- Epistemology of Disagreement and the Moral Non-Conformist.Benjamin Sherman - manuscriptdetails
- The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism.Neil Sinhababu - manuscriptdetails
- Change in Moral View: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology.Michael Klenk - forthcoming - In Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.details
- Institutional Review Boards and Public Justification.Anantharaman Muralidharan & G. Owen Schaefer - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-19.details
- Wang Yangming on ‘Unquestioning Obedience’ and Epistemic Superiority.Daryl Ooi - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West.details
- Disagreement and Doubts About Darwinian Debunking.Alexandra Plakias - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.details
- Streitkultur? - Expertenmeinungen in der Pandemie und die Rolle der PhilosophInnen.Nicola Mößner - 2023 - In Wissensproduktion und Wissenstransfer unter erschwerten Bedingungen. Der Einfluss der Corona-Krise auf die Erzeugung und Vermittlung von Wissen im öffentlichen Diskurs. Baden-Baden, Germany: pp. 189-217.details
- Wittgenstein y los desacuerdos morales: sobre la justificación moral y sus implicaciones para el relativismo moral.Jordi Fairhurst - 2022 - Cuadernos de Filosofía 40:21-46.details
- Moral Disagreement and Practical Direction.Ragnar Francén - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23 (2):273-303.details
- Modelling in Normative Ethics.Roussos Joe - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (5):1-25.details
- Desacuerdos Profundos: Precisiones y Exploraciones.Victoria Lavorerio - 2022 - Cuadernos de Filosofía: Universidad de Concepción 2022 (40):7-20.details
- Pragmatist Quietism: A Metaethical System.Andrew Sepielli - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
- Whence the Demand for Ethical Theory?Damian Cueni & Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):135–46.details
- Moral disagreement scepticism leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
- The Problem with Disagreement on Social Media: Moral not Epistemic.Elizabeth Edenberg - 2021 - In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford, UK:details
- Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control.Michael Klenk & Hanno Sauer - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (7):938-961.details
- Disagreement, Anti-Realism about Reasons, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Brian Leiter - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
- Illocutionary force and attitude mode in normative disputes.Teresa Marques - 2021 - Metaphilosophy (3-4):1-17.details
- Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.details
- Understanding Moral Disagreement: A Christian Perspectivalist Approach.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Religions 12 (5):318.details
- Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění: k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii [Ideal Consensus, Real Diversity, and the Challenge of Public Justification: On the Limits of Idealisation in Liberal Political Theory].Matouš Mencl & Pavel Dufek - 2021 - Acta Politologica 2 (13):49–70.details
- Disagreement and Conflict: How Moral and Taste Judgements Do Not Differ.Giulio Pietroiusti - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):837-846.details
- Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
- On the Evolution of Moral Conventions: A functionalist alternative to Buchanan and Powell’s biocultural theory of moral progress.Oskar Qvarfort - 2021 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
- Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements.Harvey Siegel - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1107-1116.details
- Moral Relativism, Metalinguistic Negotiation, and the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2021 - Erkenntnis 1:1-21.details
- Richard Rowland: Moral Disagreement: New York, Routledge, 2021, Hardback (ISBN 978-1-138-58984-1). 258 pp. [REVIEW]Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4):1053-1055.details
- Religious Disagreement Is Not Unique.Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-106.details
- Love’s Luck Knot.Carla Bagnoli - 2020 - Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 25 (1-2):195-208.details
- A debunking explanation for moral progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3171-3191.details
- A Humean Approach to the Boundaries of the Moral Domain.Mark Collier - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (1):1-16.details
- The Fragile Epistemology of Fanaticism.Joshua DiPaolo - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York, NY, USA: pp. 217-235.details
- Veřejný rozum a právo [Public Reason and Law].Pavel Dufek - 2020 - In Tomáš Sobek & Martin Hapla (eds.), Filosofie práva [Philosophy of Law]. Brno, Czechia: pp. 227–254.details
- Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens.Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):305-321.details
- The epistemic account of faultless disagreement.Xingming Hu - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2613-2630.details
- Third factor explanations and disagreement in metaethics.Michael Klenk - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):427-446.details
- Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology.Michael Klenk (ed.) - 2020 - New York: Routledge.details
- Cognitive islands and runaway echo chambers: problems for epistemic dependence on experts.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.details
- Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.details
- Against overgeneralisation objections to the argument from moral disagreement.Thomas Pölzler - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):261-273.details
- Contingency inattention: against causal debunking in ethics.Regina Rini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):369-389.details
- Moral Realism and Expert Disagreement.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Trames: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 24 (3):441-457.details
- Value Disagreement, Action, and Commitment.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2020 - In Katja Vogt & Justin Vlasits (eds.), Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 291-311.details
- How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement.Margaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 239-255.details
- Problems with Rowland’s Practical Conciliationism.Yuzhou Wang - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1639-1648.details
- Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat and All the Evidence.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
- Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett - 2019 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 117-135.details
- Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics.Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.) - 2019 - Routledge.details
- The Moral Limits of Open‐Mindedness.Matt A. Ferkany - 2019 - Educational Theory 69 (4):403-419.details
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|