Epistemology of Religion

From a Quantum Cosmic perspective, a new theology is developed based on the doctrine that humans have an energy code and a biological code that allow us to achieve direct contact with the cosmic energies permeating the universe and flow in with the Alpha Energy, namely, the energy of the Creator or God. The energy codes of human beings transcend physical death as energy never ceases to exist, only to transform. Moreover, our ‘energy body network’ produces new energy through biophotons (...) which allow beings to be in total command of their existence and communicate with the cosmos through a cosmic language. Patient and consistent practice of cosmic meditation and mental physics will lead to an awakening and evolution to a Cosmic Quantum Consciousness that resembles the ultimate connection with the Alpha Energy. This article will explore the perennial approach of Quantum Cosmic Theology which suggests that all people can be united under one fundamental creed while concurrently respecting relatively minor differences in religious belief and practice. (shrink)

This essay examines the contributions of Greek philosopher and theologian Christos Yannaras to the question of the relationship between faith and reason. Although a comprehensive analysis of the entire body of his work is beyond the scope of this project, we will attempt to demonstrate through a selective survey, from the early `On the Absence and Unknowability of God' (1970) to the later `The Effable and the Ineffable' (1999), that he presents a convincing `third way' between rationalism and deism. We (...) will argue that Yannaras accomplishes this by methodologically deconstructing the presuppositions of rationalism and advocating for a more `empirically correct' approach grounded in apophaticism and social verification of knowledge. In doing so, he introduces a paradigm that not only challenges the binary opposition between faith and reason but also establishes a distinctive point of encounter between Orthodox Christian theology and contemporary philosophical discourse. (shrink)

The term ‘natural theology’ provokes a variety of reactions, spanning from whole-hearted endorsement to passionate rejection. Charged as it is with polemical and pejorative undertones, this debate begs for an intervention. If the scholarly community is to engage constructively with the concept and practice of natural theology — either by way of acceptance, rejection, or something in between — clarity in its definition and identification is imperative. The aim of this paper, then, is to try to shed some light on (...) three of the most common definitions of ‘natural theology’ in contemporary scholarship, to provide clarity about the ways in which they differ, and to propose some conceptual refinements in the hope that, if adopted, more fruitful discourse may take place in relation to this much-debated and interdisciplinary phrase. (shrink)

RELIGION TODAY (2nd edition) offers a refreshing introduction to the academic study of religion with a particular emphasis on critically informed analysis. The book skillfully explores diverse religious traditions and phenomena, providing readers with a comprehensive overview that encourages them to engage critically with the subject and materials. Written for an undergraduate audience, this book is accessible and well-organized, making it suitable for both students and general readers interested in sharpening their understanding of religion. Overall, Religion Today is a valuable (...) resource for anyone seeking to approach the academic study of religion. Its holistic approach, engaging writing style, and emphasis on critical thinking make it a welcome addition to various religious studies curriculums or personal libraries.” — Brad Stoddard, associate professor of Religious Studies, McDaniel College. (shrink)

The introduction to a special issue of Religious Studies on the theme of experimental philosophy of religion.

Cet article explore la relation étroite entre la crise de l’autorité et celle de la croyance religieuse, ainsi que les conséquences sur le fonctionnement de la société. En nous appuyant sur les travaux de divers philosophes, nous avons défini et délimité les concepts d’autorité et de croyance, nous avons établi que l’autorité est un contenu de la croyance et réfléchi à la problématique de l’autorité de la croyance, et nous avons conclu que la croyance peut être utilisée pour justifier des (...) formes d’autorité arbitraires et abusives. j -/- La crise de l’autorité et celle de la croyance religieuse ont des conséquences importantes sur le fonctionnement de la société. Ces crises peuvent entraîner une perte de confiance dans les institutions et les valeurs établies, ainsi qu’une montée de l’individualisme et du relativisme moral. Cet article permet de mettre en lumière le pouvoir de la croyance et les enjeux qui en découlent, notamment en termes de manipulation et de confusion entre l’autorité politique et l’autorité religieuse. En encourageant une réflexion critique et une compréhension approfondie des concepts d’autorité et de croyance, nous pouvons contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des enjeux auxquels sont confrontées les valeurs des institutions religieuses et politiques aujourd’hui. j -/- تُسلّط هذه المقالة الضّوء على العلاقة الوثيقة بين أزمة السّلطة وأزمة الاعتقاد الدّينيّ أو الإيمان، وتُحلّل عواقب هذه الأزمات على سير عمل المجتمع. في استعراضها أعمال العديد من الفلاسفة، تقدّم المقالة تعريفًا وتحديدًا لمفهومَي السّلطة والإيمان باحثةً في العلاقة بينهما، مع التّركيز على إمكانيّة استخدام الإيمان لتبرير أشكال السّلطة التّعسّفيّة والمسيئة. -/- إنّ أزمة السّلطة وأزمة الاعتقاد الدّينيّ لهما عواقب جوهريّة على سير عمل المجتمع. يمكن أن تؤدّي هذه الأزمات إلى فقدان الثّقة في المؤسّسات والقيم الرّاسخة، فضلًا عن تنامي الفرديّة والنّسبيّة الأخلاقيّة. تساعد هذه المقالة في تسليط الضّوء على قوّة الإيمان والقضايا الّتي تنشأ عنه، بخاصّة فيما يتعلّق بالتّلاعب والخلط بين السّلطتين السّياسيّة والدّينيّة. إنّنا من خلال تشجيع التّفكير النّقديّ والفهم العميق لمفاهيم السّلطة والإيمان، يمكننا المساهمة في تعزيز قيم المؤسّسات الدّينيّة والسّياسيّة. (shrink)

Many studies have found correlations between reflective thinking and disbelief in God or lower levels of religiosity — so-called analytic atheism. Some data even detect analytic atheism in highly reflective people like philosophers. However, there is growing evidence that the most widely used tests of reflection confound reflection with ancillary abilities such as numeracy. Moreover, some studies do not detect analytic atheism in every country. Further, experimentally encouraging reflection has made some non-believers more open to believing in God. Finally, there (...) is growing evidence of low data quality from one of the most common sources of online research participants. These prior results indicate that analytic atheism may be less than universal or partially explained by confounding factors. To address these possibilities, we developed better measures of religiosity and reflection, controlled for more confounds, and studied both paid and ad-recruited participants (N > 70,000). All four studies detected signs of analytic atheism above and beyond confounds. We also discovered analytic apostasy: the better a person performed on reflection tests, the greater their odds of losing their religion since childhood — even when controlling for confounds. Religious conversion was rare, but the final study recruited enough converts to find that the odds of becoming religious since childhood were probably unrelated to reflection, suggesting reflection’s relationships to conversion and deconversion are asymmetric. Detected relationships were usually small, but few failed to reach conventional levels of significance, indicating that reflective thinking may be a reliable albeit marginal predictor of apostasy. (shrink)

According to an intuition highly popular in Western world, beliefs, includ-ing religious beliefs, must be supported by sufficient evidence in order to be held in a rational (or justified) way (evidentialism). Plantinga for-mulates his own view about the rationality of religious beliefs, which he considers as opposite to the traditional view. The central thesis of his position is that religious beliefs are perfectly rational when believed in the basic way, that is without any evidence or argument and even with-out the (...) use of natural reason at all. According to Plantinga people could have acquired their religious beliefs via extraordinary cognitive faculty, which he calls, after Calvin, sensus divinitatis. In this paper I ask a ques-tion whether Plantinga successfully rejects traditional intuition about the need of natural reason for religious beliefs. For this purpose, I first refer to Plantinga’s understanding of the traditional concept of the rationality of religious beliefs. I then summarize Plantinga’s views on the third condi-tion of knowledge and his account of the rationality of religious beliefs. Next, I turn to the critical part of the article. I point out the inadequacy of Plantinga’s position. To do so I first analyze and criticize Plantinga’s argument for the view that possessing sufficient evidence for religious beliefs is not an epistemic duty. I argue that Plantinga rejects only one understanding of that requirement and this is not enough to reject the whole idea of evidentialism. Then, I criticize Plantinga’s position on the third condition of knowledge, which he calls warrant. To this end I recall Laurence BonJour’s argument against externalism, since my critique of Plantinga’s position is analogous to BonJour’s argument. If my critique is successful then it is not that religious belief could be held in rational way without the use of natural reason, because in this case subject would be epistemically irresponsible. (shrink)

A short-course in comparative religion. Provides the basis (ontology) (epistemology) (logic) for both mathematics and technology.

Is skeptical theism tenable once one acknowledges, as proponents of that view do, one's cognitive limitations vis-à-vis religious matters? In this article, I aim to answer that question both by examining the apparent radical skeptical implications of the skeptical component of skeptical theism and by comparing this view with fideism and Pyrrhonism, which also lay emphasis on our cognitive limitations. My ultimate purpose is to determine which of the three stances it makes more sense to adopt once the limitations of (...) human cognitive powers are recognized. (shrink)

This work is the transcript of a theological dialogue I had with ChatGPT that spanned a couple of days. I began it merely out of curiosity over how ChatGPT might respond to questions and challenges I posed. As it progressed, I became increasingly impressed with the nuance, depth, and relevance of its responses. The dialogue became, for me, something of a contemplative exercise. I still don’t know quite how to understand the ability of generative A.I. to respond with such (apparent) (...) understanding and even insight. -/- I’ve decided to post this dialogue, not only because of the puzzle it poses concerning A.I, but even more, because I believe that the theological conclusions ‘we’ arrived at have real merit. -/- In the end, the theological views expressed here echo those that I’ve expressed in other works of mine, but the expression of these views are enhanced by the way ChatGPT picks up on them, rephrases them, elaborates upon them, and often places them in the context of the classical theological tradition. -/- I might add that I have been an A.I. skeptic for some time now, concerned over the potential dangers of A.I. in general. But this dialogue, anyway, reveals its potential use as a vehicle for reflection, even profound reflection. -/- . (shrink)

This paper argues that commonsense responses to radical skepticism can provide helpful lessons for religious epistemology—in particular, for thinking about how best to defend, and respond to, religious skepticism. Section 1 briefly summarizes of some of the main elements of the Reid-inspired epistemic-intuition-based commonsense response to radical skepticism developed in my 2021 book, "Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition" and highlights the role (in our thinking about radical skepticism) of epistemic intuitions understood as seemings about epistemic value in much the same (...) way that moral intuitions are seemings about moral value. Sections 2 and 3 identify five important lessons that can be drawn from the position presented in that book, apply them to religious epistemology, and explain how they can help us to account for our religious disagreements without implausibly disparaging the rationality of those with whom we disagree. Section 4 addresses some potential concerns about Sections 2 and 3. (shrink)

Foundationalism, a theory about the structure of epistemic justification, is often criticized for excesses that are unnecessary additions to it. But when correctly understood, its main tenets (featuring most prominently the claim that there can be properly basic beliefs) are virtually undeniable. The best way to get at the heart of foundationalism is to focus not on Descartes but on Aristotle and his famous regress argument. Section I unpacks that foundationalist argument. Section II addresses some objections to foundationalism. Section III (...) considers how foundationalism bears on topics in the epistemology of theology—topics such as Reformed epistemology, natural theology, Biblical criticism, and post-foundationalism. (shrink)

This Element engages with the epistemic significance of disagreement, focusing on its skeptical implications. It examines various types of disagreement-motivated skepticism in ancient philosophy, ethics, philosophy of religion, and general epistemology. In each case, it favors suspension of judgment as the seemingly appropriate response to the realization of disagreement. One main line of argument pursued in the Element is that, since in real-life disputes we have limited or inaccurate information about both our own epistemic standing and the epistemic standing of (...) our dissenters, personal information and self-trust can rarely function as symmetry breakers in favor of our own views. (shrink)

It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of activity in the field of philosophical enquiry that is known as natural theology. Having been smothered in the early part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of the anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical positivism, natural theology began to make a comeback in the late 1950s as logical positivism collapsed and analytic philosophers took a newfound interest in metaphysical topics such as possibility and necessity, causation, time, the (...) mind-body problem, and God. This chapter begins by considering how we might characterise natural theology as a field of enquiry. It then proceeds to survey the landscape of contemporary natural theology, which has spawned a large and at times highly technical body of literature. Finally, consideration is given to two epistemological issues confronting the theist who wishes to appeal to natural theology, which could be termed the problem of the gap(s) and the problem of accessibility. (shrink)

The suppression thesis is the theological claim that theistic non-belief results from culpable mistreatment of one’s knowledge of God or one’s evidence for God. The thesis is a traditional one but unpopular today. This article examines whether it can gain new credibility from the philosophy of self-deception and from the cognitive science of religion. The thesis is analysed in terms of the intentionalist and the non-intentionalist model of self-deception. The first proposed model views non-belief as intentional suppression of one’s implicit (...) knowledge of God. It is less feasible psychologically but has a good theological fit with Paul’s and Calvin’s versions of the thesis. This model also helps the argument for the culpability of non-belief. The second model views suppression as a process of subconscious motivated reasoning driven by a desire to avoid an uncomfortable truth. It fits Pascal’s view that one’s desire for or against God determines whether one sees general revelation as providing sufficient evidence for God. There is some empirical and anecdotal evidence for both models, but obvious cases of non-resistant non-belief present a major problem for the suppression thesis. Also, it is hard to see what might motivate anyone to deceive oneself about God’s existence. (shrink)

The first handbook on the topic of religious epistemology introduces and discusses topics fundamental to the epistemology of religious belief.

Mercy is central to the very identity of Islam, yet this is not often recognized by theologians and scholars. This paper will demonstrate that the idea of mercy is important as a prelude to the understanding of Islam and an interpretation of its teachings. This important role of mercy is evident in Islam’s primary sources – the Quran and the Sunnah – and is not contingent on political, social, or historical contexts. It is well recognized that the proper comprehension of (...) Islam hinges on grasping the attributes of God, his divine message, and the character of his messenger. But what is often overlooked is that these aspects are fundamentally rooted in mercy. Islam encourages its followers to cultivate merciful virtues. It emphasizes that the compassionate nature of the faith should always precede the understanding and interpretation of its teachings. As a result, Muslims are encouraged to nurture a compassionate self, foster a benevolent mindset and approach, and anchor their religious obedience in the spirit of mercy. While followers of Islam are responsible for upholding this ethos, external observers too should try to view the religion fairly based upon this recognition of the centrality of mercy. (shrink)

انتشرت ظاهرة الغش في الامتحان إلى الحد الذي جعلها عادة مألوفة يمارسها السواد الأعظم من التلاميذ، ويصنف الراغب عنها في حكم الشاذ الذي لا يعتد به، وقد تطور الأمر إلى الإبداع والتفنن في ابتكار الوسائل والطرق "الحديثة" التي لم تخطر من ذي قبل على بال أحد من العالمين، ولأن ما يتكرر يتقرر فقد صارت هذه الآفة جزءا من "الممارسة البيداغوجية"، بل تحولت إلى صاحبة الشأن الأول التي يتبتل التلميذ في محرابها الساعات الطوال تفكيرا وتنظيرا وممارسة، حتى وصل إلى درجة الكمال (...) والبلوغ في الاهتداء إلى أنجع السبل وأكثرها تطورا، مسجلا بذلك براءات اختراع مبهرة. ولعل نظرة فضولية إلى طوابير التلاميذ المقبلين على محلات النسخ قبيل الامتحانات تظهر بجلاء "حيوية هذه السوق" التي تكيف تجارها مع واقعها، وكونوا أنفسهم ليواكبوا مستجداتها، وينالوا رضا زبنائهم، وكل هذه "الدينامية" تجري أمام أنظار السلطات العمومية التي تكتفي بالتفرج السلبي على المشهد، كأنها لاتدري أن حرمة القانون تنتهك بهذا السلوك المخل بالأمن التربوي، وتستوجب الضرب بيد من حديد على أيدي هؤلاء "التجار" الذين يشيعون الفاحشة في أرض التربية والتعليم بضمائرهم الميتة وجيوبهم الجشعة. إن الانتشار الواسع لهذه الظاهرة أكسبها شرعية الفعل، وأسقط عن ممارسيها الشعور بالإثم الذي يحيك في القلب ويحجز من يهم به عن إتيانه خشية أن يطلع عليه الناس، فصار التباهي سمة المقدم عليها، وإنتاج الأبطال والفرسان نهاية حلبتها. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose and defend an account of the nature and the epistemology of religious beliefs loosely inspired by Wittgenstein´s remarks on the structure of reason and on the nature of religious beliefs. I argue that following and developing his account we can not only make a strong case for the prima facie rationality of religious beliefs but also, and more importantly, cast new light on the epistemology of religious disagreement. Keywords: Wittgenstein. Hinges. Epistemic warrant. Religious disagreement.

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Should one use philosophy in service of religion? I argue that Dionysius the Areopagite gives a negative answer to this question. The relevant text is Dionysius’ Letter 7, in which he explains why he does not use philosophy to attack Greco-Roman paganism. Philosophy, according to Dionysius, is something divine. In fact, in Letter 7 he goes so far as to identify philosophy with what St. Paul calls the “wisdom of God.” As a result, philosophy should not be treated as a (...) tool to be used in service of anything, even the true religion, which Dionysius of course identifies with Christianity. In order to elucidate Dionysius’ position, I provide a detailed account of how he understands philosophy, religion (thrêskeia), and use (chraô). (shrink)

When we talk about dialogue, we always start looking for ways to best present the content of our speech. Approaching another through dialogue does not seem to care too much about the will or desire to accept the otherness for dialogue even if this is the basis of the binary formula of dialogue. Yet, in the case of religious dialogue, things are not at all so clear or proactive; instead, this (accepting otherness) is usually the central issue of interreligious dialogue. (...) However, when we finally manage to bring together two or more religious representatives for dialogue, the most intriguing aspect of the dialogue is less emphasized on the content and issues to be brought to the attention of the participants and more on the issue of accepting, tolerating all others’ traditions through this dialogue. Nervousness, anxiety, discomfort, and squirming are the habitual and, even more shocking, "expected" features in interfaith dialogue. Well, if this is the main problem in interfaith - being able to bring acceptance in this "toxic" environment - then this would be a step forward. But probably all these are since, at present, the construction of interreligious dialogue is still in progress, about to be polished and become a formal custom, an emerging tradition of the current era. However, is the content that all participants in the interfaith dialogue bring, our particular traditions, to blame for this challenge? Can they help us build the bridge or, on the contrary, put interfaith in a limbo state, waiting for a redeemer? To pinpoint the direction in which interreligious dialogue is heading, we must better evaluate and understand a "tradition", what it is, how it works, and why it is developed and preserved. What is the significance of a tradition for people in general and a religious group in particular? How deeply rooted is it in human thinking and how valuable to fight for it? And then, can we consider changing, altering, or even removing a whole tradition from our perspective? If so, [regardless of the response] what is then the impact of [any] tradition on us and our reactions to the current issues, therefore to human endeavor? This article illustrates the role that tradition plays in peoples' views of the world and how tradition influences their behavior and attitudes toward certain practices and against a current acquisition of interreligious relationships, namely interreligious dialogue. (shrink)

This paper develops an internal critique of Graham Oppy’s metaphilosophy of religion – his theories of argumentation, worldview comparison, and epistemic justification. First, it presents Oppy’s views and his main reasons in their favor. Second, it argues that Oppy is committed to two claims – that only truth-conducive reasons can justify philosophical belief and that such justification depends entirely on one’s judgments about the theoretical virtues of comprehensive worldviews – that jointly entail the unacceptable conclusion that philosophical beliefs cannot be (...) justified. Third, it briefly argues that of his two claims, it is his thoroughgoing coherentism that should be rejected. (shrink)

In a well-known apocryphal story, Theresa of Avila falls off the donkey she was riding, straight into mud, and injures herself. In response, she seems to blame God for her fall. A playful if indignant back and forth ensues. But this is puzzling. Theresa should never think that God is blameworthy. Why? Apparently, one cannot blame what one worships. For to worship something is to show it a kind of reverence, respect, or adoration. To worship is, at least in part, (...) to praise. You cannot praise and blame simultaneously. Indeed, Paul counsels against “back-talk” against God, suggesting we lack the standing to blame our creator (Romans 9:20). Drawing on Strawsonian theorizing about praise and blame, this paper argues that, surprisingly, a person can both blame and worship God. Although blameful worship is possibly epistemically akratic, it may sometimes be acceptable given our nature as finite, emotional beings. In fact, blaming God might on occasion be the only way we have to stand with God’s goodness despite apparent evidence of evil in the world. This suggestion, I’ll argue, should change the way we think about the problem of evil. The problem has interpersonal and moral psychological dimensions that merit serious attention. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of the second ‘theological’ pattern in Plato’s Republic. Situating Plato within his religious context, it argues that this pattern calls into question the traditional ancient model of divine epiphany. Divine epiphany was a central element in Greek religion. Yet, in the absence of a centralized religious organization, this model threatened the philosophers’ authoritative position. Plato’s second pattern seeks not only to undermine this potential threat but also to pave the way towards a new, philosophicalmodel (...) of divine epiphany, thus further establishing the philosophers’ authority and legitimacy within and outside his ideal city. (shrink)

In a recent article, Bernáth and Tőzsér (2021) defend what they call the Bias Argument, a new skeptical argument from expert peer disagreement. They argue that the best contrastive causal explanation for disagreement among leading experts in philosophy is that they adopt their positions in a biased way. But if the leading experts are biased, non-experts either are also biased or only avoid bias through epistemic inferiority. Recognizing this is expected to prompt one to decrease one‘s confidence in one‘s philosophical (...) beliefs. This paper argues that some beliefs are immune to a key premise of the Bias Argument. To show this, the paper develops the concepts of self-favoring theories, decisive support, and standing-incommensurable disagreements. A plausible example of a self-favoring theory, dubbed Mere Reformed Protestantism, is sketched. Many disagreements over self-favoring theories and over beliefs decisively supported by self-favoring theories are shown to be standing-incommensurable. It is then argued that when non-experts are in standing-incommensurable disagreements with experts, the standards of assessing expertise are themselves controverted. This result undercuts the move in the Bias Argument from expert bias to non-expert bias. Finally, a couple reservations about the role of self-favoring theories in philosophy are addressed. (shrink)

El esfuerzo humano por la búsqueda del sentido de la existencia se inscribe en la práctica discursiva que las religiones exhiben no sólo de la situación existencial del hombre sino también de la experiencia de este con lo trascendente. De hecho, un lenguaje que expresa lo trascendente es básicamente intuitivo, sin embargo, la idea de carencia de significado para los contenidos de fe aconteció por boca de filósofos analíticos. De ahí que el presente artículo intente reproducir algunas consideraciones pro et (...) contra de los contenidos de fe por parte de pensadores adscritos a la escuela analítica para luego enfatizar en una necesaria contribución de la filosofía en el tratamiento del lenguaje religioso. (shrink)

Las críticas que brotan en un medio en que el debate epistemológico parece encabezar los problemas que competen al filosofar, tienen en el negar el sentido de verdad al discurso de índole religiosa la ratificación del estatus de cientificidad. Esta es la apuesta de teóricos inscritos a la tradición analítica surgida en el pasado siglo. No obstante, frente a los discursos neopositivistas y el radical evidencialismo vienen las posiciones de algunos filósofos y teólogos analíticos quienes paralelamente abogaron por la validez (...) y el sentido de lo religioso. (shrink)

For the purposes of this paper, I attempt to wrestle with the question of whether or not it is a requisite for a “believer” (which turns out to be a loaded and ambiguous term) to be a part of a formal/institutional Christian Church. This is a difficult task to accomplish, and this, I admit. There is no way to answer this, truly with certainty. But Metaphysics are rarely grounded in “certainty.” This is true for many Christian Theological tasks as well. (...) Nevertheless, this argument will be attempted by working with and off of the Black liberation theologian and philosopher, James H. Cone's basic structured argument found in "Black Theology & Black Power." It's important to note that Cone is a systematic theologian writing in 1969, a time where White America (and its "Christians") helped contribute to the assassination of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. Not to mention, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was on a hunt for the next “Black Messiah,” had already infiltrated the Black Power movement, and that same year was making serious moves in undermining the Black Panther Party. Whereas White “Christian” America largely had his full support. After all the atrocities Black people in America have gone through, especially by its "Christians," many Black people had lost hope; they were broken, tired, many were angry—and righteously so. Cone’s 1969 argument reflects these Black sensibilities, a righteously angry theological and philosophical argument. I am attempting to wrestle with whether the basic structure of his argument is still applicable in contemporary America during the modern Black Lives Matter Movement. Thus, after rendering Cone’s argument from 1969, we imaginatively bend space and time to fast forward to the modern era 2020 and on, where we see if, by implication, Cone's argument is still relevant to the majority ("white") "Christian" Institutional/Formal Church. For the purposes of this paper, I will attempt to argue that Cone’s basic argument structure is still applicable, and that it is not a requisite for a Christian “believer” to be a part of a formal/institutional church. In this paper, I look at the ramifications of the Black Lives Matter movement in relation to the Christian formal institutional Church. (shrink)

Bouddha n'a pas érigé de religion. Dans les dimensions culturelles lointaines de son époque, il a fait de la philosophie et de la science. Si nous observons les racines de sa pensée et l'histoire de la connaissance humaine, nous nous rendrons compte qu'il a été, à sa manière, le précurseur du réalisme scientifique, de la psychanalyse, de la philosophie analytique, de l'existentialisme, du féminisme, de l'épistémologie, de la théorie et de la critique de la connaissance, de la psychologie sociale, de (...) la psychologie positive, du préservationnisme écologique et des concepts relatifs à la matière et à l'énergie que la physique quantique n'a pu démontrer que très récemment. Savoir correctement ce qu'est le bouddhisme est essentiel pour l'éducation et la culture de toute personne qui ne veut pas être un aliéné de plus dans un troupeau qui marche aveuglément au milieu d'une révolution technologique. (shrink)

I argue that the epistemology underlying Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic methodology is quasi-fideist. According to this view, the rationality of religious belief is dependent on absolutely certain ungrounded grounds, called hinges. I further argue that the quasi-fideist epistemology of presuppositional apologetics explains why Van Til’s method is neither fideist nor problematically circular: hinges are rational in the sense that they are partly constitutive of rationality, and all beliefs (not just religious ones) depend on hinges. In addition, it illuminates something (...) of why it may strike one as a misguided or uncompelling apologetic method: instead of starting by tackling the comparatively minor epistemic commitments of the nonbeliever, it directly approaches their deepest and surest commitments. (shrink)

Given the laws of our universe, the initial conditions and cosmological constants had to be "fine-tuned" to result in life. Is this evidence for design? We argue that we should be uncertain whether an ideal agent would take it to be so—but that given such uncertainty, we should react to fine-tuning by boosting our confidence in design. The degree to which we should do so depends on our credences in controversial metaphysical issues.

The article concerns the relationship between Luigi Giussani's thought and contemporary Virtue Ethics.

Short Papers on Al-bayunniyah's "Principles of Sufism," Hafiz's "Faces of Love," Ibn Tufayl's "Hayy Ibn Yaqzan," and Watt's "Islamic Creeds.".

In their simplest form, consensus gentium arguments for theism argue that theism is true on the basis that everyone believes that theism is true. While such arguments may have been popular in history, they have all but fallen from grace in the philosophy of religion. In this short paper, we reconsider the neglected topic of consensus gentium arguments, paying particular attention to the value of such arguments when deployed in the defence of theistic belief. We argue that while consensus gentium (...) arguments are unlikely to offer anything close to overwhelming support for theism, their probative value is nevertheless underappreciated, and that they have been unfairly maligned as a consequence. (shrink)

In this chapter, we focus on animism and how it is studied in the cognitive science of religion and cultural anthropology. We argue that philosophers of religion still use (outdated) normative notions from early scientific studies of religion that go back at least a century and that have since been abandoned in other disciplines. Our argument is programmatic: we call for an expansion of philosophy of religion in order to include traditions that are currently underrepresented. The failure of philosophy of (...) religion to discuss and accommodate different perspectives means a large part of human religious beliefs, practices, and experiences remains outside its purview. As a point of focus, we examine animism in two cultures as a way to think about what sorts of questions and ideas an expansion of philosophy of religion into lesser-explored traditions could offer. (shrink)

The Bugis-Makassar indigenous people who live around Mount Bawakaraeng perform a ritual pilgrimage (hajj) to the top of Mount Bawakaraeng (as a sacred space). This ritual is often considered heretical and deviant. These negative assumptions are the result of the monopoly definition of “sacred place” by the world religion paradigm which is only limited to the doctrine of the holy book and is hierarchical-exclusive. Meanwhile, in the indigenous religion paradigm, “sacred place” is closely related tothe surrounding environment (nature) which also (...) gives life to indigenous peoples. The Bugis-Makassar indigenous people who live around Mount Bawakaraeng construct the sacredness of the mountain, not only as a place for religious rituals but also as a guarantor of their life. There were lacking previous researches discussing “sacred place” through the indigenous religion paradigm approach. This research contributes to that lack. This study examines how the indigenous religion paradigm interprets “sacred place”. The research method used in this research is qualitative. This study argues that there is no better way to understand why indigenous people perform rituals on Mount Bawakaraeng than using the indigenous religion paradigm. This study also shows that the “sacred place” associated with Mount Bawakaraeng is a way for the indigenous people who live around the mountain to preserve the nature around them which has enabled them to live and make a living such as accessing water, gathering medicines from nature, and so on. Eventually, with research that provides a better explanation of what a “sacred place” is in the indigenous religion paradigm, negative assumptions about indigenous people who regard a mountain as sacredplace can be better understood. (shrink)

This study aims to evaluate whether the idea of ultimate reality in world religions contributes to the characteristics of the world religion paradigm, which is hierarchical cosmology or “subject-object cosmology.” Several research on this topic claims that one of the characteristics of the world religion paradigm is its hierarchical perspective. Discussing this issue is important to distinguish the world religions as the paradigm and the world religions as the most widely embraced religion. This study argues that the hierarchical perspective of (...) the world religion paradigm can be rooted in the idea of ultimate reality, that there is a supreme, foremost, and most principal reality in the continuity of this universe, namely the supernatural or God. The hierarchical cosmology consists of three main domains: supernatural/God, culture/human, and nature. This study uses a literature study methodology, relying on books, journals, and texts related to research questions. This study finds that the world religion paradigm or hierarchical cosmology or “subject-object cosmology” is prominent, especially in Abrahamic religions such as Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, even though the concept of ultimate reality in these three religions is different. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga is an American-born philosopher of religion and one of the leading advocates of contemporary Christian philosophy. Plantinga deals with numerous problems of the monotheistic Christian religion, including the problem of religious pluralism. One of the most common questions an atheist asks a believer is, "Why your God and not someone else's?" Therefore, this paper aims to present Plantinga's answer to the question of religious pluralism. We will achieve this goal by developing Plantinga's theory of "proper functioning", a thesis (...) that atheism represents a state of incorrect functioning of cognitive mechanisms. We can respond to the problem of religious pluralism through positive or negative apologetics. Plantinga has chosen negative apologetics, arguing that the believer is under no obligation to justify the truth of his beliefs when confronted with the problem of religious pluralism. Although Plantinga provides numerous convincing arguments supporting his position, we will show that we can provide a positive apologetic by returning to the foundations of Plantinga's understanding of intentionality and mental representations. In so doing, we will demonstrate a broader range of ways a believer can defend his epistemic position and connect Plantinga's epistemology of religion in relevant ways to contemporary theories of cognitive psychology and philosophy of cognition. (shrink)

This article discusses three epistemological themes emerging from the writings of Ignatius of Loyola. Firstly, it examines the model of the voluntariness of belief implied in his vision of religious obedience through the lenses of contemporary theories of doxastic voluntarism. Secondly, it reconstructs the relationship between faith and reason in the writings of Ignatius in the context of recent interpretations of the religious sacrificium intellectus. Thirdly, it searches for the foundation for the ethics of belief in general which would be (...) inspired by the Ignatian world-view presented in his Contemplation Ad Amorem and the Cardoner experience. The author argues that such a model of epistemic normativity can be successfully developed using the elements of contemporary virtue epistemology and B. Lonergan’s and K. Rahner’s transcendental method. Against the preconception of antagonism between religion and intellectual progress, the author indicates how religiosity can positively contribute to the growth of knowledge, being the leading motivation within intellectual life. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between science and theology within a critical realist framework. Focusing on the role of metaphysics as a unifying starting point, especially in consideration of theological issues that are concerned with corporeality and temporality (such as in the incarnation). Some metaphysical challenges that lead to the appearance of “paradox” in the incarnation are highlighted, and the implications of two forms of holistic scientific ontology on the appearance of a paradox in the incarnation are explored. It is (...) concluded that ultimately both science and theology are concerned with the nature of reality, and the search for coherent models that can describe the unseen. Whilst one should maintain a criticality to any realist conception of theological and scientific theories, a shared metaphysics ensures theological doctrine can continue to be interpreted with relevance in a world in which scientific thought is increasingly stretching into the meta-scientific. (shrink)

In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired (...) by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief. (shrink)

I apply the Buddhist and Chinese religious understandings of miracles as natural events to a contemporary Chinese American religious healer who employs Buddhist spells, qigong, and a range of Chinese medical arts to successfully treat conditions such as a golf-ball-sized cancerous tumor, a balance and memory disorder, and stroke-induced facial hemiparesis. In doing so, I build upon the work of anthropologists and historians to do comparative philosophy on the theoretical categories of and boundaries among miracles, the natural, the supernatural, healing, (...) and religion. I engage with Morton Klass’ point on the ethnocentric presuppositions of such categories; Susan Sered’s attention to the political nature of strict binaries as opposed to more flexible continuums; Robert Campany’s distinction between ontological and epistemological miracles, where the latter uncovers the hidden wonders in the natural world; and Helen Tilley’s polyglot therapeutics, which are marked by oscillation between, and the simultaneous holding of, contradictory or incommensurable ontologies. I argue that the category of natural miracle allows reimagining of the above categories and their neat delineations. (shrink)

Description: With major themes like "the knowledge of good and evil," "knowing that YHWH is your God," knowing that Jesus is the Christ, and the goal of developing Israel into a "wise and discerning people," Scripture clearly stresses human knowledge and the consequences of error. We too long for confidence in our understanding, the assurance that our most basic knowledge is not ultimately incorrect. Biblical Knowing assesses what Israel knew, but more importantly, how she was meant to know--introducing a comprehensive (...) Scriptural epistemology, firmly rooted in the Scripture's own presentation of important epistemological events in the story of Israel. Because modern philosophy has also made authoritative claims about knowledge, Biblical Knowing engages contemporary academic views of knowledge (e.g., Reformed Epistemology, scientific epistemology, Virtue Epistemology, etc.) and recent philosophical method (e.g., Analytic Theology), assessing them for points of fittedness with or departure from Scripture's own epistemology. Additionally, Biblical Knowing explores what proper knowing looks like in the task of theology itself, in the teaching and preaching of the church, and in the context of counseling.Endorsements: "Dru Johnson attends carefully to Scripture to elucidate the dimensions of human knowing it exemplifies throughout. He compares biblical knowing favorably with scientific epistemology in a Polanyian vein, and he contrasts it with the myopic preoccupation with propositions in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Johnson taps his multi-disciplinary expertise to bring Christian scholars a valuable study that itself calls us to listening and participation in order to see a broader reality."--Esther L. MeekAssociate Professor of PhilosophyGeneva College"Dru Johnson's Biblical Knowing is a superb introduction to the latest currents in scholarship seeking to elucidate the philosophical content of Scripture. Johnson focuses on biblical approaches to human knowledge, arguing that Scripture shies away from propositional affirmations in favor of phenomenal experience as constitutive of knowledge. In doing so he defends rigor and clarity as biblical values, but boldly insists that these can be no less present in biblical stories about gaining knowledge than in the discursive arguments of later traditions. This is an excellent work that deserves careful attention, opening up new horizons in both philosophy and biblical studies."--Yoram Hazonyauthor of The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture"Biblical Knowing makes a significant contribution to a fresh opening up of the relationship between Scripture and philosophy. This is no easy task, requiring the author to navigate philosophy, biblical studies, and theology. Dru does this masterfully. The result is a lucid, accessible text, and yet one that makes an original contribution. It is the sort of book that I have been waiting for when teaching epistemology and I suspect that many professors will have the same experience."--from the foreword by Craig G. BartholomewH. Evan Runner Professor of PhilosophyRedeemer University CollegeAbout the Contributor(s): Dru Johnson is an Assistant Professor of Biblical Studies at The King's College in New York City. He is also the Templeton Associate Research Fellow in Analytic Theology at the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem, Israel. (shrink)

Can we know truth even though certain proof is unattainable? Can we be known by Truth? Is there a relationship between belief and truth, and if so, what is the nature of that relationship? Do we need to have faith in reason and in real meaning to be able to reason towards truth? These are the sorts of questions this book seeks to address. In Faith's Knowledge, Paul Tyson argues that all knowledge that aims at truth is always the knowledge (...) of faith. If this is the case, then--against our modernist cultural assumptions about knowledge--truth cannot be had by proof. Yet, if this is true, then mere information and simply objective facts do not (for us as knowers) exist. Knowledge is always embedded in belief, and knowledge and belief is always expressed in relationships, histories, narratives, shared meanings, and power. Hence, a theological sociology of knowledge emerges out of these explorations in thinking about knowledge as a function of faith."--Publisher's website. (shrink)