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  1. Should one care about the intuitions of others: Trying out intuition solipsism.Thomas Grundmann - manuscript
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  2. Philosophical Intuition and the Need for an Explanation.Alexander S. Harper - manuscript
    Traditionally, intuitions about cases have been taken as strong evidence for a philosophical position. I argue that intuitions about concept deployment have epistemic value while intuitions about matters of fact have none. I argue this by use of the explanationist criterion which contends that S is justified in believing only those propositions which are part of the best explanation of S’s making the judgements she makes. This criterion accords with scientific practice. Bealer suggests, as a defence of intuition, that naturalists (...)
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  3. Non-propositional intuition, intuitive belief and ‘intuition that p’.Cyrill Mamin - manuscript
    According to a popular view in philosophy, intuition is a singular propositional attitude. In this paper, I outline an opposite account on “garden-variety intuition”, i.e. intuition that people experience in their daily lives. The account is based on a distinction between intuition on the processing level, ‘intuitive belief’ and ‘intuition that p’. Immediacy and certainty prove to be the phenomenal features of intuitive beliefs and intuitions that p. Regarding the processing level, I suggest to combine dual-process theory and the theory (...)
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  4. The Counterexample Method and Armchair Philosophy.Peyman Pourghannad & Davood Hosseini - manuscript
    According to a bedrock assumption in the current methodology of armchair philosophy, we may refute a theory aiming at analyzing a concept by providing a counterexample in which it intuitively seems that a hypothetical or real situation does not fit with what the theory implies. In this paper, we shall argue that this assumption is at most either untenable or otherwise useless in bringing about what is commonly expected from it.
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  5. Reply to Sosa.Stephen Stich - manuscript
    Sosa’s topic is the use of intuitions in philosophy. Much of what I have written on the issue has been critical of appeals to intuition in epistemology, though in recent years I have become increasingly skeptical of the use of intuitions in ethics and in semantic theory as well.
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  6. Intuitions: Their nature and epistemic efficacy.C. Beyer & A. Burri - forthcoming - Grazer Philosophische Studien. Philosophical Knowledge-its Possibility and Scope.
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  7. Skepticism is Wrong for General Reasons.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-10.
    According to Michael Bergmann’s “intuitionist particularism,” our position with respect to skeptical arguments is much the same as it was with respect to Zeno’s paradoxes of motion prior to our developing sophisticated theories of the continuum. We observed ourselves move, and that closed the case in favor of the ability to move, even if we had no general theory about that ability. We observe ourselves form justified beliefs, and that closes the case in favor of the ability to form justified (...)
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  8. Why Your Causal Intuitions are Corrupt: Intermediate and Enabling Variables.Christopher Clarke - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-29.
    When evaluating theories of causation, intuitions should not play a decisive role, not even intuitions in flawlessly-designed thought experiments. Indeed, no coherent theory of causation can respect the typical person’s intuitions in redundancy (pre-emption) thought experiments, without disrespecting their intuitions in threat-and-saviour (switching / short-circuit) thought experiments. I provide a deductively sound argument for these claims. Amazingly, this argument assumes absolutely nothing about the nature of causation. I also provide a second argument, whose conclusion is even stronger: the typical person’s (...)
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  9. Who's Afraid of Cognitive Diversity?Miguel Egler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD) states that demography-specific intuitions are unsuited to play evidential roles in philosophy. The CCD attracted much attention in recent years, in great part due to the launch of an international research effort to test for demographic variation in philosophical intuitions. In the wake of these international studies, the CCD may prove revolutionary. For, if these studies uncover demographic differences in intuitions, then, in line with the CCD, there would be good reason to challenge philosophical (...)
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  10. Difference and Robustness in the Patterns of Philosophical Intuition Across Demographic Groups.Joshua Knobe - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    In a recent paper, I argued that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly robust both across demographic groups and across development. Machery and Stich reply by reviewing a series of studies that do show significant differences in philosophical intuition between different demographic groups. This is a helpful point, which gets at precisely the issues that are most relevant here. However, even when one looks at those very studies, one finds truly surprising robustness. In other words, despite the presence of statistically significant differences (...)
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  11. The threat of the intuition-shaped hole.Ethan Landes - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The assumption that philosophers rely on intuitions to justify their philosophical positions has recently come under substantial criticism. In order to protect philosophy from experimental findings that suggest that intuitions are epistemically problematic, a number of metaphilosophers have argued that intuitions play no substantial epistemic role in philosophy. This paper focuses on attempts to deny intuitions’ epistemic role through exegetical analysis of original thought experiments. Using Deutsch’s particularly well-developed exegesis of Gettier’s 10 coin case as an exemplar of this method, (...)
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  12. Philosophical producers, philosophical consumers, and the metaphilosophical value of original texts.Ethan Landes - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):207-225.
    In recent years, two competing methodological frameworks have developed in the study of the epistemology of philosophy. The traditional camp, led by experimental philosophy and its allies, has made inferences about the epistemology of philosophy based on the reactions, or intuitions, people have to works of philosophy. In contrast, multiple authors have followed the lead of Deutsch and Cappelen by setting aside experimental data in favor of inferences based on careful examination of the text of notable works of philosophy. In (...)
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  13. Arthur Schopenhauer: Logic and Dialectic.Jens Lemanski - 2023 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    For Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), logic as a discipline belongs to the human faculty of reason, more precisely to the faculty of language. This discipline of logic breaks down into two areas. Logic or analytics is one side of the coin; dialectic or the art of persuasion is the other. The former investigates rule-oriented and monological language. The latter investigates result-oriented language and persuasive language...
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  14. Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.
    According to the ‘expertise defence’, experimental findings suggesting that intuitive judgments about hypothetical cases are influenced by philosophically irrelevant factors do not undermine their evidential use in (moral) philosophy. This defence assumes that philosophical experts are unlikely to be influenced by irrelevant factors. We discuss relevant findings from experimental metaphilosophy that largely tell against this assumption. To advance the debate, we present the most comprehensive experimental study of intuitive expertise in ethics to date, which tests five well- known biases of (...)
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  15. Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!Moti Mizrahi - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (6):969-990.
    In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to (...)
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  16. Why the Empirical Study of Non-philosophical Expertise Does not Undermine the Status of Philosophical Expertise.Theodore Bach - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):999-1023.
    In some domains experts perform better than novices, and in other domains experts do not generally perform better than novices. According to empirical studies of expert performance, this is because the former but not the latter domains make available to training practitioners a direct form of learning feedback. Several philosophers resource this empirical literature to cast doubt on the quality of philosophical expertise. They claim that philosophy is like the dubious domains in that it does not make available the good, (...)
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  17. Zombie intuitions.Eugen Fischer & Justin Sytsma - 2021 - Cognition 215 (C):104807.
    In philosophical thought experiments, as in ordinary discourse, our understanding of verbal case descriptions is enriched by automatic comprehension inferences. Such inferences have us routinely infer what else is also true of the cases described. We consider how such routine inferences from polysemous words can generate zombie intuitions: intuitions that are ‘killed’ (defeated) by contextual information but kept cognitively alive by the psycholinguistic phenomenon of linguistic salience bias. Extending ‘evidentiary’ experimental philosophy, this paper examines whether the ‘zombie argument’ against materialism (...)
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  18. Acies mentis. Il progetto cartesiano di un'epistemologia dell'intuitus e il suo ripensamento metafisico.Simone Guidi - 2021 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (31):139-164.
    The present paper deals with the diachronic evolution of the Cartesian concept of intuitus, focusing particularly on the reasons for its (at least lexical) dismissal in Descartes's mature elaborations of his metaphysics. In section 1, I address the notion of intuitus presented in the Rules, showing that this concept is pivotal in Descartes' early epistemology of evidence. In section 2, I argue that such a concept can be traced back to certain distinctive elements of the Late Scholastic debate on angels (...)
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  19. Bergson ja intuitio filosofian metodina.Katariina Lipsanen - 2021 - Tiede Ja Edistys 46 (3):133–146.
    Tässä artikkelissa käsittelen Henri Bergsonin (1859–1941) intuition käsitettä ja sen suhdetta hänen filosofiseen menetelmäänsä. Bergsonin on nähty tarkoittavan intuitiolla yhtäältä filosofian metodia ja toisaalta tiettyä älyyn verrattavaa filosofialle ainutlaatuista tiedon muotoa. Esitän, että Bergsonille intuitio on samanaikaisesti näitä molempia. Se on todellisuuden ajattelemista kestona, sisäistä jatkuvuuttamme muistuttavana liikkeenä. Intuitiossa tavoitetaan todellisuuden luonne sikäli kuin se on läsnä myös meissä itsessämme tällaisena jatkuvuutena. Metodologisesti se on todellisuuden tarkastelua ajallisuuden ja muutoksen perspektiivistä. Tiedon muotona se on välitöntä ymmärrystä tarkastelun kohteesta itsestään.
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  20. The method(s) of cases.Jeffrey Maynes - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):102-124.
    Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to philosophical cases play in philosophical argumentation. The method of appealing to such cases has been dubbed the “method of cases,” and, in recent work, Edouard Machery has both defended its prevalence and uniformity in philosophical practice, and criticized its epistemic value. In this paper, I argue that there is no single method of cases, but rather a set of methods of cases. To defend this claim, I distinguish and (...)
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  21. Nietzsche's Intuitions.Justin Remhof - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):732-753.
    ABSTRACT This essay examines a particular rhetorical strategy Nietzsche uses to supply prima facie epistemic justification: appeals to intuition. I first investigate what Nietzsche thinks intuitions are, given that he never uses the term ‘intuition’ as we do in contemporary philosophy. I then examine how Nietzsche can simultaneously endorse naturalism and intuitive appeals. I finish by looking at why and how Nietzsche uses appeals to intuition to further his philosophical agenda. Answering these questions should provide a new and deeper understanding (...)
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  22. La intuición en la filosofía de Arthur Schopenhauer.Clara Zimmermann - 2021 - Logos Revista de Filosofía 137:6-29.
    In the present work, we will analyze the concept of intuition mainly in relation to the epistemological and the metaphysical theses of Schopenhauerian theory. In the first section, we will discuss the central axes of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical system, especially regarding the concept of will (Wille) and the relationship that this entails with his theory of knowledge. Then, we will examine the difference that the German philosopher establishes between representative —or mediated— rational knowledge and direct —or immediate— intuitive knowledge. Likewise, we (...)
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  23. Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Perception and intuition are our basic sources of knowledge. They are also capacities we deliberately improve in ways that draw on our knowledge. Elijah Chudnoff explores how this happens, developing an account of the epistemology of expert perception and expert intuition, and a rationalist view of the role of intuition in philosophy.
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  24. Thought Experiments and the (Ir-)relevance of intuitions in Philosophy.Daniel Cohnitz - 2020 - In Julia Simone Hermann, Jeroen Hopster, Wouter Kalf & Michael Klenk (eds.), Philosophy in the Age of Science? Inquiries into philosophical progress, method, and societal relevance. London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 95-110.
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  25. A fé como “salto qualitativo” e as três possibilidades existenciais fundamentais em Kierkegaard: o esforço de conquista de si mesmo, a harmonização com a generalidade do bem e do mal e a espiritualidade individual e a autenticidade existencial.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2020 - Guairacá - Revista de Filosofia 36 (1):192-218.
    Caracterizando a existência como um processo de escolha e decisão que converge para a constituição do sujeito como tal, Kierkegaard atribui à existência a condição de um projeto em uma construção que encerra três possibilidades existenciais fundamentais, a saber, o estético, o ético e o religioso. Dessa forma, o artigo assinala que, constituindo-se uma dimensão em cujo estádio a procura do sentido ou a busca do absoluto circunscreve-se à imanência, o modo existencial estético caracteriza-se como a fruição da subjetividade consigo (...)
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  26. Intuitions, Biases, and Extra‐Wide Reflective Equilibrium.Samuel Director - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (5):674-684.
    It seems that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. Yet, there is evidence that our intuitions are heavily influenced by biases. This generates a puzzle: we must use our intuitions, but we seemingly cannot fully trust those very intuitions. In this paper, I develop a methodology for philosophical theorizing which attempts to avoid this puzzle. Specifically, I develop and defend a methodology that I call Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium. I argue that this method allows us to use intuitions, while also providing (...)
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  27. Testing for the phenomenal: Intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology.Miguel Egler - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):48-66.
    Recent empirical studies raise methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that have precisely this phenomenology to argue that the above reply fails. Furthermore, it shows that empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant (...)
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  28. Philosophical expertise under the microscope.Miguel Egler & Lewis Dylan Ross - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1077-1098.
    Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the (...)
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  29. Lingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument.Eugen Fischer & Paul E. Engelhardt - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):415-439.
    Many philosophical thought experiments and arguments involve unusual cases. We present empirical reasons to doubt the reliability of intuitive judgments and conclusions about such cases. Inferences and intuitions prompted by verbal case descriptions are influenced by routine comprehension processes which invoke stereotypes. We build on psycholinguistic findings to determine conditions under which the stereotype associated with the most salient sense of a word predictably supports inappropriate inferences from descriptions of unusual (stereotype-divergent) cases. We conduct an experiment that combines plausibility ratings (...)
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  30. It just feels right: an account of expert intuition.Ellen Fridland & Matt Stichter - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1327-1346.
    One of the hallmarks of virtue is reliably acting well. Such reliable success presupposes that an agent is able to recognize the morally salient features of a situation, and the appropriate response to those features and is motivated to act on this knowledge without internal conflict. Furthermore, it is often claimed that the virtuous person can do this in a spontaneous or intuitive manner. While these claims represent an ideal of what it is to have a virtue, it is less (...)
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  31. Astrid Burgbacher: Moralische Intuition. [REVIEW]Cyrill Mamin - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Literatur 8:17-25.
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  32. Intuition und Erkenntnis.Cyrill Mamin - 2020 - Paderborn: Mentis.
    Was ist Intuition? Gibt es intuitive Erkenntnis? Intuition beschäftigt Philosophie, Psychologie und Alltagsdenken. Einschätzungen reichen dabei von "höchste Erkenntnisart" bis "höchst unzuverlässig." Cyrill Mamin zeichnet zentrale Bestimmungen der Intuition in Philosophie und Psychologie nach. Wesentliche Fragen sind dabei: Wie ist es, eine Intuition zu haben? Wie kommt eine Intuition zustande? Auf dieser Grundlage bestimmt Mamin Intuition als massgeblich nicht-propositionale Erkenntnisart, welche unsere intuitiven Überzeugungen rechtfertigen kann. Im Zentrum steht ein neuartiges Modell der intuitiven Rechtfertigung, das psychologische mit erkenntnistheoretischen Elementen verbindet. (...)
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  33. Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism.Howard Sankey - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (4):437-445.
    The aim of this paper is to document Laudan's rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire approach to the evaluation of a theory (...)
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  34. Guglielmo di Ockham, l’onnipotenza divina e l’intuizione del non-esistente.Fabrizio Amerini - 2019 - In Fabrizio Amerini, Simone Fellina & Andrea Strazzoni (eds.), Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale. Parma: E-theca OnLineOpenAccess Edizioni. pp. 812-877.
    In this essay, we reconsider two themes particularly discussed by the interpreters of Ockham: that of divine omnipotence and the hypothesis of the intuitive cognition of non-existent things. The purpose is to show that the hypothetical case considered by Ockham was subjected to opposite interpretations. For theological reasons, Ockham attributes not only to God but also to human beings the possibility of having acts of intuitive cognition of things that do not exist; nonetheless, he holds that it is contradictory for (...)
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  35. Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?James Andow - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):257-269.
    I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse? If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophers’ reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think about the role of intuitions in philosophy.
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  36. Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):697-724.
  37. The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances.Jeroen Hopster - 2019 - Animals 9 (12):1-14.
    This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant (‘species-relativism’). Third, if we (...)
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  38. Analiza empirycznych argumentów na rzecz tezy o zróżnicowaniu kulturowym intuicji epistemicznych.Krzysztof Sękowski - 2019 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 14 (2):75-102.
    The founding text for the new current in modern philosophy—experi-mental philosophy—can be seen in Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Ste-phen Stich’s “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” (2001). The authors describe in this article a study to prove cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions. On the basis of their results, they argue that since epistemic intuitions seem to serve a crucial role in the use of thought experiments, contemporary philosophical methodology is highly unjustified. That study has brought about at least three replication attempts (...)
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  39. On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism.Declan Smithies - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244.
    What is the role of phenomenal consciousness in grounding epistemic justification? This paper explores the prospects for a global version of phenomenal conservatism inspired by the work of Michael Huemer, according to which all epistemic justification is grounded in phenomenal seemings. I’m interested in this view because of its global ambitions: it seeks to explain all epistemic justification in terms of a single epistemic principle, which says that you have epistemic justification to believe whatever seems to you strongly enough on (...)
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  40. Thinking Off Your Feet: How Empirical Psychology Vindicates Armchair Philosophy.Michael Strevens - 2019 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
    What is going on under the hood in philosophical analysis, that familiar process that attempts to uncover the nature of such philosophically interesting kinds as knowledge, causation, and justice by the method of posit and counterexample? How, in particular, do intuitions tell us about philosophical reality? The standard, if unappealing, answer is that philosophical analysis is conceptual analysis—that what we learn about when we do philosophy is in the first instance facts about our own minds. Drawing on recent work on (...)
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  41. Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.
    Disagreement is a hot topic right now in epistemology, where there is spirited debate between epistemologists who argue that we should be moved by the fact that we disagree and those who argue that we need not. Both sides to this debate often use what is commonly called “the method of cases,” designing hypothetical cases involving peer disagreement and using what we think about those cases as evidence that specific normative theories are true or false, and as reasons for believing (...)
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  42. Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):69-104.
    In recent years a growing number of philosophers writing about the methodology of philosophy have defended the surprising claim that philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. In this paper I defend the contrary view that philosophers do use intuitions as evidence. I argue that this thesis is the best explanation of several salient facts about philosophical practice. First, philosophers tend to believe propositions which they find intuitive. Second, philosophers offer error theories for intuitions that conflict with their theories. Finally, (...)
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  43. Thought experiments without possible worlds.Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):363-384.
    The method of thought experiments or possible cases is widespread in philosophy and elsewhere. Thought experiments come with variegated theoretical commitments. These commitments are risky. They may turn out to be false or at least controversial. Other things being equal, it seems preferable to do with minimal commitments. I explore exemplary ways of minimising commitments, focusing on modal ones. There is a near-consensus to treat the scenarios considered in thought experiments as metaphysical possibilities. I challenge this consensus. Paradigmatic thought experiments (...)
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  44. Epistemology Without Intuition.Manhal Hamdo - 2018 - International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities 3 (10):49-53.
    From Plato to the present, intuition plays a central role in epistemology. My concern in this paper is with the nature and epistemic status of intuition. To that end, I will be reviewing both Bealer’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of intuition. I will be arguing that by ‘intuition’ Bealer understands modal intuition that has Platonic and metaphysical roles. Subsequently, I shall also show that although Wittgenstein’s view avoids these two issues, it amounts to the idea that intuition is a normative activity (...)
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  45. Intuition: An Integrated Account.Manhal Hamdo - 2018 - Arts and Education International Research Journal 5 (1):104-112.
    This paper is a defense of the evidentiality of epistemic intuitions. To that end, I will first briefly discuss both experimentalists’ and some salient forms of reliabilists’ accounts of intuition, showing that they bring us up to a stalemate. To find a way out of this standoff, I will argue that reliabilists’ accounts pave the way for experimentalists’ challenge to the epistemic value of intuitions in two ways. First, each of reliabilists’ accounts leaves enough space to be occupied by normativity. (...)
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  46. Intuitions as inferential judgments.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):7-29.
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  47. Kant on Intuition: Western and Asian Perspectives on Transcendental Idealism.Stephen Palmquist (ed.) - 2018 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    This anthology consists of 20 chapters, many of which feature engagements between Kant and various Asian philosophers. Key themes include the nature of human intuition (not only as theoretical—pure, sensible, and possibly intellectual—but also as relevant to Kant’s practical philosophy, aesthetics, the sublime, and even mysticism), the status of Kant’s idealism/realism, and Kant’s notion of an object. Roughly half of the chapters take a stance on the recent conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate. The chapters are organized into four parts, each with five chapters. (...)
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  48. The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments.Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.) - 2018 - London: Routledge.
    Thought experiments are a means of imaginative reasoning that lie at the heart of philosophy, from the pre-Socratics to the modern era, and they also play central roles in a range of fields, from physics to politics. The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments is an invaluable guide and reference source to this multifaceted subject. Comprising over 30 chapters by a team of international contributors, the Companion covers the following important areas: -/- · the history of thought experiments, from antiquity to (...)
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  49. Intuicijų ir transcendencijos reikšmė grindžiant racionalumą.Vytautas Vyšniauskas - 2018 - Logos: A Journal, of Religion, Philosophy Comparative Cultural Studies and Art 95:203-212.
    The paper deals with the paradox that rationality demands rational substantiation which can’t be given in principle. Thus it is argued that only intuition can prevail against skepticism and subjectivism. But intuition is "transcendent" to rationality and therefore its acceptance as the substantiation of rationality implies existence of transcendental reality. In itself it has infinite regress qua infinite reiteration of reality levels without any qualitative ontological alteration, therefore only infinite transcendence is able to ground a finite immanence.
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  50. Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.
    Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to framing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to framing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with the resources to resist challenges (...)
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