Moral Progress and Grand Narrative Genealogy

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this article, I explore the method of genealogy in moral philosophy, with a focus on evaluating the credibility of moral progress judgments. Despite genealogy becoming a new trend in this field, I critique three types of defective grand narrative genealogies represented by the works of Peter Railton, Michael Huemer, and Nicholas Smyth. I argue that their genealogies fail to be adequate for evaluating moral progress judgments’ credibility. Railton’s genealogy lacks specificity regarding the relatum of the causal story he presents, Huemer’s fails to withstand the scrutiny of historical evidence, and Smyth’s gives no clear verdict on the credibility of the moral progress judgments it explains. These failures, I argue, stem from grand narratives’ neglect of the particularities in each case of moral belief emergence. The disregard for details renders grand narratives generally inadequate for credibility evaluation. Instead, I propose a case study approach that takes into account four types of particulars in each case. I argue that this approach is more methodologically adequate in evaluating the credibility of moral progress judgments since these case-specific details are essential in determining the credibility of a moral belief.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Slavery, Carbon, and Moral Progress.Dale Jamieson - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):169-183.
Measuring Moral Development.Michael Klenk - 2017 - de Filosoof 75:21-23.
Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress.Anders Schinkel & Doret J. Ruyter - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):121-136.
Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress.Anders Schinkel & Doret J. de Ruyter - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):121-136.
Moral Progress and Evolution: Knowledge Versus Understanding.Eleonora Severini - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):87-105.
Is There Moral Progress?Eva Buddeberg - 2019 - Analyse & Kritik 41 (2):195-204.
On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):137-152.
Morally we roll along: (Optimistic reflections) on moral progress.Stan Godlovitch - 1998 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (3):271–286.
Progress and Meliorism: Making Progress in Thinking about Progress.Andrew Fiala - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 15 (1):28-50.
Functionalist Conceptions of Moral Progress and the Plurality of Ways of Life.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2019 - In Michael Reder, Alexander Filipovic, Dominik Finkelde & Johannes Wallacher (eds.), Yearbook Practical Philosophy in a Global Perspective 3. Verlag Karl Alber. pp. 50-72.
Moral Progress: Between Justification and Innovation.Philippe Brunozzi - 2020 - Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy 4 (1):295-313.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-01-29

Downloads
32 (#483,225)

6 months
32 (#100,983)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jinglin Zhou
Fudan University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
The ethical project.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity.Charles Taylor - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):187-190.

View all 44 references / Add more references