- Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.details
- What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.details
- Meta-ethics: An Introduction.Leslie Allan - manuscriptdetails
- A Defence of Emotivism.Leslie Allan - manuscriptdetails
- A Taxonomy of Meta-ethical Theories.Leslie Allan - manuscriptdetails
- The 2-D Argument Against Metaethical Naturalism.Richard Yetter Chappell - manuscriptdetails
- Ought-implies-can, the original position, and reflective equilibrium.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptdetails
- Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality.Matti Eklund - manuscriptdetails
- The Onus in 'Ought'.Mahrad Almotahari & Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Analysis.details
- Noncognitivism Without Expressivism.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- Contextualism in Ethics.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.details
- Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the Logic of Obligation.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- The Language of Reasons and 'Ought'.Aaron Bronfman & J. L. Dowell - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons.details
- Semantics for Reasons, by Bryan Weaver and Kevin Scharp. [REVIEW]Daniel Fogal & Peter Van Elswyk - forthcoming - Ethics.details
- Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16.details
- The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice Dowell J. L. - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.details
- Sticky situations: 'Force' and quantifier domains.Matthew Mandelkern & Jonathan Phillips - forthcoming - Semantics and Linguistic Theory 28.details
- Moral and Moorean Incoherencies.Andrés Soria-Ruiz & Nils Franzén - forthcoming - Ergo.details
- Why Quasi-Realism cannot Accommodate Moral Mind-Independence.Yifan Sun - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-14.details
- Why Quasi-Realism cannot Accommodate Moral Mind-Independence.Yifan Sun - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-14.details
- Why Formal Objections to the Error Theory are Sound.Christine Tiefensee & Gregory Wheeler - forthcoming - Analysis.details
- Metalinguistic negotiations in moral disagreement.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):352-380.details
- Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2503-2516.details
- Maitzen’s Objection from God’s Goodness.Philipp Kremers - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):581-598.details
- Norms and Alternatives : Logical Aspects of Normative Reasoning.Karl Nygren - 2022 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
- On Evaluative Imprecision.Teruji Thomas - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 478-497.details
- Defending the Kratzerian presuppositional error theory.Elliot Salinger - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):701–709.details
- Evaluational adjectives.Alex Silk - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1):1-35.details
- Practical Expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- Why formal objections to the error theory fail.Bart Streumer & Daniel Wodak - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):254-262.details
- Theory-Indexed Moral Contextualism.Pyro Suarez - 2021 - Esercizi Filosofici 1 (16):59-70.details
- Separating the evaluative from the descriptive: An empirical study of thick concepts.Pascale Willemsen & Kevin Reuter - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):135-146.details
- Reply to critics.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):535-561.details
- Reply to Worsnip, Dowell, and Koehn.Stephen Finlay - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):131-147.details
- Evaluative Discourse and Affective States of Mind.Nils Franzén - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1095-1126.details
- Permissibility Is the Only Feasible Deontic Primitive.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):117-133.details
- The Expansion View of Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):914-944.details
- An Empirical Argument against Moral Non-Cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jen Wright - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
- The Demandingness of Virtue.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (1):1-22.details
- Stoic Virtue: A Contemporary Interpretation.Wes Siscoe - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (18):1-20.details
- "Ought" and Error.Christine Tiefensee - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (2):96-114.details
- Getting a Moral Thing Into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 140-169.details
- Resisting Relativistic Contextualism: On Finlay's Confusion of Tongues.Alex Worsnip - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):122-131.details
- Are Moral Judgements Semantically Uniform? A Wittgensteinian Approach to the Cognitivism - Non-Cognitivism Debate.Benjamin De Mesel - 2019 - In Benjamin De Mesel & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge. pp. 126-148.details
- A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
- Thick Evaluation, by Simon Kirchin. [REVIEW]Brent G. Kyle - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):954-962.details
- The sense of incredibility in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115.details
- Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law.Teresa Marques - 2019 - In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press.details
- An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs.Eleonore Neufeld - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
- "Moral Skepticism: New Essays" ed. Diego E. Machuca (Routledge 2018). [REVIEW]Neil Sinclair - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):1-7.details
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