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  1. Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge (Under Contract, Oxford University Press).Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming
    The expression ‘aware of the fact that’ is a commonplace, not at all a philosopher’s term of art. We often criticize, excuse, admonish, and inform each other by relying on expressions of the form ‘S is (not) aware of the fact that p’ and such uses presuppose the existence of a state of awareness that one can be in or fail to be in with regard to some fact. Here lies the phenomenon of factual awareness. It is conventional in epistemology (...)
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  2. The ‘Ethic of Knowledge’ and Responsible Science: Responses to Genetically Motivated Racism.Natan Elgabsi - 2021 - Social Studies of Science:1-21.
    This study takes off from the ethical problem that racism grounded in population genetics raises. It is an analysis of four standard scientific responses to the problem of genetically motivated racism, seen in connection with the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP): (1) Discriminatory uses of scientific facts and arguments are in principle ‘misuses’ of scientific data that the researcher cannot be further responsible for. (2) In a strict scientific sense, genomic facts ‘disclaim racism’, which means that an epistemically correct grasp (...)
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  3. Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...)
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  4. Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view successfully explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all (...)
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  5. The Normativity of Logic in a Psychologistic Framework: Three Approaches.Simone Melis - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Turin
    Contemporary psychologism has been amended for most of the objections by its opponents over a century ago. However, some authors still raise doubts about its ability to account for some peculiar properties of logic. In particular, it is argued that the psychological universality of patterns of inferential behavior is not sufficient to account for the normativity of logic. In this paper, I deal with the issue and offer three alternative solutions that do not rely on mere empirical universality. I will (...)
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  6. Truth in Ethics and Epistemology: A Defense of Normative Realism.Nathan Nobis - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    In this work I defend moral realism, the thesis that there are objective moral truths, by defending “epistemic realism.” Epistemic realism is the thesis that epistemic judgments, e.g., judgments that some belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or known or should be held, are sometimes true and made true by stance-independent epistemic facts and properties. -/- One might think that epistemic realism needs no defense because it is obviously true and nearly universally accepted. But there are influential arguments against moral (...)
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  7. Correction to: The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism.Carlo Burelli & Chiara Destri - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-1.
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  8. Bounded Reflectivism and Epistemic Identity.Nick Byrd - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (1).
    Reflectivists consider reflective reasoning crucial for good judgment and action. Anti-reflectivists deny that reflection delivers what reflectivists seek. Alas, the evidence is mixed. So, does reflection confer normative value or not? This paper argues for a middle way: reflection can confer normative value, but its ability to do this is bound by such factors as what we might call epistemic identity: an identity that involves particular beliefs—for example, religious and political identities. We may reflectively defend our identities’ beliefs rather than (...)
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  9. THE "COPERNICAN REVOLUTION" (THE TRUE "TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM").Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2011 - Revista Opinião Filosófica / Sociedade Hegel Brasileira 2 (2):34-51.
    Article in question holds in epistemological implications of the revolution copernicana of Immanuel Kant, whose perspective, emerging of borders that inter-related rationalism of Leibniz, empiricism Hume and science positive physical-mathematics Newton, introduces the horizon of idealism transcendental, establish the correlation fundamental involving the subject and object of knowledge.
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  10. Da “revolução copernicana” (do verdadeiro “idealismo transcendental”).Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2011 - Revista Intuitio, Programa de Pós-Graduação Em Filosofia da PUC/RS 4 (1):117-133.
    O artigo em questão se detém nas implicações epistemológicas da revolução copernicana de Immanuel Kant, cuja perspectiva, emergindo das fronteiras que inter-relacionam o racionalismo de Leibniz, o empirismo de Hume e a ciência positiva físico-matemática de Newton, instaura o horizonte do idealismo transcendental, estabelecendo a correlação fundamental envolvendo o sujeito e o objeto do conhecimento.
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  11. Basic Knowledge and the Normativity of Knowledge: The Awareness‐First Solution.Paul Silva - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  12. Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.
    Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exemplify what is called the exploration/exploitation trade-off. In computer science and psychology, this trade-off has fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents or systems make choices over time. This article extends the trade-off to belief. We can be torn between two ways of believing, one of which is expected to be more accurate in (...)
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  13. Can Arbitrary Beliefs Be Rational?Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Episteme.
    When a belief has been influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer’s own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed proposition, we can say that the belief has been, in a sense, arbitrarily formed. Can such beliefs ever be rational? It might seem obvious that they can’t. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” But many epistemologists have come to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, indeed, be rational. In this (...)
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  14. Feeling as Consciousness of Value.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2021:1-18.
    A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three (...)
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  15. The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism.Carlo Burelli & Chiara Destri - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    This article argues that political realists have at least two strategies to provide distinctively political normative judgments that have nothing to do with morality. The first ground is instrumental normativity, which states that if we believe that something is a necessary means to a goal we have, we have a reason to do it. In politics, certain means are required by any ends we may intend to purse. The second ground is epistemic normativity, stating that if something is true, this (...)
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  16. Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity.Petar Nurkić - 2021 - Theoria, Beograd 64 (3):91-112.
    Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori (...)
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  17. Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-14.
    In moral and political philosophy, topics like the distributive inequities conferred via special partial relationships – family relationships, for example – have been frequently debated. However, the epistemic dimensions of such partiality are seldom discussed in the ethical context, and the topic of partial relationships rarely feature in the realm of social epistemology. My view is that the role of partial relationships is worth exploring to enrich our understanding of epistemic injustice and its transmission. I claim that epistemic features typical (...)
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  18. Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.
    Suppose we learn that we have a poor track record in forming beliefs rationally, or that a brilliant colleague thinks that we believe P irrationally. Does such input require us to revise those beliefs whose rationality is in question? When we gain information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational, we are in one of two general cases. In the first case we made no error, and our beliefs are rational. In that case the input to the contrary is misleading. In (...)
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  19. Conflict Contagion.Marie Oldfield - 2015 - Institute of Mathematics and its Applications 1.
    With an increased emphasis on upstream activity and Defence Engagement, it has become increasingly more important for the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) and government to understand the relationship between conflict and regional instability. As part of this process, the Historical and Operational Data Analysis Team (HODA) in Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) was tasked to look at factors that influenced the regional spread of internal conflicts to help aid the decision making of government. Conflict contagion is the process (...)
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  20. Call for Written Evidence - Risk Assessment and Risk Planning.Marie Oldfield - 2021 - UK Government Risk Enquiry.
    Call for Written evidence - Risk Assessment and Risk Planning.
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  21. “In a Certain Sense We Cannot Make Mistakes in Logic” — Wittgenstein, Psychologism and the So-Called Normativity of Logic.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Disputatio 10 (18):165-185.
    Wittgenstein’s Tractatus construes the nature of reasoning in a manner which sharply conflicts with the conventional wisdom that logic is normative, not descriptive of thought. For although we sometimes seem to reason incorrectly, Wittgenstein denies that we can make logical mistakes (5.473). My aim in this paper is to show that the Tractatus provides us with good reasons to rethink some of the central assumptions that are standardly made in thinking about the relation between logic and thought. In particular, the (...)
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  22. Knowing Full Well: The Normativity of Beliefs as Performances.Ernest Sosa - 2015 - Disputatio 4 (5).
    Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true, a second level if competent, and a third if true because competent. Knowledge on one level is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does belief itself, yet to suspend (...)
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  23. Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):411-424.
    According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between these two strands of thought? This paper makes two claims. First, logic is doubly normative for reasoning because, in addition to constraining the combinations of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may form them. Second, given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, a wide array of (...)
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  24. Truth: The Rule or the Aim of Assertion?Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Is truth the rule or the aim of assertions? Philosophers disagree. After reviewing the available evidence, the hypothesis that truth is the aim of assertion is defended against recent attempts to prove that truth is rather a rule of assertion.
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  25. The Normative and the Natural.Michael Padraic Wolf & Jeremy Randel Koons - 2016 - New York: Palgrave.
    Drawing on a rich pragmatist tradition, this book offers an account of the different kinds of ‘oughts’, or varieties of normativity, that we are subject to contends that there is no conflict between normativity and the world as science describes it. The authors argue that normative claims aim to evaluate, to urge us to do or not do something, and to tell us how a state of affairs ought to be. These claims articulate forms of action-guidance that are different in (...)
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  26. Doxastic Normativity.Daniel J. Singer - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    There is a puzzle about Hume's is-ought gap involving an epistemic `ought'. From the premise `Snow is white,' we can infer `Sophia's belief that snow is white is correct.' `Snow is white' is paradigmatically non-normative, and that Sophia's belief is correct, a claim about what belief she ought to have, seems to be normative. The argument seems valid, so the is-ought gap is supposed to block this kind of inference. The puzzle is over whether we should give up on the (...)
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  27. Commentary on Deborah Heikes’s “Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility”. [REVIEW] Cheryl - 2020 - Southwest Philosophy Review 36:27-29.
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  28. El poscolonialismo o el colonialismo de los ‘pos.José Ramón Fabelo Corzo - 2002 - Revista Internacional Marx Ahora 13 (13):130-141.
    Se realiza una valoración crítica de algunas de las propuestas teóricas fundamentales del poscolonialismo, particularmente del Grupo Latinoamericano de Estudios Subalternos, nacido en los Estados Unidos en la década de 1990. Se muestra algunos de sus méritos, pero, sobre todo, sus limitaciones teórico-prácticas. -/- .
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  29. Practical Reasons for Belief Without Stakes.N. G. Laskowski & Shawn Hernandez - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Pragmatic encroachment can be thought of as the idea that knowledge is in some way sensitive to practical considerations, including practical considerations involving what's at stake in getting things right. Recently, Mark Schroeder defends pragmatic encroachment by showing how it could be true. This paper argues that the view proposed by Schroeder is vulnerable to a simple but important objection. It also argues that the objection can be avoided by claiming that there are even more kinds of practical considerations that (...)
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  30. Sur la régularité.Mario Barra Jover - manuscript
    La régularité est traitée non pas comme une propriété primitive de certains événements du monde, mais comme une relation d'implication entre une situation S et une événement E. La régularité, aussi bien dans les descriptions du monde que dans les comportements, n'est pas expliquée en termes de règles abstraites (il n'a a pas un "secret de la règle" à percer) mais à travers ses trois manifestations : conventions, règles individuelles et énoncés normatifs. Table des matières : I. De la régularité (...)
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  31. Proceed with Caution.Annette Zimmermann & Chad Lee-Stronach - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    It is becoming more common that the decision-makers in private and public institutions are predictive algorithmic systems, not humans. This article argues that relying on algorithmic systems is procedurally unjust in contexts involving background conditions of structural injustice. Under such nonideal conditions, algorithmic systems, if left to their own devices, cannot meet a necessary condition of procedural justice, because they fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced model of which cases count as relevantly similar. Resolving this problem requires deliberative capacities uniquely (...)
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  32. The Two Forms of Doxastic Normativity in Hume's Treatise.Sam Zahn - 2021 - Hume Studies 44 (1):3-22.
    Recent commentators have contended that Hume’s skeptical arguments in the Treatise lead him to eschew a traditional epistemic account of justification in favor of a pragmatic account. While this view resolves some textual puzzles, others arise. Instead, Hume should be read as endorsing two completely distinct standards of doxastic normativity: the epistemic and the pragmatic. The epistemic grants beliefs philosophical approval, while the pragmatic circumscribes the domain of investigation to prevent reasoning that leads to extreme skepticism. I argue that the (...)
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  33. Epistemic Dilemma and Epistemic Conflict.Verena Wagner - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles.
    In this paper, I will examine the notion of an epistemic dilemma, its characterizations in the literature, and the different intuitions prompted by it. I will illustrate that the notion of an epistemic dilemma is expected to capture various phenomena that are not easily unified with one concept: while some aspects of these phenomena are more about the agent in a certain situation, other aspects seem to be more about the situation as such. As a consequence, incompatible intuitions emerge concerning (...)
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  34. Précis of "What’s the Point of Knowledge?".Michael Hannon - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):85-87.
    I acquired many intellectual debts while writing What’s the Point of Knowledge?, but I am especially indebted to my three symposiasts. David Henderson’s work helped me to appreciate the value of thinking about the point of epistemic evaluation; Catherine Elgin’s writings prompted me to investigate the purpose of the concept of understanding; and Krista Lawlor’s 2013 book revealed important connections between three of my primary epistemological interests: the role of epistemic evaluation, the semantics of knowledge claims and the work of (...)
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  35. Thinking on Thinking.Philippe Schweizer - 2020 - International Journal of Neutrosophic Science (IJNS) 2 (2):63-71.
    Beyond the predominant paradigm of an essentially rational human cognition, based on the classical binary logic, we want to propose some reflections that are organized around the intuition that the representations we have of the world are weighted with appreciations, for example affective ones. resulting from our integration into a social environment. We see these connotations as essentially ternary in nature, depending on the concepts underlying neutrosophy: either positive, negative or neutral. This form of representation would then influence the very (...)
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  36. Affective Polarization, Evidence, and Evidentialism.McWilliams Emily - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology.
    This chapter concerns some ways that political beliefs are formed and maintained in polarized political environments. Specifically, it examines how self-serving, directional biases in the ways that agents gather and process evidence can make their beliefs resistant to change. It argues that although our intuitive judgment is that these mechanisms undermine the justification of resulting beliefs, this is not so according to an evidentialist theory of epistemic justification, which says the epistemic justification of a subject's doxastic attitude toward a proposition (...)
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  37. Epistemic Vice and Epistemic Nudging: A Solution?Daniella Meehan - 2020 - In Guy Axtell & Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications (Collective Studies in Knowledge and Society). Lanham, MD 20706, USA: pp. 249-261.
    ‘Bad’ epistemic behaviour is unfortunately commonplace. Take, for example, those who believe in conspiracy theories, trust untrustworthy news sites or refuse to take seriously the opinion of their epistemic peers. Sometimes this kind of behaviour is sporadic or “out of character”; however, more concerning are those cases that display deeply embedded character traits, attitudes and thinking styles (Cassam 2016). When this is the case, these character traits, attitudes and thinking styles are identified by vice epistemologists as epistemic or intellectual vices. (...)
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  38. Normativity and Epistemic Institutions.Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oup Usa.
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  39. Ignorance, Empathy, and Resisting Racism.Elís Miller Larsen - 2021 - Radical Philosophy Review 24 (1):105-108.
  40. Epistemic Dilemmas Defended.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Epistemic Dilemmas.
    Daniel Greco (forthcoming) argues that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas. I argue that he is wrong. I then look in detail at a would-be epistemic dilemma and argue that no non-dilemmic approach to it can be made to work. Along the way, there is discussion of octopuses, lobsters, and other ‘inscrutable cognizers’; the relationship between evaluative and prescriptive norms; a failed attempt to steal a Brueghel; epistemic and moral blame and residue; an unbearable guy who thinks he’s God’s gift to (...)
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  41. Disagreement and Easy Bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.
    ABSTRACTShould conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational beliefs? Thomas Kelly argues that when taken this way, Conciliationism lets those who enter into a disagreement with an irrational belief reach a rational belief all too easily. Three kinds of responses defending Conciliationism are found in the literature. One response has it that conciliation is required only of agents who have a rational belief as they enter into a disagreement. This response yields a requirement that no one should (...)
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  42. Hedging and the Ignorance Norm on Inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.
    What sort of epistemic positions are compatible with inquiries driven by interrogative attitudes like wonder and puzzlement? The ignorance norm provides a partial answer: interrogative attitudes directed at a particular question are never compatible with knowledge of the question’s answer. But some are tempted to think that interrogative attitudes are incompatible with weaker positions like belief as well. This paper defends that the ignorance norm is exhaustive. All epistemic positions weaker than knowledge directed at the answer to a question are (...)
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  43. The Epistemic Status of the Imagination.Joshua Myers - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3251-3270.
    Imagination plays a rich epistemic role in our cognitive lives. For example, if I want to learn whether my luggage will fit into the overhead compartment on a plane, I might imagine trying to fit it into the overhead compartment and form a justified belief on the basis of this imagining. But what explains the fact that imagination has the power to justify beliefs, and what is the structure of imaginative justification? In this paper, I answer these questions by arguing (...)
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  44. Knowledge-First Theories of Justification.Paul Silva - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Knowledge-first theories of justification give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this entry is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and in what follows I offer an opinionated survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the last two decades since the (...)
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  45. Bayesianism and Self-Doubt.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2225-2243.
    How should we respond to evidence when our evidence indicates that we are rationally impaired? I will defend a novel answer based on the analogy between self-doubt and memory loss. To believe that one is now impaired and previously was not is to believe that one’s epistemic position has deteriorated. Memory loss is also a form of epistemic deterioration. I argue that agents who suffer from epistemic deterioration should return to the priors they had at an earlier time. I develop (...)
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  46. Faith: How to Be Partial While Respecting the Evidence.Taylor-Grey Miller & Derek C. Haderlie - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    In her paper, “True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defense of Evidentialism,” Katherine Dormandy argues against the view that there is a partiality norm on faith. Dormandy establishes this by showing that partiality views can’t give the right responses to encounters with stubborn counter evidence. Either they (anti-epistemic-partiality views) recommend flouting the evidence altogether in order hold on to positive beliefs about the object of faith or they (epistemic-partiality views) lower the epistemic (...)
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  47. No hope for the Irrelevance Claim.Miguel Egler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3351-3371.
    Empirical findings about intuitions putatively cast doubt on the traditional methodology of philosophy. Herman Cappelen and Max Deutsch have argued that these methodological concerns are unmotivated as experimental findings about intuitions are irrelevant for assessments of the methodology of philosophy—I dub this the ‘Irrelevance Claim’. In this paper, I first explain that for Cappelen and Deutsch to vindicate the Irrelevance Claim from a forceful objection, their arguments have to establish that intuitions play no epistemically significant role whatsoever in philosophy—call this (...)
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  48. Are Desires Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Avery Archer - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):236-251.
  49. Possessing Reasons: Why the Awareness-First Approach is Better Than the Knowledge-First Approach.Paul Silva - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.
    In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline a (...)
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  50. Basic Knowledge and the Normativity of Knowledge: The Awareness‐First Solution.Paul Silva - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self-evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge. The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection to the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state. (...)
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