Intentionality

Edited by Robert D. Rupert (University of Colorado, Boulder)
About this topic
Summary Intentionality is a property possessed by representational states or states with content or meaning, their property of being about something. Mental states appear most prominently among the inventory of intentional items, being directed toward such varied objects as historical events, people, and numbers. When a person believes that Hitler led the Nazis, her belief is about Hitler and about the Nazis. Philosophical work on intentionality ranges from phenomenological investigations of the experience of having thoughts about objects -- including nonexistent ones -- to investigations of the semantics of sentences used to attribute mental states, to the physical or causal determinants of the semantic values of mental representations. This category subsumes work in all of these areas, as well as work in cognitive science on concepts, symbolic representations, and mental images and work in consciousness studies on the intentionality of phenomenal states (such as the what-it's-like to see red).
Key works As part of a proposal for distinguishing the subject matter of psychology from that of the physical sciences, Franz Brentano (Brentano 1874) claimed that intentionality is the mark of the mental and is present in mental states themselves (not a function of their relation to something beyond the psychological realm). Although this focus on internally accessible intentional objects may have comported well enough with the introspectionist psychology of Brentano's day and may have grounded rich phenomenological projects (e.g., Husserl 1980), the rise of behaviorist psychology tended, in the Anglophone world of analytic philosophy, to work against Brentano's approach and its close cousins. Instead, many of the most influential English-language works of the twentieth century marginalized or re-interpreted intentional claims (Ryle 1949, Quine 1956). Later parts of the twentieth century, however, saw the cognitivist revolution in the empirical study of the mind and the widespread rejection of philosophical behaviorism, and these developments led to renewed interest in mental representation and, accordingly, in intentionality, particularly in the promise that we might best understand intentionality as a physical, scientifically respectable phenomenon. Thus began efforts to "naturalize" intentionality, by grounding it in information-related, nomic, causal, or evolutionary facts (Dretske 1981Fodor 1990, and Millikan 1984 provide exemplary efforts of these sorts). Recent years have seen attempts to locate intentionality closer to where Brentano and the phenomenologists envisioned, as something directly experienced in, or as an intrinsic property of, conscious thought (see, e.g., Horgan & Tienson 2002, Kriegel 2007).
Introductions Rupert 2008Fodor 1985Adams & Aizawa 2010Crane 1998Margolis & Laurence 1999
Related categories
Subcategories:
History/traditions: Intentionality

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  1. Extended Modal Realism — A New Solution to Problems Related to Non-Existence.Andrew Thomas - 2021 - Dissertation, Durham University
  2. Plentitude, Essence, and the Mental.Alex Grzankowski & Ray Buchanan - manuscript
    Your belief that Obama is a Democrat wouldn’t be the belief that it is if it didn't represent Obama, nor would the pain in your ankle be the state that is if, say, it felt like an itch. Accordingly, it is tempting to hold that phenomenal and representational properties are essential to the mental states that have them. But, as several theorists have forcefully argued (including Kripke (1980) and Burge (1979, 1982)) this attractive idea is seemingly in tension with another (...)
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  3. Extended Modal Realism: A New Solution to Problems Related to Non-Existence.Andrew Thomas - 2021 - Dissertation, Durham University
    This thesis argues that we should consider extended modal realism as a new player in the debate about non-existence. The primary aim is to show that extended modal realism is a viable theory when it comes to solving problems of non-existence. At times I will argue that extended modal realism has advantages over Lewisian modal realism when it comes to examining the problems of non-existence, not only in the case of problems relating to thought but also problems concerning truth as (...)
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  4. Crane and the Mark of the Mental.Andrea Raimondi - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Brentano’s (1874: 88–89) suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality (McGinn 1982; Dretske 1995; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Bordini 2017). What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane (2014 (...)
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  5. Normative Binding.David L. Thompson - manuscript
    Why should anyone be bound by cognitive norms, such as the norms of reason or mathematics? To become a mathematician is to learn to obey the norms of the mathematical community. A self becomes intentional by binding itself to communal norms. Only then can it have the freedom to think or make assertions about the community’s objects -- triangles or imaginary numbers, for example. Norms do not bind selves from the outside: being bound by norms is what constitutes a self.
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  6. The Phenomenology of Frustration and Orthodox Transcendental Idealism.Micah Phillips-Gary - 2021 - Dialectic 14 (2):7-14.
    In this paper I draw on Husserl's early analysis of the frustration of an intentional act to argue against orthodox transcendental idealism, the claim that our acts of cognition can be mistaken with regard to a "matter," and are therefore objective, but this matter only has conceptual structure by virtue of human activity. For example, the proposition "My coffee cup is red" can be true or false depending on the sensations I receive (the matter of the act of cognition), which (...)
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  7. The Evolutionary Origin of Selfhood in Normative Emotions.David L. Thompson - manuscript
    Modern selfhood presents itself as autonomous, overcoming emotion by following cognitive, moral and linguistic norms on the basis of clear, rational principles. It is difficult to imagine how such normative creatures could have evolved from their purely biological, non-normative, primate ancestors. I offer a just-so story to make it easier to imagine this transition. Early hominins learned to cooperate by developing group identities based on tribal norms. Group identity constituted proto-selves as normative creatures. Such group identity was not based on (...)
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  8. Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.
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  9. Embodied Higher Cognition: Insights From Merleau-Ponty’s Interpretation of Motor Intentionality.Jan Halák - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-29.
    This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...)
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  10. Language and Phenomenology.Chad Engelland (ed.) - 2020 - New York: Routledge.
    At first blush, phenomenology seems to be concerned preeminently with questions of knowledge, truth, and perception, and yet closer inspection reveals that the analyses of these phenomena remain bound up with language and that consequently phenomenology is, inextricably, a philosophy of language. Drawing on the insights of a variety of phenomenological authors, including Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, this collection of essays by leading scholars articulates the distinctively phenomenological contribution to language by examining two sets of questions. The first (...)
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  11. Adaptive Imagination: Toward a Mythopoetic Cognitive Science.Stephen Asma - forthcoming - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture.
    A mythopoetic paradigm or perspective sees the world primarily as a dramatic story of competing personal intentions, rather than a system of objective impersonal laws. Asma (2017) argued that our contemporary imaginative cognition is evolutionarily conserved—it has structural and functional similarities to premodern Homo sapiens’ cognition. This article will (i) outline the essential features of mythopoetic cognition or adaptive imagination, (ii) delineate the adaptive socio-cultural advantages of mythopoetic cognition, (iii) explain the phylogenetic and ontogenetic mechanisms that give rise to human (...)
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  12. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2635-2663.
    This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered. An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motivation for the bodily-attitudinal theory and creates problems for its claims concerning the content of emotional experience. The conclusion is that while the bodily-attitudinal theory marks out a (...)
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  13. John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences.Tony Cheng - 2021 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    John McDowell's philosophical ideas are both influential and comprehensive, encompassing philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics and the history of philosophy. This book is a much-needed systematic overview of McDowell's thought that offers a clear and accessible route through the main elements of his philosophy. Arguing that the world and minded human subject are constitutively interdependent, the book examines and critically engages with McDowell's views on naturalism of second nature, the inner space model, intentionality, personhood and practical (...)
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  14. A-Priority and Hermeneutics: The Scientificity of Phenomenology From Husserl to Heidegger.Bruno Cassara - 2020 - Bollettino Filosofico 35 (1):58-70.
    Like Husserl, the young Heidegger was preoccupied with the a-priority of phenomenology. He also incorporates hermeneutics into phenomenology, though Husserl was convinced that the a-priority of phenomenology removed all interpretation from its analyses. This paper investigates how the early Heidegger is able to make hermeneutics a general condition of understanding while maintaining, in line with Husserl, that phenomenology is an a-priori science. This paper also provides insight into key debates in the history of phenomenology. I examine two places in which (...)
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  15. Hate: Toward a Four-Types Model.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental (...)
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  16. Brentano and the Medieval Distinction Between First and Second Intentions.Hamid Taieb - forthcoming - Topoi:1-16.
    Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being – namely, “intentional inexistence” (intentionale Inexistenz) – and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” (intentionale Beziehung) to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” (tendere in) of mental (...)
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  17. Emotionale Tiefe und die Spielarten der affektiven Intentionalität: Eine Anwendung auf die Philosophie der Religion.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Philosophische Anthropologie und Religion Religiöse Erfahrung, soziokulturelle Praxis und die Frage nach dem Menschen.
  18. Empathy in Appreciation: An Axiological Account.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2021 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 79 (2):233-238.
    This paper argues that certain literary works can only be fully appreciated if the reader is able to experience through empathy the character’s values. I call it "the axiological account" because it makes the grasping of aesthetic values dependent on the experience of other values embodied in the work. I develop my argument in three stages. First, I argue that in empathy we not only apprehend but also experience something similar to what the target is going through. Next, I show (...)
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  19. Mapping the Dimensions of Agency: The Narrative as Unifying Mechanism.Przemysław Zawadzki - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):191-193.
  20. O lugar da Inteligência Artificial nas relações entre mente e Direito Penal.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2020 - Anatomia Do Crime 1 (12):51-66.
    Terá sentido proteger e responsabilizar penalmente máquinas tal como se protege e responsabiliza penalmente pessoas? Será a Inteligência Artificial das máquinas uma mentalidade artificial, produzida por entidades mentais naturais? Se sim, a artificialidade é decisiva para negar a sua proteção e responsabilidade penais? Se não há verdadeira mentalidade, estará justificada, ainda assim, a sua proteção e responsabilidade penais? E é necessária a posse de mentalidade para haver proteção e responsabilidade penais? Estas são questões fulcrais relativas à relação entre Inteligência Artificial (...)
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  21. Commands and Collaboration in the Origin of Human Thinking: A Response to Azeri’s “On Reality of Thinking”.Chris Drain - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (3):6-14.
    L.S. Vygotsky’s “regulative” account of the development of human thinking hinges on the centralization of “directive” speech acts (commands or imperatives). With directives, one directs the activity of another, and in turn begins to “self-direct” (or self-regulate). It’s my claim that Vygotsky’s reliance on directives de facto keeps his account stuck at Tomasello's level of individual intentionality. Directive speech acts feature prominently in Tomasello’s developmental story as well. But Tomasello has the benefit of accounting for a functional differentiation in directive (...)
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  22. Two Irreducible Classes of Emotional Experiences: Affective Imaginings and Affective Perceptions.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object – because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects – nonetheless need not differ qua emotion-type. This leads to the same-emotional attitude, different content (...)
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  23. Mind and Object. An Essay on Intentionality.Patrik Engisch - 2017 - Dissertation, Université de Fribourg
    Provides a certain conception of the target of a theory of intentionality in terms of five properties (aboutness, non-existence, aspectuality, generality, and semantic normativity) and provides a guided tour of how different styles of theories of intentionality can meet up these requirements.
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  24. Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality.Markus Kneer - 2021 - In Tadeusz Ciecierski & Paweł Grabarczyk (eds.), Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition. De Gruyter. pp. 131-154.
    According to Anscombe, acting intentionally entails knowledge in ac- tion. This thesis has been near-universally rejected due to a well-known counter- example by Davidson: a man intending to make ten legible carbon copies might not believe with confidence, and hence not know, that he will succeed. If he does, however, his action surely counts as intentional. Damaging as it seems, an even more powerful objection can be levelled against Anscombe: while act- ing, there is as yet no fact of the (...)
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  25. Conservation of a Circle Explains (the Human) Mind.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
  26. Thinking About Morality.Sarah Sawyer - 2017 - Forum for European Philosophy.
    Sarah Sawyer on concepts and the objectivity of moral reasons.
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  27. Husserlian Intentionality and Contingent Universals.Nicola Spinelli - 2017 - Argumenta 2 (2):309-325.
    Can one hold both that universals exist in the strongest sense (i.e., neither in language nor in thought, nor in their instances) and that they exist contingently—and still make sense? Edmund Husserl thought so. In this paper I present a version of his view regimented in terms of modal logic cum possible-world semantics. Crucial to the picture is the distinction between two accessibility relations with different structural properties. These relations are cashed out in terms of two Husserlian notions of imagination: (...)
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  28. Connaissance de soi et engagement : Richard Moran lecteur analytique de Sartre.Samuel Webb - 2017 - In Paulo Jesus, Gonçalo Marcelo & Johann Michel (eds.), Du moi au soi : variations phénoménologiques et herméneutiques. Rennes: pp. 121-134.
    En général, une personne sait ce qu’elle pense, veut, ou ressent, sans avoir besoin pour cela de s’appuyer sur des observations d’elle-même. En ce sens, la connaissance de soi semble bénéficier d’un privilège par rapport à la connaissance d’autrui, celui de pouvoir apparaître comme vraie sans être fondée sur l’observation et l’inférence. Ce privilège se nomme, après Wittgenstein, l’« autorité de la première personne ». Pour expliquer ce phénomène, la métaphysique traditionnelle a postulé, à l’instar du cogito cartésien, que le (...)
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  29. Review of Malafouris & Renfrew (2010): The Cognitive Life of Things. Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind. [REVIEW]Lucas M. Bietti - 2011 - Pragmatics and Cognition 19 (1):141-149.
  30. Review of Nelson (1996): Language in Cognitive Development: The Emergence of the Mediated Mind. [REVIEW]Andrew Woodfield - 1999 - Pragmatics and Cognition 7 (2):423-425.
  31. Review of Culioli, Liddle & Stonham (1995): Cognition and Representation in Linguistic Theory. [REVIEW]Thomas Bearth - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (1):135-147.
  32. Intention and Empathy.Kevin Harrelson - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1162-1184.
    This essay challenges some assumptions of prevalent theories of empathy. The empathizer, according to these theories, must have an emotion or a representation that matches the recipient’s emotion or representation. I argue that these conditions fail to account for important cases, namely surrogate and out-group empathy. In the course of this argument, I isolate some conceptual difficulties in extant models of cognitive empathy. In place of the matching theories,I propose an indexical model that (1) distinguishes virtual from real self-reference and (...)
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  33. Pain Experiences and Their Link to Action: Challenging Imperative Theories.Sabrina Coninx - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):104-126.
    According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I argue that, although (...)
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  34. The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85.
    Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by (...)
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  35. Intuitions About the Reference of Proper Names: a Meta-Analysis.Noah van Dongen, Matteo Colombo, Felipe Romero & Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-30.
    The finding that intuitions about the reference of proper names vary cross-culturally was one of the early milestones in experimental philosophy. Many follow-up studies investigated the scope and magnitude of such cross-cultural effects, but our paper provides the first systematic meta-analysis of studies replicating. In the light of our results, we assess the existence and significance of cross-cultural effects for intuitions about the reference of proper names.
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  36. The Concept of Motivation in Merleau-Ponty: Husserlian Sources, Intentionality, and Institution.Philip J. Walsh - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Merleau-Ponty’s relation to Husserl has been understood along a spectrum running from outright repudiation to deep appreciation. The aim of this paper is to clarify a significant and heretofore largely neglected unifying thread connecting Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, while also demonstrating its general philosophical import for phenomenological philosophy. On this account, the details of a programmatic philosophical continuity between these two phenomenologists can be structured around the concept of motivation. Merleau-Ponty sees in Husserl’s concept of motivation a necessary and innovative concept (...)
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  37. The Normative/Agentive Correspondence.Ryan Simonelli - forthcoming - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy.
    In recent work, Robert Brandom has articulated important connections between the deontic normative statuses of entitlement and commitment and the alethic modal statuses of possibility and necessity. In this paper, I articulate an until now unexplored connection between Brandom’s core normative statuses of entitlement and commitment and the agentive modal statuses of ability and compulsion. These modals have application not only in action, but also in perception and inference, and, in both of these cases, there is a direct mapping between (...)
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  38. The problem of intentionality in the pragmatics of communicative language use.Alexa Bódog - 2012 - Dissertation, Doctoral School of Linguistics, University of Debrecen, Hungary
    The thesis is a metatheoretical analysis of the concept of ‘speaker’s intention’ as it is used in traditional linguistic-philosophical and in cognitive pragmatics. The analysis centers around works of Austin, Searle, Grice, and Relevance Theory. The main aim is to argue for the following thesis: (T1) if pragmatics is targeting on how speaker’s intentions contribute to linguistic choices in communicative language use, then focusing solely on causally efficient mental states and analyzing them at the utterance level necessarily leads to unsatisfactory (...)
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  39. Henry P. Stapp. Quantum Theory and Free Will: How Mental Intentions Translate Into Bodily Actions.Alin Christoph Cucu - 2020 - Philosophia Christi 22 (1):175-179.
  40. Liking That It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. Second-order desire views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to second-order desire views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the second-order desire view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until (...)
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  41. Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrew D. Thomas - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1197-1208.
    Kriegel described the problem of intentional inexistence as one of the ‘perennial problems of philosophy’, 307–340, 2007: 307). In the same paper, Kriegel alluded to a modal realist solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. However, Kriegel does not state by name who defends the kind of modal realist solution he has in mind. Kriegel also points out that even what he believes to be the strongest version of modal realism does not pass the ‘principle of representation’ and thus modal (...)
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  42. Emotions as Original Existences: A Theory of Emotion, Motivation and the Self.Demian Whiting - 2020 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as ‘original existences’: feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emotion (...)
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  43. Must We Mean What We Do? – Review Symposium on Leys’s The Ascent of Affect.Clive Barnett - 2020 - History of the Human Sciences 33 (2):115-126.
  44. La naturalización de las emociones: anotaciones a partir de Wittgenstein.Juan Raúl Loaiza Arias - 2016 - Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario.
    En la literatura sobre las emociones una de las teorías con mayor fuerza es la llamada “teoría James-Lange”. En esta obra se intenta hacer una crítica a dicha teoría a partir de algunas observaciones de Wittgenstein sobre el uso de conceptos psicológicos, sacando a la luz dos confusiones gramaticales que surgen en ella. Para ello, se construye primero la categoría de “programa de naturalización de las emociones” que recoge las teorías del Descartes, James y Prinz, siguiendo la metodología de Lakatos. (...)
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  45. Connectionism and the Intentionality of the Programmer.Mark Ressler - 2003 - Dissertation, San Diego State University
    Connectionism seems to avoid many of the problems of classical artificial intelligence, but has it avoided all of them? In this thesis I examine the problem that Intentionality, the directedness of thought to an object, raises for connectionism. As a preliminary approach, I consider the role of Intentionality in classical artificial intelligence from the programmer’s point of view. In this investigation, one problem I identify with classical artificial intelligence is that the Intentionality of the programmer seems to be projected onto (...)
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  46. The Artificial View: Toward a Non-Anthropocentric Account of Moral Patiency.Fabio Tollon - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):147-155.
    In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of the Organic View of Ethical Status, as outlined by Torrance (2008). A key presupposition of this view is that only moral patients can be moral agents. It is claimed that because artificial agents lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern (i.e. moral patients). This account of moral standing in principle excludes machines from participating in our moral universe. I will argue that the Organic View operationalises anthropocentric intuitions (...)
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  47. Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.
    Bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings, are commonly characterized in terms of their phenomenal character. In order to account for this phenomenal character, many philosophers adopt strong representationalism. According to this view, bodily sensations are essentially and entirely determined by an intentional content related to particular conditions of the body. For example, pain would be nothing more than the representation of actual or potential tissue damage. In order to motivate and justify their view, strong representationalists often (...)
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  48. Filosofía de la Mente y Psicología: Enfoques Interdisciplinarios.Pablo Lopez-Silva - 2020 - Santiago, Santiago Metropolitan Region, Chile: UAH Ediciones.
  49. Discusiones Contemporáneas en Filosofía de la Mente: Voces Locales.Pablo Lopez-Silva - 2019 - Valparaíso, Chile: Selección de Textos.
  50. Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
1 — 50 / 12221