Skepticism

Edited by Everett Fulmer (Loyola University, New Orleans)
About this topic
Summary Skepticism involves doubt, or at least a reluctance to commit. For example, some philosophers are moral skeptics, claiming that no one can know what is right or wrong. Skepticism about the "external world" is more general, denying that there is knowledge of the world “outside our minds.”  Even more generally, some skeptics claim that there is no knowledge at all.  Philosophers have long explored reasons for and against various skeptical positions and argued about the consequences of adopting various skeptical stances.   In the ancient world, skepticism was recommended as a way of life.  The general claim was that living with an attitude of skeptical doubt is superior (morally and/or practically) to living with an attitude of dogmatic certainty.  In the modern world (i.e., the 1600s through the 1800s), skepticism was more often treated as something to be avoided, and considerable philosophical energy was put into strategies for doing so.  In contemporary philosophy, skepticism is typically framed as a theoretical problem rather than a practical one. The concern is to closely consider the best arguments for skepticism and to explore how best to respond to them.  Attempts to answer skeptical arguments have inspired philosophers to adopt substantive positions in epistemology, but also in ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and moral philosophy.  
Key works The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism provides a comprehensive introduction to skeptical arguments and responses to skepticism.  Influential volumes include Popkin 1961Unger 1975Stroud 1984; and Williams 1991.   
Introductions Useful introductory articles include DeRose 1995; Greco 2007Pritchard 2002.
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  1. Le critère sceptique: approches anciennes et modernes.Enzo Godinot & Lucas Pétuaud-Létang (eds.) - 2024 - Paris: Classiques Garnier.
    Peut-on parler de 'critère' sceptique? En tant qu'outil de distinction et de choix, un critère, qu'il soit pratique ou épistémique, est-il compatible avec des philosophies professant un pessimisme gnoséologique prononcé, sinon radical? Faut-il considérer qu'il n'y a pas de critère sans dogmatisme, et que l'absence de critère conduit les scepticismes à l'aporie, ou peut-on identifier des 'critères' sceptiques, dont l'originalité consiste à pouvoir établir des distinctions en suspendant son assentiment? Les études réunies dans le présent volume analysent la rémanence de (...)
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  2. Challenging knowledge: how we (sometimes) don't know what we think we know.Jody Azzouni - 2025 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Starting-point epistemology (SPE) is a new position that, coupled with agent-centered rationality, is the key to resolving philosophical scepticism. SPE acknowledges that metacognitively-sophisticated agents know that they know things and know (something) about the methods by which this happens. Agent-centered rationality implies that a metacognitively-sophisticated agent should only desert a knowledge claim because of a challenge they recognize to be fatal to that claim. Scepticism is metacognitive pathology: Except in those rare cases when an individual is cognitively damaged, sceptical arguments (...)
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  3. Suspending judgement on gods and on the meaningfulness of religious language in pyrrhonism.Joachim Bromand - 2025 - In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra (eds.), Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
    While Sextus Empiricus, according to the traditional view, tries to motivate suspension of judgment, e.g. regarding religious questions, by adducing equally convincing arguments for and against the claims in question, there is another – and hitherto unnoticed – dimension to Sextus’ remarks: Sextus not only tries to motivate the dogmatists to suspend judgment in the case of ‘first-order’ religious questions (like ‘Are there gods?’) but also on ‘higher-order’ or ‘metaphilosophical’ questions that are not concerned with the objects of religious faith (...)
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  4. Suspension in default logic.Daniela Schuster - 2025 - In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra (eds.), Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
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  5. The availability of further evidence and agentialism about suspension.Matthew McGrath - 2025 - In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra (eds.), Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
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  6. Suspension in epistemology and beyond.Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra (eds.) - 2025 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    This volume brings together original research exploring suspension of judgment from a variety of perspectives, both historical and contemporary. It examines the nature and normative status of suspension, its connections to other philosophical concepts, and its interdisciplinary applications.
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  7. Open Problems: The Debasing Demon.Guido Tana - forthcoming - Aphex.
    Skepticism is both a historical and foundational problem in epistemology. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has provided a new expression of its threat. The Debasing Demon appears to generate a novel form of radical doubt, one that has gained prominence in recent debates. Instead of targeting the connection between belief and truth, it undercuts the link between belief and evidence (or reasons). This contribution presents the Debasing Demon Problem, analyzing its reach. It will provide an account for explaining how its threat is (...)
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  8. Memory - Skepticism, reliability & knowledge.Martin Cappelen Prasir - 2024 - Dissertation, Universitet I Oslo
    The reliability of one´s memory is far from certain. Have you ever misplaced an item, forgotten a name or gotten the date wrong? Everyday situations can introduce doubt about our memorial faculties. This raises epistemological questions: Can we trust our memory as a source of knowledge? If memory is fallible, how can we justify beliefs that depend on it? Andrew Moon` global skeptical argument about memory states that we lack knowledge or warrant when it comes to trusting our memory as (...)
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  9. Awareness by degree.Paul Silva Jr & Robert Weston Siscoe - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (1):172-200.
    Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a factive mental state that comes in degrees. We (...)
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  10. Claudine Verheggen (ed.), Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40.Guido Tana - 2025 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (4):331-348.
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  11. Replies to Commentators.Ángel Pinillos - 2025 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (4):317-329.
    I respond to comments from Branden Fitelson, Chad Gonnerman and John Waterman, and Mark Walker. My response to Fitelson concerns how we should understand the notion of “sensitivity” which is central to my account of why we find skeptical premises intuitive. I argue against his recommendation except for a specific type of “loose” skeptical hypothesis. Gonnerman and Waterman push me to say more about the conditions under which we feel or not feel the skeptical pull. I clarify and expand on (...)
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  12. Précis of Why We Doubt.Ángel Pinillos - 2025 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (4):269-273.
    I selectively summarize some of the main ideas in my book Why We Doubt, focusing on the elements that are discussed in the replies from commentators. In the book, I investigated our skeptical intuitions which form the basis of the skeptic’s arguments. I argue that these intuitive judgments or inclinations to judge are produced by the deployment of a subconscious heuristic, pbs, which serves us well most of the time but misfires in esoteric cases like those associated with global skepticism. (...)
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  13. Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’s Why We Doubt.Branden Fitelson - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (4):274-281.
    In these brief remarks, I describe the author’s Bayesian explication of the narrow function of the meta-cognitive, heuristic algorithm (pbs) that is at the heart of his psychological explanation of why we entertain skeptical doubts. I provide some critical remarks, and an alternative Bayesian approach that is (to my mind) somewhat more elegant than the author’s.
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  14. Método, Natureza e Cognição: Uma comparação entre os naturalismos metodológicos de Quine e Hume quanto à natureza da cognição.Fernanda Cardoso - 2024 - Dissertation, Unicamp
    Esta monografia faz parte de uma pesquisa de Iniciação Científica (IC) atualmente em curso, com financiamento da FAPESP (processo 2023/04313-5) até 31/12/2024.A pesquisa de IC em questão, intitulada “Como fazer ciência da cognição? O problema do método científico nas ciências cognitivas na perspectiva do naturalismo anti-reducionista das epistemologias de Quine e Sellars”, pretende caracterizar e articular os conceitos de ciência e de cognição a partir das epistemologias naturalizadas de Willard von Orman Quine (1951/1961 e 1969) e Wilfrid Sellars (1956/1963 e (...)
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  15. Sextus Empiricus : Contre les moralistes, translated by René Lefebvre.Dimitri Cunty - 2025 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-6.
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  16. Claudine Verheggen (ed.), Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40.Guido Tana - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (4):331-348.
  17. Fixed Ideas and Ideologies: Developing a New Epistemology Rooted in Apathy.Zachary Isrow - 2024 - Conatus 9 (2):103-117.
    Epistemologies are overwhelmingly riddled with biases, influenced by ideologies and fixed ideas. Max Stirner and Louis Althusser argue at length regarding the negative impact of these on our way of thinking. This paper argues that the only escape from Stirner's fixed ideas or Althusser's ISAs (Ideological State Apparatuses) is through an apathetic disposition to the truth – something very unphilosophical in nature. In order to create parallactic shifts in thought, we must also develop a new epistemology, one rooted in apathy. (...)
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  18. How Can a Skeptic Write a Book?Brian Ribeiro - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-11.
    In this short essay, I will be using my title’s question as a way to explore some of the main themes and most intriguing new ideas in Mark Walker’s Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism: On Disbelieving Our Philosophical Views. I will first offer a sketch of Walker’s skeptical-dogmatist view. I will then lay out the “skeptic’s predicament” and explore possible ways of escaping the predicament, viz. longshotting, pseudonymizing, and dialogizing.
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  19. Resistance to Evidence, by Mona Simion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. Pp. xiv + 214. (Review). [REVIEW]Carolina Flores - forthcoming - Mind.
  20. Faits mooréens et révision des croyances, ou le sceptique peut-il gagner?Thomas Kelly & Benoit Guilielmo - 2024 - Klesis 57. Translated by Benoit Guilielmo.
    Un fait Mooréen, selon l'expression de David Lewis, est « l'une des choses que nous savons mieux que toute prémisse d'une argumentation philosophique visant à é tablir le contraire. » Le sujet des faits Mooréens soulève des questions profondes, à la fois de méthode philosophique et d'épistémologie de premier ordre. Comment devrions-nous répondre aux arguments qui remettent en question des croyances dont nous sommes extrêmement confiants ? Dans quelle mesure ces arguments – ou plutôt ceux qui les avancent – peuvent-ils (...)
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  21. Scepticism, evidential holism and the logic of demonic deception.Samir Okasha - 2024 - Noûs 58 (4):1032-1049.
    Sceptical arguments in epistemology typically employ sceptical hypotheses, which are rivals to our everyday beliefs so constructed that they fit exactly the evidence on which those beliefs are based. There are two ways of using a sceptical hypothesis to undermine an everyday belief, giving rise to two distinct sorts of sceptical argument: underdetermination‐based and closure‐based. However, both sorts of argument, as usually formulated in the literature, fall foul of evidential holism, for they ignore the crucial role of background beliefs. An (...)
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  22. Mind as a Figment of Yours, and, Reason to Pragmatism.Louis Birla - manuscript
  23. The Heritage Value of Culinary Items: A Rather Skeptical Tale.Patrik Engisch - 2023 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 81 (4):539-544.
    Can culinary items bear heritage value? That is, can culinary items bear the kind of universal value shared by, say, a paleolithic site and the Hiroshima P.
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  24. (1 other version)Skepticism.Annalisa Coliva - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge. Edited by Duncan Pritchard.
    Skepticism is one of the perennial problems of philosophy: from antiquity, to the early modern period of Descartes and Hume, and right through to the present day. It remains a fundamental and widely studied topic and, as Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard show in this book, it presents us with a paradox with important ramifications not only for epistemology but also for many other core areas of philosophy. In this book they provide a thorough grounding in contemporary debates about skepticism, (...)
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  25. Turning the tables on Hume.Casper Storm Hansen - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (10).
    Certain prior credence distributions concerning the future lead to inductivism, and others lead to inductive skepticism. I argue that it is difficult to consider the latter to be reasonable. I do not prove that they are not, but at the end of the paper, the tables are turned: in line with pre-philosophical intuitions, inductivism has retaken its place as the most reasonable default position, while the skeptic is called on to supply a novel argument for his. The reason is as (...)
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  26. Growing up godless: non-religious childhoods in contemporary England.Anna Strhan - 2025 - Princeton: Princeton University Press. Edited by Rachael Shillitoe.
    In Britain, as in many other countries across Europe, non-religion has now replaced Christianity as the cultural default, especially among younger age groups. There is for the first time a no-religion majority, and only around half the overall population now express belief in some kind of God. And while religion continues to feature prominently in children's education in countries like the UK, schools are, increasingly, making space in the classroom for nonreligious stances toward life. But as of yet, there has (...)
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  27. Oakeshott’s skepticism, politics and aesthetics. [REVIEW]Elizabeth Corey - 2024 - History of European Ideas 50 (6):1152-1153.
    When Michael Oakeshott died in 1990, there were only a handful of scholarly monographs about his thought. Twenty years later, in contrast, the burgeoning number of studies of his thought prompted o...
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  28. Before the Caress: The Expansion of Intimacy in Suspension.Rachel Aumiller - 2024 - In Rebekka A. Klein & Calvin D. Ullrich (eds.), The Unthinkable Body: Challenges of Embodiment in Religion, Politics, and Ethics. Stuttgart: Mohr Siebeck. pp. 257-272.
    This chapter offers phenomenological ethics of intimacy for experiences of isolation, reduced haptic relations, and periods when we must hold each other at a distance. How can we practice an ethics of intimacy from a space of separation and suspended activities involving bodily proximity and touch? By drawing on Luce Irigaray’s identification of a “caress before the caress,” I locate a queer, feminist ethics of intimacy born from the experience of undetermined desire or “erotic suspension.” The reduction and disruption of (...)
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  29. Suspension of Judgment as a Doxastic Default.Mark Satta - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-25.
    In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophical views—i.e., he argues that we should disbelieve most philosophical views. Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism over both Dogmatism and Skepticism. In response, I defend Skepticism—i.e., the view that we should neither believe nor disbelieve most philosophical views. I argue that Walker’s arguments overlook some of the most plausible forms of philosophical Skepticism where the Skeptic suspends judgment about most disputed philosophical views without assigning a credence of 0.5 to those views. (...)
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  30. (1 other version)Other minds.John Wisdom - 1952 - Oxford,: Blackwell.
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  31. Das palavras ao pacto: a linguagem como fundamento em Thomas Hobbes.Mariana Dias Pinheiro Santos - 2024 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Sergipe
    Defendo que a linguagem, em Thomas Hobbes, por ser o fundamento de sua filosofia, pode ser entendida, em última instância, como um pacto de entendimento e de vontades. Sendo assim, não apenas os nomes e a verdade decorrem da convenção linguística, mas todos os tipos de regras e princípios são fruto de um contrato linguístico que atende às necessidades, às convenções e às vontades dos humanos. Com o objetivo de provar esta hipótese, foi necessário provar, primeiro, como a linguagem ocupa (...)
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  32. Bias Defended.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):234-258.
    In this paper, I clarify and defend some of the central ideas of Bias in response to commentators, with a special focus on the theme of skepticism. In response to Michael Veber, I defend the project of offering a modest as opposed to an ambitious response to the skeptic. In response to Jonathan Matheson, I defend my account of the way in which bias attributions function in contexts of interpersonal disagreement, as well as the claim that an unbiased believer will (...)
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  33. Bias, Knowledge, Skepticism, and Disagreement: Précis of Part iii of Bias: A Philosophical Study.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):181-189.
    The third and final part of Bias: A Philosophical Study explores the connections between bias and some of the central topics of epistemology, including knowledge, skepticism, and disagreement. It defends the possibility of biased knowing: biased believers can sometimes know, even when they believe in accordance with their biases, and even if those biases guarantee that they would believe as they do even if the truth were otherwise. It argues that the possibility of biased knowing has significant implications for both (...)
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  34. Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, edited by Nathan Ballantyne and David Dunning.Christos Kyriacou - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):263-268.
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  35. Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers.Michael Veber - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):190-200.
    In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the (...)
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  36. The Skeptic and the Veridicalist: On the Difference Between Knowing What There Is and Knowing What Things Are, written by Yuval Avnur.Kevin McCain - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):259-262.
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  37. (1 other version)Metodología de lo suprasensible.Alfonso López Quintás - 1963 - Madrid,: Editora Nacional.
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  38. After Critique: Cynicism, Scepticism and the Politics of Laughter.Benedikt Korf - 2024 - Theory, Culture and Society 41 (4):95-110.
    In 1983, two philosophers, Michel Foucault and Peter Sloterdijk, engaged with ancient Cynicism and the outspokenness and laughter of Diogenes as a critical practice. Foucault and Sloterdijk did so to position themselves ‘after’ critique: ‘after’ a period of and ‘beyond’ a certain style of dogmatism and theoretical deadlocks that troubled left thinking in the early 1980s (and continue to do so today). I show how Foucault and Sloterdijk, while differing in their critical politics, both read Diogenes’ politics of truth as (...)
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  39. The Indefensibility of the Scientific Concept of Probability.A. Braynen - manuscript
    Whereas many philosophers accept the validity of 'probability' and confine themselves to interpreting it, this paper challenges its conceptual coherence by critically examining its use in the empirical world. While measure theory provides a rigorous mathematical framework for manipulating probability functions, we argue that applying precise probability measures to empirically uncertain outcomes introduces a fundamental contradiction. Probability measures claim to quantify uncertainty while simultaneously implying a degree of understanding about events that we do not fully possess. This inconsistency undermines the (...)
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  40. Normative relations between ignorance and suspension of judgement: a systematic investigation.Anne Meylan & Thomas Raleigh - 2025 - In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra (eds.), Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In the recent epistemological literature much has been written about the nature of suspending judgement or agnosticism. There has also been a surge of recent interest in the nature of ignorance. But what is the relationship between these two epistemically significant states? Prima facie, both suspension and ignorance seem to involve the lack of a correct answer to a question. And, again prima facie, there may be some intuitive attraction to the idea that when one is ignorant whether p, one (...)
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  41. (1 other version)Other minds.John Wisdom - 1966 - Oxford,: Blackwell.
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  42. In Defense of an Account of Degrees of Epistemic Responsibility.Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda - 2023 - Philosophy and Progress 73 (1-2):95-112.
    This article explores the concept of degrees of epistemic responsibility by examining the debate between Michael Bishop and Katherine Puddifoot on the internalist perspective on epistemic responsibility. While Bishop’s empirical evidence challenges internalism, Puddifoot argues it can be supportive. The author presents an account of degrees of epistemic responsibility, drawing inspiration from Martin Montminy’s idea of moral responsibility. The central argument suggests that an agent is epistemically responsible only if her reasoning strategy aligns with her epistemic abilities, a concept referred (...)
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  43. “Did Descartes Read Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism?” A “Sceptical” Response.Paul O’Mahoney - 2024 - The European Legacy 29 (6):614-622.
    This article has been invited by The European Legacy editors as a response to Ayumu Tamura’s “Did Descartes Read Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism?” which continues the promising lines of enquiry he...
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  44. Ethics of atomism – Democritus, Vasubandhu, and the skepticism that wasn’t.Amber D. Carpenter - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (4):840-864.
    Democritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its results, and aims to address different concerns. It leaves us with a (...)
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  45. Problem granic poznania z hipersystemowego punktu widzenia.Krzysztof Mudyń - 1992 - Kraków: Nakł. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
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  46. Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism.Matteo Baggio - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (3):439-465.
    Logical realism is the metaphysical view asserting that the facts of logic exist and are mind-and-language independent. McSweeney argues that if logical realism is true, we encounter a dilemma. Either we cannot determine which of the two logically equivalent theories holds a fundamental status, or neither theory can be considered fundamental. These two conclusions together constitute what is known as the _Unfamiliarity Dilemma_, which poses significant challenges to our understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical features of logic. In this article, (...)
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  47. Psychological Reflections in the Philosopher’s Mirror: Comments on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study.Jared B. Celniker & Nathan Ballantyne - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):229-233.
    In this brief commentary, we offer thoughts on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study. We focus on the book’s relevance to the study of cognitive biases, including Kelly’s discussion of naïve realism (in the psychologists’ sense). While we are largely enthusiastic about Kelly’s theorizing, we also provide some pushback against his notion of emergent biases. We hope that psychologists will engage with Kelly’s work and might consider how some philosophical refinements could improve the empirical study of biases.
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  48. Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’ Treatment of Global Skepticism in Why We Doubt.Mark Walker - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (4):302-316.
    Ángel Pinillos’ Why We Doubt offers an error theory for at least some versions of global skepticism: skeptical doubts are based on a faulty heuristic. Once this heuristic is replaced by a more apt principle inspired by Bayesian approaches to epistemology, the skeptical doubts are shown not to be motivated. I argue contra Pinillos that skeptical doubts may remain even if we grant the main line of Pinillos’ argument. Skeptical doubts might be generated by disagreement even when we accept Pinillos’ (...)
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  49. Biased Suspension of Judgment.Brett Sherman - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):218-228.
    According to Thomas Kelly, traditional skeptical arguments can be conceived in terms of bias. The main aim of this paper is not to challenge Kelly’s conclusions, but rather to draw some interesting consequences from them. Specifically, in addition to cases of biased judgments, which draw the ire of the skeptic, there are also cases of biased suspension of judgment. By examining cases of racially biased suspension of judgment and comparing them to cases of skepticism, I argue that we can help (...)
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  50. The Curious Case of the Disappearance of Pyrrhonism from Continental Philosophy.Robb Dunphy - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-27.
    In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. (1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation with ancient Greek thought, with Pyrrhonian scepticism. (2) That major continental philosophers of the twentieth century tended to engage in some depth with their nineteenth-century forebears and maintained their tendency to engage significantly with ancient Greek thought. (3) That twentieth-century continental philosophers demonstrate little (...)
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