Intentionality

Edited by Robert D. Rupert (University of Colorado, Boulder)
About this topic
Summary Intentionality is a property possessed by representational states or states with content or meaning, their property of being about something. Mental states appear most prominently among the inventory of intentional items, being directed toward such varied objects as historical events, people, and numbers. When a person believes that Hitler led the Nazis, her belief is about Hitler and about the Nazis. Philosophical work on intentionality ranges from phenomenological investigations of the experience of having thoughts about objects -- including nonexistent ones -- to investigations of the semantics of sentences used to attribute mental states, to the physical or causal determinants of the semantic values of mental representations. This category subsumes work in all of these areas, as well as work in cognitive science on concepts, symbolic representations, and mental images and work in consciousness studies on the intentionality of phenomenal states (such as the what-it's-like to see red).
Key works As part of a proposal for distinguishing the subject matter of psychology from that of the physical sciences, Franz Brentano (Brentano 1874) claimed that intentionality is the mark of the mental and is present in mental states themselves (not a function of their relation to something beyond the psychological realm). Although this focus on internally accessible intentional objects may have comported well enough with the introspectionist psychology of Brentano's day and may have grounded rich phenomenological projects (e.g., Husserl 1980), the rise of behaviorist psychology tended, in the Anglophone world of analytic philosophy, to work against Brentano's approach and its close cousins. Instead, many of the most influential English-language works of the twentieth century marginalized or re-interpreted intentional claims (Ryle 1949, Quine 1956). Later parts of the twentieth century, however, saw the cognitivist revolution in the empirical study of the mind and the widespread rejection of philosophical behaviorism, and these developments led to renewed interest in mental representation and, accordingly, in intentionality, particularly in the promise that we might best understand intentionality as a physical, scientifically respectable phenomenon. Thus began efforts to "naturalize" intentionality, by grounding it in information-related, nomic, causal, or evolutionary facts (Dretske 1981Fodor 1990, and Millikan 1984 provide exemplary efforts of these sorts). Recent years have seen attempts to locate intentionality closer to where Brentano and the phenomenologists envisioned, as something directly experienced in, or as an intrinsic property of, conscious thought (see, e.g., Horgan & Tienson 2002, Kriegel 2007).
Introductions Rupert 2008Fodor 1985Adams & Aizawa 2010Crane 1998Margolis & Laurence 1999
Related categories
Subcategories:
History/traditions: Intentionality

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  1. Hostile Affective States and Their Self-Deceptive Styles: Envy and Hate.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Alba Montes Sánchez & Alessandro Salice (eds.), Emotional Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    This paper explores how individuals experiencing hostile affective states such as envy, jealousy, hate, contempt, and Ressentiment tend to deceive themselves about their own mental states. More precisely, it examines how the feeling of being diminished in worth experienced by the subject of these hostile affective states motivates a series of self-deceptive maneuvers that generate a fictitious upliftment of the subject’s sense of self. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper explores the main arguments that explain why several hostile (...)
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  2. On the Importance of a Human-Scale Breadth of View: Reading Tallis' Freedom.Jan Halák - 2022 - Human Affairs 32 (4):439-452.
    This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis’ book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis argues that the laws described by science are dependent on human agency which extracts them from nature. Consequently, human agency cannot be explained as an effect of natural laws. I agree with Tallis’ main argument and I appreciate that he helps us understand the systematic importance of a human-scale breadth of view regarding any theoretical investigation. In the main part of the paper, I critically comment (...)
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  3. On a Proposal of Strawson Concerning Context Vs. 'What is Said'.Varol Akman - 2008 - In Paolo Bouquet, Luciano Serafini & Richmond H. Thomason (eds.), Perspectives on Contexts, CSLI Lecture Notes No. 180. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications. pp. 79-94.
    In Strawson’s Entity and Identity, there are two essays (Chapters 11 and 12), which study the notion of context. In these essays, Strawson advances a threefold distinction regarding how context bears on the meaning of 'what is said' when a sentence is uttered. -/- In this paper, we'll (i) review the original scheme of Strawson and summarize his improvements to his own scheme, and (ii) add our own improvements to make it even more thoroughgoing. We'll also show that unless it (...)
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  4. Representing Emotions in Terms of Object Directedness.Varol Akman & Hakime G. Unsal - 1994 - Department of Computer Engineering Technical Reports, Bilkent University.
    A logical formalization of emotions is considered to be tricky because they appear to have no strict types, reasons, and consequences. On the other hand, such a formalization is crucial for commonsense reasoning. Here, the so-called "object directedness" of emotions is studied by using Helen Nissenbaum's influential ideas.
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  5. Rethinking Phenomenal Intentionality.Christopher Stratman - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
    My dissertation puts forward a critique of the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT). According to standard accounts of PIT, all genuine intentionality is either identical to or partly grounded in phenomenal consciousness. I argue that it is a conceptually significant mistake to construe conscious experiences in terms of token mental states that instantiate phenomenal properties. This mistake is predicated on ignoring an important difference in the temporal character—what I call the “temporal shape”—between states and properties as opposed to conscious experiences. States (...)
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  6. Inwiefern sind philosophische Erfahrungen epistemisch transformativ?Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 70 (5):809-822.
    Drawing on Laurie A. Paul’s notion of “transformative experience”, this paper explores transformative philosophical experiences and analyses the structure of the attitude underlying them. It is argued that these experiences have to be explained not in cognitive terms but as a change in our affective attitude. More precisely, these experiences lead us to feel values in a novel manner. However, in order to make the philosophical experience epistemically transformative and provide a new perspective from which we can acquire new philosophical (...)
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  7. Inwiefern sind philosophische Erfahrungen epistemisch transformativ?Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2022 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 70 (5).
  8. The Essence of the Mental.Ray Buchanan & Alex Grzankowski - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    Your belief that Obama is a Democrat wouldn’t be the belief that it is if it didn't represent Obama, nor would the pain in your ankle be the state that is if, say, it felt like an itch. Accordingly, it is tempting to hold that phenomenal and representational properties are essential to the mental states that have them. But, as several theorists have forcefully argued (including Kripke (1980) and Burge (1979, 1982)) this attractive idea is seemingly in tension with another (...)
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  9. Intentionality and Dualism: Does the Idea That Intentionality Is the MOM Necessarily Entail Dualism?Andrea Tortoreto - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (Philosophy of Mind, Intentionali):82.
    It is well known that Franz Brentano was the first to suggest intentionality, the property of being about something, as a criterion for demarcating the domain of the mental. He suggested that intentionality is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to qualify as a mental event. It is important, for the purposes of this paper, to pay attention to the fact that Brentano’s theory came from within a broader philosophical outlook that was thoroughly dualistic. He sought a total separation (...)
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  10. Emociones religiosas: fenomenología, cognición y valor.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Rubén Sánchez (ed.), Filosofía y religión. Problemas y enfoques contemporáneos. Mexiko-Stadt, Hauptstadtdistrikt, Mexiko:
    Tener miedo del más allá, sentirse amado incondicionalmente por un ser superior, avergonzarse de la condición imperfecta del ser humano, son algunos ejemplos de emociones que no dudaríamos en calificar como religiosas. Ahora bien ¿Cómo describir su estructura? ¿Por qué llamamos a estas emociones “religiosas”? ¿Cuálos son los rasgos distintivos que sirven para diferenciarlas de las emociones “no religiosas”? En este artículo se examinan los rasgos distintivos de las emociones religiosas. Para ello, se analizan tres elementos cruciales de la experiencia (...)
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  11. Love and Fear as Asymmetric Opposites.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Iulian Apostolescu & Veronica Cibotaru (eds.), Phenomenologies of Love. Leiden, Niederlande:
  12. Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are “diffuse”. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...)
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  13. Affective Persistence and the Normative Phenomenology of Emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - In J. Deonna, C. Tappolet & F. Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.
    This paper presents a detailed analysis of affective persistence and its significance – that is the persistence of affect in the face of countervailing or contradictory evaluative information. More specifically, it appeals to the phenomena of affective persistence to support the claim that a significant portion of the emotional experiences of adult humans involve a kind of normative phenomenology. Its central claim is that by appealing to a distinctive kind of normative phenomenology that emotions exhibit, we get a neat personal (...)
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  14. The Estimator Theory of Life and Mind: How Agency and Consciousness Can Emerge.J. H. Van Hateren - manuscript
    This book provides a comprehensive overview of my recent theoretical work that aims to explain some of the more puzzling properties of life and mind, in particular agency, goal-directedness and consciousness. It contains published papers as well as new material. Table of contents: Preface - PART I: GROUNDWORK - 1. Introduction - 2. The basic mechanism - 3. Inclusive and extensive fitness - 4. Components of F and X - 5. The consequences: a preview - PART II: LIFE - 6. (...)
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  15. The Precision of Content Characterizations.Fabian Hundertmark - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    The contents of representations in non-human animals, human core cognition, and perception cannot precisely be characterized by sentences of a natural language. However, this fact does not stop us from giving imprecise characterizations of these contents through natural language. In this paper, I develop an account of the precision of content characterizations by appealing to possible-world semantics combined with set and measurement theory.
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  16. The Phenomenal Contribution of Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, that is in terms of properties of its intentional object. This paper (...)
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  17. Minimal Rationality: Structural or Reasons-Responsive?Jean Moritz Müller - 2022 - In Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa. Genf, Schweiz:
    According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs in important (...)
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  18. The Ineffable as Radical.Laura Silva - 2022 - In Christine Tappolet, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa. Geneva:
    Ronald de Sousa is one of the few analytic philosophers to have explored the ineffability of emotion. Ineffability arises, for de Sousa, from attempts to translate experience, which involves non-conceptual content, into language, which involves conceptual content. As de Sousa himself rightly notes, such a characterization construes all perceptual experience as ineffable and does not explain what might set emotional ineffability apart. I build on de Sousa’s insights regarding what makes emotional ineffability distinctive by highlighting that in the case of (...)
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  19. The Hyle of Imagination and Reproductive Consciousness: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Phantasy Reconsidered.Ka-yu Hui - 2022 - Husserl Studies 38 (3):273–292.
    The validity of Husserl’s early apprehension/content of apprehension schema of intentionality has long been a subject of dispute. In the case of phantasy, commentators often assert that the talk of “non-intentional content,” i.e. the phantasm, is abandoned in Husserl’s mature phenomenology of phantasy, and his subsequent theory of reproductive consciousness aims precisely to replace the previous schema. Against the current dismissive stance in the literature, this paper argues for the centrality of the concept of phantasm in the phenomenology of phantasy. (...)
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  20. Describing the Person as Cognitive-Intentional Entity.Lucian Delescu - 2017 - Studii Franciscane 17:169-184.
    When describing the person, the general tendency is to rely upon the assumption that the quality of “person” is always constituted from “outside” to “inside” either by being determined to re-project the content of emotional experiences, or by simply transferring existent theoretical constructions. I have explored this way of thinking in a previous occasion and made more or less clear why it ultimately leads to the rejection of the inner dimension of person in the absence of which no serious discussion (...)
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  21. Arrangements in Science and Mind.Richard Davies Gill - 2022 - Seatle: Amazon.
    This book is about trying to comprehend the mind from both scientific and philosophical standpoints. In recent years interest has revived in the difficult problem of consciousness. The many difficulties of understanding our minds have been considered in the past, mainly from philosophical or religious viewpoints, but only more recently from scientific perspectives. The book charts the landscape and proposes that the fundamental thing in the world is an arrangement, and this concept can encompass both material objects and things of (...)
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  22. Imagine What It Feels Like.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Anja Berninger & Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination. Routledge.
    Often in our everyday lives, for instance, in decision-taking, empathizing with others, and engaging with fictions, we are able to imagine what a particular emotion feels like. This chapter analyzes the structure of these imaginings as a kind of experiential imagining. After introducing the topic (section 1), I argue that these imaginings cannot be explained exclusively by their content and that a focus on the mode of imagining is required. We not only imagine having emotions, but we also imagine them (...)
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  23. The Concept of Motivation in Merleau-Ponty: Husserlian Sources, Intentionality, and Institution.Philip J. Walsh - 2022 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 60 (2):303-336.
    Merleau-Ponty’s relation to Husserl has been understood along a spectrum running from outright repudiation to deep appreciation. The aim of this paper is to clarify a significant and heretofore largely neglected unifying thread connecting Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, while also demonstrating its general philosophical import for phenomenological philosophy. On this account, the details of a programmatic philosophical continuity between these two phenomenologists can be structured around the concept of motivation. Merleau-Ponty sees in Husserl’s concept of motivation a necessary and innovative concept (...)
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  24. Scheler and Zambrano: On a Transformation of the Heart in Spanish Philosophy.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Karolina Enquist Källgren - 2022 - History of European Ideas 47.
    This paper compares the concept of the heart in the works of Max Scheler and María Zambrano. Both authors use the heart as a metaphor for distinct human affective phenomena that have a central anthropological, epistemological, and ontological significance. The comparison between authors’ use of the metaphor is organised around three main topics: the order of the heart; the idea of a primordial feeling and its place in the affective life; and the primacy of love in relation to negative affective (...)
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  25. Crane and the Mark of the Mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.
    Brentano’s suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality. What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane, some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane replies that the concept of (...)
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  26. The First Breakthrough: Psychology, Theory of Knowledge, and Phenomenology of Meaning.Renaudie Pierre-Jean - 2022 - In Jacobs Hanne (ed.), The Husserlian Mind. London: Routledge. pp. 7-21.
    The publication of the two volumes of the Logical Investigations at the turn of the 20th Century constituted, according to their author, the first breakthrough of an entirely new and original philosophical undertaking, which gave birth to the phenomenological movement. However, before Husserl’s later attempt to systematize the content and provide a unified interpretation of the methods of phenomenology, the strength of this breakthrough rested mainly on the new, though sometimes divergent, paths of investigation that phenomenology was able to open. (...)
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  27. Abstract Events in Semantics.Gilles Kassel - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1913-1930.
    Here, we defend the thesis whereby the event plays a main role of sense in the meaning of certain sentences. This thesis is based on the one hand on recent work in the metaphysics of so-called “happening” entities, which has led to a distinction between concrete physical processes and abstract events, the latter being conceived as psychological constructs accounting for stabilities or changes in the world. Furthermore, we look back at the work on intentionality carried out in the Brentanian school (...)
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  28. Two Irreducible Classes of Emotional Experiences: Affective Imaginings and Affective Perceptions.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):307-325.
  29. Introduction.Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort - 2019 - In Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  30. Brentano and the Medieval Distinction Between First and Second Intentions.Hamid Taieb - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):143-158.
    Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” —and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there (...)
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  31. Ressentiment and Self-Deception in Early Phenomenology: Voigtländer, Scheler and Reinach.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (ed.), Else Voigtländer: Self, Emotion, and Sociality.
    This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...)
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  32. On the Analogy Between the Sensing of Secondary Qualities and the Feeling of Values: Landmann-Kalischer’s Epistemic Project, Its Historical Context, and Its Significance for Current Meta-Ethics.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Beatrice Centi, Faustino Fabbianelli & Gemmo Iocco (eds.), Philosophy of Value. The Historical Roots of Contemporary Debate: An Overview. De Gruyter.
    This paper explores Landmann-Kalischer’s analogy between the sensing of secondary qualities and the feeling of values in her work “Philosophie der Werte” (Philosophy of Values) (1910). Attention is paid to the epistemic motivation of the analogy, the distinction between pure feelings and affects, and the relation of pure feelings to value judgments. Her account is contrasted with two other accounts of the Brentanian tradition: Scheler’s approach within early phenomenology and Meinong’s account within the Graz School. I demonstrate that Landmann-Kalischer’s pioneering (...)
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  33. Do We Visually Experience Objects’ Occluded Parts?Matt E. M. Bower - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):239-255.
    A number of philosophers have held that we visually experience objects’ occluded parts, such as the out-of-view exterior of a voluminous, opaque object. That idea is supposed to be what best explains the fact that we see objects as whole or complete despite having only a part of them in view at any given moment. Yet, the claim doesn’t express a phenomenological datum and the reasons for thinking we do experience objects’ occluded parts, I argue, aren’t compelling. Additionally, I anticipate (...)
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  34. Intuitions About the Reference of Proper Names: a Meta-Analysis.Noah van Dongen, Matteo Colombo, Felipe Romero & Jan Sprenger - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):745-774.
    The finding that intuitions about the reference of proper names vary cross-culturally was one of the early milestones in experimental philosophy. Many follow-up studies investigated the scope and magnitude of such cross-cultural effects, but our paper provides the first systematic meta-analysis of studies replicating. In the light of our results, we assess the existence and significance of cross-cultural effects for intuitions about the reference of proper names.
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  35. Extended Modal Realism — A New Solution to Problems Related to Non-Existence.Andrew Thomas - 2021 - Dissertation, Durham University
  36. Extended Modal Realism: A New Solution to Problems Related to Non-Existence.Andrew Thomas - 2021 - Dissertation, Durham University
    This thesis argues that we should consider extended modal realism as a new player in the debate about non-existence. The primary aim is to show that extended modal realism is a viable theory when it comes to solving problems of non-existence. At times I will argue that extended modal realism has advantages over Lewisian modal realism when it comes to examining the problems of non-existence, not only in the case of problems relating to thought but also problems concerning truth as (...)
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  37. Normative Binding.David L. Thompson - manuscript
    Why should anyone be bound by cognitive norms, such as the norms of reason or mathematics? To become a mathematician is to learn to obey the norms of the mathematical community. A self becomes intentional by binding itself to communal norms. Only then can it have the freedom to think or make assertions about the community’s objects -- triangles or imaginary numbers, for example. Norms do not bind selves from the outside: being bound by norms is what constitutes a self.
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  38. The Phenomenology of Frustration and Orthodox Transcendental Idealism.Micah Phillips-Gary - 2021 - Dialectic 14 (2):7-14.
    In this paper I draw on Husserl's early analysis of the frustration of an intentional act to argue against orthodox transcendental idealism, the claim that our acts of cognition can be mistaken with regard to a "matter," and are therefore objective, but this matter only has conceptual structure by virtue of human activity. For example, the proposition "My coffee cup is red" can be true or false depending on the sensations I receive (the matter of the act of cognition), which (...)
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  39. The Evolutionary Origin of Selfhood in Normative Emotions.David L. Thompson - manuscript
    Modern selfhood presents itself as autonomous, overcoming emotion by following cognitive, moral and linguistic norms on the basis of clear, rational principles. It is difficult to imagine how such normative creatures could have evolved from their purely biological, non-normative, primate ancestors. I offer a just-so story to make it easier to imagine this transition. Early hominins learned to cooperate by developing group identities based on tribal norms. Group identity constituted proto-selves as normative creatures. Such group identity was not based on (...)
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  40. Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.
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  41. Embodied Higher Cognition: Insights From Merleau-Ponty’s Interpretation of Motor Intentionality.Jan Halák - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-29.
    This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...)
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  42. Language and Phenomenology.Chad Engelland (ed.) - 2020 - New York: Routledge.
    At first blush, phenomenology seems to be concerned preeminently with questions of knowledge, truth, and perception, and yet closer inspection reveals that the analyses of these phenomena remain bound up with language and that consequently phenomenology is, inextricably, a philosophy of language. Drawing on the insights of a variety of phenomenological authors, including Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, this collection of essays by leading scholars articulates the distinctively phenomenological contribution to language by examining two sets of questions. The first (...)
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  43. Adaptive Imagination: Toward a Mythopoetic Cognitive Science.Stephen Asma - 2021 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 5 (2):1-32.
    A mythopoetic paradigm or perspective sees the world primarily as a dramatic story of competing personal intentions, rather than a system of objective impersonal laws. Asma argued that our contemporary imaginative cognition is evolutionarily conserved-it has structural and functional similarities to premodern Homo sapiens’s cognition. This article will outline the essential features of mythopoetic cognition or adaptive imagination, delineate the adaptive sociocultural advantages of mythopoetic cognition, explain the phylogenetic and ontogenetic mechanisms that give rise to human mythopoetic mind, show how (...)
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  44. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2635-2663.
    This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered. An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motivation for the bodily-attitudinal theory and creates problems for its claims concerning the content of emotional experience. The conclusion is that while the bodily-attitudinal theory marks out a (...)
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  45. John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences.Tony Cheng - 2021 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    John McDowell's philosophical ideas are both influential and comprehensive, encompassing philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics and the history of philosophy. This book is a much-needed systematic overview of McDowell's thought that offers a clear and accessible route through the main elements of his philosophy. Arguing that the world and minded human subject are constitutively interdependent, the book examines and critically engages with McDowell's views on naturalism of second nature, the inner space model, intentionality, personhood and practical (...)
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  46. A-Priority and Hermeneutics: The Scientificity of Phenomenology From Husserl to Heidegger.Bruno Cassara - 2020 - Bollettino Filosofico 35 (1):58-70.
    Like Husserl, the young Heidegger was preoccupied with the a-priority of phenomenology. He also incorporates hermeneutics into phenomenology, though Husserl was convinced that the a-priority of phenomenology removed all interpretation from its analyses. This paper investigates how the early Heidegger is able to make hermeneutics a general condition of understanding while maintaining, in line with Husserl, that phenomenology is an a-priori science. This paper also provides insight into key debates in the history of phenomenology. I examine two places in which (...)
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  47. Hate: Toward a Four-Types Model.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental (...)
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  48. Emotionale Tiefe und die Spielarten der affektiven Intentionalität: Eine Anwendung auf die Philosophie der Religion.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Philosophische Anthropologie und Religion Religiöse Erfahrung, soziokulturelle Praxis und die Frage nach dem Menschen. De Gruyter.
    This paper provides an account on how to understand “emotional depth” and applies it to the particular case of religious experiences. After motivating the topic (section 1), I turn to classical and contemporary approaches to “emotional depth”. I divide these accounts into two main groups depending on whether they interpret depth as a constitutive or a momentary feature of the affective experience. I argue that despite their descriptive power, none of the existing accounts adequately captures the depth of affective religious (...)
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  49. Empathy in Appreciation: An Axiological Account.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2021 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 79 (2):233-238.
    This paper argues that certain literary works can only be fully appreciated if the reader is able to experience through empathy the character’s values. I call it "the axiological account" because it makes the grasping of aesthetic values dependent on the experience of other values embodied in the work. I develop my argument in three stages. First, I argue that in empathy we not only apprehend but also experience something similar to what the target is going through. Next, I show (...)
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  50. Mapping the Dimensions of Agency: The Narrative as Unifying Mechanism.Przemysław Zawadzki - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):191-193.
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