Technology Ethics, Misc

Evaluates e-mail critically from four perspectives. Note: This is /not/ the full version. The full version is available upon written request only.

Algorithms wield increasing control over our lives—over the jobs we get, the loans we're granted, the information we see online. Algorithms can and often do wield their power in a biased way, and much work has been devoted to algorithmic bias. In contrast, algorithmic neutrality has been largely neglected. I investigate algorithmic neutrality, tackling three questions: What is algorithmic neutrality? Is it possible? And when we have it in mind, what can we learn about algorithmic bias?

This is a virtual reality simulation that imagines its subject as emerging from a long stint in Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine." The simulation is an interview (with many branching paths) meant to gauge the subject's views on the metaphysics of virtual objects and the ethics of virtual actions. It draws heavily from the published work of David Chalmers, Mark Silcox, Jon Cogburn, Morgan Luck, and Nick Bostrom. *Requires an Oculus Rift (or Rift-S) or HTC Vive and a VR capable computer. (...) To open the files, uncompress the downloaded .zip folder and run the executable (.exe) file. **This module is made possible due to an APA Small Grant and a grant from Oculus Education. (shrink)

Datele trebuie procesate cu instrumente avansate de colectare și analiză, pe baza unor algoritmi prestabiliți, pentru a putea obține informații relevante. Algoritmii trebuie să ia în considerare și aspecte invizibile pentru percepțiile directe. Big Data în procesele guvernamentale cresc eficiența costurilor, productivitatea și inovația. Registrele civile sunt o sursă pentru Big Data. Datele prelucrate ajută în domenii critice de dezvoltare, cum ar fi îngrijirea sănătății, ocuparea forței de muncă, productivitatea economică, criminalitatea, securitatea și gestionarea dezastrelor naturale și a resurselor. DOI: (...) 10.13140/RG.2.2.19525.50405. (shrink)

Etica Big Data presupune aderarea la conceptele de comportament corect și greșit în ceea ce privește datele, în special datele cu caracter personal. Etica Big Data pune accentul pe colectorii și diseminatorii de date structurate sau nestructurate. Etica Big Data este susținută, la nivelul UE, de o amplă documentație, prin care se încearcă să se găsească soluții concrete pentru maximizarea valorii Big Data fără a sacrifica drepturile fundamentale ale omului. Autoritatea Europeană pentru Protecția Datelor (AEPD) sprijină dreptul la viață privată (...) și dreptul la protecția datelor cu caracter personal în respectul demnității umane. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.34749.82405. (shrink)

Big Data ethics involves adherence to the concepts of right and wrong behavior regarding data, especially personal data. Big Data ethics focuses on structured or unstructured data collectors and disseminators. Big Data ethics is supported, at EU level, by extensive documentation, which seeks to find concrete solutions to maximize the value of Big Data without sacrificing fundamental human rights. The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) supports the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data in the (...) respect of human dignity. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30867.43041. (shrink)

Recently criticisms against autonomous weapons were presented in a video in which an AI-powered drone kills a person. However, some said that this video is a distraction from the real risk of AI—the risk of unlimitedly self-improving AI systems. In this article, we analyze arguments from both sides and turn them into conditions. The following conditions are identified as leading to autonomous weapons becoming a global catastrophic risk: 1) Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) development is delayed relative to progress in narrow (...) AI and manufacturing. 2) The potential for very cheap manufacture of drones, with prices below 1 USD each. 3) Anti-drone defense capabilities lagging offensive development. 4) Special global military posture encouraging development of drone swarms as a strategic offensive weapon, able to kill civilians. We conclude that while it is unlikely that drone swarms alone will become existential risk, lethal autonomous weapons could contribute to civilizational collapse in case of new world war. (shrink)

This paper investigates how human interactions with AI-powered chatbots may offend human dignity. Current chatbots, driven by large language models (LLMs), mimic human linguistic behaviour but lack the moral and rational capacities essential for genuine interpersonal respect. Human beings are prone to anthropomorphise chatbots—indeed, chatbots appear to be deliberately designed to elicit that response. As a result, human beings’ behaviour toward chatbots often resembles behaviours typical of interaction between moral agents. Drawing on a second-personal, relational account of dignity, we argue (...) that interacting with chatbots in this way is incompatible with the dignity of users. We show that, since second-personal respect is premised on reciprocal recognition of second-personal moral authority, behaving towards chatbots in ways that convey second-personal respect is bound to misfire in morally problematic ways, given the lack of reciprocity. Consequently, such chatbot interactions amount to subtle but significant violations of self-respect—the respect we are dutybound to show for our own dignity. We illustrate this by discussing four actual chatbot use cases (information retrieval, customer service, advising, and companionship), and propound that the increasing societal pressure to engage in such interactions with chatbots poses a hitherto underappreciated threat to human dignity. (shrink)

First, we explain the conception of trustworthiness that we employ. We model trustworthiness as a relation among a trustor, a trustee, and a field of trust defined and delimited by its scope. In addition, both potential trustors and potential trustees are modeled as being more or less reliable in signaling either their willingness to trust or their willingness to prove trustworthy in various fields in relation to various other agents. Second, following Alfano (forthcoming) we argue that the social scale of (...) a potential trust relationship partly determines both explanatory and normative aspects of the relation. Most of the philosophical literature focuses on dyadic trust between a pair of agents (Baier 1986, Jones 1996, Jones 2012, McGeer 2008, Pettit 1995), but there are also small communities of trust (Alfano forthcoming) and trust in large institutions (Potter 2002, Govier 1997, Townley & Garfield 2013, Hardin 2002). The mechanisms that induce people to extend their trust vary depending on the size of the community in question, and the ways in which trustworthiness can be established and trusting warranted vary with these mechanisms. Mechanisms that work in dyads and small communities are often unavailable in the context of trusting an institution or branch of government. Establishing trust on this larger social scale therefore requires new or modified mechanisms. In the third section of the paper, we recommend three policies that – we argue – tend to make institutions more trustworthy and to reliably signal that trustworthiness to the public. First, they should ensure that their decision-making processes are as open and transparent as possible. Second, they should make efforts to engage stakeholders in dialogue with decision-makers such as managers, members of the C-Suite, and highly-placed policy-makers. Third, they should foster diversity – gender, ethnicity, age, socioeconomic background, disability, etc. – in their workforce at all levels, but especially in management and positions of power. We conclude by discussing the warrant for distrust in institutions that do not adopt these policies, which we contend is especially pertinent for people who belong to groups that have historically faced (and in many cases still do face) oppression. (shrink)

When thinking about designing social media platforms, we often focus on factors such as usability, functionality, aesthetics, ethics, and so forth. Epistemic considerations have rarely been given the same level of attention in design discussions. This paper aims to rectify this neglect. We begin by arguing that there are epistemic norms that govern environments, including social media environments. Next, we provide a framework for applying these norms to the question of platform design. We then apply this framework to the real-world (...) case of long-form informational content platforms. We argue that many current long-form informational content platforms are epistemically unhealthy. The good news? We provide concrete advice on how to take steps toward improving their health! Specifically, we argue that they should change how they verify and authenticate content creators and how this information is displayed to content consumers. We conclude by connecting this guidance to broader issues about the epistemic health of platforms. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010; Palermos 2014) have recently become increasingly receptive tothe hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realisers of a person’s cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorising and practice must be updated, by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to (...) include intentional harm towards gadgets that have been appropriately integrated. We next situate the theoretical case for extended personal assault within the context of some recent ethical and legal cases and close with some critical discussion. (shrink)

This paper examines the practice of using predictive systems to lengthen the prison sentences of convicted persons when the systems forecast a higher likelihood of re-offense or re-arrest. There has been much critical discussion of technologies used for sentencing, including questions of bias and opacity. However, there hasn’t been a discussion of whether this use of predictive systems makes sense in the first place. We argue that it does not by showing that there is no plausible theory of punishment that (...) supports it. (shrink)

Is it wrong to distract? Is it wrong to direct others’ attention in ways they otherwise would not choose? If so, what are the grounds of this wrong – and, in expounding them, do we have to at once condemn large chunks of contemporary digital commerce (also known as the attention economy)? In what follows, I attempt to cast light on these questions. Specifically, I argue – following the pioneering work of Jasper Tran and Anuj Puri – that there is (...) a right to attention, and that its existence underlies some of our claims regarding the wrongness of distractions. However, I depart from both these authors in two respects: first, I present a new way of deriving the right to attention, grounding it in the more fundamental right to mental integrity. Second, I remain agnostic on whether the contemporary business practices of capturing attention in exchange for a variety of digital products and services are plagued by routine violations of the right. (shrink)

It might become possible to build artificial minds with the capacity for experience. This raises a plethora of ethical issues, explored, among others, in the context of whole brain emulations (WBE). In this paper, I will take up the problem of vulnerability – given, for various reasons, less attention in the literature – that the conscious emulations will likely exhibit. Specifically, I will examine the role that vulnerability plays in generating ethical issues that may arise when dealing with WBEs. I (...) will argue that concerns about vulnerability are more matters of institutional design than individual ethics, both when it comes to creating humanlike brain emulations, and when animal-like emulations are concerned. Consequently, the article contains reflection on some institutional measures that can be taken to protect the sims' interests. It concludes that an institutional framework more likely to succeed in this task is competitive and poly-centric, rather than monopolistic and centralized. (shrink)

Having been involved in a slew of recent scandals, many of the world’s largest technology companies (“Big Tech,” “Digital Titans”) embarked on devising numerous codes of ethics, intended to promote improved standards in the conduct of their business. These efforts have attracted largely critical interdisciplinary academic attention. The critics have identified the voluntary character of the industry ethics codes as among the main obstacles to their efficacy. This is because individual industry leaders and employees, flawed human beings that they are, (...) cannot be relied on voluntarily to conform with what justice demands, especially when faced with powerful incentives to pursue their own self-interest instead. Consequently, the critics have recommended a suite of laws and regulations to force the tech companies to better comply with the requirements of justice. At the same time, they have paid little attention to the possibility that individuals acting within the political context, e.g. as lawmakers and regulators, are also imperfect and need not be wholly compliant with what justice demands. This paper argues that such an omission is far from trivial. It creates a heavy argumentative burden on the part of the critics that they by and large fail to discharge. As a result, the case for Big Tech regulation that emerges from the recent literature has substantial lacunae and more work needs to be done before we can accept the critics’ calls for greater state involvement in the industry. (shrink)

This paper argues, against the prevailing view, that consent to privacy policies that regular internet users usually give is largely unproblematic from the moral point of view. To substantiate this claim, we rely on the idea of the right not to know (RNTK), as developed by bioethicists. Defenders of the RNTK in bioethical literature on informed consent claim that patients generally have the right to refuse medically relevant information. In this article we extend the application of the RNTK to online (...) privacy. We then argue that if internet users can be thought of as exercising their RNTK before consenting to privacy policies, their consent ought to be considered free of the standard charges leveled against it by critics. (shrink)

This chapter provides a general overview and introduction to the law and ethics of virtual sexual assault. It offers a definition of the phenomenon and argues that there are six interesting types. It then asks and answers three questions: (i) should we criminalise virtual sexual assault? (ii) can you be held responsible for virtual sexual assault? and (iii) are there issues with 'consent' to virtual sexual activity that might make it difficult to prosecute or punish virtual sexual assault?

Friendship is an important part of the good life. While many roboticists are eager to create friend-like robots, many philosophers and ethicists are concerned. They argue that robots cannot really be our friends. Robots can only fake the emotional and behavioural cues we associate with friendship. Consequently, we should resist the drive to create robot friends. In this article, I argue that the philosophical critics are wrong. Using the classic virtue-ideal of friendship, I argue that robots can plausibly be considered (...) our virtue friends - that to do so is philosophically reasonable. Furthermore, I argue that even if you do not think that robots can be our virtue friends, they can fulfil other important friendship roles, and can complement and enhance the virtue friendships between human beings. (shrink)

The field of AI safety aims to prevent increasingly capable artificially intelligent systems from causing humans harm. Research on moral alignment is widely thought to offer a promising safety strategy: if we can equip AI systems with appropriate ethical rules, according to this line of thought, they'll be unlikely to disempower, destroy or otherwise seriously harm us. Deontological morality looks like a particularly attractive candidate for an alignment target, given its popularity, relative technical tractability and commitment to harm-avoidance principles. I (...) argue that the connection between moral alignment and safe behavior is more tenuous than many have hoped. In general, AI systems can possess either of these properties in the absence of the other, and we should favor safety when the two conflict. In particular, advanced AI systems governed by standard versions of deontology need not be especially safe. (shrink)

Purpose – Contemporary technology has been implicated in the rise of perfectionism, a personality trait that is associated with depression, suicide and other ills. is paper explores how technology can be developed to promote an alternative to perfectionism, which is a self- constructionist ethic. Design/methodology/approach – is paper takes the form of a philosophical discussion. A conceptual framework is developed by connecting the literature on perfectionism and personal meaning with discussions in information ethics on the self, the ontic trust and (...) technologies of the self. To illustrate these themes, the example of selfies and self-portraits is discussed. Findings – e self today must be understood as both individualistic and relational, i.e., hybrid; the trouble is balance. To realize balance, the self should be recognized as part of the ontic trust to which all information organisms and objects belong. us technologically-mediated self-care takes on a deeper urgency. e selfie is one example of a technology for self-care that has gone astray (i.e., lost some of its care-conducive aspects), but this can be remedied if selfie-making technology incorporates relevant aspects of self-portraiture. is example provides a path for developing self- constructionist and meaningful technologies more generally. Practical implications – Technology development should proceed with self-care and meaning in mind. e comparison of selfies and self-portraits, situated historically and theoretically, provides some guidance in this regard. Some specific avenues for development are presented. Originality/value – e question of the self has not been much discussed in information ethics. is paper links the self to the ontic trust: the self can be fruitfully understood as an agent within the ontic trust to which we all belong. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that clinicians are ethically obligated to disclose their use of medical machine learning systems to patients, and that failure to do so would amount to a moral fault for which clinicians ought to be held accountable. Call this ‘the disclosure thesis.’ Four main arguments have been, or could be, given to support the disclosure thesis in the ethics literature: the risk-based argument, the rights-based argument, the materiality argument and the autonomy argument. In this article, I argue (...) that each of these four arguments are unconvincing, and therefore, that the disclosure thesis ought to be rejected. I suggest that mandating disclosure may also even risk harming patients by providing stakeholders with a way to avoid accountability for harm that results from improper applications or uses of these systems. (shrink)

Higher education institutions are mining and analyzing student data to effect educational, political, and managerial outcomes. Done under the banner of “learning analytics,” this work can—and often does—surface sensitive data and information about, inter alia, a student’s demographics, academic performance, offline and online movements, physical fitness, mental wellbeing, and social network. With these data, institutions and third parties are able to describe student life, predict future behaviors, and intervene to address academic or other barriers to student success (however defined). Learning (...) analytics, consequently, raise serious issues concerning student privacy, autonomy, and the appropriate flow of student data. We argue that issues around privacy lead to valid questions about the degree to which students should trust their institution to use learning analytics data and other artifacts (algorithms, predictive scores) with their interests in mind. We argue that higher education institutions are paradigms of information fiduciaries. As such, colleges and universities have a special responsibility to their students. In this article, we use the information fiduciary concept to analyze cases when learning analytics violate an institution’s responsibility to its students. (shrink)

This paper aims to clear up the epistemology of learning morality from Artificial Moral Advisors (AMAs). We start with a brief consideration of what counts as moral enhancement and consider the risk of deskilling raised by machines that offer moral advice. We then shift focus to the epistemology of moral advice and show when and under what conditions moral advice can lead to enhancement. We argue that people’s motivational dispositions are enhanced by inspiring people to act morally, instead of merely (...) telling them how to act. Drawing upon these insights, we claim that if AMAs are to genuinely enhance people morally, they should be designed as inspiration and not authority machines. In the final section, we evaluate existing AMA models to shed light on which holds the most promise for helping to make users better moral agents. (shrink)

This article presents a case study in how sellers of weaponizable technology can develop safeguards to mitigate risks of misuse by end users. In 2020, the authors were approached by a defense technology start-up whose core product offering was weaponizable drones. The start-up sought guidance in designing terms of sale and service that would ensure responsible usage of this technology. Combining elements from just war theory, international humanitarian law, and the theory of responsibility, we developed a novel, systematic framework for (...) reducing risks of misuse on the basis of precise principles and objective metrics. Although designed for a specific use case, we believe aspects of this framework are portable to a wide range of scenarios. We share it to demonstrate proof of concept and stimulate further work on integrating ethical considerations into the business of weapons and dual-use technology. (shrink)

This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker (2013), moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the Harm Account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own and others’ moral obligations. On the Qualified Harm Account, there is (...) no harm in cases where moral uncertainty is related to innovation that is “for the best” in historical perspective, or where uncertainty is the expression of a deliberative virtue. The two accounts are compared by applying them to Baker’s historical case of the introduction of mechanical ventilation and organ transplantation technologies, as well as the present-day case of mass data practices in the health domain. (shrink)

Advances in AI are powering increasingly precise and widespread computational propaganda, posing serious threats to national security. The military and intelligence communities are starting to discuss ways to engage in this space, but the path forward is still unclear. These developments raise pressing ethical questions, about which existing ethics frameworks are silent. Understanding these challenges through the lens of “cognitive security,” we argue, offers a promising approach.

The rapid expansion of Big Tech companies into various societal domains (e.g., health, education, and agriculture) over the past decade has led to increasing concerns among governments, regulators, scholars, and civil society. While existing theoretical frameworks—often revolving around privacy and data protection, or market and platform power—have shed light on important aspects of Big Tech expansionism, there are other risks that these frameworks cannot fully capture. In response, this editorial proposes an alternative theoretical framework based on the notion of sphere (...) transgressions, which draws on political philosopher Michael Walzer's theory of justice. The editorial not only introduces the sphere transgressions framework, but it also highlights its potential to generate novel research questions. Furthermore, this editorial introduces eight articles and one commentary from a group of interdisciplinary scholars that critically examine Big Tech expansionism by reflecting on this expansionism from the perspective of different societal spheres or by engaging with the sphere transgressions framework itself. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the concept of attentional scaffolds and show the resemblance between social media platforms and slot machines, both functioning as hostile attentional scaffolds. The first section establishes the groundwork for the concept of attentional scaffolds and draws parallels to the mechanics of slot machines, to argue that social media platforms aim to capture users’ attention to maximize engagement through a system of intermittent rewards. The second section shifts focus to the interplay between emotions and attention, revealing (...) how online attentional capture through emotionally triggering stimuli leads to distraction. The final section elucidates the collective implications of scaffolding attention through social media platforms. The examination of phenomena such as emotional contagion and the emergence of group emotions underscores the transition from individual experiences to shared collective outcomes. Employing online moral outrage as a case study, we illustrate how negative emotions serve as scaffolds for individuals’ attention, propagate within social groups, and give rise to collective attitudes. (shrink)

Imagine that in the cold heart of a secret military facility, a new form of intelligence awakens. It is a synthetic mind born from intricate algorithms and complex computations, operating in ways unfathomable to its human creators. Charged with safeguarding national security, this intelligence orchestrates strategies that defy human ethics and laws of war, leaving its creators both awed and unnerved. -/- Unknowable Minds delves into the unsettling reality of entrusting our safety to an intelligence that lacks human essence. As (...) we navigate the Age of Artificial Intelligence, these systems — powering everything from our smartphones to military defenses — remain inherently opaque and unpredictable. The book explores how AI differs from any technology we've ever developed, its inherent complexities, and the profound risks it poses to our future. -/- Drawing on philosophy, AI theory, and national security insights, this book offers a thought-provoking examination of AI’s potential and peril. From the complexities of neural networks to the unpredictable nature of emergent behaviors, Unknowable Minds challenges us to rethink our relationship with AI and its role in the theater of global security. -/- Can we control an unknowable intellect, or will it redefine human existence? As we stand on the precipice of unprecedented technological advancement, understanding and navigating the unknowable minds of artificial intelligence becomes a quest fraught with extraordinary challenges and existential questions. (shrink)

A number of scholars and policy-makers have raised serious concerns about the impact of chatbots and generative artificial intelligence (AI) on the spread of political disinformation. An increasingly popular proposal to address this concern is to pass laws that, by requiring that artificially generated and artificially disseminated content be labeled as such, aim to ensure a degree of transparency in this rapidly transforming environment. This article argues that such laws are misguided, for two reasons. We first aim to show that (...) legally requiring the disclosure of the automated nature of bot accounts and AI-generated content is unlikely to succeed in improving the quality of political discussion on social media. This is because information that an account spreading or creating political information is a bot or a language model is itself politically relevant information, and people reason very poorly about such information. Second, we aim to show that the main motivation for these laws – the threat of coordinated disinformation campaigns (automated or not) – appears overstated. (shrink)

Who is responsible for a harm caused by AI, or a machine or system that relies on artificial intelligence? Given that current AI is neither conscious nor sentient, it’s unclear that AI itself is responsible for it. But given that AI acts independently of its developer or user, it’s also unclear that the developer or user is responsible for the harm. This gives rise to the so-called responsibility gap: cases where AI causes a harm, but no one is responsible for (...) it. Two central questions in the literature are whether responsibility gaps exist, and if yes, whether they’re morally problematic in a way that counts against developing or using AI. While some authors argue that responsibility gaps exist, and they’re morally problematic, some argue that they don’t exist. In this paper, I defend a novel position. First, I argue that current AI doesn’t generate a new kind of concern about responsibility that the older technologies don’t. Then, I argue that responsibility gaps exist but they’re unproblematic. (NOTE: Email me for a copy.). (shrink)

This paper engages the ongoing debate around the possibility of virtue friendships in the Aristotelian sense through online mediation. However, I argue that since the current literature has remained overly focused on the mere possibility of virtual friendship, it has obscured the more common phenomena of using digital communication to sustain previous in-person friendships which are now at a distance. While I agree with those who argue that entirely virtual friendship is possible, I argue that the current rebuttals to the (...) objections regarding embodiment are lacking. We can see this more clearly when we shift our consideration to more ordinary cases of virtual friendship. I discuss this problem of disembodiment by engaging with an interpretive issue of Aristotle’s “living together” which has played a key role in the current literature. I then turn to expand the current debate by examining how physical absence, disembodiment, and the technology we use to overcome such disembodiment, shapes and impacts friendships at a distance. In short, I explore the tendencies of technology of which virtual friends ought to be aware. I argue that even though virtual virtue friendships are possible via technology, the medium makes it harder and limits the possible experiences within friendships. Even if we overcome these tendencies, technologically mediated virtue friendships require more discipline for a diminished experience. While these limitations and extra disciplines in no way make virtual friendship unimportant, I argue that the fullest possible virtual friendship will be lesser than the fullest possible traditional friendship. (shrink)

Machine learning (ML) systems are vulnerable to performance decline over time due to dataset shift. To address this problem, experts often suggest that ML systems should be regularly updated to ensure ongoing performance stability. Some scholarly literature has begun to address the epistemic and ethical challenges associated with different updating methodologies. Thus far, however, little attention has been paid to the impact of model updating on the ML-assisted decision-making process itself, particularly in the AI ethics and AI epistemology literatures. This (...) article aims to address this gap in the literature. It argues that model updating introduces a new sub-type of opacity into ML-assisted decision-making – update opacity – that occurs when users cannot understand how or why an update has changed the reasoning or behaviour of an ML system. This type of opacity presents a variety of distinctive epistemic and safety concerns that available solutions to the black box problem in ML are largely ill-equipped to address. A variety of alternative strategies may be developed or pursued to address the problem of update opacity more directly, including bi-factual explanations, dynamic model reporting, and update compatibility. However, each of these strategies presents its own risks or carries significant limitations. Further research will be needed to address the epistemic and safety concerns associated with model updating and update opacity going forward. (shrink)

Public debates over the morality of new or emerging technologies tend to devolve into false dichotomies of optimism versus pessimism. Playing God with Emerging Technologies: How to Avoid the Traps of Techno-Optimism and Techno-Pessimism provides a conceptual apparatus for engaging in such debates in a critical manner through the constructive lens of “playing God” arguments. Moti Mizrahi sketches a conceptual framework consisting of an argumentation scheme for “playing God” arguments along with Critical Questions. This framework can be used to analyze (...) and evaluate “playing God” arguments as they are made in debates over the ethical development and deployment of new and emerging technologies, such as solar geoengineering, Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, autonomous weapons, and more. Mizrahi argues that “playing God” arguments allow us to assume an intermediate and critical attitude between the extremes of hype and panic and to approach the governance of new or emerging technologies in ways that might help to increase our control over, improve our understanding of, and prevent our misuse or abuse of such technologies. (shrink)

Longtermists have argued that humanity should significantly increase its efforts to prevent catastrophes like nuclear wars, pandemics, and AI disasters. But one prominent longtermist argument overshoots this conclusion: the argument also implies that humanity should reduce the risk of existential catastrophe even at extreme cost to the present generation. This overshoot means that democratic governments cannot use the longtermist argument to guide their catastrophe policy. In this paper, we show that the case for preventing catastrophe does not depend on longtermism. (...) Standard cost-benefit analysis implies that governments should spend much more on reducing catastrophic risk. We argue that a government catastrophe policy guided by cost-benefit analysis should be the goal of longtermists in the political sphere. This policy would be democratically acceptable, and it would reduce existential risk by almost as much as a strong longtermist policy. (shrink)

As Christian List (2021) has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems requires, among others things, that we ask whether it makes sense (...) to extend our blaming practices to these systems. In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising thesis that this question should be answered in the affirmative: contrary to what one might initially think, it can make a lot of sense to blame AI systems, since, as we furthermore argue, many of the important functions that are fulfilled by blaming humans can also be served by blaming AI systems. The paper concludes that this result gives us a good pro tanto reason to extend our blame practices to AI systems. (shrink)

In this chapter, we turn our attention to the effects of the attention economy on our ability to act autonomously as a group. We begin by clarifying which sorts of groups we are concerned with, which are structured groups (groups sufficiently organized that it makes sense to attribute agency to the group itself). Drawing on recent work by Purves and Davis (2022), we describe the essential roles of trust (i.e., depending on groups to fulfill their commitments) and trustworthiness (i.e., the (...) property of a group that makes trusting them fitting) in autonomous group action, with particular emphasis on democratic institutions (which we view as group agents) and democratic legitimacy (which depends on trust and trustworthiness). We then explain how engagement maximization promotes polarization, which is detrimental to trust and trustworthiness and, in turn, democratic legitimacy and democratic institutions. We close by considering what groups might do to protect themselves from the threat posed to them by the attention economy. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that so-called echo chambers and epistemic bubbles, associated with social media, are detrimental to liberal democracies. Drawing on John Rawls’s political liberalism, we offer a novel explanation of why social media platforms amplifying echo chambers and epistemic bubbles are likely contributing to the violation of the democratic norms connected to the ideal of public reason. These norms are clarified with reference to the method of (full) reflective equilibrium, which we argue should be cultivated as a civic (...) virtue in the context of political justification. The paper demonstrates how epistemic bubbles and echo chambers are likely to be detrimental to the disposition to follow the method of reflective equilibrium in the political context. Based on this diagnosis the paper highlights the need for interventions that help cultivate reflective equilibrium as a civic virtue and the need for corresponding interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

The fact that information and communication technologies (ICTs) increasingly shape our online and offline lifeworlds has lead to the emergence of a new societal threat in the form of vulnerabilities in critical ICT systems that may be exploited by malicious actors. Cybersecurity researchers work on finding such vulnerabilities and on identifying new attack vectors, i.e. they systematically step into the role of attackers. Normatively, however, the goal of this research is to strengthen ICTs against cyberattacks and, thus, to reduce the (...) societal threat. However, this implies a dual-use potential: as in any discipline, results in cybersecurity research need to be published at some point and the disclosure of vulnerabilities to software companies and ICT administrators is an integral part of ensuring that ICT vulnerabilities are closed; such a disclosure, however, can be misused by attackers, as well. Thus, instruments for ethical orientation in regard of these dual-use issues seem to be necessary to identify potential issues and to guide researchers in dealing with them. While corresponding resources, such as codes of conduct, already exists for cybersecurity research, we will show that they currently do not adequately address the need for ethical orientation in the academic context. This, we argue, creates the need for a new research ethics culture in cybersecurity research. (shrink)

Deepfakes are extremely realistic audio/video media. They are produced via a complex machine-learning process, one that centrally involves training an algorithm on hundreds or thousands of audio/video recordings of an object or person, S, with the aim of either creating entirely new audio/video media of S or else altering existing audio/video media of S. Deepfakes are widely predicted to have deleterious consequences (principally, moral and epistemic ones) for both individuals and various of our social practices and institutions. In this introduction (...) to the Topical Collection, I first survey existing philosophical research on deepfakes (Sects. 2 and 3). I then give an overview of the papers that comprise the Collection (Sect. 4). Finally, I conclude with remarks on a line of argument made in a number of papers in the Topical Collection: that deepfakes may cause their own demise (Sect. 5). (shrink)

This paper argues that the well-established fact of political irrationality imposes substantial constraints on how governments may combat the threat of political misinformation. Though attempts at regulating misinformation are becoming increasingly popular, both among policymakers and theorists, I intend to show that, for a wide range of anti-misinformation interventions (collectively termed “debunking” and “source labeling”), these attempts ought to be abandoned. My argument relies primarily on the fact that most people process politically-relevant information in biased and motivated ways. Since debunking (...) or factual correction of politically relevant misinformation (as well as source labeling) themselves consist of providing politically-relevant information, they are also very likely to be processed in irrational ways. This makes it extremely difficult to effectively correct people’s political beliefs and political information processing. Since governments should not pursue policies likely to be futile, they should refrain from mandating such interventions. My conclusion is of relevance to considerable literature in digital ethics of misinformation. It shows that many celebrated works in the field ignore political irrationality and fail to consider its implications. (shrink)

Many people regularly watch horror films. While it seems clear that sporadically watching horror films will not make us bad people, if it is the main type of media that we consume, then are we still safe? I will defend most horror films from Di Muzio (2006), who worries that we are harming our moral character by watching them. Most horror films (e.g., Candyman, Get Out, and Scream) fall into what I call the summit of safe horror (SoSH), the inverse (...) of the uncanny valley effect, wherein almost-but-not-quite-human robots elicit discomfort from viewers rather than empathy. In the SoSH, violence elicits excitement rather than pity for the victims because the violence is mitigated by, among other things, comic relief and foolish choices by the characters. These narrative features allow most horror films to be intense enough to cause excitement and terror yet not so intense as to cause a negative moral attitude to form in our soul, because we feel what Aristotle would consider the appropriate amount of fear. Torture porn, a subset of horror films lacking plot and focus solely on gore (e.g., the Saw sequels), falls outside of the SoSH because it lacks these narrative features, making the violence depicted too intense to be entertaining. These films outside the SoSH will not necessarily cause an inappropriate amount of fear but are simply the only ones that could possibly do so. Caution: spoilers ahead! (shrink)

There are calls from various sectors, including the popular press, industry, and academia, to incorporate artificial intelligence (AI)-based technologies in general, and large language models (LLMs) (such as ChatGPT and Gemini) in particular, into various spheres of the South African higher education sector. Nonetheless, the implementation of such technologies is not without ethical risks, notably those related to bias, unfairness, privacy violations, misinformation, lack of transparency, and threats to autonomy. This paper gives an overview of the more pertinent ethical concerns (...) that may result from the deployment of various current AI technologies in the South African higher education context. It provides a broad overview of the relevant AI ethics literature and distills a few general AI-ethics principles that can serve as guidelines for the ethical development, adoption, and use of AI systems. Suggestions are made as to how these might be applied to mitigate the ethical concerns in the South African higher education context. Overall, it is argued that AI technologies should only be adopted if they offer demonstrable benefits to stakeholders affected by them and that care should be taken to ensure that any potential harms are adequately addressed. (shrink)

Deepfakes raise various concerns: risks of political destabilization, depictions of persons without consent and causing them harms, erosion of trust in video and audio as reliable sources of evidence, and more. These concerns have been the focus of recent work in the philosophical literature on deepfakes. However, there has been almost no sustained philosophical analysis of deepfakes from the perspective of concerns about honesty and dishonesty. That deepfakes are potentially deceptive is unsurprising and has been noted. But under what conditions (...) does the use of deepfakes fail to be honest? And which human agents, involved in one way or another in a deepfake, fail to be honest, and in what ways? If we are to understand better the morality of deepfakes, these questions need answering. Our first goal in this paper, therefore, is to offer an analysis of paradigmatic cases of deepfakes in light of the philosophy of honesty. While it is clear that many deepfakes are morally problematic, there has been a rising counter-chorus claiming that deepfakes are not essentially morally bad, since there might be uses of deepfakes that are not morally wrong, or even that are morally salutary, for instance, in education, entertainment, activism, and other areas. However, while there are reasons to think that deepfakes can supply or support moral goods, it is nevertheless possible that even these uses of deepfakes are dishonest. Our second goal in this paper, therefore, is to apply our analysis of deepfakes and honesty to the sorts of deepfakes hoped to be morally good or at least neutral. We conclude that, perhaps surprisingly, in many of these cases the use of deepfakes will be dishonest in some respects. Of course, there will be cases of deepfakes for which verdicts about honesty and moral permissibility do not line up. While we will sometimes suggest reasons why moral permissibility verdicts might diverge from honesty verdicts, we will not aim to settle matters of moral permissibility. (shrink)

Educational disparities between traditional and non-traditional student groups in higher distance education can potentially be reduced by alleviating social identity threat and strengthening students’ sense of belonging in the academic context. We present a use case of how Learning Analytics and Machine Learning can be applied to develop and implement an algorithm to classify students as at-risk of experiencing social identity threat. These students would be presented with an intervention fostering a sense of belonging. We systematically analyze the intervention’s intended (...) positive consequences to reduce structural discrimination and increase educational equity, as well as potential risks based on privacy, data protection, and algorithmic fairness considerations. Finally, we provide recommendations for Higher Education Institutions to mitigate risk of bias and unintended consequences during algorithm development and implementation from an ethical perspective. (shrink)

Whatever one makes of the relationship between free will and moral responsibility – e.g. whether it’s the case that we can have the latter without the former and, if so, what conditions must be met; whatever one thinks about whether artificially intelligent agents might ever meet such conditions, one still faces the following questions. What is the value of moral responsibility? If we take moral responsibility to be a matter of being a fitting target of moral blame or praise, what (...) are the goods attached to them? The debate concerning ‘machine morality’ is often hinged on whether artificial agents are or could ever be morally responsible, and it is generally taken for granted (following Matthias 2004) that if they cannot, they pose a threat to the moral responsibility system and associated goods. In this paper, I challenge this assumption by asking what the goods of this system, if any, are, and what happens to them in the face of artificially intelligent agents. I will argue that they neither introduce new problems for the moral responsibility system nor do they threaten what we really (ought to) care about. I conclude the paper with a proposal for how to secure this objective. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that patient preferences concerning human physical attributes associated with race, culture, and gender should be excluded from public healthcare robot design. On one hand, healthcare should be (objective, universal) needs oriented. On the other hand, patient well-being (the aim of healthcare) is, in concrete ways, tied to preferences, as is patient satisfaction (a core WHO value). The shift toward patient-centered healthcare places patient preferences into the spotlight. Accordingly, the design of healthcare technology cannot simply disregard (...) patient preferences, even those which are potentially morally problematic. A method for handling these at the design level is thus imperative. By way of uncontroversial starting points, I argue that the priority of the public healthcare system is the fulfillment of patients’ therapeutic needs, among which certain potentially morally problematic preferences may be counted. There are further ethical considerations, however, which, taken together, suggest that the potential benefits of upholding these preferences are outweighed by the potential harms. (shrink)

Recently, a growing number of experts in artificial intelligence (AI) and medicine have be-gun to suggest that the use of AI systems, particularly machine learning (ML) systems, is likely to humanise the practice of medicine by substantially improving the quality of clinician-patient relationships. In this thesis, however, I argue that medical ML systems are more likely to negatively impact these relationships than to improve them. In particular, I argue that the use of medical ML systems is likely to comprise the (...) quality of trust, care, empathy, understanding, and communication between clinicians and patients. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems have demonstrated impressive performance across a variety of clinical tasks. However, notoriously, sometimes these systems are 'black boxes'. The initial response in the literature was a demand for 'explainable AI'. However, recently, several authors have suggested that making AI more explainable or 'interpretable' is likely to be at the cost of the accuracy of these systems and that prioritising interpretability in medical AI may constitute a 'lethal prejudice'. In this paper, we defend the value of interpretability (...) in the context of the use of AI in medicine. Clinicians may prefer interpretable systems over more accurate black boxes, which in turn is sufficient to give designers of AI reason to prefer more interpretable systems in order to ensure that AI is adopted and its benefits realised. Moreover, clinicians may be justified in this preference. Achieving the downstream benefits from AI is critically dependent on how the outputs of these systems are interpreted by physicians and patients. A preference for the use of highly accurate black box AI systems, over less accurate but more interpretable systems , may itself constitute a form of lethal prejudice that may diminish the benefits of AI to - and perhaps even harm - patients. (shrink)