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  1. What is the difference between conceptual and moral relativism? Rejecting the nature-value contrast, with help from Joseph Raz.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    I aim to undermine an account of the difference between conceptual and moral relativism according to which conceptual relativism focuses on the description of nature and moral relativism on values. I do so with some help from Joseph Raz.
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  2. (1 other version)Relativism. [REVIEW]Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly:1-3.
  3. Rule Consequentialism and Moral Relativism in advance.Ryan Jenkins - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Rule consequentialism is usually taken to recommend a single ideal code for all moral agents. Here I argue that, depending on their theoretical mo- tivations, some rule consequentialists have good reasons to be relativists. Rule consequentialists who are moved by consequentialist considerations ought to support a scheme of multiple relativized moral codes because we could expect such a scheme to have better consequences in terms of impartial aggregate well- being than a single universal code. Rule consequentialists who nd compelling the (...)
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  4. Quasi-Realism for Realists.Bart Streumer - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Reductive realists about normative properties are often charged with being relativists: it is often argued that their view implies that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, these judgements can both be true. I argue that reductive realists can answer this charge by copying the quasi-realist moves that many expressivists make. I then argue that the remaining difference between reductive realism and expressivism is unimportant.
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  5. Cultural Relativism (2nd edition).Diane Jeske - 2025 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Living ethics: an introduction with readings. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 35-43.
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  6. Zhuangzi's "Difference Stories" and Patient Moral Relativism.Waldemar Brys - 2024 - In Xiangnong Hu & Yong Huang (eds.), Ethics in the Zhuangzi: Dialogues on the State of the Field. Cham: Springer. pp. 65-76.
    I examine passages from the Zhuangzi that proponents of interpreting Zhuangzian ethics as "patient moral relativism" (PMR) primarily draw on to support their view. I consider whether in these passages Zhuangzi morally evaluates agents or their actions, and if he does, whether his evaluations support ascribing to him PMR. My argument is that Zhuangzi either fails to make the required moral evaluations or he makes moral evaluations that do not accord with PMR. A PMR-friendly reading is possible only if we (...)
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  7. Distance Relativism and the Limits of Moral Assessment: Fricker and Williams.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (4):1153-1163.
    Distance relativism (Williams, 1975, 1985) can be distinguished from other ethical relativisms in two ways. First, moral assessment is appropriate between contemporary societies and those of the recent past. Second, where moral assessment is not appropriate, the distance relativist practices quietism. Fricker (2010) critiques Bernard Williams’s (1975, 1985) distance relativism, claiming it fails to deliver the intended results regarding which societies we can appraise. Here, I address Fricker’s critique and present a novel interpretation of Williams’s idea of ‘outlooks,’ showing that (...)
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  8. Moral Relativism and Moral Disagreement.Jussi Suikkanen - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This chapter focuses on the connection between moral disagreement and moral relativism. Moral relativists, generally speaking, think both (i) that there is no unique objectively correct moral standard and (ii) that the rightness and wrongness of an action depends in some way on a moral standard accepted by some group or an individual. This chapter will first consider the metaphysical and epistemic arguments for moral relativism that begin from the premise that there is considerable amount of moral disagreement both within (...)
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  9. Anti-Luminosity and Anti-Realism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-24.
    This paper begins by applying a version of Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to normative properties. This argument suggests that there must be at least some unknowable normative facts in normative Sorites sequences, or otherwise we get a contradiction given certain plausible assumptions concerning safety requirements on knowledge and our doxastic dispositions. This paper then focuses on the question of how the defenders of different forms of metaethical anti-realism (namely, error theorists, subjectivists, relativists, contextualists, expressivists, response dependence theorists, and constructivists) could (...)
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  10. Cultural Relativism.John J. Tilley - 2024 - In Ritzer George (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Wiley-Blackwell.
  11. نسبی‌انگاری ارزش‌ها و گرایش‌های درباره خود.Peyman Jabbari, Mohsen Javadi & Muhammad Legenhausen - 2023 - فلسفه 20 (2):35-56.
    نسبی‌انگاری اخلاقی یکی از مکاتب کهن فرااخلاقی است که به وجود ویژگی‌های اخلاقی، و صدق و توجیه احکام اخلاقی می‌پردازد. با این حال، بخشی از بحث‌های مربوط به نسبی‌انگاری متوجّه معناشناسی جملات نسبی است. نظریات نسبی‌انگارانۀ سنّتی زمینه‌گرا هستند، به این معنا که احکام اخلاقی را دارای عنصری می‌دانند که به نحوی ارجاع به گوینده دارد. این دیدگاه نسبی‌انگاری را با چالش‌هایی مواجه می‌کند، از جمله این‌که اختلاف نظر که یکی از اسباب عمدۀ گرایش به نسبی‌انگاری است، به سوء تفاهم (...)
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  12. Friends with the Good: Moral Relativism and Moral Progress.Eduardo Pérez-Navarro - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):886-899.
    The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it would make it irrational to classify past changes in public opinion as instances of moral progress, for they would constitute an improvement only from our current point of view. The argument is this. For our assessment of a change in public opinion as an instance of moral progress to be rational, we need to take the moral claims made before the change to be false simpliciter (...)
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  13. Subjectivism, Relativism and Contextualism (2nd edition).Jussi Suikkanen - 2023 - In Christian B. Miller (ed.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics, 2nd Edition. Bloomsbury. pp. 130-149.
    There is a family of metaethical views according to which (i) there are no objectively correct moral standards and (ii) whether a given moral claim is true depends in some way on moral standards accepted by either an individual (forms of subjectivism) or a community (forms of relativism). This chapter outlines the three most important versions of this type of theories: old-fashioned subjectivism and relativism, contextualism and new wave subjectivism and relativism. It also explores the main advantages of these views (...)
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  14. Negar una ética de fundamentos, ¿implica sostener una ética arbitraria? Crítica a la caracterización de Zavadivker de la teoría ética de Bunge.Óscar Teixidó - 2023 - Oximora 23:17-43.
    En su libro Una ética sin fundamentos, Nicolás Zavadivker sostiene que la teoría ética y metaética de Mario Bunge pretende fundamentar las normas morales en premisas fácticas, sin hacer uso de valores. El presente trabajo discute esa tesis y sostiene que la teoría de Bunge busca construir y evaluar un sistema de valores y de normas, de forma rigurosa y sin arbitrariedad, a partir de conocimientos fácticos y valores de los evaluadores. Dado que la teoría de Bunge incluye valores entre (...)
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  15. Moral relativism and pluralism.David B. Wong - 2023 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. This Element discusses the latest arguments in ethical theory in an accessible manner, with many examples and cases.
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  16. Establishing Moral Norms by Convention: Comments on Baghramian’s and Coliva’s Relativism.Paul Boghossian - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):506-513.
    Extract: -/- Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva (henceforth, B&C) have written a superb, compendious book on various kinds of relativism (2019). While they give nuanced and sympathetic reconstructions of these views, it is illuminating to see them show, repeatedly and in detail, how each of these views succumbs to a familiar dilemma: a relativistic view requires that it be possible for two judgers to genuinely disagree with one another, even while their views count as ‘equally valid’. However, it is not (...)
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  17. Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism.Patrick Denning - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):122-133.
    Arguments from faultless disagreement appeal to the possibility of mistake-free disagreement as evidence for semantic relativism. Typically, these arguments focus on paradigmatically subjective topics such as taste, aesthetics, and comedy. Many philosophers hold that ethics is also a subjective topic. But so far, there has been little discussion of faultless disagreement in ethics. In this paper, I advance an argument from faultless moral disagreement, in favour of a relativist semantics for ethics.
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  18. Patient Moral Relativism in the Zhuangzi Defended: A Reply to Jianping Hu.Yong Huang - 2022 - Philosophy East and West 72 (2):472-482.
    I have been developing an ethics that I initially identified in the text of the Zhuangzi and which I have characterized in different ways under different names. First, in contrast to the moral Golden Rule, which asks us to do unto others as we would like to have done unto us, I call it the moral Copper Rule: do unto others as they would like to have done unto them. Second, in contrast to the ethics of commonality, I call it (...)
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  19. Meta-Theories, Interpretability, and Human Nature: A Reply to J. David Velleman.Hagop Sarkissian - 2022 - Philosophy East and West 72 (1):252-257.
    My thanks to David Velleman for a clear and constructive response to my comment. He raises two issues that might benefit from some further brief remarks. The first concerns the error-theory I put forth to explain why the early Confucians were not relativists. The second concerns the extent to which the Confucian notion of harmony is at odds with Velleman's notion of interpretability or coherence. I consider each in turn, below.
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  20. Well-Functioning Daos and Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian - 2022 - Philosophy East and West 72 (1):230-247.
    What are the nature and status of moral norms? And what makes individuals abide by them? These are central questions in metaethics. The first concerns the nature of the moral domain—for example, whether it exists independently of what individuals or groups think of it. The second concerns the bindingness or practical clout of moral norms—how individuals feel impelled to abide by them. In this article, I bring two distinct approaches to these questions into dialogue with one another.
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  21. Comments on Hagop Sarkissian's "Well Functioning Daos and Moral Relativism".J. David Velleman - 2022 - Philosophy East and West 72 (1):247-252.
    Every author cares about being understood, but for reasons that Hagop Sarkissian has explained, I can be expected to care more than most. I'm delighted to say that Sarkissian has understood my book thoroughly and provided an accurate and charitable summary. I am also delighted to learn from him how closely my view echoes strains of classical Confucianism.I was especially interested by Sarkissian's characterization of my view as implying that "morals do indeed seem to collapse to mores, or perhaps mores (...)
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  22. The Problem of Religious Relativism: An Interreligious Approach.Subhasis Chattopadhyay - 2021 - Indian Catholic Matters.
    This post is one in a series of posts about the ground-realities of interreligious dialogue. Interreligious dialogue is not the same as ecumenism. And this blog-post shows how Christian and Hindu celibates have veered to discussing categories which are inapplicable to one or the other religion. To quote part of the post: "So the first critique of interreligious dialogue that needs clarification is this problem of religious relativism. The Sanatana Dharma does not admit of relativism, moral or religious because there (...)
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  23. Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value.Daan Evers - 2021 - British Journal of Aesthetics 61 (1).
    I argue that relativists about aesthetic and other evaluative language face some of the same objections as non-naturalists in ethics. These objections concern the metaphysics required to make it work. Unlike contextualists, relativists believe that evaluative propositions are not about the relation in which things stand to certain standards. Nevertheless, the truth of such propositions would depend on variable standards. I argue that relativism requires the existence of states of affairs very different from other things known to exist. Furthermore, there (...)
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  24. What is an Appropriate Educational Response to Controversial Historical Monuments?Michael S. Merry & Anders Schinkel - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (3):484-497.
    There are many things that can be done to educate young people about controversial topics - including historical monuments - in schools. At the same time, however, we argue that there is little warrant for optimism concerning the educational potential of classroom instruction given the interpretative frame of the state-approved history curriculum; the onerous institutional constraints under which school teachers must labour; the unusual constellation of talents history teachers must possess; the frequent absence of marginalized voices in these conversations; and (...)
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  25. The Tolerant Society and its Enemies: Moral Relativism, Multiculturalism, and Islamism.T. M. Murray - 2021 - Perichoresis 19 (3):113-131.
    In this paper, T. M. Murray defends a vision of liberal tolerance as grounding the common good. She critiques the discourse that Western liberalism amounts to ‘Islamophobia’ or ‘cultural imperialism’. She argues that liberal academics, in maintaining these narratives, contradict their own vaunted values and tacitly collude with religious hypocrisy and intolerance. She argues for a universal vision of the common good broadly grounded in human flourishing and human nature and linked to the philosophies of Aristotle and J. S. Mill.
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  26. The Psychological Basis of Moral Judgments: Philosophical and Empirical Approaches to Moral Relativism.John J. Park - 2021 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    This volume examines the psychological basis of moral judgments and what theories of concepts apply to moral ones. It considers what mental states not only influence but also constitute our moral concepts and judgments by combining philosophical reasoning and empirical insights from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience. On this basis, Park proposes a novel pluralistic theory of moral concepts which includes three different cognitive structures and emotions. Thus, our moral judgments are a hybrid that (...)
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  27. The Virtues of Mestizaje: Lessons from Las Casas on Aztec Human Sacrifice.Noell Birondo - 2020 - APA Studies on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 19 (2):2-8.
    Winner of the American Philosophical Association’s 2019 Essay Prize in Latin American Thought | Western imperialism has received many different types of moral-political justifications, but one of the most historically influential justifications appeals to an allegedly universal form of human nature. In the early modern period this traditional conception of human nature—based on a Western archetype, e.g. Spanish, Dutch, British, French, German—opens up a logical space for considering the inhabitants of previously unknown lands as having a ‘less-than-human’ nature. This appeal (...)
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  28. Misunderstanding Metaethics: Difficulties Measuring Folk Objectivism and Relativism.Lance S. Bush & David Moss - 2020 - Diametros 17 (64):6-21.
    Recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people appears to show that they are metaethical pluralists that adopt different metaethical standards for different moral judgments. Yet the methods used to evaluate folk metaethical belief rely on the assumption that participants interpret what they are asked in metaethical terms. We argue that most participants do not interpret questions designed to elicit metaethical beliefs in metaethical terms, or at least not in the way researchers intend. As a result, existing methods are (...)
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  29. Resisting Relativistic Contextualism: On Finlay's Confusion of Tongues.Alex Worsnip - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):122-131.
    Stephen Finlay’s book Confusion of Tongues is extraordinarily sophisticated, ambitious and thought-provoking. I highly commend it to those who haven’t read it yet. I will begin this commentary with a summary of which big-picture issues Finlay and I agree on and which we disagree on.
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  30. Rational learners and metaethics: Universalism, relativism, and evidence from consensus.Alisabeth Ayars & Shaun Nichols - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (1):67-89.
    Recent work in folk metaethics finds a correlation between perceived consensus about a moral claim and meta-ethical judgments about whether the claim is universally or only relatively true. We argue that consensus can provide evidence for meta-normative claims, such as whether a claim is universally true. We then report several experiments indicating that people use consensus to make inferences about whether a claim is universally true. This suggests that people's beliefs about relativism and universalism are partly guided by evidence-based reasoning. (...)
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  31. Relativism and Expressivism.Bob Beddor - 2019 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge.
    Relativism and expressivism offer two different semantic frameworks for grappling with a similar cluster of issues. What is the difference between these two frameworks? Should they be viewed as rivals? If so, how should we choose between them? This chapter sheds light on these questions. After providing an overview of relativism and expressivism, I discuss three potential choice points: their relation to truth conditional semantics, their pictures of belief and communication, and their explanations of disagreement.
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  32. Constructivism, intersubjectivity, provability, and triviality.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):515-527.
    Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of (...)
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  33. Evolutionary Debunking and Moral Relativism.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2019 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge. pp. 190-199.
    Our aim here is to explore the prospects of a relativist response to moral debunking arguments. We begin by clarifying the relativist thesis under consideration, and we explain why relativists seem well-positioned to resist the arguments in a way that avoids the drawbacks of existing responses. We then show that appearances are deceiving. At bottom, the relativist response is no less question-begging than standard realist responses, and – when we turn our attention to the strongest formulation of the debunking argument (...)
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  34. Relativism in the Philosophy of Anthropology.Inkeri Koskinen - 2019 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge. pp. 425–434.
    This chapter explores arguments, ideas, and practices related to relativism in social and cultural anthropology. It covers discussions about cultural relativism, methodological relativism, conceptual relativism, relativism about rationality, moral relativism, epistemic relativism, and ontological relativism.
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  35. Military Virtues and Moral Relativism.Peter Olsthoorn - 2019 - In Michael Skerker, David Whetham & Don Carrick (eds.), Military Virtues. Havant: Howgate Publishing.
  36. Why I Am Not a Moral Relativist (and Neither Are You).Mark Timmons - 2019 - In Disputed Moral Issues: A Reader, 5th ed. Oxford University Press. pp. 41-48.
    After explaining what moral relativism is, Mark Timmons gives three arguments against the view. He then proceeds to contrast moral relativism with what he calls the "context sensitivity thesis" and the "moral diversity thesis." He speculates that those who say they are moral relativists often have in mind one of these other theses that does not commit one to moral relativism. He ends with remarks about moral tolerance.
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  37. Між релятивністю й абсолютом.Vira Ageyeva - 2018 - NaUKMA Researh Papers. Literary Studies 1:38-43.
    У статті розглянуто один із аспектів надзвичайно широкого інтертекстуального поля прози Віктора Домонтовича. Поняття зради й відступництва письменник інтерпретує у різних контекстах і в різному історичному антуражі. Зокрема в оповіданні «Апостоли» він своєрідно представляє проблему віри й довіри, вводячи у євангельський сюжет ще й тему знання, роздуми про побутування релігії й віри у добу раціоналізму й скептицизму. Страждаючи від роздвоєності й сумнівів, герої цього письменника згодні відповідати за наслідки лише власного вибору. Домонтович демонструє трагічні наслідки ситуації, коли людина бере на (...)
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  38. Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:48-70.
    This chapter identifies a novel family of metaethical theories that are non-descriptive and that aim to explain the action-guiding qualities of normative thought and language. The general strategy is to consider different relations language might bear to a given content, where we locate descriptivity (or lack of it) in these relations, rather than locating it in a theory that begins with the expression of states of mind, or locating it in a special kind of content that is not way-things-might-be content. (...)
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  39. Moral Relativism and Perspectival Values.Pietro Gori & Paolo Stellino - 2018 - In António Marques & João Sàágua (eds.), Essays on Values and Practical Rationality: Ethical and Aesthetical Dimensions. Peter Lang. pp. 155-174.
    The paper explores the issue of moral relativism in Nietzsche, and tries to argue that Nietzsche's attitude towards moral values does not support a radical relativism according to which since (i) every moral interpretation is relative to a judging perspective, and (ii) an absolute viewpoint is lacking, then (iii) every moral interpretation seems to be as true, valid or justified as the others. On the contrary, Nietzsche's perspectivism leaves space for a rank order among values, whose establishment is considered by (...)
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  40. Humanism and Cruelty in Williams.Lorenzo Greco - 2018 - In Sophie Grace Chappell & Marcel van Ackeren (eds.), Ethics Beyond the Limits: New Essays on Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 84-103.
  41. Modern Moral Relativism.Christian Miller - 2018 - In Todd K. Shackelford & Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer Verlag.
    This entry first provides some background about how to define moral relativism. It then reviews two different strands of the contemporary discussion of moral relativism. The first concerns the question of whether most people endorse, either implicitly or explicitly, some form of moral relativism. The second concerns the question of whether moral relativism is actually true. Here the focus will be on the influential work of Shaun Nichols, who has proposed an account of the psychology of moral judgments which he (...)
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  42. Epoch Relativism and Our Moral Hopelessness.Regina Rini - 2018 - In Sophie Grace Chappell & Marcel van Ackeren (eds.), Ethics Beyond the Limits: New Essays on Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-187.
    When we look back upon people in past societies, such as slaveholders and colonialists, we judge their actions to have been morally atrocious. Yet we should give some thought to how the future will judge us. Here I argue that future people are likely to regard our behavior as no better than that of the past. If these future people are to be believed, then we are morally hopeless; we have little chance of working out the moral truth for ourselves. (...)
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  43. Moralische Forderungen und Relativismus.Fabian Wendt - 2018 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 66 (5):653-668.
    Peter Stemmer has developed an elegant and impressive theory of normativity and morality. In this article, I try to show that he does not achieve two goals he set for himself. First, his theory does not capture the categorical bindingness of moral demands, even in Stemmer’s own interpretation of categorical bindingness: it does not show that wemustfollow moral demands no matter what our personal goals and desires are. Second, just because it would be rational to establish positive moralities in a (...)
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  44. Relativism and pluralism in moral epistemology.David Wong - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
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  45. J. David Velleman, Foundations for Moral Relativism (2nd edition), Open Book Publishers, 2015. [REVIEW]Dan Zeman - 2018 - Firu'n 4.
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  46. Relativism about Morality.Paul Boghossian - 2017 - In Katharina Neges, Josef Mitterer, Sebastian Kletzl & Christian Kanzian (eds.), Realism - Relativism - Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 301-312.
    Many philosophers and non-philosophers are attracted to the view that moral truths are relative to moral framework or culture. I distinguish between two versions of such a view. I argue that one version is coherent but not plausible, and I argue that the second one can’t be made sense of. The upshot is that we have to make sense of at least some objective moral truths.
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  47. (2 other versions)Metaethical Relativism.Stojanovic Isidora - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 119-134.
    Although relativism may be said to be one of the oldest doctrines in philosophy, dating back to the teachings of Protagoras in the 5th century B.C., when it comes to contemporary philosophy, there is no consensus on what makes a view qualify as "relativist". The problem is particularly accute in metaethics, since most of the views that up to a decade ago were described as “relativist” would be more accurately described as "contextualist" or even “expressivist” in light of the distinctions (...)
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  48. Review of C. Rovane, The Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism (Harvard University Press, 2013). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):463-466.
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  49. Review of Foundations for Moral Relativism. [REVIEW]Hagop Sarkissian - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):116-119.
    Review of David Velleman's Foundations for Moral Relativism.
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  50. Children’s developing metaethical judgments.Marco F. H. Schmidt, Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera & Michael Tomasello - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 164:163-177.
    Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N = 136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children’s metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could (...)
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