Social Relationships

Prominent accounts of collective intentional activity explain the nature of social groups by virtue of a specific criterion: goal-directedness. In doing so, these accounts offer little in the way of determining whether there are any differences among social groups. In this paper, I propose a refined framework of collective intentional activity that can distinguish among social groups better than alternative accounts, and which has revisionary but nevertheless plausible implications for the nature of the family: specifically, that certain friendship relationships may (...) count as genuinely familial, and that we ought to count them as such. I argue that social groups are distinguished by what we can expect from one another within different kinds of social groups; specifically, that there is an important difference between reciprocity that is equivalent in performance and reciprocity that is equivalent in intention; familial groups are specifically guided by this latter kind of reciprocity. This more inclusive definition of familial groups may have important implications for how such groups are supported within a given society – for instance, by recognizing certain caring relations as essential for well-being and supporting them accordingly. (shrink)

Under which conditions are social relationships hierarchical, and under which conditions are they not? This article has three main aims. First, I will explain what this question amounts to by providing a more detailed description of the general phenomenon of social hierarchy. Second, I will provide an account of what social hierarchy is. Third, I will provide some considerations in favour of this account by discussing how it improves upon three alternative ways of thinking about social hierarchy that are sometimes (...) explicitly endorsed and sometimes suggested or presupposed in writings in philosophy and elsewhere. (shrink)

This paper identifies a challenge for liberal relational egalitarians—namely, how to respond to the prospect of emergent inequalities of power, status, and influence arising unintentionally through the free exercise of fundamental individual liberties over time. I argue that these emergent social inequalities can be produced through patterns of nonmalicious choices, that they can in fact impede the full realization of relational equality, and that it is possible they cannot be eliminated entirely without abandoning fundamental liberal commitments to leave individuals substantial (...) discretion in their personal lives. In such cases, I argue that liberal egalitarians should accept fair relational equality—a demanding but nevertheless imperfect form of relational equality. (shrink)

Radical democrats highlight dramatic moments of political action, which disrupt everyday habits of perception that sustain unequal social relations. In doing so, however, we sometimes neglect how social conditions—such as precarious employment, social dislocation, and everyday exposure to violence—undermine political agency or might be contested in uneventful ways. Despite their differences, two thinkers who have significantly influenced radical democratic theory have been similarly criticized for contributing to such a socially weightless picture of politics. However, attending to how they are each (...) preoccupied by the social conditions of inequality and loneliness enables us to recognize two distinct aspects of democratic politics–emancipation and civility. Cultivating an interpretive flexibility to shift between these aspects of politics might enable radical democrats to more clearly picture how struggles for appearance are limited and shaped by the social conditions within which they are enacted. (shrink)

According to public reason liberalism, the laws and institutions of society must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. But why care about justifiability to reasonable citizens? R...

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Colleagues are not only an integral part of many people’s lives; empirical research suggests that having a good relationship with one’s colleagues is the single most important factor for being happy at work. However, so far, no one has provided a comprehensive account of what it means to be a colleague. To address this lacuna, we have conducted both an empirical as well as theoretical investigation into the content and structure of the concept ‘colleague.’ Based on the empirical evidence that (...) we present in this paper, we argue that ‘colleague’ is a dual character concept that has both a descriptive and a normative basis for categorization. Its descriptive dimension is characterized by three features, according to which two people are colleagues if they work for the same institution and know each other, or if they work for the same institution and work in the same field. An independent normative dimension is revealed, which shows that, as colleagues, we are expected to fulfill substantial normative expectations. Understanding the expectations that are encoded in the very structure of this concept is crucial to lay the groundwork for an ethics of collegiality. (shrink)

T.M. Scanlon has recently offered an influential treatment of blame as a response to the impairment of a relationship. I argue, first, that Scanlon’s remarks about the nature of blame suggest several sharply diverging views, so different that they can reasonably be considered different theories: a judgment-centered theory, on which blame is the reaction the blamer judges appropriate; an appropriateness-centered theory, on which blame is any reaction that is actually appropriate; and a substantive list theory, on which blame is any (...) of a list of reactions, such as anger or loss of trust. Once distinguished, each theory faces a series of formidable challenges that neither Scanlon nor his commentators have addressed. I argue that the notion of directed attention, central in Scanlon’s earlier work, can be used to address these challenges, while preserving the spirit of Scanlon’s discussion of blame. (shrink)

Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 90-94.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In this study, the starting point is the well-known physical laws applied to human social life. On the basis of natural laws human actions are considered and through the prism of physical laws such concepts as use and possession are defined. A parallel is drawn between such a representation of these concepts and those conflicting views that are available in the literature regarding the concept of property. To complete the definitions of use and possession nature is introduced as a fictitious (...) owner. And on this basis, the positive possibility of a theoretical solution to the problem of initial assignment is shown. Again, on the basis of physical laws, the fundamental concept of [human] needs is introduced. It is shown that the collision of people's needs on the same thing allows uniform classifying property defined in literature as the relationship between a person and a thing or as the relationship between people because of a thing. Considering the relationship between two human beings through needs and costs, as a natural necessity, people inevitably renounce their claims to possess and use certain things in favor of other people. It is shown that this refusal forms the right of those people in whose favor this refusal is carried out to possess and use things. The right of one is the refusal of all others to own and use the thing. It is shown that the right was ensured and will always be ensured by force. The use or threat of the use of force is something that can reliably ward off a person from the unbridled realization of his needs. In the process of the formation of mankind, nature itself forces people to organize into communities that can oppose their individual members and their associations with significantly greater power. The whole, as a rule, is stronger than its part. And it is society that can reliably ensure the exercise of rights for its members. Natural laws also make it possible to resolve, on the basis of the concept of law, as a renunciation of possession and use, the issue of belonging to what nature gives us. These are natural resources and the human body. It is shown that the human body should belong to the person himself, and the resources to all members of society equally. The affiliation of all other things produced by man can be unambiguously determined within the framework of contractual relations between members of society, their associations and society as a whole. Since the right of everyone is ensured by the society, and, therefore, by each member of the society individually, a necessary condition for membership is understanding and recognition of the rights of certain things to other members of the society. And this may be the main criterion for joining full members of society, as opposed to the commonly used age criterion, which works on the bulk of people, but gives failures in many special cases. A typical example of such cases is the deprivation or infringement of the rights of persons of full legal age, but committed acts that are called unlawful in society. As part of the research on ownership issues, ownership is considered. It is shown that the necessary tool for using the objects of co-ownership is the voting of co-owners. A special case of co-ownership, when all co-owners have equal shares in co-ownership, is indistinguishable from what is called democracy. It is shown that voting in general and democracy in particular, as procedures for aggregating preferences, can have a positive decision, in refutation of the universality of the conclusion of Arrow's theorem. (shrink)

This dissertation fits within the literature on subordinating speech and aims to demonstrate that how language subordinates is more complex than has been described by most philosophers. I argue that the harms that subordinating speech inflicts on its targets (chapter one), the type of authority that is exercised by subordinating speakers (chapters two and three), and the expansive variety of subordinating speech acts themselves (chapter three) are all under-developed subjects in need of further refinement—and, in some cases, large paradigm shifts. (...) I also examine cases that have yet to be adequately addressed by philosophers working on this topic, like the explosion of abusive speech online (chapter four) or the distinctive speech acts of protest groups (chapter five). I argue that by considering these alongside the ‘paradigm’ cases of subordinating speech that inform most models, we are better able to capture the lived realities of this phenomena, as described by members of groups targeted by such speech. I develop a novel account of speaker authority to explain the variety of pragmatic effects subordinating speech generates. Instead of seeing this authority as reducible to either a formal position or a merely local, linguistic phenomenon, I argue for a conception of speaker authority that is a richly contextual social fact, distributed unevenly among members of different social groups. I also develop an account of collective authority that explains how a group of speakers can join together to subordinate in a way that no individual speaker is capable of doing. This account, I argue, is better able to explain the social reality of subordinating speech than individualist models. Overall, I show how a more fine-grained account of subordinating speaker authority gives us a more accurate picture of the different subordinating speech acts available to different speakers, along with how these may harm their targets. (shrink)

Responding to the Dutch Labour Party's campaign centred around the theme of security ("zekerheid"), I explore the political philosophy of security. How is security good for us, why would we carry responsibility for one another's security, and what does politics have to do with it? [Dutch].

ABSTRACTI extract a problematic from Levinas’ shifting attitude towards the idea of recognition. An underappreciated aspect of Levinas’ work is that at an early stage he appeals to a recognition-based model of intersubjectivity, which characteristically plots a relation of mutual affirmation between individuals. However, he later explicitly rejects this paradigm in favour of an intensified heterological orientation which invests in otherness as a value in itself. Levinas’ rejection of recognition raises the question of how we are to interpret the relation (...) between the latter and heterology as rival models for reading into intersubjectivity an immanent and dynamic source of normativity. (shrink)

What responsibilities does each of us have to reduce or limit our greenhouse gas emissions? Advocates of individual emissions reductions acknowledge that there are limits to what we can reasonably demand from individuals. Climate ethics has not yet systematically explored those limits. Instead, it has become popular to suggest that such judgements should be ‘context-sensitive’ but this does not tell us what role different contextual factors should play in our moral thinking. The current approach to theory development in climate ethics (...) is not likely to be the most effective way to fill this gap. In existing work, climate ethicists use hypothetical cases to consider what can be reasonably demanded of individuals in particular situations. In contrast, ‘climate ethics with an ethnographic sensibility’ uses qualitative social science methods to collect original data in which real individuals describe their own situations. These real-life cases are more realistic, more detailed and cover a broader range of circumstances than hypothetical cases. Normative analysis of real-life cases can help us to develop a more systematic understanding of the role that different contextual factors should play in determining individual climate responsibilities. It can also help us to avoid the twin dangers of ‘idealization’ and ‘special pleading’. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive, critical review of social theory that places leading contributions in their larger context. Written predominantly for students, the scope and range of the subjects and authors dealt with results in one of the most comprehensive introductions to social theory published to date. Ranging from the philosophical foundations of sociology and the discovery of `the social' to distinctive sociological approaches, to the significance of issues pertaining to gender and patriarchy, to questions of modernity and post-modernity, the book (...) is comprehensive in subject matter. (shrink)

This article uses Karl Marx’s notions of alienation and antagonism to understand human connection, defined as the interrelationship between human beings that helps transcend self-interest and fosters the sense of solidarity. The Marxian notions are revisited using the works of Amartya Sen, particularly those on identity and violence. Sen’s critique of rationality is discussed, invoking his notions of sympathy, antipathy, and commitment. The article uses two texts, Franz Kafka’s Metamorphosis and Manik Bandyopadhyay’s Ekannoborti, as vantage points to understand the key (...) concepts of Marx and Sen. It then discusses the backgrounds of the authors and the political interpretations of their work and shows how the overriding importance ascribed to a particular identity may convolute the literary motivation of an author. (shrink)

I argue for an account of the vulnerability of trust, as a product of our need for secure social attachments to individuals and to a group. This account seeks to explain why it is true that, when we trust or distrust someone, we are susceptible to being betrayed by them, rather than merely disappointed or frustrated in our goals. What we are concerned about in matters of trust is, at the basic level, whether we matter, in a non-instrumental way, to (...) that individual, or to the group of which they are a member. We have this concern as a result of a drive to form secure social attachments. This makes us vulnerable in the characteristic way of being susceptible to betrayal, because how the other acts in such matters can demonstrate our lack of worth to them, or to the group, thereby threatening the security of our attachment, and eliciting the reactive attitudes characteristic of betrayal. (shrink)

Macmurray’s distinctive portrayal of personhood has much to contribute to more recent accounts of what it means to be human. Michael Fielding, for one, has devoted much of his career to promoting and advocating a Macmurrian-style of schooling both as a critique of and a corrective to the performance-driven form of state education that is prevalent in the UK. Further, while I agree with Fielding and others that Macmurray’s concept of the person is of importance for education, I also hold (...) that it contains significant social and political implications for a religiously plural era. In addition, Macmurray’s emphasis on our inherent relationality provides a philosophical grounding for what is coming to be known as ‘postliberalism’. (shrink)

Desire, fantasy and imagination are integral aspects of the consumption experience. This paper critically develops a Sadean analytical framework to further explore these aspects of consumption in contemporary cultural settings. The philosophy of the Marquis de Sade is introduced, followed by a detailed examination of Sadism as text and social structure. Five components of Sadean narratives are identified and applied in two consumer behavior cases. The first applies a Sadean analysis to the popular television game show The Weakest Link. The (...) second provides a Sadean interpretation of the service encounter. A justification for Sadean approach is considered together with a brief discussion of some of the moral questions raised by the analytical approach. (shrink)

This paper responds to a recent challenge posed to Claudia Card’s atrocity paradigm by “transmuted goods,” or, goods which positively transmute victims of atrocity in ways which are difficult for the paradigm to explain. Whereas the legacy of Card’s atrocity paradigm will surely be its demand that we hold others culpable for allowing and perpetuating systems of harm which threaten our ability to flourish, this paper suggests a way for the paradigm to incorporate transmuted goods in a manner that strengthens (...) the paradigm’s overall goal of holding people responsible for perpetuating atrocious harms. To that end, I will articulate the systematicity and transmutativity conditions of an “atrocity,” will demonstrate how “transmuted goods” can threaten the transmutativity condition of an atrocity, and will conclude by suggesting a potential integration of transmuted goods into the atrocity paradigm to salvage the transmutativity condition for the paradigm. (shrink)

The turn to narrative in biomedicine has been one of the most important alternatives to traditional approaches to bioethics. Rather than using ethical theories and principles to guide behavior, narrative ethics uses the moral imagination to cultivate and expand one’s capacities for empathy. This paper argues that by themselves narratives do not, and cannot, fully capture the range of the illness experience. But more than that, the emphasis on narrative often obscures how dominant forms of narrative discourse often operate to (...) marginalize those whose narratives fall outside the parameters of traditional narrative forms or whose stories are occluded by structural violence and oppression. Rather, by focusing on forms of embodiment that are irreducible to narrative discursivity, this paper highlights forms of selfhood that exist outside of the narrative self. (shrink)

The childhood platitude, “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me,” has become nothing more than wishful thinking as we prepare each new generation for the slew of hurtful words they will inevitably encounter throughout their life. The truth of the matter is, words can hurt. To discuss how this is possible, a recent surge in philosophy of language literature has had the sole focus of analyzing pejorative language, particularly slurs. From semantic content theories to (...) deflationary accounts, there have been numerous attempts to answer the questions “How can words hurt?” and “Why do some words hurt?” Unfortunately, in the current discourse, the focus has been so heavily on accounting for the features of derogatory words that the accounts skip over providing for even the most basic insult, as an indirect speech act. Using an analysis of insults, I argue that there is a layer of analysis prior to any semantic content that theories regarding speech acts should include and and I present a framework for an ethicist to do such an analysis. (shrink)

This philosophical dialogue explores some of the barriers to an adequate definition of general health, encompassing physical, social, and mental/emotional well-being. Many of the putative obstacles to such a definition—concerns about subjectivity, cultural difference, marginal cases, etc.—prove to be chimerical once the characters take seriously the Peircean insight that truth-claims methodologically grounded in people’s lives, experiences, and conversations need not be apodictic to be useful. Drawing on Canguilhem and others, the characters critically discuss a proposed definition of health: a dynamic (...) equilibrium by which a human being thrives in relation to its situation. Although they do not manage to resolve all of this definition’s difficulties, or all of their differences, their interaction in some ways models the ongoing task of inquiry. (shrink)

Most psychological literature on gaslighting focuses on it as a dyadic phenomenon occurring primarily in marriage and family relationships. In my analysis, I will extend recent fruitful philosophical engagement with gaslighting by arguing that gaslighting, particularly gaslighting that occurs in more public spaces like the workplace, relies upon external reinforcement for its success. I will ground this study in an analysis of the film Gaslight, for which the phenomenon is named, and in the course of the analysis will focus on (...) a paradox of this kind of gaslighting: it wreaks significant epistemic and moral damages largely through small, often invisible actions that have power through their accumulation and reinforcement. (shrink)

Does expertise have a place in ethics? As this question has been raised in moral philosophy and bioethics literatures over the past twenty years, skepticism has been a common theme, whether metaphysical, epistemological or social-political. Here I identify three common, contestable assumptions about ethics expertise which underwrite skepticism of one form or another: a singular conception of ethics expertise constituted by a core property or unity among multiple properties, equivocation of ethics expertise and ethicists’ expertise, and priority of moral deference (...) as an unavoidable implication of ethics expertise. Taken separately, each assumption can have unpalatable implications for ethics expertise that make skepticism seem more attractive; taken together, the resulting picture of ethics expertise is that much worse. Each of these assumptions is vulnerable to criticism, however, and jettisoning them enables a pluralist approach to ethics expertise less prone to skepticism and better suited for the ranging functions of ethics expertise in healthcare and other contexts. (shrink)

When it comes to explaining someone’s puzzling, objectionable, or otherwise problematic behavior, one type of explanation occasionally employed in the service of doing so is as follows: “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” But what, exactly, do explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so” mean? More specifically, in what way, if any, is it meaningful or informative to say such things? And what is the precise function of such explanations of someone’s behavior? Is it merely to present what one (...) takes to be the underlying causes of the behavior, or something beyond that? In what follows, I lay out a few possibilities—basic possibilities, to be precise, given philosophy’s keen interest in fundamentals—with respect to the various meanings, functions, and moral implications of explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” While doing so, I apply these basic possibilities to three tokens of this kind of explanation: “That’s just Manny being Manny” (in reference to Manny Ramirez, the former professional baseball player), “That’s just Charlie being Charlie” (in reference to Charlie Rose, the former television host), and “That’s just Trump being Trump” (in reference to Donald Trump, the current President of the United States). (shrink)

This paper examines extracts from a daughter’s blog about her father’s time in a care home in the north of England from June 2015 until his death in January 2016. Through these extracts, the author of the paper, who is also the daughter of the title, provokes key ethical issues concerning the identity, agency and voice of an elder in the context of residential care. The wider, rapidly deteriorating, political and economic climate for the care of older people is briefly (...) discussed and the paper makes reference to a feminist ethics of care, in order to both critique and celebrate women’s central place in caring for elders. The paper explores how the ethnographic process of writing about care for another can be considered a route to ethical care practice and it suggests that this blog is part of an autoethnographic analytic tradition [Anderson 2006. “Analytic Autoethnography.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 35 (4): 373–395]. Finally, the paper asks questions about the ethics of blogging about and on behalf of an elder that, in this case, played a significant role in bringing not only the daughter-author but also other family members closer to the life of their father, grandfather and great-grandfather. (shrink)

According to common-sense morality, agents can become morally connected to the wrongdoing of others, such that they incur special obligations to prevent or rectify the wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer. We argue that, under certain conditions, voluntary and unjustified observation of another agent’s degrading wrongdoing, or of the ‘product’ of their wrongdoing, can render an agent morally liable to bear costs for the sake of the victim of the primary wrong. We develop our account with particular reference to widespread (...) modern phenomena such as so-called ‘revenge porn’, ‘up-skirting’, and the online observation of sexual assault and murder. On our account, observation is not a sui generis basis of liability. Instead, observation grounds liability in virtue of manifesting three, more general, grounds of liability. First, observation can compound a primary wrong, making that wrong more harmful for the victim. Second, observation can constitute degrading treatment of the victim. Third, in certain cases observation can enable primary wrongdoing. We conclude by discussing the conditions under which observing degrading wrongs might be morally justified. (shrink)

The article analyzes the philosophical and cultural view of 'doctor’s professional culture' as a result of centuries-old practice of human relations, which is characterized by constancy and passed from generation to generation. Medicine is a complex system in which an important role is played by: philosophical outlook of a doctor, philosophical culture, ecological culture, moral culture, aesthetic culture, artistic culture. We have found that within the system “doctor-patient” the degree of cultural proximity becomes a factor that influences the health or (...) life of a patient. Thus, the following factors are important here: 1) communication that suppresses a sick person; 2) the balance of cultural and intellectual levels; 3) the cultural environment of a patient which has much more powerful impact on a patient than the medical one. At the present stage, the interdependence of professional and humanitarian training of future specialists is predominant, as a highly skilled specialist can not but become a subject of philosophizing. We outlined the sphere where the doctors present a genre variety of philosophizing. This tradition represents the original variations in the formation of future doctor’s communicative competences, which are formed in the process of medical students’ professional training. A survey conducted among medical students made it possible to establish their professional values, which are indicators of the formation of philosophical and culturological competence. It was found out that 92% of respondents believed that a doctor should demonstrate a high level of health culture 99% of respondents favoured a high level of personal qualities of a doctor which would allow methods and forms of medical practice to assert higher human ideals of truth, goodness and beauty that are the subject area of cultural studies and philosophy. (shrink)

By considering various case studies drawn from contemporary culture, I propose the idea of victim-blaming shaming, which, like victim blaming, involves replicating injustice by focusing attention on the particular situation rather than the general problem. In cases of victim-blaming shaming, a person is criticized for in any way addressing a problem by addressing the victim. Victim-blaming not only involves an inconsistent ethic, but because of this inconsistency promotes that which it opposes. It responds to a social problem by directing attention (...) to an individual within that problematic social situation. (shrink)

Marxist Philosophy as an explanation of social reality has, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, been largely neglected. However, some philosophers have contended that it may still be relevant to explain today’s social reality. In this article, I wish to demonstrate precisely that Marxist philosophy can be relevant to understand social reality. To carry out this task, I show that Marxist philosophy of law can offer a sound explanation of Animal law in South Africa. My argument is that South (...) African law is a superstructure that reinforces the power of the animal farming industry in South Africa. That is, the hidden purpose of the law is to benefit the industry. In order to argue for this, I present two sets of arguments. The first set argues that the law facilitates the functioning of the animal farming industry. In the second set of arguments I contend that the law socialises individuals into approving the methods of slaughtering by the animal farming industry. (shrink)

WEBARTIGOS -/- KARL MARX: TRABALHO E CLASSES SOCIAIS Publicado em 12 de June de 2019 por Emanuel Isaque cordeiro da silva -/- KARL MARX: TRABALHO E CLASSES SOCIAIS(1) -/- KARL MARX: WORK AND SOCIAL CLASSES -/- Alana Thaís Mayza da Silva - CAP-UFPE(2) Eduarda Carvalho da Silva Fontain - CAP-UFPE(3) Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE(4) -/- Dentro do mundo marxista, como para a Sociologia, a fundamental e principal obra de Karl Marx foi O capital (1867 (...) o primeiro volume e os demais volumes -2- foram publicados pós-morte de Marx, em 1883). Karl Marx é considerado um dos maiores pensadores da Economia, da Sociologia e da Filosofia de seu tempo até os dias atuais. Seus estudos centraram-se na devassa dos nexos de força entre os sujeitos. Para Marx, a principal questão para a elucidação das metamorfoses sociais é o nexo conflituoso entre forças sociais, isto é, entre esferas sociais divergentes entre si e com interesses completamente contrários. -/- Nessa perspectiva, Marx explana: -/- A história de toda a sociedade até aqui é a história de lutas de classes. [Homem] livre e escravo, patrício e plebeu, barão e servo [Leibeigener], burgueses de corporação [Zunftbürger] e oficial, em suma, opressores e oprimidos, estiveram em constante oposição uns aos outros, travaram uma luta ininterrupta, ora oculta ora aberta, uma luta que de cada vez acabou por uma reconfiguração revolucionária de toda a sociedade ou pelo declínio comum das classes em luta. [...] A moderna sociedade burguesa, saída do declínio da sociedade feudal, não aboliu as oposições de classes. Apenas pôs novas classes, novas condições de opressão, novas configurações de luta, no lugar das antigas. A nossa época a época da burguesia, distingue-se, contudo, por ter simplificado as oposições de classes. A sociedade toda cinde-se, cada vez mais, em dois grandes campos inimigos, em duas grandes classes que diretamente se enfrentam: burguesia e proletariado. (MARX e ENGELS, 1988).(5) -/- A alegação principal de Marx é a de que os corpos sociais se fracionam em esferas ou classes sociais. Esse fracionamento é consequência de um processo histórico de embates em que uma das esferas/classes torna-se hegemônica e imperante e acaba subjugando os interesses das demais classes. No capitalismo, o filósofo observa que a chamada burguesia(6), tornou-se hegemônica e imperante em todo os países industrializados. A burguesia, primeiramente venceu a nobreza e a hegemonia do feudalismo, o sistema que imperava na Europa até a Revolução Francesa e, posteriormente, instaura um novo tipo de sodalismo(7). A elite(8) ou a alta sociedade, ou ainda, os burgueses, passaram a designar e constituir as formas de governo, a cultura e a política, de acordo com seus interesses. Isso implica dizer que as regras sodalísticas, as leis instauradas mediante o diálogo social e os magistrados, as normas coercitivas ou não, os gostos e os arquétipos de consumo, de estruturação e conformação da economia, da ciência e da política passaram a ser estabelecidas e designadas pelos anseios e interesses da elite. Isto é, o corpo social capitalista em que subsistimos tem como primordial finalidade a reprodução da forma de vida da elite, alicerçada na formação do lucro e arquitetada na produção de mercadorias. Para demonstrar o feitio de vida da elite, é imprescindível que haja uma esfera que produza as mercadorias, cujo trabalho dessa classe produtora é explorado pelos capitalistas. Com efeito, ao passo em que se constitui historicamente uma classe de elite, também é formada uma esfera antagônica à burguesia, que nada mais é do que a classe dos trabalhadores, ou como Marx designa de proletariado(9). Diante do processo histórico de estruturação e organização do capitalismo, a elite que acabara de nascer já gozava da exploração do trabalho de pequenos produtores. Logo, ao passo da ascensão desse feitio de produção, a elite torna-se imperante e o coletivo de laboradores, antigos servos e agricultores, também ascende vigorosamente conformando-se em um feitio de proletariado industrial. Logo, as esferas sociais essenciais do corpo social capitalista são a elite de burgueses (a classe capitalista, que detém o poderio) e os laboradores ou o proletariado. -/- Não obstante, aparecem algumas indagações quanto ao dualismo burgueses e proletários, e uma das principais questões gira em torno do por que a classe laboral deixa ser explorada? E por que não há uma equidade econômica entre os sujeitos? Segundo o filósofo, ao longo da História, a esfera laboral foi desapoderada de seus meios de produção, isto é, de suas propriedades, de suas ferramentas e de seus locais de trabalho. A elite que se empoderou dos meios de produção dos trabalhadores, passaram a subjugar os trabalhadores a vender seu trabalho em troca de um salário.(10)(11) Com a desapropriação de suas posses e a oferta de empregos para subsistência, os trabalhadores são submetidos a oferecer seu labour-power(12) a determinado salário, a certas condições e jornadas de trabalho, a um ritmo ditado pelo burguês e, sobretudo, a uma certa demanda de produtividade. Com todas essas determinações da elite, a esfera laboral não tem escolha. Se o trabalhador quiser sobreviver nesse mundo capitalista, deve a todo momento vender seu labour-power a um capitalista, seja no meio comercial, seja no meio industrial, seja numa instituição de ensino particular ou até mesmo à campo, cortando cana-de-açúcar para uma usina produtora de álcool. A esfera capitalista (elite) tem como ponto motriz de sua imperância a reprodução e a exploração do trabalho. Para tanto, a produção industrial caba se tornando cada vez mais incrementada, tanto na esfera dos feitios de gerência quanto as novas tecnologias que são introduzidas para maximizar a produção e produtividade. Com efeito, surgem implicações como o por que é tão essencial a introdução de mais e mais tecnologias para desenvolver a produção de mercadorias? O filósofo entende que quanto mais o trabalhador é comedido, maior será sua produtividade, todavia menor será seu poder político no corpo social. Dessarte, a permuta do trabalhador por uma máquina é uma tendência do capitalista para obtenção maximizada de mercadorias, ascendendo a produtividade da atividade laboral. Vale salientar que com a máquina a produção ascende, mas também aumenta o controle do capitalista sobre os trabalhadores, uma vez que os mesmos, para não perder o emprego, terão que responder ao mesmo ritmo que as máquinas. Isto é, o patrão goza da máquina ou robô para aumentar a produtividade e para aumentar seu poder político sobre os trabalhadores. Ao submeter o trabalhador ao mesmo ritmo da máquina, ritmo esse que ele não comanda, o patrão subjuga a aumentar sua produtividade com relação ao seu trabalho para que o mesmo não venha a perder seu emprego. -/- Podemos sintetizar essa inquirição com uma frase de Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa(13): "é preciso que tudo mude para que tudo se mantenha”. Isto quer dizer que é essencial desenvolver novas tecnologias para a produção e feitios de organização, fazendo com que: 1. Ascenda a produção e, com efeito, o lucro dos capitalistas também maximizem; 2. É importante também que aumente o controle e o poderio do patrão sobre a esfera laboral. Em vista disso, para Karl, a ascensão desenfreada do capitalismo é alicerçada mediante a exploração e imperância da classe trabalhadora pela esfera capitalista. Assim, as esferas sociais esbarram-se e as metamorfoses históricas e sociais se desenrolam. -/- Ante todo o supracitado texto, observemos que de um lado estão os proletários, que reivindicam seus direitos por intermédio de sindicatos, na busca por melhores salários e condições de trabalho. Em contrapartida, estão os burgueses ou os capitalistas, que visam somente a maximização de seus lucros. Logo, ante esse dualismo, existe um embate entre forças sociais completamente divergentes e opostas. Os capitalistas querem maximizar os lucros, e para isso empregam técnicas produtivas cada vez mais sofisticadas; a outra esfera, a dos trabalhadores, resiste, com o objetivo de manter e/ou ampliar suas condições materiais de sobrevivência na sociedade. Temos, assim, um corpo social alicerçado em relações divergentes, que inspiram embates políticos provindos da fragmentação social em classes. -/- Notas: -/- (1) In. AMORIM, H.; BARROS, C. R. de.; MACHADO, I. J. de R. Sociologia Hoje. 1ª. ed. São Paulo: Ática, 2013. 127-129. -/- (2) Estudante do Colégio de Aplicação da Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (2018-2020). Cursa Especialização em História Geral e do Brasil na Universidade Católica de Pernambuco. (3) Atualmente estuda o ensino médio no Colégio de Aplicação da Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (2018-2020). Cursa Inglês e Francês no Instituto Brasileiro de Línguas no Bairro Derby em Recife. Cursa ballet clássico na Escola de Ballet Marisa Queiroga. -/- (4) Bacharelando em Zootecnia pela Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco – UFRPE (2019-). Tecnólogo em Agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Pernambuco Campus Belo Jardim (2016-2018). Normalista (magistério) pela Escola Estadual Frei Cassiano Comacchio (2014-2017). Professor substituto e de reforço do Colégio de Aplicação da UFPE e do Colégio Santa Maria. Pesquisador assíduo de assuntos com cunho educacional, filosófico, político e social. Contatos: [email protected] / [email protected] e WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399. -/- (5) ENGELS, F.; MARX, K. Manifesto do Partido Comunista. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1988. p. 66-67. -/- (6) Para o professor Emanuel Isaque, por burguesia pode-se entender a camada ou classe social de Capitalistas modernos (ao tempo de Marx) ou contemporâneos, proprietários de indústrias ou quaisquer meios lucrativos e de produção social e que empregam por meio do trabalho assalariado, em que o indivíduo trabalha por horas semanais e ao fim do mês é lhe conferido um salário correspondente ao seu trabalho. -/- (7) Para o professor Emanuel Isaque, Sodalismo nada mais é do a doutrina relacionada à tudo que se conecta diretamente com a sociedade, à exemplo, vida sodalícia significa vida em sociedade. Nada mais é do que um simples sinônimo. -/- (8) O termo burguesia é trocado pelo termo elite para designar a classe social que detém o poder político, econômico, etc. -/- (9) Para o professor Emanuel Isaque, por proletariado pode-se entender a classe de trabalhadores assalariados modernos, aos quais não tendo meios próprios de produção nem de subsistência, são reduzidos a vender sua força de trabalho (labour-power) para que possam viver no corpo social capitalista. -/- (10) O professor Emanuel Isaque diz que é sumamente essencial lembrar e salientar que para o filósofo, o trabalho que enfrentamos cotidianamente tem como suma finalidade a geração de lucros para o capitalista. Toda a produção de uma indústria, à exemplo, é organizado de acordo com essa finalidade suprema. Todavia, os proletários ficam apenas com uma pequena parcela equivalente à produção. O resto é exatamente o lucro do capitalista proveniente do labour-power do trabalhador. -/- (11) Uma profícua ampliação do tema poderá ser encontrado em: MAIOR, J. L. S. Um conceito marxista de salário. Germinal: Marxismo e Educação em Debate, Salvador, v. 6, n. 2, p. 95-109, dez. 2014. -/- (12) Nota de Engels à edição inglesa do manifesto do Partido Comunista de 1888. -/- (13) Escritor italiano (1896-1957). -/- -/- SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected] -/- Quaisquer meios de reprodução do artigo é extremamente proibida. Os infratores estarão sujeitos à pena de três meses à um ano de prisão conforme artigo 184 do Código Penal e Lei 9.610/98. -/- Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva. ©2019. (shrink)