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Summary This section contains works falling under three main remits: 1) meta-ethical analysis of the concept of intrinsic value, and discussion of whether it is definable at all or not, and whether the concept is intelligible at all; 2) structural relations between intrinsic value and other kinds of value, such as extrinsic value, final value, instrumental value, and so on; 3) application of the category of intrinsic value to specific objects, for example non-human animals and the environment.
Key works Moore 1998 Classical work introducing the notion into contemporary moral philosophy. Feldman 1998 Clarificatory article, spells out some misconceptions about intrinsic value. Chisholm 1980, Chisholm 2005 Chisholm's 2-page proposal of a definition. Korsgaard 1983, Korsgaard 1983 Groundbreaking paper on the relation between intrinsic value and final value or value as an end. Zimmerman 2001 A contemporary classic defending intrinsic value and articulating its various dimensions. Bradley 2006 An assessment of current disputes between "Mooreans" and "Kantians" about intrinsic value.
Introductions Zimmerman 2019 Thorough Stanford Encyclopedia introduction. See also Schroeder 2008. Bradley 2013 Accessible and uptodate introduction. Rønnow-Rasmussen & Zimmerman 2005 Introduction to the collection: Rønnow-Rasmussen & Zimmerman 2005. Feldman 1998 This can also be used as introduction, easily accessible.
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  1. Meta-Ethical Quietism? Wittgenstein, Relaxed Realism, and Countercultures in Meta-Ethics.Farbod Akhlaghi - forthcoming - In Jonathan Beale & Richard Rowland (eds.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein has often been called a quietist. His work has inspired a rich and varied array of theories in moral philosophy. Some prominent meta-ethicists have also been called quietists, or ‘relaxed’ as opposed to ‘robust’ realists, sometimes with explicit reference to Wittgenstein in attempts to clarify their views. In this chapter, I compare and contrast these groups of theories and draw out their importance for contemporary meta-ethical debate. They represent countercultures to contemporary meta-ethics. That is, they reject in different (...)
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  2. Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.Jonathan Beale & Richard Rowland (eds.) - forthcoming
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  3. Awe’s Place in Ethics.Ashley Coates - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-14.
    After a period of relative neglect, awe has been the focus of substantial empirical work in psychology and has also begun to receive some philosophical attention. Thus far, though, little attention has been devoted to a line of reasoning present in the literature on environmental ethics that moves from _being awe-inspiring_ to _being worthy of preservation_. I argue here that this neglect ought to be remedied, as this argument potentially has a significant role to play in various ethical contexts involving (...)
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  4. Saving the Last Person From Radical Scepticism: How to Justify Attributions of Intrinsic Value to Nature Without Intuition or Empirical Evidence.Alexander Pho & Allen Thompson - forthcoming - Environmental Values.
    Toby Svoboda argues that humans cannot ever justifiably attribute intrinsic value to nature because we can never have evidence that any part of non-human nature has intrinsic value. We argue that, at best, Svoboda’s position leaves us with uncertainty about whether there is intrinsic value in the non-human natural world. This uncertainty, however, together with reason to believe that at least some non-human natural entities would possess intrinsic value if anything does, leaves us in a position to acquire evidence that (...)
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  5. Intrinsically Good, God Created Them.Daniel Rubio - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    Erik Wielenberg [2014] and Mark Murphy [2017], [2018] have defended a series of arguments for the conclusion that creatures are not good intrinsically. In response, I take two steps. First, I introduce a conception of intrinsic value that makes created intrinsic value unproblematic. Second, I respond to their arguments in turn. The first argument is from the sovereignty-aseity intuition and an analysis of intrinsicality that makes derivative good extrinsic. I challenge the analysis. The second comes from a conception of perfection (...)
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  6. Une défense de l'hédonisme axiologique.Antonin Broi - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):325-346.
    L'hédonisme axiologique a une longue histoire en philosophie. Pourtant, il garde une mauvaise réputation qui lui vaut d’être parfois écarté sans ménagement de la discussion philosophique. Cet article se propose de défendre l'hédonisme axiologique en exposant les principaux arguments en sa faveur et en répondant aux principales critiques et confusions dont il fait l'objet. Une attention particulière sera portée aux arguments établissant la spécificité du plaisir et du déplaisir par rapport à toutes les autres choses — amitié, savoir, justice, etc. (...)
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  7. Two Internal Critiques for Theists Who Oppose Moral Enhancement on a Process Virtue Basis.Abram Brummett & Parker Crutchfield - 2022 - Bioethics 36 (4):367-373.
    Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 367-373, May 2022.
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  8. Penelas, Federico. Wittgenstein. Estudio preliminar y selección de textos.Andrés Crelier - 2022 - Ideas Y Valores 71 (178):206-215.
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  9. Review of Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé: A Different Order of Difficulty, Literature After Wittgenstein. [REVIEW]Reidar Due - 2022 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 11.
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  10. The Worth of Persons: The Foundation of Ethics.James Franklin - 2022 - New York: Encounter Books.
    The death of a person is a tragedy while the explosion of a lifeless galaxy is a mere firework. The moral difference is grounded in the nature of humans: humans have intrinsic worth, a worth that makes their fate really matter. This is the worth proposed as the foundation of ethics. Ethics in the usual sense of right and wrong actions, rights and virtues, and how to live a good life, is founded on something more basic that is not itself (...)
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  11. Created Goodness and the Goodness of God: Divine Ideas and the Possibility of Creaturely Value.Dan Kemp - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (3):534-546.
    Traditional theism says that the goodness of everything comes from God. Moreover, the goodness of something intrinsically valuable can only come from what has it. Many conclude from these two claims that no creatures have intrinsic value if traditional theism is true. I argue that the exemplarist theory of the divine ideas gives the theist a way out. According to exemplarism, God creates everything according to ideas that are about himself, and so everything resembles God. Since God is wholly good (...)
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  12. The Mathematics of Desert: Merit, Fit, and Well-Being.Stephen Kershnar & Michael Tooley - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (18):18.
    Here, we argue for a mathematical equation that captures desert. Our procedure consists of setting out principles that a correct equation must satisfy and then arguing that our set of equations satisfies them. We then consider two objections to the equation. First, an objector might argue that desert and well-being separately contribute to intrinsic goodness, and they do not separately contribute. The concern here is that our equations treat them as separate contributors. Second, our set of desert-equations are unlike equations (...)
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  13. “A Great Miracle in a Little Room”: Thomas Traherne and the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Animals.G. P. Marcar - 2022 - Journal of Animal Ethics 12 (2):128-137.
    The writings of English poet and mystic Thomas Traherne remain a relatively underexplored reservoir. Traherne's technological context includes the invention of the telescope as well as the microscope. As will become evident in this article, Traherne's expositions on creation display an imagination that is adept at placing itself behind both types of lenses. This article focuses on Traherne's treatment of two types of insects—the fly and the ant—in order to extrapolate some of the insights that can be gleaned from Traherne's (...)
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  14. The Philosophical Significance of Secondary Uses of Language in Wittgenstein’s Late Philosophy.Marco Marchesin - 2022 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 11.
    This paper aims to provide an account of Wittgenstein’s employment of the distinction between primary and secondary uses. Against views that either dismiss secondariness as an uninteresting by-product of our rule-governed employment of words or circumscribe their relevance to aesthetics, ethics, or expressive uses of language, the paper shows that the distinction is primarily philosophically significant, as it is to be conceived – and it is effectively employed by Wittgenstein - as a powerful device to tackle different – often unrelated (...)
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  15. Conservatisms About the Valuable.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):180-194.
    ABSTRACT Sometimes it seems that an existing bearer of value should be preserved even though it could be destroyed and replaced with something of equal or greater value. How can this conservative intuition be explained and justified? This paper distinguishes three answers, which I call existential, attitudinal, and object-affecting conservatism. I raise some problems for existential and attitudinal conservatism, and suggest how they can be solved by object-affecting conservatism.
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  16. Wittgenstein’s Transcendental Thought Experiment in Ethics.Simone Nota - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22:176.
    In this essay, I argue that Wittgenstein attempted to clarify ethics through a procedure that, by analogy with “transcendental arguments”, I call “transcendental thought experiment”. Specifically, after offering a brief perspectival account of both transcendental arguments and transcendental thought experiments, I focus on a thought experiment proposed by Wittgenstein in his 1929 'Lecture on Ethics', arguing that it deserves the title of “transcendental”.
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  17. The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1845-1860.
    The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object. In this paper we argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a (...)
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  18. The Cost of Denying Intrinsic Value in Nature.Lars Samuelsson - 2022 - Environmental Ethics 44 (3):267-288.
    Many people who claim to genuinely care about nature still seem reluctant to ascribe intrinsic value to it. Environmentalists, nature friendly people in general, and even environmental activists, often hesitate at the idea that nature possesses value in its own right—value that is not reducible to its importance to human or other sentient beings. One crucial explanation of this reluctance is probably the thought that such value—at least when attached to nature—would be mysterious in one way or another, or at (...)
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  19. Sobre la noción de interpretación en el “ver-como” de Ludwig Wittgenstein.María Sol Yuan - 2022 - Ideas Y Valores 71 (179):161-180.
    Los casos de “ver-como”, presentados por Wittgenstein en la Segunda Parte de Philosophical Investigations, muestran que el concepto de “ver” se encuentra cercano al de “interpretar” y resiste su separación. El presente artículo propone un argumento para aclarar la noción de “interpretación” presente en estos casos, a partir de su comparación con los usos presentes en el Tractatus y en la Primera Parte de Philosophical Investigations. Se sostiene que dicha noción cumple el rol de determinar el sentido de lo visualmente (...)
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  20. From Shared Enaction to Intrinsic Value. How Enactivism Contributes to Environmental Ethics.Konrad Werner & Magdalena Kiełkowicz-Werner - 2022 - Topoi 41 (2):409-423.
    Two major philosophical movements have sought to fundamentally rethink the relationship between humans and their environment: environmental ethics and enactivism. Surprisingly, they virtually never refer to or seek inspiration from each other. The goal of this analysis is to bridge the gap. Our main purpose, then, is to address, from the enactivist angle, the conceptual backbone of environmental ethics, namely the concept of intrinsic value. We argue that intrinsic value does indeed exist, yet its "intrinsicality" does not boil down to (...)
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  21. Time of the Magicians: Wittgenstein, Benjamin, Cassirer, Heidegger and the Decade That Reinvented Philosophy by Wolfram Eilenberger. [REVIEW]Leonid Bilmes - 2021 - Philosophy Now 146:48-50.
  22. Intrinsic Value and Educational Value.Jane Gatley - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (4-5):675-687.
    Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.
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  23. Wittgenstein’s Limits of Language and Normative Theories of Assertion: Some Comparisons.Leila Haaparanta - 2021 - Disputatio 10 (18).
    In his classic work on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Erik Stenius described Wittgenstein’s study as a critique of pure language, thus pointing to a connection between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Kant’s critique of pure reason. Besides similarities, there also seems be important differences between the two philosophers. In Kant’s critique, one discerns a subject who does something, namely, constructs the world of experience, while Wittgenstein draws a picture in which neither an agent nor an act is visible. Like Kant and Wittgenstein, contemporary normative (...)
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  24. Against ‘Good for’/‘Well-Being’, for ‘Simply Good’.Thomas Hurka - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):803-22.
    This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well-being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G. E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there's no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that's neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to ‘simply good’. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value ‘good for’ expresses is distinctively (...)
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  25. What Is Basic Intrinsic Value?Noah Lemos - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):33-43.
    The concept of basic intrinsic value is important for axiology. Michael Zimmerman and Timothy Perrine each present necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s having basic intrinsic value. I argue that neither account is satisfactory. I present two objections to Zimmerman’s view. First, I argue that his view cannot accommodate some widely held and plausible views about the intrinsic value of knowledge and true belief. Second, I argue that it cannot accommodate some plausible views about the intrinsic value of states when (...)
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  26. Logic in its Space. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Logic in the Tractatus.Ulrich Metschl - 2021 - Disputatio 10 (18).
    The paramount role of logic in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is undeniable and must be obvious to anyone even on a cursory reading. Yet, Wittgenstein's formulations often appear metaphorical when he sketches his ideas on logic and its relation to sentence meaning. Sometimes, they seem more apt to invite loose philosophical associations than pinning down rigorously technical details. This impression notwithstanding, the Tractatus still offers one of the deepest philosophical accounts of modern logic and it does so precisely through its suggestive exposition. (...)
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  27. A Puzzle About Epistemic Value and Steps Towards a Solution.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119.
    This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is that several principles about the epistemic value of true beliefs and epistemic disvalue of false beliefs are, individually, plausible but, collectively, contradictory. My solution claims that sometimes false beliefs are epistemically valuable. I nonetheless show how my solution is not in deep tension with the Jamesian idea that true beliefs are epistemically valuable and false beliefs are epistemically disvaluable. I conclude by indicating how the (...)
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  28. Leyendo a Wittgenstein desde la periferia.Jaime Ramos - 2021 - Ideas Y Valores 70:173-213.
    Mediante un examen crítico de los ensayos publicados en Ideas y Valores acerca de la filosofía de Ludwig Wittgenstein, el escrito busca establecer qué tan rica es nuestra asimilación del pensamiento de uno de los grandes filósofos de la historia, si tal trabajo muestra una evolución a lo largo del devenir de la revista y si el examen que hago aquí puede darnos algún indicio acerca de nuestro desarrollo filosófico. Finalmente, se hacen algunas breves consideraciones acerca de lo que significa (...)
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  29. Value Conservatism and Its Challenge to Consequentialism.Reuben Sass - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (3):337-352.
    G.A. Cohen’s value conservatism entails that we ought to preserve some existing sources of value in lieu of more valuable replacements, thereby repudiating maximizing consequentialism. Cohen motivates value conservatism through illustrative cases. The consequentialist, however, can explain many Cohen-style cases by taking extrinsic properties, such as historical significance, to be sources of final value. Nevertheless, it may be intuitive that there’s stronger reason to preserve than to promote certain sources of value, especially historically significant things. This motivates an argument that (...)
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  30. Prospects for Internal, Embodied Realism with Regard to Intrinsic Value.Konrad Werner & Magdalena KiełKowicz-Werner - 2021 - Ethics and the Environment 26 (2):21-50.
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  31. Do Mundo Pedagógico-Filosófico em Wittgenstein.Bárbara Wilson Barra - 2020 - Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (55-56):337-346.
    This dissertation aims to understand, in the light of Wittgenstein’s Investigations, language as a match or a game, whose performance is trained by using certain rules, taking in traditions and those techniques that propel the young shoots to the integration in the world. In order to this, it will be developed the argument that sustains that the learning process, which is incompatible with an automatic system of direct and instantaneous print of information – considering that there is no way that (...)
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  32. Becoming Attuned.Christian Busch - 2020 - In The Serendipity Mindset: The Art and Science of Creating Good Luck. pp. 1-45.
    Breaking Down the Barriers to Serendipity Life is what happens to us while we are making other plans. ALLEN SAUNDERS, AMERICAN WRITER, JOURNALIST, AND CARTOONIST.
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  33. A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):891-913.
    A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions is plausible if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable. Yet there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable.
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  34. The Parallel Goods of Knowledge and Achievement.Thomas Hurka - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):589-608.
    This paper examines what it takes to be the intrinsic human goods of knowledge and achievement and argues that they are at many points parallel. Both are compounds, and of parallel elements: belief, justification, and truth in the one case, and intentional pursuit, competence, and success in the other. Each involves a Moorean organic unity, so its full presence or value requires a connection between its elements: an outside-in connection, where what makes a belief true helps explain why it’s justified, (...)
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  35. The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1207-1221.
    The fitting attitude analysis of value states that for objects to have value is for them to be the fitting targets of attitudes. Good objects are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, while bad objects are the fitting targets of negative attitudes. The following paper presents an argument to the effect that value and the fittingness of attitudes differ in terms of their explanations. Whereas the fittingness of attitudes is explained, inter alia, by both the properties of attitudes and those (...)
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  36. On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism (...)
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  37. Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: A Defense of Indefinability.Miles Tucker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2261-2276.
    Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; (...)
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  38. Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection.Vuko Andrić - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):101-109.
    Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, that are intrinsically good? If so, it can be objected that Hedonism is incomplete. In this paper, I defend Hedonism against this objection by arguing for a distinction between goodness and desirability that understands “desirability” as a deontic concept, in terms of “reason to desire”, but goodness as an (...)
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  39. Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
    Accounts of the nature of unpleasant pain have proliferated over the past decade, but there has been little systematic investigation of which of them can accommodate its badness. This paper is such a study. In its sights are two targets: those who deny the non-instrumental disvalue of pain's unpleasantness; and those who allow it but deny that it can be accommodated by the view—advanced by me and others—that unpleasant pains are interoceptive experiences with evaluative content. Against the former, I argue (...)
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  40. Wittgenstein and Brandom: Affinities and Divergences.Simon Blackburn - 2019 - Disputatio 8 (9).
    It is not difficult to find both affinities and divergences in the work of Wittgenstein and Brandom but this particular text explores several key issues beyond first impressions and reveals hidden divergences in supposed similarities and occasionally less profound dissimilarities where their philosophies seem to differ radically. Both Wittgenstein and Brandom, while agreeing that representations cannot be taken to be primitive, would not approve of Rorty’s drive to jettison the very idea of representation along with that of truth. Wittgenstein, on (...)
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  41. Some Strands of Wittgenstein’s Normative Pragmatism, and Some Strains of His Semantic Nihilism.Robert B. Brandom - 2019 - Disputatio 8 (9).
    In this reflection I address one of the critical questions this monograph is about: How to justify proposing yet another semantic theory in the light of Wittgenstein’s strong warnings against it. I see two clear motives for Wittgenstein’s semantic nihilism. The first one is the view that philosophical problems arise from postulating hypothetical entities such as “meanings”. To dissolve the philosophical problems rather than create new ones, Wittgenstein suggests substituting “meaning” with “use” and avoiding scientism in philosophy together with the (...)
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  42. Recognition and Personhood: A Critique of Bernstein's Account of the Wrongfulness of Torture.Johnny Brennan - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):211-226.
    J. M. Bernstein argues that to capture the depths of the harm of torture, we need to do away with the idea that we possess intrinsic and inviolable worth. If personhood is inviolable, then torture can inflict only apparent harm on our standing as persons. Bernstein claims that torture is a paradigm of moral injury because it causes what he calls “devastation”: The victim experiences an actual degradation of his or her personhood. Bernstein argues that our value is given to (...)
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  43. Human Rights Without Objective Intrinsic Value.Víctor Cantero-Flores & Roberto Parra-Dorantes - 2019 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 21 (1):10-27.
    The current predominant conception of human rights implies that human beings have objective intrinsic value. In this paper, we defend that there is no satisfactory justification of this claim. In spite of the great variety of theories aimed at explaining objective intrinsic value, all of them share one common problematic feature: they pass from a non-evaluative proposition to an evaluative proposition by asserting that a certain entity has intrinsic value in virtue of having certain non-evaluative features. This is a step (...)
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  44. Morals, Meaning and Truth in Wittgenstein and Brandom.Jordi Fairhurst - 2019 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 9 (8).
    The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the similarities that stem from Wittgenstein’s (Philosophical Investigations (1953)) and Brandom’s (Making it Explicit (1994)) commitment to pragmatics in the philosophy of language to account for moral utterances. That is, the study of the meaning of moral utterances is carried out resorting to the study of the acts being performed in producing or exhibiting these utterances. Both authors offer, therefore, a pragmatic solution in order to account for the meaning of (...)
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  45. Brandom and Wittgenstein: Disagreements on How to Be in Agreement with a Rule.Florian Franken Figueiredo - 2019 - Disputatio 8 (9).
    This paper offers an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks that discusses the meaning of being in practical agreement with a rule, arguing that Brandom misconstrues the idea undergirding Wittgenstein’s remarks in terms of the relation between the pragmatic and normative aspects of language. First, I discuss Brandom’s idea of normative pragmatism and Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that Brandom enforces the picture of implicit rules as a salient solution for the problem of infinite regress regarding explicit (...)
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  46. Wittgenstein's Diagonal Argument: A Variation on Cantor and Turing.Juliet Floyd & Kurt Wischin - 2019 - Disputatio 8 (9).
    Turing was a philosopher of logic and mathematics, as well as a mathematician. His work throughout his life owed much to the Cambridge milieu in which he was educated and to which he returned throughout his life. A rich and distinctive tradition discussing how the notion of “common sense” relates to the foundations of logic was being developed during Turing’s undergraduate days, most intensively by Wittgenstein, whose exchanges with Russell, Ramsey, Sraffa, Hardy, Littlewood and others formed part of the backdrop (...)
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  47. Brandom, Wittgenstein, and Human Encounters.Leila Haaparanta - 2019 - Disputatio 8 (9).
    There are several similarities between Robert B. Brandom’s and the later Wittgenstein’s views on linguistic meaning. Like Wittgenstein, Brandom rejects representationalism and takes linguistic practices to be the basis where all meaning rests. His inferentialism is a holistic view, already envisaged by Frege. The idea of a language game connects Brandom to Wittgenstein, although Wittgenstein’s idea has also been developed in various other directions. However, unlike Wittgenstein, Brandom pays special attention to the game of giving and asking for reasons. This (...)
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  48. Wittgenstein (and His Followers) on Meaning and Normativity.Paul Horwich - 2019 - Disputatio 8 (9).
    This paper questions the idea that Wittgenstein’s account of meaning as use requires an intrinsically normative understanding of this notion, and suggests instead that Wittgenstein is better understood as promoting a naturalistic view of meaning that undertakes an explanation based on non–semantic and non–normative facts of word–usage. It discusses the relevant positions of Kripke, Brandom and McDowell, all of whom are found to be united by the attempt to attribute to Wittgenstein a normative understanding of language that is not convincing. (...)
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  49. “What the Picture Tells Me Is Itself”: The Reflexivity of Knowledge Between Brandom and Wittgenstein.Vojtěch Kolman - 2019 - Disputatio 8 (9).
    Both Brandom and Wittgenstein base their concepts of experience on the game metaphor and the associated concept of rule. In fact, what Brandom seems to do is further refine Wittgenstein’s vocabulary by specifying the game as the game of giving and asking for reasons and rules as the rules of inference. By replacing the plurality of “games” with the one and only “game”, though, Brandom also lays the ground for a possible discord. This relates particularly to the cognitive significance of (...)
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  50. On Keeping Things in Proportion.Adam Lovett & Stefan Riedener - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3).
    Formula One isn’t very important. You can't care about it too much. The refugee crisis is more important. You can care about it much more. In this paper we investigate how important something is. By ‘importance’ we mean how much it is fitting to care about a thing. We explore a view about this which we call Proportionalism. This view says that a thing’s importance depends on that thing’s share of the world’s total value. The more of what matters there (...)
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