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  1. Abolishing Morality in Biomedical Ethics.Parker Crutchfield & Scott Scheall - forthcoming - Bioethics.
    In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as “S should do X”. The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person’s (...)
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  2. Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.
    Traditionally epistemologists have taken doxastic states to come in three varieties—belief, disbelief, and suspension. Recently many epistemologists have taken our doxastic condition to be usefully represented by credences—quantified degrees of belief. Moreover, some have thought that this new credal picture is sufficient to account for everything we want to explain with the old traditional picture. Therefore, belief, disbelief, and suspension must map onto the new picture somehow. In this paper I challenge that possibility. Approaching the question from the angle of (...)
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  3. William P. Alston.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2009 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), The History of Western Philosophy of Religion, Volume 5, Twentieth-Century Philosophers of Religion. New York: Routledge. pp. 221-232.
    This is a 12-page article on the life and work in philosophy of religion by William P. Alston (1921-2009).
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  4. Introduction.Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke - 2000 - In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-10.
    This collection of newly commissioned essays, edited by NYU philosophers Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, resumes the current surge of interest in the proper explication of the notion of a priori. The authors discuss the relations of the a priori to the notions of definition, meaning, justification, and ontology, explore how the concept figured historically in the philosophies of Leibniz, Kant, Frege, and Wittgenstein, and address its role in the contemporary philosophies of logic, mathematics, mind, and science. The editors’ Introduction (...)
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  5. The Epistemic Structure of the Imagination.Joshua Myers - 2023 - Dissertation, New York University
    The imagination is ubiquitous in our cognitive lives. You might imagine rotating a puzzle piece to determine whether it fits in an open space, or imagine what things are like from another person's perspective to figure out how they are feeling, or imagine a new rug in your living room to determine whether it matches the color of your sofa. These examples are mundane, but they point to a deep philosophical puzzle: how could merely imagining something give you any reason (...)
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  6. Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    This paper defends three theses on the normativity of the suspension of judgment. First, even if beliefs have to fit the truth and disbelief the false, suspension can still have satisfiable fittingness conditions. Second, combining this view with specific theses on the link between fittingness and normative reasons in favour of attitudes commits one to the existence of reasons to suspend judgement, which are neither reasons to believe nor reasons to disbelieve. These independent reasons, in turn, generate a form of (...)
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  7. Implicit Bias and Qualiefs.Martina Fürst - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-34.
    In analyzing implicit bias, one key issue is to clarify its metaphysical nature. In this paper, I develop a novel account of implicit bias by highlighting a particular kind of belief-like state that is partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. I call these states ‘qualiefs’ for three reasons: qualiefs draw upon qualitative experiences of what an object seems like to attribute a property to this very object, they share some of the distinctive features of proper beliefs, and they also share some (...)
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  8. Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.
    When a belief has been influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer's own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed proposition, we can say that the belief has been, in a sense, arbitrarily formed. Can such beliefs ever be rational? It might seem obvious that they can't. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” But many epistemologists have come to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, indeed, be rational. In this (...)
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  9. XII—Deferring to Doubt.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):269-290.
    In this paper I’ll suggest that a certain challenge facing defeatist views about higher-order evidence cannot be met, namely, motivating principles that recommend abandoning belief in cases of higher order defeat, but do not recommend global scepticism. I’ll propose that, ultimately, the question of whether to abandon belief in response to the realization that our belief can’t be recovered from what I’ll call ‘a perspective of doubt’ can’t be answered through rational deliberation aimed at truth or accuracy.
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  10. Epistemologia (o della Conoscenza).Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2023 - In Tiziana Andina & Gregorio Fracchia (eds.), Filosofia Contemporanea. Roma: Carocci. pp. 63-99.
    L’epistemologia (detta anche filosofia della conoscenza o gnoseologia) è la disciplina filosofica che studia come gli esseri umani si rapportano da un punto di vista cognitivo alla realtà che li circonda. Le questioni fondamentali che la interessano sono principalmente di natura normativa. Riguardano il modo in cui dovremmo regolare le nostre credenze alla luce dell’informazione in nostro possesso, e la natura della conoscenza umana ed i suoi limiti. Questo capitolo è organizzato in modo corrispondente. La prima sezione tratta della nozione (...)
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  11. Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge.Paul Silva Jr - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Expressions of the form 'S is aware of the fact that p' are commonplace. This book provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than (...)
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  12. Normative Realism.Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.) - forthcoming
    Normativity is both one of the most important and ubiquitous of phenomena and, despite its historical centrality to philosophy, one of the least understood. The idea that there might be objective, attitude-independent, truths about what we ought to do (morality), what we ought to believe (rationality) or what we ought to appreciate (aesthetics), has always seemed very puzzling to philosophers, even though ordinary thought seems steeped in such judgments. -/- Up until quite recently, the received view was that there was (...)
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  13. Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    This is a three-part exchange on the relationship between belief and credence. It begins with an opening essay by Roger Clarke that argues for the claim that the notion of credence generalizes the notion of belief. Julia Staffel argues in her reply that we need to distinguish between mental states and models representing them, and that this helps us explain what it could mean that belief is a special case of credence. Roger Clarke's final essay reflects on the compatibility of (...)
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  14. Awareness, Epistemics, and Paradigm Repair: An epistemic lexicon of terms, with definitive explanations.Michael Lucas Monterey & Michael Lucas-Monterey - manuscript
    Abstract: This is necessarily an evolutionary work in progress. Its purpose and goal is enabling real progress of science, mathematics, society, and civilization. Thus, to accomplish the mission, upgrading the current sociocultural paradigm is essential. That makes holistic ontology and optimal epistemics essential to ongoing work and to further development of new theory and metatheory. Hence, the current listings of key terms, definitions, and explanations presented here provide some core concepts and supporting theorems, metatheorems, equations, and examples. That enables remedial (...)
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  15. La naturaleza del reflejo valorativo de la realidad (libro).José Ramón Fabelo-Corzo - 1987 - Matanzas, Cuba: lnstituto Superior Agroindustrial, Camilo Cienfuegos.
    Primera versión al español de la Tesis en opción al grado científico de doctor en ciencias filosóficas El reflejo valorativo de la realidad y su papel en las actividades cognoscitiva y práctica. El objetivo general del trabajo consistió en mostrar la naturaleza del reflejo valorativo de la realidad y su nexo orgánico con las actividades cognoscitiva y práctica. El alcance de este objetivo presupuso solucionar las siguientes tareas: 1.- definir el objeto del reflejo valorativo; 2.- develar la naturaleza de la (...)
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  16. Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.
    In this paper I consider the project of offering an evolutionary debunking explanation for transparency in doxastic deliberation. I examine Nicole Dular and Nikki Fortier’s (2021) attempt at such a project. I suggest that their account faces a dilemma. On the one horn, their explanation of transparency involves casting our mechanisms for belief formation as solely concerned with truth. I argue that this is explanatorily inadequate when we take a wider view of our belief formation practices. I show that Dular (...)
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  17. On the Analogy between the Sensing of Secondary Qualities and the Feeling of Values: Landmann-Kalischer’s Epistemic Project, Its Historical Context, and Its Significance for Current Meta-Ethics.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Beatrice Centi, Faustino Fabbianelli & Gemmo Iocco (eds.), Philosophy of Value. The Historical Roots of Contemporary Debate: An Overview. Brill.
    This paper explores Landmann-Kalischer’s analogy between the sensing of secondary qualities and the feeling of values in her work “Philosophie der Werte” (Philosophy of Values) (1910). Attention is paid to the epistemic motivation of the analogy, the distinction between pure feelings and affects, and the relation of pure feelings to value judgments. Her account is contrasted with two other accounts of the Brentanian tradition: Scheler’s approach within early phenomenology and Meinong’s account within the Graz School. I demonstrate that Landmann-Kalischer’s pioneering (...)
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  18. How to Reason About Religious Beliefs.Daniele Bertini - 2021 - Dialogo Journal 8 (1):179-193.
    Intractable disagreements are commonly analyzed in terms of the semantic opposition of (at least) couples of disputed beliefs (purely epistemic view, from here on PEV). While such a view seems to be a very natural starting point, my intuitions are that such an approach is misleadingly unrealistic, and that an empirical modeling towards how individuals hold beliefs in intractable opposition constitutes a strong defeater for PEV. My work addresses disagreements within the religious domain. Accordingly, I will be concerned with developing (...)
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  19. Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.
    Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exemplify what is called the exploration/exploitation trade-off. In computer science and psychology, this trade-off has fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents or systems make choices over time. This article extends the trade-off to belief. We can be torn between two ways of believing, one of which is expected to be more accurate in (...)
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  20. Defeaters and the generality problem.Tim Loughrist - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5):13845-13860.
    Consider a simple form of process reliabilism: S is justified in believing that p if and only if S’s belief that p was formed through a reliable process. Such accounts are thought to face a counter-example in the form of defeaters. It seems possible that a belief might result from a reliable belief forming process and yet be unjustified because one possesses a defeater with respect to that belief. This counter-example is merely apparent. The problem of defeaters is just a (...)
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  21. Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.
    While epistemologists routinely employ disbelief talk, it is not clear that they really mean it, given that they often equate disbelieving p with believing ¬p. I argue that this is a mistake—disbelief is a doxastic attitude of rejection and is distinct from belief. I first clarify this claim and its opposition, then show that we must distinguish disbelieving p from believing ¬p in order to account for the fact that we continue to hold doxastic attitudes toward propositions that we reject. (...)
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  22. Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition. Volume Three: Concept Formation.Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist & Juhana Toivanen (eds.) - 2022 - Boston: Brill.
  23. Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy.Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.) - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.
    "Divided chronologically into four volumes, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History presents the history of one of Western philosophy's greatest challenges: understanding the nature of knowledge. Each volume follows conceptions of knowledge that have been proposed, defended, replaced, and proposed anew. Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy covers discussions about scientific knowledge, social knowledge, and self-knowledge, along with attempts to understand knowledge naturalistically, contextually, and normatively. How did contemporary epistemology begin? What shape is it now in? What future seems to await it? (...)
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  24. Evidentialism, Inertia, and Imprecise Probability.William Peden - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-23.
    Evidentialists say that a necessary condition of sound epistemic reasoning is that our beliefs reflect only our evidence. This thesis arguably conflicts with standard Bayesianism, due to the importance of prior probabilities in the latter. Some evidentialists have responded by modelling belief-states using imprecise probabilities (Joyce 2005). However, Roger White (2010) and Aron Vallinder (2018) argue that this Imprecise Bayesianism is incompatible with evidentialism due to “inertia”, where Imprecise Bayesian agents become stuck in a state of ambivalence towards hypotheses. Additionally, (...)
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  25. The Stage of pre- or non-conceptual art and spirituality.Ulrich de Balbian - 2021 - Oxford:
    The ideas I suggest and will attempt to explore can be expressed and conceptualized in many ways. -/- Wittgenstein suggested that there are things that cannot be talked about. -/- I suggest that we most likely have ideas, attitudes, words, conceptions, notions, values, standards, opinions, etc when we approach any work of art or perceive anything as art or aesthetic. Just as we have notions, ideas etc concerning spirituality and spiritual phenomena. -/- But during the interaction with those things, when (...)
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  26. BACON E A INDUÇÃO POR SUBTRAÇÃO COMO NOVO MÉTODO INDUTIVO NA FUNDAÇÃO DO EMPIRISMO MODERNO.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2020 - Revista Filosofia Capital 15 (22):21-35.
    Defendendo a união entre a razão e a experiência como a possibilidade de instauração do desenvolvimento científico, Bacon se contrapõe à indução aristotélica enquanto procedimento que implica a enumeração de casos particulares tendo em vista o objetivo de encontrar o geral existente em todos e em cada um deles em um processo que se detém na soma de fatos, limitando-se à comunicação, na medida em que não tem capacidade de empreender a descoberta do conhecimento. Dessa forma, sobrepondo-se ao acúmulo de (...)
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  27. Why Burdensome Knowledge Need Not Be Imposed.Alvin Novick - 1986 - IRB: Ethics & Human Research 8 (5):6.
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  28. Intuitions Might Not Be Sui Generis: Some Criticisms of George Bealer.Marcus Hunt - 2020 - Florida Philosophical Review 19 (1):49-66.
    George Bealer provides an account of intuitions as “intellectual seemings.” My purpose in this paper is to criticize the phenomenological considerations that Bealer offers in favor of his account. In the first part I review Bealer’s attempt to distinguish intuitions from beliefs, judgments, guesses, and hunches. I examine each of the three phenomenological differences – incorrigibility, implasticity, and scope – that Bealer adduces between intuitions and these other types of mental contents. I argue that any difference between intuitions and these (...)
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  29. Методология организации глобального бизнеса.Sergii Sardak & С. Э Сардак - 2016 - Авторське Право І Суміжні Права 42:167.
    МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО БИЗНЕСА Разработана методология организации глобального бизнеса, позволяющая проектировать, создавать, администрировать, трансформировать и продавать легальный бизнес, а также предусматривает возможность развития компании от стартапа до глобальной корпорации в странах с рыночной и трансформационной экономикой. -/- МЕТОДОЛОГІЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦІЇ ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО БІЗНЕСУ Розроблено методологію організації глобального бізнесу, що дозволяє проектувати, створювати, адмініструвати, трансформувати та продавати легальний бізнес й передбачає можливість розвитку компанії від стартапу до глобальної корпорації у країнах з ринковою та трансформаційною економікою. -/- GLOBAL BUSINESS ORGANIZATION METHODOLOGY A methodology for (...)
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  30. Epistemic Anxiety, Adaptive Cognition, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Juliette Vazard - 2018 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (Philosophical Perspectives on Af):137-158.
    Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...)
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  31. Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, by Pritchard, Duncan: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, pp. xv + 239, US$35. [REVIEW]Scott Aikin - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):819-822.
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  32. Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.
    According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not (...)
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  33. Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantiga’s Proper Functioning Theory. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup & Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):409.
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  34. Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
    _ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order evidence is (...)
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  35. Precis of Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper FunctionWarrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):393.
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  36. On Richard Foley's Theory of Epistemic RationalityThe Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Marshall Swain & Richard Foley - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):159.
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  37. Truth as Sort of Epistemic: Putnam’s Peregrinations.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (6):335.
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  38. Rational beliefs in rationalizability.Xiao Luo - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):189-198.
    In this paper I scrutinize the “rational beliefs” in the concept of rationalizability in strategic games [Bernheim, Pearce ]. I illustrate through an example that a rationalizable strategy may not be supported by a “rational belief”, at least under one plausible interpretation of “rational belief”. I offer an alternative formulation of “rational belief” in the concept of rationalizability, which yields a novel epistemic interpretation of the notion of point-rationalizability.
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  39. Comparing the axiomatic and ecological approaches to rationality: fundamental agreement theorems in SCOP.Patricia Rich - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):529-547.
    There are two prominent viewpoints regarding the nature of rationality and how it should be evaluated in situations of interest: the traditional axiomatic approach and the newer ecological rationality. An obstacle to comparing and evaluating these seemingly opposite approaches is that they employ different language and formalisms, ask different questions, and are at different stages of development. I adapt a formal framework known as SCOP to address this problem by providing a comprehensive common framework in which both approaches may be (...)
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  40. Knowledge Is Not Enough.Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):658-672.
    Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms (...)
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  41. Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):150-171.
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...)
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  42. Faith and Reason: A Response to Duncan Pritchard.Roberto di Ceglie - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (2):231-247.
    In a recent essay Duncan Pritchard argues that there is no fundamental epistemological distinction between religious belief and ordinary or non-religious belief. Both of them – so he maintains in the footsteps of Wittgenstein's On certainty – are ultimately grounded on a-rational commitments, namely, commitments unresponsive to rational criteria. I argue that, while this view can be justified theologically, it cannot be advanced philosophically as Pritchard assumes.I offer an account of Aquinas's reflection on faith and reason to show that the (...)
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  43. Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning.Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):877-886.
    There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain (...)
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  44. On How to Be a Moral Rationalist.Jonathan Dancy - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (2):103-110.
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  45. The Factive Turn in Epistemology.Veli Mitova (ed.) - 2017 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are either facts, veridical experiences, or known propositions. This ground breaking volume (...)
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  46. Knowledge of the External World. [REVIEW]Panayot Butchvarov - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):490-492.
  47. Knowledge, Belief and Opinion. [REVIEW]Henry Lanz - 1932 - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):78-80.
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  48. The Degrees of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Ernest A. Moody - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (26):717-719.
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  49. Knowledge and Human Interests. [REVIEW]Raymond Geuss - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (22):810-819.
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  50. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. [REVIEW]Fred I. Dretske - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (21):793-802.
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