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  1. Hierarchy and Heterarchy in Ross's Theories of the Right and the Good.Anthony Skelton - forthcoming - In Robert Audi & David Phillips (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of W. D. Ross. Oxford University Press.
    In both The Right and the Good and The Foundations of Ethics, W. D. Ross maintains that any amount of the non-instrumental value of virtue outweighs any amount of the non-instrumental value of pleasure or avoidance of pain. The chapter raises two challenges to the status that Ross accords the value of virtue relative to the value of pleasure (pain). First, it argues that Ross fails to provide a good argument for thinking that virtue is always better than pleasure and (...)
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  2. Barriers to Entailment: Hume's Law and other limits on logical consequence.Gillian K. Russell - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    A barrier to entailment exists if you can't get conclusions of a certain kind from premises of another. One of the most famous barriers in philosophy is Hume's Law, which says that you can't get normative conclusions from descriptive premises, or in slogan form: you can't get an ought from an is. This barrier is highly controversial, and many famous counterexamples were proposed in the last century. But there are other barriers which function almost as philosophical platitudes: no Universal conclusions (...)
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  3. True Pejorative Sentences Beyond the Existential Core: On Some Unwelcome Implications of Hom and May's Theory.Ludovic Soutif & André Pontes - 2022 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 63 (153):757-780.
    This paper considers one of the most significant and controversial attempts to account for the meaning of pejoratives as lexical items, namely Hom and May’s. After outlining the theory, we pinpoint sets of pejorative sentences that come out true on their account and for which the question as to whether they are compatible with the view advocated by them (so-called Moral and Semantic Innocence) remains open. Helping ourselves to the standard model-theoretical framework Hom and May (presumably) work in, we prove (...)
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  4. The Virtue of Hope in a Turbulent World.Cathy Mason - 2022 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 92:293-306.
    I argue that hope is an ethical virtue. Hope, I suggest, is necessary for engaging in a broad kind of project which is essential for living a meaningful human life, and this gives us reason to think that it is non-instrumentally valuable in our lives. Specifically, I claim that hope is well understood as a ‘structural virtue’ without which we are prone to slip into despair, fantasy and cynicism. Moreover, I argue that this virtue will be particularly significant in turbulent (...)
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  5. Who Decides How History Should Be Studied? [REVIEW]Vicente Medina - 2022 - Chronicle of Higher Education 69 (2):1-1.
    The claim that historians “write from a present-day perspective” does not entail that the past only matters when interpreted by categories of social justice. The past is a set of amorphous events and people, including their actions and motives. So, historians are free to explore various aspects of it to offer meaningful and compelling interpretations without necessarily privileging one category. The past is richer than we can humanely understand. Hence, it is important that new generations of scholars revise it from (...)
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  6. Conservatisms about the Valuable.Jacob M. Nebel - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):180-194.
    ABSTRACT Sometimes it seems that an existing bearer of value should be preserved even though it could be destroyed and replaced with something of equal or greater value. How can this conservative intuition be explained and justified? This paper distinguishes three answers, which I call existential, attitudinal, and object-affecting conservatism. I raise some problems for existential and attitudinal conservatism, and suggest how they can be solved by object-affecting conservatism.
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  7. Die Sinntheorie der Menschenwürde. Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen und integrativen Ansatz.Roland Kipke - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 7 (2):91-118.
    The central role of human dignity in ethics and law stands in striking contrast to the disagreement regarding the meaning and normative content of this concept. Each competing theory of human dignity also has serious problems. Against the background of this situation, the meaning-oriented theory of human dignity suggests a new understanding that can integrate a number of conceptions of human dignity and resolve their theoretical problems. According to this new theory, respect for human dignity consists in respect for human (...)
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  8. Preferring to Decrease One's Own Well-Being.John Bronsteen - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (1):52-64.
    Many scholars have argued that well-being is the satisfaction of preferences, or of fully informed preferences, or of fully informed preferences about one's own life. But none of those theories can be true if it is possible to prefer, with full information, to decrease one's own well-being. And because it is possible to have such a preference, those theories cannot be true.
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  9. Problems for Perfectionism.Gwen Bradford - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (3):344-364.
    Perfectionism, the view that well-being is a matter of developing characteristically human capacities, has relatively few defenders in the literature, but plenty of critics. This paper defends perfectionism against some recent formulations of classic objections, namely, the objection that perfectionism ignores the relevance of pleasure or preference for well-being, and a sophisticated version of the ‘wrong properties’ objection, according to which the intuitive plausibility of the perfectionist ideal is threatened by an absence of theoretical pressure to accept putative wrong properties (...)
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  10. Evil and a Worthwhile Life.Zachary J. Goldberg - 2017 - In Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility: Essays in Honor of Peter A. French. Springer. pp. 145-163.
    The concept of evil plays a central role in many of Peter French’s publications. He defines evil as “a human action that jeopardizes another person’s (or group’s) aspirations to live a worthwhile life (or lives) by the willful infliction of undeserved harm on that person(s)” (French 2011, 61, 95). Inspired by Harry Frankfurt’s work on the importance of what we care about, French argues that “the life a person leads is worthwhile if what he or she really gives a damn (...)
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  11. Millian superiorities.Gustaf Arrenhuis & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Utilitas 17 (2):127-146.
    Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The (...)
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  12. Distributive Justice and Freedom: Cohen on Money and Labour*: Cécile Fabre.Cécile Fabre - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):393-412.
    In his recent Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen mounts a sustained critique of coerced labour, against the background of a radical egalitarian conception of distributive justice. In this article, I argue that Cohenian egalitarians are committed to holding the talented under a moral duty to choose socially useful work for the sake of the less fortunate. As I also show, Cohen's arguments against coerced labour fail, particularly in the light of his commitment to coercive taxation. In the course (...)
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  13. Vagueness and Goodness Simpliciter.Henrik Andersson - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):378-394.
    Recently a lot has been written on the topic of value incomparability. While there is disagreement on how we are to understand incomparability, most seem to accept Ruth Chang's claim that all comparisons must proceed in some specific respect. Call this the Requirement for Specification. Interestingly, even though most seem to accept this requirement, next to nothing has been written on it. In this paper I focus on the requirement and discuss two different but related topics. First, an important observation (...)
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  14. Modeling parity and incomparability.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - In .
  15. Virtuous act, virtuous dispositions.Thomas Hurka - 2006 - Analysis 66 (1):69-76.
    Everyday moral thought uses the concepts of virtue and vice at two different levels. At what I will call a global level it applies these concepts to persons or to stable character traits or dispositions. Thus we may say that a person is brave or has a standing trait of generosity or malice. But we also apply these concepts more locally, to specific acts or mental states such as occurrent desires or feelings. Thus we may say that a particular act (...)
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  16. From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries.Tim Henning - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):169-206.
    Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction account, the procedural account, and the ideal consent account, and argues that none of these (...)
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  17. The Impotence of the Value Pump.John Halstead - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (2):195-216.
    Many philosophers have argued that agents must be irrational to lose out in a or . A number of different conclusions have been drawn from this claim. The has been one of the main arguments offered for the axioms of expected utility theory; it has been used to show that options cannot be incomparable or on a par; and it has been used to show that our past choices have normative significance for our subsequent choices. In this article, I argue (...)
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  18. Toward A New Axiology.Federico Gay - 1973 - Southwest Philosophical Studies.
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  19. Toward An Axiology Of Nature.Richard Leggett - 1975 - Southwest Philosophical Studies.
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  20. The Multiplication of Utility.Wp SWp, Wswp Swsw & Wswswp Swswsw - 1994 - Utilitas 6 (2).
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  21. Justice, Contestability, and Conceptions of the Good.I. Barry'S. Argument - 1996 - Utilitas 8 (3).
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  22. James Griffin's Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs is.Michele M. Moody-Adams - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1).
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  23. The Moral Aspect of Nonmoral Goods and Evils.I. What Admirable Immorality & Nonadmirable Morality Are - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1).
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  24. Andrew Mason (ed.), Ideals on Equality.J. de Wispelaere - 2000 - Utilitas 12 (2):243-247.
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  25. Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.
    The incomparability of alternatives is thought to pose a problem for justified choice, particularly for proponents ofcomparativism– the view that comparative facts about alternatives determine what one rationally ought to choose. As a solution, it has been argued that alternatives judged incomparable by one of the three standard comparative relations, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally good,” are comparable by some fourth relation, such as “roughly equal” or “on a par.” This solution, however, comes at what many would regard as (...)
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  26. Value, Interest, and Well-Being.Jeremy Bentham - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (4).
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  27. Aggregation, Beneficence, and Chance.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.
    It is plausible to think that it is wrong to cure many people’s headaches rather than save someone else’s life. On the other hand, it is plausible to think that it is not wrong to expose someone to a tiny risk of death when curing this person’s headache. I will argue that these claims are inconsistent. For if we keep taking this tiny risk then it is likely that one person dies, while many others’ headaches are cured. In light of (...)
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  28. Formal Axiology and Its Critics.Rem Blanchard Edwards (ed.) - 1995 - Amsterdam - Atlanta: Rodopi.
    This book is a collection of articles dealing with criticisms of Robert S. Hartman’s theory of formal axiology. During his lifetime, Hartman wrote responses to many of his critics. Some of these were previously published but many are published here for the first time. In particular, published here are Hartman’s replies to such critics as Hector Neri Castañeda, Charles Hartshorne, Rem B. Edwards, Robert E. Carter, G. R. Grice, Nicholas Rescher, Robert W. Mueller, Gordon Welty, Pete Gunter, George Kimball Plochmann, (...)
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  29. Incommensurability (and incomparability).Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell. pp. 2591-2604.
    This encyclopedia entry urges what it takes to be correctives to common (mis)understandings concerning the phenomenon of incommensurability and incomparability and briefly outlines some of their philosophical upshots.
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  30. Axiology, and science.Sigmund Koch - 1969 - In Marjorie Grene (ed.), The anatomy of knowledge: papers presented to the Study Group on Foundations of Cultural Unity, Bowdoin College, 1965 and 1966. London,: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 119.
  31. The problem of semantic incomparability.Johannes Bechert - 1991 - In Dietmar Zaefferer (ed.), Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics. Foris Publications. pp. 12--60.
  32. Art as an Axiology of Man.E. Moutsopoulos - 1987 - Filosofia 17:120-152.
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  33. Value relations: old wine in new barrels.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - In .
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, the (...)
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  34. Transitivity and the patterns of adult preferences.H. Bradbury & T. M. Nelson - 1973 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 1 (5):337-339.
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  35. The foundations of axiology.B. Zboril - 1992 - Filosoficky Casopis 40 (3):468-475.
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  36. Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. ix + 357. [REVIEW]Jennifer Hawkins - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (2):237-241.
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  37. Moral Dimensions of Moral Hazards.Will Braynen - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (1):34-50.
    ‘Moral hazard’ is an economic term which commonly refers to situations in which people have a tendency to increase their exposure to risk when the costs of their actions, should they get unlucky, befall someone else. Once insured, for example, a person might have little reason, financially speaking, to be careful if he will get fully reimbursed for his losses should things go wrong, especially if he does not risk an increase in his insurance premium fees. In this article, I (...)
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  38. Conflicting violations of transitivity and where they may lead us.Brett Day & Graham Loomes - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):233-242.
    The literature contains evidence from some studies of asymmetric patterns of choice cycles in the direction consistent with regret theory, and evidence from other studies of asymmetries in the opposite direction. This article reports an experiment showing that both patterns occur within the same sample of respondents operating in the same experimental environment. We discuss the implications for modelling behaviour in such environments.
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  39. Some Difficult Intuitions for the Principle of Universality.G. E. Moore & W. D. Ross - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (4).
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  40. Is the Body Special? Review of Cecile Fabre, Whose Body is it Anyway? Justice and the Integrity of the Person.Cécile Fabre - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2).
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  41. Moral Aspirations and Ideals.Saul Smilansky - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3).
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  42. Fairness and Fair Shares.Keith Horton - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):88-93.
    Some moral principles require agents to do more than their fair share of a common task, if others won’t do their fair share – each agent’s fair share being what they would be required to do if all contributed as they should. This seems to provide a strong basis for objecting to such principles. For it seems unfair to require agents who have already done their fair share to do more, just because other agents won’t do their fair share. The (...)
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  43. Delving into the Ethical Dimension of.Nicolito A. Gianan - 2011 - Cultura 8 (1):63-82.
    The article aims to delve into the ethical dimension of Ubuntu philosophy, which is an African philosophy that reverberates in other cultures and in various forms, thus exemplifying its universality and universalizability. In this dimension, it tries to re-examine the notion of ethics in relation to morals/morality, including “is” and “ought”, with reference to the human person. Moreover, Ubuntu philosophy is articulated and communicated in the maxim that is an essential component inthe lived experiences of the Bantu-speaking African community: “A (...)
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  44. Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences.Ben Colburn - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):52-71.
    Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster's explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are characterized by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily unaware), and covert influence undermines our (...)
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  45. No Argument against the Continuity of Value: Reply to Dorsey.John Broome - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):494-496.
    Dorsey rejects Conclusion, so he believes he must reject one of the premises. He argues that the best option is to reject Premise 3. Rejecting Premise 3 entails a certain sort of discontinuity in value. So Dorsey believes he has an argument for discontinuity.
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  46. John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 286.Krister Bykvist - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):497-500.
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  47. Aristocratism of the Spirit in Henryk Elzenberg’s Philosophy.Leslaw Hostynski - 2009 - Dialogue and Universalism 19 (8-9):121-133.
    Elzenberg’s philosophy is usually defined as perfectionism, culturalism, pessimism, conservatism, or asceticism. Despite the accuracy and validity of the above mentioned terms it seems, however, that none of them fully encompass the characteristics of the view, tending rather to focus on its given profile. One term that, in my opinion, can be regarded as a suitable candidate for the role is “aristocratism of the spirit”, which embraces perfectionism, culturalism and asceticism as well as pessimism, conservatism and outsiderism. In debating on (...)
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  48. Darwall on Welfare as Rational Care.Subject Darwall’S. - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (4).
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  49. A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence.Guy Fletcher - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):417-420.
    Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have recently proposed this thesis: [Reasons as Evidence: Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to PHI.
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  50. Against Equality and Priority.Michael Huemer - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (4):483-501.
    -/- I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y, then x is better than y; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that benefits given to the worse off contribute no more to (...)
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