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  1. Beyond Diminishing Marginal Utility.Walter Barta - manuscript
    Diminishing Marginal Utility is widely accepted as a law of human action, and therefor has become one of the primary premises of ethics, economics, and politics. In popular parlance, “diminishing returns” has entered into the cliches of common sense; in philosophical argument, it has achieved the status of an axiomatic assumption; and indeed, in terms of personal experience or folk psychology, it seems to largely hold true for goods in general over a range of consumption. However, a theory of diminishing (...)
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  2. Digitale Ethik: Leben in vernetzten Welten.Petra Grimm, Tobias O. Keber & Oliver Zöllner (eds.) - 2019 - Ditzingen: Reclam.
    This book offers an introduction to key areas and challenges of digital ethics. Intended readerships include (older) high-school students, undergraduates at universities (philosophy and otherwise) as well as the interested general public. Stories and case studies introduce a wide range of ethical problems, while info boxes and a glossary explain basic facts about the topic. At the end of each chapter readers find questions for reflection to review what has been learned.
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  3. Testing for intrinsic value, for us as we are.Daniel Coren - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):773-798.
    Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm suggest marks of intrinsic value. Contemporary philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard have insightful discussions of intrinsic value. But how do we verify that some specific thing really is intrinsically valuable? I propose a natural way to test for intrinsic value: first, strip the candidate bare of all considerations of good consequences; and, second, see if what remains is still a good thing. I argue that we, as ordinary human beings, have (...)
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  4. Wasted Potential: The Value of a Life and the Significance of What Could Have Been.Michal Masny - 2023 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 51 (1):6-32.
    According to the orthodox view, the goodness of a life depends exclusively on the things that actually happened within it, such as its pleasures and pains, the satisfaction of its subject’s preferences, or the presence of various objective goods and bads. In this paper, I argue that the goodness of a life also depends on what could have happened, but didn’t. I then propose that this view helps us resolve ethical puzzles concerning the standards for a life worth living for (...)
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  5. Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):420-445.
    A popular view of harming is the causal account (CA), on which harming is causing harm. CA has several attractive features. In particular, it appears well equipped to deal with the most important problems for its main competitor, the counterfactual comparative account (CCA). However, we argue that, despite its advantages, CA is ultimately an unacceptable theory of harming. Indeed, while CA avoids several counterexamples to CCA, it is vulnerable to close variants of some of the problems that beset CCA.
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  6. Arendt's anti-humanism of labour.Nicholas H. Smith - 2019 - European Journal of Social Theory 2 (22):175-190.
    The aim of this article is to situate Arendt’s account of labour as a critical response to humanisms of labour, or put otherwise, to situate it as an anti-humanism of labour. It compares Arendt’s account of labour with that of the most prominent humanist theorist of labour at the time of the composition of The Human Condition: Georges Friedmann. Arendt’s and Friedmann’s accounts of labour are compared specifically with respect to the range of capacities, social relations, and possibilities of fulfilment (...)
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  7. Perverse Reasons.Francesco Orsi - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (3):457-480.
    For an agent to be motivated by a normatively perverse reason is to be motivated by a normative or evaluative thought as such which, if true, would count as such against the action that it motivates the agent to perform, or against the attitude that it motivates the agent to take. For example, that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad counts, as such, against performing the action. When the thought that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad (...)
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  8. A Critique of Humoristic Absurdism. Problematizing the legitimacy of a humoristic disposition toward the Absurd.Thom Hamer - 2020 - Utrecht: Utrecht University.
    To what extent can humorism be a legitimate disposition toward the Absurd? The Absurd is born from the insurmountable contradiction between one’s ceaseless striving and the absence of an ultimate resolution – or, as I prefer to call it, the ‘dissolution of resolution’. Humoristic Absurdism is the commitment to a pattern of humorous responses to the Absurd, which regard this absurd condition, as well as its manifestation in absurd situations, as a comical phenomenon. Although the humoristic disposition seems promising, by (...)
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  9. Modeling parity and incomparability.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - In .
  10. Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.
    The incomparability of alternatives is thought to pose a problem for justified choice, particularly for proponents ofcomparativism– the view that comparative facts about alternatives determine what one rationally ought to choose. As a solution, it has been argued that alternatives judged incomparable by one of the three standard comparative relations, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally good,” are comparable by some fourth relation, such as “roughly equal” or “on a par.” This solution, however, comes at what many would regard as (...)
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  11. Incommensurability (and incomparability).Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell. pp. 2591-2604.
    This encyclopedia entry urges what it takes to be correctives to common (mis)understandings concerning the phenomenon of incommensurability and incomparability and briefly outlines some of their philosophical upshots.
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  12. The problem of semantic incomparability.Johannes Bechert - 1991 - In Dietmar Zaefferer (ed.), Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics. Foris Publications. pp. 12--60.
  13. Value relations: old wine in new barrels.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - In .
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, the (...)
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  14. Transitivity and the patterns of adult preferences.H. Bradbury & T. M. Nelson - 1973 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 1 (5):337-339.
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  15. First Philosophy in the Pragmatic Humanism of F.C.S. Schiller.H. P. McDonald - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):503-525.
    During his lifetime, F.C.S. Schiller was viewed as a major figure in the pragmatist movement, but his reputation has faded. This article will challenge the view that he was an unoriginal or less important figure. In particular, I will attempt a reconstruction of Schiller’s position on first philosophy, which will examine the differences between Schiller and the other major figures in the pragmatist movement. By using texts from Schiller’s writings, I attempt to create an undistorted reconstruction of what he wrote (...)
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  16. Choice structures and preference relations.Bengt Hansson - 1968 - Synthese 18 (4):443 - 458.
  17. Axiological atomism.Graham Oddie - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):313 – 332.
    Value is either additive or else it is subject to organic unity. In general we have organic unity where a complex whole is not simply the sum of its parts. Value exhibits organic unity if the value of a complex, whether a complex state or complex quality, is greater or less than the sum of the values of its components or parts. Whether or not value is additive might be thought to be of purely metaphysical interest, but it is also (...)
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  18. The mere addition paradox, parity and vagueness.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):129–151.
    Derek Parfit’s mere addition paradox has generated a large literature. This paper articulates one response to this paradox - which Parfit hirnself suggested - in terms of a formal account of the relation of parity. I term this response the ‘parity view’. It is consistent with transitivity of ‘at least as good as’, but implies incompleteness of this relation. The parity view is compatible with critical-band utilitarianism if this is adjusted to allow for vagueness. John Broome argues against accounts which (...)
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  19. Linguistic characterization of preference relations as a basis for choice in social systems.L. A. Zadeh - 1977 - Erkenntnis 11 (1):383 - 410.
Fact-Value Distinction
  1. Barriers to Entailment: Hume's Law and other limits on logical consequence.Gillian K. Russell - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    A barrier to entailment exists if you can't get conclusions of a certain kind from premises of another. One of the most famous barriers in philosophy is Hume's Law, which says that you can't get normative conclusions from descriptive premises, or in slogan form: you can't get an ought from an is. This barrier is highly controversial, and many famous counterexamples were proposed in the last century. But there are other barriers which function almost as philosophical platitudes: no Universal conclusions (...)
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  2. Metaethical Experientialism.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - In Geoffrey Lee & Adam Pautz (eds.), The Importance of Being Conscious. Oxford University Press.
    I develop and defend metaethical experientialism, the thesis that phenomenal facts explain certain kinds of value facts. I argue, for example, that anyone who knows what it’s like to feel extreme pain is in a position to know that that kind of experience is bad. I argue that metaethical experientialism yields genuine counterexamples to the principle that no ethical conclusion can be derived from purely descriptive premises. I also discuss the prospects for a pluralistic metaethics, whereby different metaethical theories hold (...)
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  3. Fact and Value.Craig Taylor - 2019 - In Nora Hämäläinen & Gillian Dooley (eds.), Reading Iris Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. Springer Verlag. pp. 67-78.
    For Murdoch the importance of the fact–value dichotomy is not to suggest that value is not real. Rather this separation is required in order to keep value pure and untainted with empirical facts. Here Murdoch focuses Kant and Wittgenstein, notably the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. For both, value appears as an intimation of ‘something higher’. And it is here that Murdoch sees the deeper problem with various forms of the fact–value dichotomy: that in our explanations of human life the essential (...)
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  4. The Third Manuscript : Rules of Conduct and the Fact-Value Distinction in Mid-20th Century Biochemistry.Sven Widmalm - 2015 - In Isabelle Dussauge, Claes-Fredrik Helgesson & Francis Lee (eds.), Value practices in the life sciences and medicine. Oxford University Press.
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  5. No-ought-from-is, the naturalistic fallacy and the fact/value distinction: the history of a mistake.Charles Pigden - 2018 - In Neil Sinclair (ed.), The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge University Press.
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  6. A review of Gene cloning and editing strategies for photosynthesis improvement. [REVIEW]Walaa Y. Saedi, Semaa A. Shaban, Tamadher A. Rafaa & Ahmed A. Suleiman - unknown
    Photosynthesis seems to be a central process which converts the sunlight to energy, thereby promotes plant proliferation and development, and leads to the maintenance of life on the earth by using water to introduce oxygen into the environment. Increased plant photosynthesis has recently been revitalized as a strategy to increase yields of crops and solve global food problems. Photosynthesis, thus, has become a primary focus of genetic engineering. Multiple attempts are ongoing to improve photosynthesis in order to overcome the obstacles (...)
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  7. Holism about Fact and Value.Kenneth Walden - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues for confirmational holism about facts and values. This position is similar to one defended by (among others) Hilary Putnam, but the argument is importantly different. Whereas Putnam et al. rely on examples of the putative entanglement of facts and values – a strategy which I suggest is vulnerable to parrying – my argument proceeds at a more general level. I argue that the explanation of action can not be separated from our practical reasoning, and for this reason, (...)
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  8. What is economics for?Brendan Hogan - 2020 - In Peter Rona, Laszlo Zolnai & Agnieszka Wincewicz-Price (eds.), Words, Objects and Events in Economics: The Making of Economic Theory.
    The methodological foundations of any scientific discipline are shaped by the goals towards which that discipline is aiming. While it is almost universally accepted that the goals of explanation and prediction of natural and non-human phenomena have been met with great success since the scientific revolution, it is almost just as universally accepted that the social sciences have not even come close to achieving these goals. This raises the question addressed in this paper, namely, what is economics, and social science (...)
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  9. L’objectivité scientifique à l’heure de la post-vérité.Laurent Jodoin - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:199-219.
    L’objectivité permettrait d’assurer la supériorité de la science par rapport à d’autres modes de connaissance. Elle doit donc être défendue, surtout en cette « ère de post-vérité » où les « faits alternatifs » remplacent les faits avérés, en politique comme ailleurs. Or les attaques proviennent autant de l’extérieur que de l’intérieur de la sphère philosophique. Il convient donc de tenter d’opérer la réconciliation la plus large possible avec deux représentants de clans (très) opposés, Mario Bunge et Bruno Latour. Réinvestissant (...)
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  10. Public Preferences about Fairness and the Ethics of Allocating Scarce Medical Interventions.Govind Persad - 2017 - In Meng Li & David Tracer (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Fairness, Equity, and Justice. Springer, Cham. pp. 51-65.
    This chapter examines how social- scientific research on public preferences bears on the ethical question of how those resources should in fact be allocated, and explain how social-scientific researchers might find an understanding of work in ethics useful as they design mechanisms for data collection and analysis. I proceed by first distinguishing the methodologies of social science and ethics. I then provide an overview of different approaches to the ethics of allocating scarce medical interventions, including an approach—the complete lives system—which (...)
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  11. Comments on Kolenda's Theses.Irvin M. Copi - 1956 - Review of Metaphysics 10 (1):115-117.
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  12. Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    [First published 09/2016; substantive revision 02/2021.] Evaluative terms and concepts are often divided into “thin” and “thick”. We don’t evaluate actions and persons merely as good or bad, or right or wrong, but also as kind, courageous, tactful, selfish, boorish, and cruel. The latter evaluative concepts are "descriptively thick": their application somehow involves both evaluation and a substantial amount of non-evaluative description. This article surveys various attempts to answer four fundamental questions about thick terms and concepts. (1) A “combination question”: (...)
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  13. 'It's evaluation, only thicker'.Debbie Roberts - forthcoming - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press.
  14. Risk, Everyday Intuitions, and the Institutional Value of Tort Law.Govind C. Persad - 2009 - Stan. L. Rev 62:1445.
    This Note offers a normative critique of cost-benefit analysis, one informed by deontological moral theory, in the context of the debate over whether tort litigation or a non-tort approach is the appropriate response to mass harm. The first Part argues that the difference between lay and expert intuitions about risk and harm often reflects a difference in normative judgments about the existing facts, rather than a difference in belief about what facts exist, which makes the lay intuitions more defensible. The (...)
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  15. What is Value? Where Does it Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.
    Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...)
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  16. Actuality and Value.J. Laird, G. Dawes Hicks & W. G. de Burgh - 1931 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 10 (1):81-134.
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  17. Knowledge and Values.Jeffrey Ernest Foss - 1977 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
  18. Moral Disagreement and the" Fact/Value Entanglement".Ángel Manuel Faerna - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):245-264.
    In his recent work, "The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy," Hilary Putnam traces the history of the fact-value dichotomy from Hume to Stevenson and Logical Positivism. The aim of this historical reconstruction is to undermine the foundations of the dichotomy, showing that it is of a piece with the dichotomy - untenable, as we know now - of "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments. Putnam's own thesis is that facts and values are "entangled" in a way that precludes any attempt to draw (...)
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  19. Thick Concepts and Thick Descriptions.Simon Kirchin - 2013 - In Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press. pp. 60.
    In this article I compare Ryle's notion of a thick description with Williams' notion of a thick concept so as to illuminate our understanding of both. In doing so I suggest lines of thought that show us that the notion of 'evaluation' in play in many people's writings should be broadened. Doing so will help to lessen the credibility of separationist notions of thick concepts.
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  20. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics.Pekka Vayrynen - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    In addition to thin concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to thick concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind -- concepts that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. Thick concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in content, and many philosophers claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance in ethics and metaethics. In this first book-length treatment of thick (...)
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  21. The ethics of reality and virtual reality: Latour, facts and values.Mariam Fraser - 2006 - History of the Human Sciences 19 (2):45-72.
    In the context of the question of the extent to which science studies is able to mount an adequate critique of contemporary developments in science and technology, and in view of the proliferating interest in ethics across the social sciences, this article has two aims. Firstly to address some of the implications for ethics of Bruno Latour's, and to a lesser extent Alfred North Whitehead’s, conceptions of reality, both of which have a bearing on the long-standing dichotomy between facts and (...)
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  22. Moving Beyond Mirroring - a Social Affordance Model of Sensorimotor Integration During Action Perception.Maria Brincker - 2010 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than (...)
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  23. Shapelessness in Context.Pekka Väyrynen - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):573-593.
    Many philosophers believe that the extensions of evaluative terms and concepts aren’t unified under non-evaluative similarity relations and that this “shapelessness thesis” (ST) has significant metaethical implications regarding non-cognitivism, ethical naturalism, moral particularism, thick concepts and more. ST is typically offered as an explanation of why evaluative classifications appear to “outrun” classifications specifiable in independently intelligible non-evaluative terms. This paper argues that both ST and the outrunning point used to motivate it can be explained on the basis of more general (...)
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  24. Morality and Hot Mud.Arnold Zuboff - 2002 - Philosophy Now 37:39-40.
    For a while in this article it seems impossible to articulate a compelling reason for refraining from killing an innocent stranger with the press of a button when this would earn one a small prize and would be done with absolutely guaranteed immunity from any punishment or other harm (including even an instantaneous elimination of any chance of a guilty memory, achieved through hypnosis, and an ironclad commitment from God not to condemn the killing). After many failed attempts, a compelling (...)
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  25. Why Should I Care About Morality?Arnold Zuboff - 2001 - Philosophy Now 31:24-27.
    For a while in this article it seems impossible to articulate a compelling reason for refraining from killing an innocent stranger with the press of a button when this would earn one a small prize and would be done with absolutely guaranteed immunity from any punishment or other harm (including even an instantaneous elimination of any chance of a guilty memory, achieved through hypnosis, and an ironclad commitment from God not to condemn the killing). After many failed attempts, a compelling (...)
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  26. Putnam and the political.Narve Strand - 2011 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (7):743-757.
    This article deals with how to talk about the political. After the introduction (I), I show, first, that Putnam’s arguments against the root dichotomies between facts and values (II), and between values and norms (III), are valid. I then discuss Putnam’s resistance to drawing skeptical lessons from these negative arguments, a fight that is largely successful (IV). I go on to sketch his own middle position, looking at the way he expands cognitive meaning in the practical sphere (V). I end (...)
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  27. Shapelessness and the thick.Debbie Roberts - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):489-520.
    This article aims to clarify the view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick. I do this by putting the disentangling argument in its place and then setting out what nonreductivists about the thick are committed to. To distinguish the view from possible reductive accounts, defenders of irreducible thickness are, I argue, committed to the claim that evaluative concepts and properties are nonevaluatively shapeless. This in turn requires a commitment to (radical) holism and particularism. Nonreductivists are also committed to the claim (...)
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  28. Symposium: Actuality and Value.J. Laird, G. Dawes Hicks & W. G. De Burgh - 1931 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 10 (1):81 - 134.
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  29. It Does Not Matter Whether We Can Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'.Alison Jaggar - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):373 - 379.
    In this paper, I want to discuss the recent attempts by Professor John R. Searle to cast doubt on the traditional empiricist distinction between fact and value. Searle's first attack on this distinction was made in 1964 in his now classic article, “How to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’.” In that paper, he presented what he claimed to be a counter-example to the thesis that statements of fact may not entail statements of value. Searle's argument aroused much controversy and inspired many (...)
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  30. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Distinction and Other Essays. [REVIEW]Alexei Angelides - 2003 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 24 (1):235-242.
    Towards the end of their reign, the logical positivists found themselves in bitter disagreement as to what extent the methods and axioms of the natural sciences can be justified by our abilities to grunt and point. What began as a project to epistemically ground the natural sciences ended as an argument about cavemen. Although such a story might be a good one, the consensus, among the positivists’ rivals and the positivists themselves, seemed to be that ahead lay a difficult road (...)
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  31. The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy.Julian Dodd & Suzanne Stern-Gillet - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (4):727-.
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