Summary |
Serious empirical work on psychopathy and moral psychology started with
the investigation on how individuals with psychopathy solve the
moral/conventional task (M/C). First studies seemed to show that psychopaths do
not differentiate between the two types of norms as the nonpsychopathic
individuals. This result was taken to lend support to neosentimentalist views on
moral judgment and has been taken to have important implications for debates on
different kinds of internalism/externalism views in metaethics, accounts of
moral understanding and ascriptions of responsibility. Later research and
philosophical reflection on empirical data gave a more nuanced picture of
psychopaths’ neuropsychological abnormalities and what implications those might
have on moral psychology more generally. In particular, it has been noted that
psychopaths exhibit cognitive deficits in decision-making processes and that
different affective and cognitive abnormalities appear and disappear as a
function of the context of the research paradigm. Moreover, in recent years
pressure has been put on the initial discovery that psychopaths fail to solve
the M/C. Thus it seems that psychopaths might possess normal moral
understanding, albeit acquired by utilization of different neurocognitive
resources. Further inquiries include questions whether psychopathic abnormal
moral psychology might be an evolutionary adaptation to an antisocial life
history. |