of defeaters is just a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.
    While epistemologists routinely employ disbelief talk, it is not clear that they really mean it, given that they often equate disbelieving p with believing ¬p. I argue that this is a mistake—disbelief is a doxastic attitude of rejection and is distinct from belief. I first clarify this claim and its opposition, then show that we must distinguish disbelieving p from believing ¬p in order to account for the fact that we continue to hold doxastic attitudes toward propositions that we reject. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition. Volume Three: Concept Formation.Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist & Juhana Toivanen (eds.) - 2022 - Brill.
    _Concept Formation_ is the final part of the trilogy _Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition_. It investigates some of the most perplexing and provocative discussions on conceptual thinking in the Greek, Latin, and Arabic reception of Aristotle’s psychology.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy.Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.) - 2018 - Bloomsbury Publishing.
    "Divided chronologically into four volumes, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History presents the history of one of Western philosophy's greatest challenges: understanding the nature of knowledge. Each volume follows conceptions of knowledge that have been proposed, defended, replaced, and proposed anew. Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy covers discussions about scientific knowledge, social knowledge, and self-knowledge, along with attempts to understand knowledge naturalistically, contextually, and normatively. How did contemporary epistemology begin? What shape is it now in? What future seems to await it? (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Evidentialism, Inertia, and Imprecise Probability.William Peden - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-23.
    Evidentialists say that a necessary condition of sound epistemic reasoning is that our beliefs reflect only our evidence. This thesis arguably conflicts with standard Bayesianism, due to the importance of prior probabilities in the latter. Some evidentialists have responded by modelling belief-states using imprecise probabilities (Joyce 2005). However, Roger White (2010) and Aron Vallinder (2018) argue that this Imprecise Bayesianism is incompatible with evidentialism due to “inertia”, where Imprecise Bayesian agents become stuck in a state of ambivalence towards hypotheses. Additionally, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. The Stage of Pre- or Non-Conceptual Art and Spirituality.Ulrich de Balbian - 2021 - Oxford:
    The ideas I suggest and will attempt to explore can be expressed and conceptualized in many ways. -/- Wittgenstein suggested that there are things that cannot be talked about. -/- I suggest that we most likely have ideas, attitudes, words, conceptions, notions, values, standards, opinions, etc when we approach any work of art or perceive anything as art or aesthetic. Just as we have notions, ideas etc concerning spirituality and spiritual phenomena. -/- But during the interaction with those things, when (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. BACON E A INDUÇÃO POR SUBTRAÇÃO COMO NOVO MÉTODO INDUTIVO NA FUNDAÇÃO DO EMPIRISMO MODERNO.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2020 - Revista Filosofia Capital 15 (22):21-35.
    Defendendo a união entre a razão e a experiência como a possibilidade de instauração do desenvolvimento científico, Bacon se contrapõe à indução aristotélica enquanto procedimento que implica a enumeração de casos particulares tendo em vista o objetivo de encontrar o geral existente em todos e em cada um deles em um processo que se detém na soma de fatos, limitando-se à comunicação, na medida em que não tem capacidade de empreender a descoberta do conhecimento. Dessa forma, sobrepondo-se ao acúmulo de (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Why Burdensome Knowledge Need Not Be Imposed.Alvin Novick - 1986 - IRB: Ethics & Human Research 8 (5):6.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Intuitions Might Not Be Sui Generis: Some Criticisms of George Bealer.Marcus Hunt - 2020 - Florida Philosophical Review 19 (1):49-66.
    George Bealer provides an account of intuitions as “intellectual seemings.” My purpose in this paper is to criticize the phenomenological considerations that Bealer offers in favor of his account. In the first part I review Bealer’s attempt to distinguish intuitions from beliefs, judgments, guesses, and hunches. I examine each of the three phenomenological differences – incorrigibility, implasticity, and scope – that Bealer adduces between intuitions and these other types of mental contents. I argue that any difference between intuitions and these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Методология организации глобального бизнеса.Sergii Sardak & С. Э Сардак - 2016 - Авторське Право І Суміжні Права 42:167.
    МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО БИЗНЕСА Разработана методология организации глобального бизнеса, позволяющая проектировать, создавать, администрировать, трансформировать и продавать легальный бизнес, а также предусматривает возможность развития компании от стартапа до глобальной корпорации в странах с рыночной и трансформационной экономикой. -/- МЕТОДОЛОГІЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦІЇ ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО БІЗНЕСУ Розроблено методологію організації глобального бізнесу, що дозволяє проектувати, створювати, адмініструвати, трансформувати та продавати легальний бізнес й передбачає можливість розвитку компанії від стартапу до глобальної корпорації у країнах з ринковою та трансформаційною економікою. -/- GLOBAL BUSINESS ORGANIZATION METHODOLOGY A methodology for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Epistemic Anxiety, Adaptive Cognition, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Juliette Vazard - 2018 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (Philosophical Perspectives on Af):137-158.
    Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, by Pritchard, Duncan: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, Pp. Xv + 239, US$35. [REVIEW]Scott Aikin - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):819-822.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Knowledge Attribution Revisited: A Deflationary Account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.
    According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantiga’s Proper Functioning Theory. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup & Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):409.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-Order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
    _ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order evidence is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. Precis of Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper FunctionWarrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):393.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. On Richard Foley's Theory of Epistemic RationalityThe Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Marshall Swain & Richard Foley - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):159.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  22. Truth as Sort of Epistemic: Putnam’s Peregrinations.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (6):335.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  23. Rational Beliefs in Rationalizability.Xiao Luo - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):189-198.
    In this paper I scrutinize the “rational beliefs” in the concept of rationalizability in strategic games [Bernheim, Pearce ]. I illustrate through an example that a rationalizable strategy may not be supported by a “rational belief”, at least under one plausible interpretation of “rational belief”. I offer an alternative formulation of “rational belief” in the concept of rationalizability, which yields a novel epistemic interpretation of the notion of point-rationalizability.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Comparing the Axiomatic and Ecological Approaches to Rationality: Fundamental Agreement Theorems in SCOP.Patricia Rich - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):529-547.
    There are two prominent viewpoints regarding the nature of rationality and how it should be evaluated in situations of interest: the traditional axiomatic approach and the newer ecological rationality. An obstacle to comparing and evaluating these seemingly opposite approaches is that they employ different language and formalisms, ask different questions, and are at different stages of development. I adapt a formal framework known as SCOP to address this problem by providing a comprehensive common framework in which both approaches may be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25. Knowledge Is Not Enough.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):658-672.
    Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):150-171.
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. Faith and Reason: A Response to Duncan Pritchard.Roberto di Ceglie - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (2):231-247.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Epistemic Akrasia and the Fallibility of Critical Reasoning.Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):877-886.
    There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. On How to Be a Moral Rationalist, a Contribution to a Symposium on C. Peacocke The Realm of Reason.Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. The Factive Turn in Epistemology.Veli Mitova (ed.) - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are either facts, veridical experiences, or known propositions. This ground breaking volume (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Knowledge of the External World.Panayot Butchvarov - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):490-492.
  32. Knowledge, Belief and Opinion.Henry Lanz - 1932 - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):78-80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. The Degrees of Knowledge.Ernest A. Moody - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (26):717-719.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. Knowledge and Human Interests.Erkenntnis Und Interesse, MIT Einem Neuen Nachwort.Raymond Geuss - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (22):810-819.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  35. Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Fred I. Dretske - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (21):793-802.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. An Essay on Reasoning. [REVIEW]Edward T. Dixon - 1892 - Ancient Philosophy (Misc) 3:138.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Conditions for Description.Peter Zinkernagel & Olaf Lindum - 1962 - New York: Routledge & K. Paul Humanities Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  38. Being, Order, and Knowledge.Gerald B. Phelan - 1959 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 33:12.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Warrant and Form.John Zeis - 1995 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 69:157.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Christopher Hookway - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):122-125.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology.William P. Alston - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):249-251.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  42. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. By Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. (New York: Oxford UP, 2009. Pp. Xxi + 251. Price US$60.00.).Ram Neta - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):211-215.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Common-Sense Reasoning and Everyday Activities.Yvonne Rogers - 1993 - Pragmatics and Cognition 1 (2):307-340.
    This paper is concerned with the nature of common-sense reasoning and understanding in relation to practical behaviour. It examines the relationship between intuitive knowledge based on everyday experience and institutionalized theory and practice. An analysis of the types of knowledge that guide the selection of actions and understanding in the domain of cooking practice is presented. Verbal transcripts were elicited from participants, with varying levels of experience, of the cooking methods they followed and their underlying rationale. The results suggest that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.John Koethe - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):136-139.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  45. Gambling And The UK National Lottery.Peter G. Moore - 1997 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 6 (3):153-158.
    The British National Lottery has now been running for almost three years and it arouses social and ethical misgivings in several quarters, whether in its contribution to the British gambling scene or in the size and distribution of its prizes or in its contributions to the good causes which it was introduced to benefit. Bringing wide experience and an expert eye to analyse and comment on the lottery, Dr Moore, DSc PhD FIA, is Emeritus Professor of Decision Sciences at London (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Justification and Knowledge. By George Pappas. [REVIEW]Roger Trigg - 1982 - Mind 91 (364):624-625.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Knowing and Seeing: Responding to Stroud's Dilemma.Quassim Cassam - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):571-589.
    : Barry Stroud suggests that when we want to explain a certain kind of knowledge philosophically we feel we must explain it on the basis of another, prior kind of knowledge that does not imply or presuppose any of the knowledge we are trying to explain. If we accept this epistemic priority requirement we find that we cannot explain our knowledge of the world in a way that satisfies it. If we reject EPR then we will be failing to make (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  48. Reasons and Causes of Beliefs.Franz Kutschera - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Foley's Theory of Epistemic Rationality.William P. Alston - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):135.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. The Reliability of Premise and Conclusion Indicators.Thomas Smythe - 1997 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 16 (3):94-95.
1 — 50 / 7921