Defining Death

My project examines the pedagogical approach of the Stoic Epictetus by focusing on seven vital lessons he imparts. This study will deepen our understanding of his vocation as a Stoic educator striving to free his students from the fears and foolishness that hold happiness hostage. These lessons are (1) how freedom, integrity, self-respect, and happiness interrelate; (2) real versus fake tragedy and real versus fake heroism; (3) the instructive roles that various animals play in Stoic education; (4) athleticism, sport, and (...) game-playing as analogies for striving to live virtuously; (5) place, time, and progress in the journey to self-realization; (6) how to live with death and exit life fearlessly; (7) how teaching wisdom is one of several ways the Stoic sage loves others. (shrink)

Prolonged survival after the declaration of death by neurologic criteria creates ambiguity regarding the validity of this methodology. This ambiguity has perpetuated the debate among secular and nondissenting Catholic authors who question whether the neurologic standards are sufficient for the declaration of death of organ donors. Cardiopulmonary criteria are being increasingly used for organ donors who do not meet brain death standards. However, cardiopulmonary criteria are plagued by conflict of interest issues, arbitrary standards for candidacy, and the lack of standardized (...) protocols for organ procurement. Combining the neurological and cardiopulmonary standards into a single protocol would mitigate the weaknesses of both and provide greater biologic and moral certainty that a donor of unpaired vital organs is indeed dead. (shrink)

A defense of the view that (i) to be alive is to be actively undergoing (not merely capable of undergoing) certain vital processes, that (ii) to die is cease to be capable of undergoing those processes (not to cease undergoing them), and that (iii) organisms in cryptobiosis (suspended animation) are not undergoing those processes but are capable of doing so, and are neither alive nor dead.

Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one’s own death but rather at saving the lives of others, and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one foresees one’s death as the outcome. Double Effect Donation, we argue, (...) opens a novel position in debates surrounding brain death and organ donation, and does so without compromising the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life. (shrink)

In this paper, I am dealing with the phenomena of “life” and “death.” The questions that I attempt to answer are “What is life, and what is death?” “Is it bad to die?” and “Is there life after death?” The method that I am using in this paper is that of phenomenology. The latter I understand as an inquiry into meaning, that is, what makes this or that phenomenon as such. Thus, I am approaching the phenomena in question from the (...) point of view of their meaning in the first place. I claim that ordinarily we constitute phenomena of “life” and “death” in a twofold way. When it comes to “life,” one can specify “life-as-biological,” and “life-as-a-possibility” senses. The former I understand as a cluster of biological processes that unfold in physical time. By “life-as-a-possibility,” I understand a cluster of projects, potentials that depend on our subjectivity. I claim that we essentially perceive life-as-biological through life-as-possibility. When it comes to “death,” I argue that we essentially constitute this phenomenon in a similar manner. On the one hand, we perceive “death” in the “death-as-biological/physical” sense which signifies the end of the organism’s biological processes. On the other hand, we constitute “death” as the “existential/practical death”/“death-of-possibility.” By that I mean an annihilation of all possibilities, and projects. In short, it is a situation when one’s life suddenly loses all its meaning and value: death of meaning. I argue that what constitutes the significance of “death-as-biological” for us is what I call the “existential/practical death” or “death-of-possibility.” I use the phenomena of mourning and suicide to illustrate my point better. -/- Reflecting on whether it is bad to die, I claim that if we accept the hypotheses I am defending in the paper, it appears that death is bad because it entails the loss of all possibilities. I also want to show that people’s desire for immortality is in fact reasonable, because the more one lives, the more possibilities one is able to realize. In other words, people’s desire for immortality is grounded in the essential understanding of the phenomenon of “life” as a possibility. -/- Reflecting on whether there is life after death, my answer is twofold. Since there is no scientific evidence of life after physical/biological death, I think there is no reason to believe in such as well. But when it comes to the question whether there is life after the existential/practical death, my answer is positive: “Yes, there is!” I try to show that it is always possible to find the meaning of life even in the light of the most terrible events. In this sense, there is always a light in the end of the tunnel. (shrink)

This is part 1 of 6 of the dossier What Do We Talk about when We Talk about Queer Death?, edited by M. Petricola. The contributions collected in this article sit at the crossroads between thanatology and queer theory and tackle questions such as: how can we define queer death studies as a research field? How can queer death studies problematize and rethink the life-death binary? Which notions and hermeneutic tools could be borrowed from other disciplines in order to better (...) define queer death studies? The present article includes the following contributions: – MacCormack P., What does queer death studies mean?; – Radomska M., On queering death studies; – Lykke N., Death as vibrancy; – Hillerup Hansen I., What concreteness will do to resolve the uncertain; – Olson P., Queer objectivity as a response to denials of death; – Manganas N., The queer lack of a chthonic instinct. (shrink)

This is a howler of a handbook. The review shows how in the name of academics, philosophers indulge in quid pro quos in high places. They have no clue about what they are writing. As a Benedictine Abbot in the US responded in email to this reviewer: "Yes, indeed, the book is not very serious. When the authors die some day, they will understand better, as we all shall see". Now that death is in the air; we will understand what (...) this handbook's real worth is! COVID 19 won't go with steroids and anti-malarials. Nor is Ebola or Zika going anywhere. Now see how prescient the Abbot is and how idiotic the book under review is. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 33-35.

When an individual is comatose while parts of her brain remain functional, the question arises as to whether any mental characteristics are still associated with this brain, that is, whether the person still exists. Settling this uncertainty requires that one becomes clear about two issues: the type of functional loss that is associated with the respective profile of brain damage and the persistence conditions of persons. Medical case studies can answer the former question, but they are not concerned with the (...) latter. Conversely, in the philosophical literature, various accounts of personal identity are discussed, but usually detached from any empirical basis. Only uniting the two debates and interpreting the real-life configurations of brain damage through the lens of the philosophical concepts enables one to make an informed judgment regarding the persistence of comatose persons. Especially challenging are cases in which three mental characteristics that normally occur together—wakefulness, awareness and memory storage—come apart. These shall be the focus of this paper. (shrink)

Fifty years have passed since brain death was first proposed as a criterion of death. Its advocates believe that with the destruction of the brain, integrated functioning ceases irreversibly, somatic unity dissolves, and the organism turns into a corpse. In this article, I put forward two objections against this assertion. First, I draw parallels between brain death and other pathological conditions and argue that whenever one regards the absence or the artificial replacement of a certain function in these pathological conditions (...) as compatible with organismic unity, then one equally ought to tolerate that function's loss or replacement in brain death. Second, I show that the neurological criterion faces an additional problem that is only coming to light as life-supporting technology improves: the growing sophistication of the latter gives rise to a dangerous decoupling of the actual performance of a vital function from the retention of neurological control over it. Half a century after its introduction, the neurological criterion is facing the same fate as its cardiopulmonary predecessor. 1Introduction2Death of the Brain or Death of the Brainstem?3The Functional Loss in Brain Death Compared with Related Conditions4The Decoupling of the Performance of a Function from the Retention of Neurological Control5Conclusion. (shrink)

Comparative thanatologists study the responses to the dead and the dying in nonhuman animals. Despite the wide variety of thanatological behaviours that have been documented in several different species, comparative thanatologists assume that the concept of death is very difficult to acquire and will be a rare cognitive feat once we move past the human species. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is based on two forms of anthropocentrism: an intellectual anthropocentrism, which leads to an over-intellectualisation of the (...) CoD, and an emotional anthropocentrism, which yields an excessive focus on grief as a reaction to death. Contrary to what these two forms of anthropocentrism suggest, we argue that the CoD requires relatively little cognitive complexity and that it can emerge independently from mourning behaviour. Moreover, if we turn towards the natural world, we can see that the minimal cognitive requirements for a CoD are in fact met by many nonhuman species and there are multiple learning pathways and opportunities for animals in the wild to develop a CoD. This allows us to conclude that the CoD will be relatively easy to acquire and, so, we can expect it to be fairly common in nature. (shrink)

In the contemporary context of environmental crises and the degradation of resources, certain habitats become unliveable, leading to the death of individuals and species extinction. Whilst bioscience emphasises interdependency and relationality as crucial characteristics of life shared by all organisms, Western cultural imaginaries tend to draw a thick dividing line between humans and nonhumans, particularly evident in the context of death. On the one hand, death appears as a process common to all forms of life; on the other, as an (...) event that distinguishes human from other organisms. Against this background, this article explores how contemporary art—in particular, the series of works The Absence of Alice by Australian new-media and bioartist Svenja Kratz—challenges the normative and human-exceptionalist concept of death. By employing queerfeminist biophilosophy as a strategy that focuses on relations, processes and transformations instead of ‘essences’, the article examines the ways Kratz’s works deterritorialise the conventional concept of death. In this way, it hopes to attend to the intimacies between materialities of a human and nonhuman kind that form part of the processes of death and dying, and what follows, to reframe ethico-ontology of death as material and processual ecologies of the non/living. (shrink)

Una de las razones fundamentales por las cuales la muerte causa dolor se debe a una comprensión equívoca acerca del sentido último de la vida humana. Además, la Modernidad se desliga, en ocasiones, de la dimensión emotiva y afectiva del ser humano. Así pues, toda terapéutica del duelo mortuorio exige reflexionar con seriedad acerca del sentido de la muerte, tarea en la cual la tradición filosófica y teológica occidental es un apoyo ineludible. En la primera parte se ha de revisar, (...) desde la perspectiva filosófica de Epicuro, la concepción de la muerte según la cual la opinión ordinaria es errada y no da cabida a una vida realizada como fundamento de la tranquilidad y la salud. En la segunda parte se esbozarán los rasgos y las notas esenciales de una concepción cristiana de la muerte a partir de la obra de San Agustín de Hipona, exponiendo algunas medidas concretas de preparación para la muerte con base en su pensamiento. (shrink)

Requiring family authorization for apnea testing subtracts health professionals control over death determination, a procedure that has traditionally been considered a matter of clinical expertise alone. In this commentary, we first provide evidence showing that health professionals’ (HPs) disposition to act on death determination without family’s prior consent could be much lower than that referred to by Berkowitz and Garrett (2020). We hypothesize that HPs may have reservations about their own expertise as regards death, and may thus hesitate to impose (...) their views on patients’ families. We then address the theoretical question of clinical expertise in death determination by distinguishing judgments about facts (e.g., the presence or absence of spontaneous breathing) from interpretations given of these facts (i.e., their meaning for the vital status of an individual). We argue that, while clinicians may claim some expert authority on the former, they hold no particular authority on the latter. (shrink)

"There are seven chapters, addressing philosophical issues pertaining to death, the badness of death, time and death, ideas on immortality, near death experiences, and extending life through medical technology. The book is shorter, and less elaborate, than Kagan's Death. And it goes into more depth about a selection of central issues related to death and immortality than May's book. It gives an original take on various basic puzzles pertaining to death, and integrates a discussion of these philosophical issues with an (...) analysis of near-death experiences, as well as an exploration of contemporary efforts to extend life by heroic medical means"--. (shrink)

La mort nous afflige, nous angoisse, voire nous terrifie. Qu’est-ce que la mort ? La tristesse et l’angoisse face à la mort sont-elles justifiées ? La mort est-elle un mal ? Vaudrait-il mieux être immortel ? Comment comprendre le deuil ? Cette entrée propose un aperçu des questions principales de la philosophie contemporaine de la mort. Tentons de sonder l’énigme la plus tragique de la vie.

I present some aspects of Sein und Zeit’s phenomenology of possibility as a key feature of Heidegger’s theoretical confrontation with the crisis of European culture. I draw from paragraphs 73-74 for an inquiry into the relation between possibility and historicity within the structure of the Dasein. Specifically, I consider the concept of repetition in light of Heidegger’s idea that authentic historicity is to be grounded in temporality. Many interpreters found the concept of repetition to be the mark of a conservative (...) conception of history. However, I argue that this is not the case. The concrete act of repetition involves all moments of the temporal horizon – even the future. If we can find our concrete possibilities of action only within our contingent historical situation, the act of repetition is always also a decision for a certain contingent future. This future is radically unpredictable. It is neither identical to the (repeated) possibility of the past, nor definable through rigid normative laws or dogmatic political positions. I then examine the concept of being-towards-death as a heuristic instrument for the task of historical decision. I argue that this ontological structure allows for a critical use of Sein und Zeit’s fundamental ontology. By deciding towards our death, we decide towards the entirety of our existence. This decision is a possible response to the crisis of culture: in front of the rationalization, the atomization and disenchantment of our experience of the world, we can react by perpetually trying to invent new possible forms of reconciliation between the values of our historical Gemeinschaft and the essential novelty of the future. I conclude by presenting Richir’s Phénoménologie et Institution symbolique as an elaboration of this suggestion and as a path for a possible renewal of Heidegger’s critical phenomenology of possibility. (shrink)

Erin E. Edwards’ "The Modernist Corpse: Posthumanism and the Posthumous" offers a unique study of the critical and creative potential of the corpse in the context of (primarily) American modernist literature and other media. Dead bodies, oftentimes “radically dehumanized” (p. 1) and depicted en masse in direct relation to atrocities of colonialism, slavery and World War I, populate modernist literature and art. While many literary theorist whose work focuses on American modernism (as Edwards herself notes), looks at death and corpses (...) through the critical lens of studies on mourning, loss and trauma (e.g. Moglen 2007) and are clearly anchored in the traditional idea of the human subject, Edwards grounds her own “necrocentric perspective” (p. 14) in (feminist) posthumanist theorising. For her, “the corpse in American modernism is involved in a trenchant re-examination of who – and what – counts as human and as ‘alive’ in the early twentieth century” (p. 2). (shrink)

Queer Death Studies (QDS) refers to an emerging transdisciplinary field of research that critically and (self) reflexively investigates and challenges conventional normativities, assumptions, expectations, and regimes of truths that are brought to life and made evident by death, dying, and mourning. Since its establishment as a research field in the 1970s, Death Studies has drawn attention to the questions of death, dying, and mourning as complex and multifaceted phenomena that require inter- or multi-disciplinary approaches and perspectives. Yet, the engagements with (...) death, dying and mourning, constitutive of conventional Death Studies’ investigations, tend to remain insufficient and reductive. They are often governed by the normative notions of: the subject; bonds between humans, as well as between humans and (their) animals; family relations and communities; rituals; and finally, experiences of grief, mourning, and bereavement. Moreover, these engagements are frequently embedded in constraining beliefs in life/death divides, constructed along the lines of conventional religious and/or scientific mind/body dualisms, characteristic of the Western cultural imaginaries. Against this background, QDS offers a site for ‘queering’ traditional ways of approaching death both as a subject of study and philosophical reflection, and as a phenomenon to articulate in artistic work or practices of mourning. Here, the notion of ‘queer’ conveys many meanings. It refers to researching and narrating death, dying, and mourning in the context of queer bonds and communities, where the subjects involved/studied/interviewed and the relations they are involved in are recognised as ‘queer’. Simultaneously, the term ‘queer’ can also function as an adverb and a verb, referring thus to the processes of going beyond and unsettling (subverting, exceeding) binaries and given norms, normativities, and constraining conventions. In other words, ‘queer’ becomes both a process and a methodology that is applicable and exceeds the focus on gender and sexuality as its exclusive concerns. (shrink)

Tod und Sterblichkeit sind Themen, die die Menschen seit Menschengedenken beschäftigt haben. Davon zeugen jahrtausendealte Grabstätten wie beispielsweise die in Stonehenge, aber auch vielfältige künstlerische Werke. Schon eines der ersten bekannten Bücher der Menschheit überhaupt, dass Gilgamesch-Epos, thematisiert die Angst vor dem Sterben und die Hoffnung auf Unsterblichkeit. Tod und Sterblichkeit waren auch schon immer zentrale Themen der Philosophie. Philosophen haben sich die Köpfe darüber zerbrochen, ob es ein Leben nach dem Tod gibt, wie man am besten damit umgehen sollte, (...) wenn es kein Leben nach dem Tode gibt, oder ob es angesichts der Absurdität der Welt nicht ohnehin am besten wäre, sich gleich selbst umzubringen. Wofür sich in der Philosophiegeschichte hingegen niemand interessiert hat, war die Frage, wann ein Mensch tot ist. Das änderte sich erst in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, ausgelöst durch zwei gewaltige Neuerungen in der Medizin und zwei sich daraus ergebende Probleme. Mit diesen Problemen und der daraus resultierenden Frage, wann ein Mensch tot ist, möchte ich meinen Beitrag beginnen. Im zweiten Teil werde ich dann auf die Hirntoddebatte eingehen und das grundsätzliche Problem untersuchen, mit dem sie uns bis heute konfrontiert, bevor ich dann am Ende einen Lösungsvorschlag für dieses Problem präsentiere. (shrink)

El presente texto es una colección de ensayos que giran en torno a la polémica obra del filósofo francés Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Como bien se hace notar en la introducción del libro, este no es un intento apologético, sino más bien crítico. Por ello, el autor lejos de reafirmar lo que ya el pensador existencialista ha dicho, se centra en uno de los puntos más contradictorios de su obra: la relación de la muerte con la libertad humana. Para ello, (...) se examinan las principales teorías que, a su juicio, han participado en la conformación de lo que entendemos por muerte. Y junto a esta tradición, analiza también las actitudes respecto a ese concepto desde el sentido común y las ciencias modernas. En el segundo capítulo introduce y contextualiza el momento específico en que emergió el existencialismo. Y concluye con su específica crítica al pensador francés desde la obra El ser y la nada. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend brain death as a criterion for determining death against objections raised by Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan. I argue that any definition of death for beings like us relies on some sortal concept by which we are individuated and identified and that the choice of that concept in a practical context is not determined by strictly biological considerations but involves metaphysical, moral, social, and cultural considerations. This view supports acceptance of (...) a more pluralistic legal definition of death as well as acceptance of brain death as death. (shrink)

The debate over whether brain death is death has focused on whether individuals who have sustained total brain failure have satisfied the biological definition of death as “the irreversible loss of the integration of the organism as a whole.” In this paper, I argue that what it means for an organism to be integrated “as a whole” is undefined and vague in the views of those who attempt to define death as the irreversible loss of the integration of the organism (...) as a whole. I show how what it means for a living thing to be integrated as a whole depends on the sortal concept by which it is identified. Since interests, values, and ontological considerations besides strictly biological ones affect the concepts by which we individuate and identify living things, those non-biological considerations have a bearing on what it means for a particular kind of living thing to exist as a whole and thus what it means for one of us to die. Even if our bodies may remain organically integrated in some sense despite total brain failure, this fact should not lead us to reject brain death as death. Artificially sustained brain-dead human bodies are not human beings, but the remains of them. While such bodies may be alive in some sense, they are not human beings or human persons. They are not one of us. (shrink)

John Lizza says that to define death well, we must go beyond biological considerations. Death is the absence of life in an entity that was once alive. Biology is the study of life. Therefore, the definition of death should not involve non-biological concerns.

Review of the book: Człowiek na granicy istnienia. Dyskusje o śmierci mózgowej i innych aspektach umierania, Grzegorz Hołub, Piotr Duchliński, Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2017.

John P. Lizza has long been a major figure in the scholarly literature on criteria for death. His searching and penetrating critiques of the dominant biological paradigm, and his defense of a theory of death of the person as a psychophysical entity, have both significantly advanced the literature. In this special issue, Lizza reinforces his critiques of a strictly biological approach. In my commentary, I take up Lizza’s challenge regarding a biological concept of death. He is certainly right to point (...) out that science is not value-free; however, this does not imply that there cannot be a characterization of biological death that can be shown to be superior to other concepts. After characterizing and justifying such a theory of biological death, I show that patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for brain death are unequivocally biologically alive. However, with respect to concepts of personhood and related ideas, I urge the acceptance of a pluralism of such concepts for matters of public policy. (shrink)

In the ongoing ‘brain death’ controversy, there has been a constant push for the use of the ‘higher brain’ formulation as the criterion for the determination of death on the grounds that brain-dead individuals are no longer human beings because of their irreversible loss of consciousness and mental functions. This essay demonstrates that such a position flows from a Lockean view of human persons. Compared to the ‘consciousness-related definition of death,’ the substance view is superior, especially because it provides a (...) holistic vision of the human person, and coheres with the perennial axiom about the ‘whole and parts.’. (shrink)

In his article, “Defining Death: Beyond Biology,” John Lizza argues in favor of a civil definition of death, according to which the potential for consciousness and social interaction marks us as the “kind of being that we are.” In this commentary, I critically discuss this approach to the bioethical debate on the definition of death. I question whether Lizza’s account is based on a full recognition of the “practical, moral, religious, philosophical, and cultural considerations” at play in this debate. I (...) further propose that a truly ethical debate on definitions of death ought to concentrate on how different definitions of death are used in diverse contexts – what definitions of death do – and focus less on who has the right definition of death for all situations. (shrink)

Sam, your newborn son, has been suffocating in your arms for the past 15 minutes. You’re as certain as you can be that he is going to die in the next 15.

This volume comprises various viewpoints representing a Catholic perspective on contemporary practices in medicine and biomedical research. The Roman Catholic Church has had a significant impact upon the formulation and application of moral values and principles to a wide range of controversial issues in bioethics. Catholic leaders, theologians, and bioethicists have elucidated and marshaled arguments to support the Church’s definitive positions on several bioethical issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, and reproductive cloning. Not all bioethical issues, however, have been definitively addressed (...) by Catholic authorities, and some Church teachings allow for differing applications in diverse circumstances. Moreover, as new biomedical technologies emerge, Church authorities rely on experts in science, medicine, philosophy, theology, law, and other disciplines to advise them. Such experts continue to debate issues related to reproduction, genetics, end-of-life care, and health care policy. This volume will be a valuable resource for scholars in bioethics or Catholic studies, who will benefit from the nuanced arguments offered based on the latest research. This volume is also instructive for students entering the field to become aware of the founding philosophical and theological principles informing the Catholic bioethical worldview. (shrink)

A crucial test for the dominant Rawlsian ‘consensus’ brand of public reason is whether it is complete – sufficient in content, that is, to yield determinate answers to the political questions put before it. Yet while doubts about the incompleteness of Rawlsian public reason have been often voiced, critics have thus far carried out relatively little of the philosophical spadework needed to substantiate them. This paper contributes to remedying this omission, via a detailed analysis of the implications of Rawlsian public (...) reason for an important bioethical problem arising at the end of human life. This is the problem of how to define and diagnose the death of a person, or determine at what point the clinical and legal practices conventionally associated with death, such as the removal of vital organs, may take place. My thesis is that this is a matter on which Rawlsian public reason does indeed have a grave incompleteness problem: the model produces indeterminacy, I argue, between a broad range of legal definitions of death. I also aim to go beyond existing articulations of the incompleteness objection, moreover, by examining what Rawlsian consensus liberalism implies about how decision-makers ought to respond to indeterminacies in public reason. Insofar as the route to a reasoned choice between competing criteria of death is foreclosed, I contend, the Rawlsian view requires that selection among policy options proceed in an intolerably arbitrary fashion. The latter finding alters the cast of the familiar incompleteness objection, by closing the gap between it and what I have elsewhere called the ethical objection – the objection, that is, that public reason can in some cases generate determinate but morally unacceptable decisions. (shrink)

Personal time, as opposed to external time, has a certain role to play in the correct account of death and immortality. But saying exactly what that role is, and what role remains for external time, is not straightforward. I formulate and defend accounts of death and immortality that specify these roles precisely.

Since its inception in 1968, the concept of whole-brain death has been contentious, and four decades on, controversy concerning the validity and coherence of whole-brain death continues unabated. Although whole-brain death is legally recognized and medically entrenched in the United States and elsewhere, there is reasonable disagreement among physicians, philosophers, and the public concerning whether brain death is really equivalent to death as it has been traditionally understood. A handful of states have acknowledged this plurality of viewpoints and enacted “conscience (...) clauses” that require “reasonable accommodation” of religious and moral objections to the determination of death by neurological criteria. This paper argues for the universal adoption of “reasonable accommodation” policies using the New Jersey statute as a model, in light of both the ongoing controversy and the recent case of Jahi McMath, a child whose family raised religious objections to a declaration of brain death. Public policies that accommodate reasonable, divergent viewpoints concerning death provide a practical and compassionate way to resolve those conflicts that are the most urgent, painful, and difficult to reconcile. (shrink)

For hundreds of years, death had been defined by cardiopulmonary criteria. When heart and respiratory functions were permanently absent, doctors declared their patients dead. Three developments in intensive care medicine called into question these widely-accepted criteria, however: the advent of positive pressure ventilation and the promotion of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, both in the early 1950s, and the first successful heart transplantation in 1967. What had previously been diagnosed as the permanent absence of vital functions, suddenly became reversible. Not only could doctors (...) replace a defective heart with a functioning transplant; patients could also be kept oxygenated in the total absence of spontaneous respiratory function. The traditional boundaries between life and death became blurred. Patients for whom there was not the remotest possibility of regaining consciousness following massive brain damage continued to consume valuable medical resources. Moreover, their organs could not be procured for transplantation. Were those patients still alive or could the ventilators be switched off? A criterion suited to indicate a patient’s death despite the provision of external life support was needed. In 1968 an ad hoc committee of the Harvard Medical School published the first comprehensive definition of what would soon become the new clinical standard: brain death. The brain bears a special relation to other organs; it directs bodily functions without carrying them out. When the brain is destroyed, it was argued, this control mechanism is irreversibly dysfunctional, so that the organism becomes unable to maintain its vital functions, loses its somatic unity and, consequently, ceases to exist. This neurological criterion has been controversial ever since its introduction. Whether brain death is indeed death is what I shall be investigating in this thesis. I will be asking three main questions: What are we? Is brain death the death of an organism? Is brain death the death of a psychological being? The question of personal identity and the question of the appropriate definition of death are intimately related. Only when we have determined what kind of entity we essentially are can we specify what conditions must apply for this entity to persist or to cease to exist. I shall argue that we are essentially psychological beings, which entails that our death is distinct from the death of our organisms. Hence, we need two different criteria – one for the death of each entity. I shall try to establish whether brainstem death and whole-brain death correspond to the irreversible cessation of organismic functioning. I will then determine by which criterion the death of a psychological being can be diagnosed. (shrink)

About death, grief, mourning, life after death and immortality. Why should we die like humans to survive as a species. "No one wants to die. Even people who want to go to heaven don't want to die to get there. And yet death is the destination we all share. No one has ever escaped it. And that is as it should be, because Death is very likely the single best invention of Life. It is Life's change agent. It clears out (...) the old to make way for the new." (Steve Jobs) CONTENTS: Death - Philosophy of death - Religions - - Animism - - Atheism - - Buddhism - - Christianity - - Hinduism - - Islam - - Jainism - - Jehovah's Witnesses - - Judaism - - Latter-day Saints - - Spiritism - Symbolism - Personification of Death - - Notable personifications - - In mythologies - - - Hindu mythology - - - In Japan - - - Slavic paganism - - - Lithuanian paganism - - In the three monotheistic religions - - - Judaism - - - Christianity - - - In Mexico - - - Islam - Axiochos - - The characters of dialogue - - Dialogue - - Prologue - - Arguments - - Citations - Paradise - - Greco-Roman mythology - - Mesopotamian mythology and influences - - According to Judaism - - According to Christianity - - - According to Catholicism - - - According to Protestantism - - - According to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints - - According to Islam - - According to Hinduism - - According to modern spiritualities - - - According to the esoteric - Hell - - Mesopotamian origins - - According to Christianity - - - Names appearing in the biblical texts - - - Medieval artistic representations - - - Concepts according to Christian movements - - According to Judaism - - According to Islam - - According to Buddhism - - According to Hinduism - - According to modern esotericism - - - According to Aïvanhov - - - According to Allan Kardec - - Philosophy - - - Jewish Kabbalah - - - Sartre - - - Popular wisdom Funerals - The funeral ritual: a rite of passage - Prehistory - Ancient death customs - - The family bereavement - - Mummification - - Sarcophagi - - Funerals - - Ancient Greece - - Ancient Rome - - Celts, Germans and Scandinavians - Religious funeral rites - - Buddhism - - Judaism - Christianity - - Protestantism - - Islam - Funeral rites by continent - - In Africa - - In Europe - The contemporary era - Mourning (Grief) - - Steps - - - Death of a close - - Loss events without mourning value (white factors) - - Duration and manifestations - - Risks - - Colors - Graveyards (Cemeteries) - - First cemeteries - - Cemeteries today - Funerary art - Dolmens - - Types of dolmens - - Function - - Location - Passage graves - Cenotaphs - - Famous cenotaphs - Lanterns of the Dead Afterlife - History - Questions about death and immortality - Testimonials - - Spiritualistic experiences - - Popular literature on the afterlife - - "Memories" and reminiscences - - Early studies of the science of the 19th century and early 20th century - Types of scenarios - Some religious and philosophical concepts - - Afterlife in Buddhism - - Afterlife in Christianity - - According to Hinduism - - According to Islam - - According to Judaism - - According to Mormonism - - According to the ancient philosophies - - According to Spiritism - - According to Native American traditions - - According to Vedism - - According to Esotericism - In science - Near-death experiences - - Clinical death - - NDE frequency - - Effects of depth of NDE on survival - - Near-death experiences and shared-death experience - - - The first contemporary testimonials - - - Experience according to Moody - - - The concept of "shared death" - - - The NDE scales - - The study of Pim van Lommel - - Spiritual and patient point of view - - - Survivalists studies - - - The religious understanding of the phenomenon - - Scientific views - - - Physiological explanation - - - Psychological explanation - Reincarnation - - Religions - - - In Hinduism - - - In Jainism - - - In Buddhism - - - In Judaism - - - In Christianity - - - In Islam - - In contemporary times - - - Esotericism - - - Works of the psychiatrist Ian Stevenson - - - Radical increase in life expectancy and artificial reincarnation - - Criticism - - - Arthur Schopenhauer - - - Ramana Maharshi - - - Rene Guenon - - - Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy - Metempsychosis - - Theories - - Ideas - Maschalismos Immortality - Immortality of the soul and religious traditions - - Buddhism - - Christianity - - Islam - - Mormonism - Contemporary perception of the immortality of the body - - Observation in the animal kingdom - - Perspectives for mankind - Immortality in science - - Alexis Carrel - - Jean Rostand - - Hayflick limit - - Étienne-Émile Baulieu and DHEA - - Aubrey de Grey - - Professor Skulachev - - Regenerative medicine - - Professor Christopher Jaeger - Eternal Return - - According to the Mesopotamians - - According to Heraclitus and the Stoics - Fountain of Youth - - History of myth and relatives myths - - - In Roman mythology, Germanic, Celtic and Irish - - - In the Middle-East - - - In Spain - - - In the Bible - - The fountain in art and literature - - Painting - - - Literature and cinema - - Persistent of the myth until today - Senescence - - Why do we age? - - Gene regulation - - Cellular senescence Undead - Ghoul - Lich - Mummy - Skeleton - Vampire - Zombie - Other legendary creatures - Creatures specific to a particular universe - Spiritism - - Point out - - Origins of spiritism - - - The traditions through the ages - - - Advent of Christianity in Europe - - - The survival of necromancy - - - The precursors - - - Relations of spiritualism to science - Mediumship - - History - - Skeptical point of view - - Favorable doctor's viewpoint - Ghosts - - Appearance - - Belief in ghosts - - Origin - - - Duality and return dead - - - Ancient roots - - Typology - - - Poltergeists - - - Revenants - - - Ghosts - - - Banshees - - - Apparitions of crisis - - - Phantasms of the living - - - Vision of his own double - - - Ghost armies - - - Ghosts of animals - - - Means of transport - - Science perspective - - - Hallucinations - - - Sleep paralysis - - - Induced ghosts - - - Aches and infrasounds - - - Magnetic fields - Vampires - - Characteristics - - - Vampire transformation - - - Identification - - - Faculties - - Protection against the vampires - - - Precautions at death and burial - - - Apotropaic objects and places - - Destruction of vampires - Zombie - - The concept - - Africa and voodoo - - - West Africa - - - South Africa - - - In Haiti (and the Caribbean) - - - Scientific research - - The "revenants" in the Western imaginary Death in art - Memento mori - - History - - - Antiquity - - - Christianity - - - Mexican syncretism - - Performing arts - - - In painting - - - In literature - - - In movies - - - In video games - - - In Japanese animation - - - In music - The iconography of Weighing of souls (Particular judgment) - - Origin - - Written sources - - Weighing in Romanesque art - - Weighing in Gothic art - - Weighing in the late Middle Ages: to a new iconography - - Weighing of souls or actions? - Poems - - Charlotte Brontë, “On the Death of Anne Brontë” - - Edgar Allan Poe, “Annabel Lee” - - Edna St. Vincent Millay, “And you as well must die” - - Emily Dickinson, “Because I could not stop for Death” - - Emily Dickinson, “If I Should Die” - - Lord Byron, “Epitaph to a Dog” - - Pablo Neruda, “Only Death” - - Stephen Crane, “God Lay Dead in Heaven” - - W. B. Yeats, “He Wishes His Beloved Were Dead” - - Rainer Maria Rilke, “Death” - Paintings - - The Three Dead Kings - - The Death of Nelson - - Beata Beatrix - Sculptures - - The Kiss of Death - - Background - - Imagery - - Angel of Grief - - Fallen Astronaut - Quotes References About the author - Nicolae Sfetcu - - By the same author - - Contact Publishing House - MultiMedia Publishing . (shrink)

Bioethics, neuroscience, medicine are contributing to a debate on the definition and criteria of death. This topic is very controversial, and it demonstrates clashing views on the meaning of human life and death. Official medical and legal positions agree upon a biological definition of death as irreversible cessation of integrated functioning of the organism as a whole, and whole-brain criterion to ascertain death. These positions have to face many criticisms: some scholars speak of logical and practical inconsistency, some others of (...) invalid scientific theory about the supreme integrator. In this paper some criticisms are exposed and discussed in order to reconstruct the state of the art in bioethical debate. -/- . (shrink)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin G Miller recently argued that the wrongness of killing is best explained by the harm that comes to the victim, and that ‘total disability’ best explains the nature of this harm. Hence, killing patients who are already totally disabled is not wrong. I maintain that their notion of total disability is ambiguous and that they beg the question with respect to whether there are abilities left over that remain relevant for the goods of personhood and human (...) worth. If these goods remain, then something more is lost in death than in ‘total disability,’ and their explanation of what makes killing wrong comes up short. But if total disability is equivalent with death, then their argument is an interesting one. (shrink)

Despre moarte, durere, doliu, viaţa de după moarte şi nemurire. De ce trebuie să murim ca oameni pentru a trăi ca specie. "Nimeni nu vrea să moară. Chiar și cei care doresc să ajungă în cer, nu ar vrea să moară pentru a ajunge acolo. Și totuși, moartea este destinația pe care o împărtășim cu toții. Nimeni nu a scăpat vreodată. Și aşa şi trebuie, pentru că Moartea este foarte probabil cea mai bună invenție a Vieții. Este agentul de schimbare (...) a Vieţii. Ea şterge pe cele vechi pentru a face loc celor noi. În momentul ăsta noul eşti tu, dar într-o zi, nu peste mult timp, vei deveni treptat vechi, și vei fi şters la rândul tău. Îmi pare rău că sună aşa de dramatic, dar este cât se poate de adevărat. Timpul tau este limitat, așa că nu-l irosi trăind viața altcuiva. Ai grijă să nu fii prins în dogme - trăind prin rezultatele gândirii altor oameni. Nu lăsa zgomotul opiniilor altora să înece propria ta voce interioară. Și cel mai important, ai curajul să urmezi inima și intuiția ta. Ele știu cumva deja ce îți dorești tu cu adevărat să devii. Orice altceva este de importanţă secundară." (Steve Jobs) CUPRINS: Moartea - Termeni asociaţi - Senectutea - Semne de moarte biologică - Conceptul de moarte - Moartea în societate şi cultură - Uitarea veşnică - - Uitarea şi Subiectivitatea - - În filosofie Moartea programată a celulelor - Istorie - Tipuri - - Apoptoza - - Autofagia - - Alte tipuri - Originea evolutivă Obiceiuri mortuare - Înmormântarea - - Istorie - - Motivaţii pentru înmormântare umană - Cimitire - - Obiceiuri şi practici în cimitire - - - Flori - - - Pietre - - - Cruci - - Cimitire şi superstiţie - Preotulsul în religia ortodoxă - - Serviciul religios - - Coliva - - Când se practică parastasul - - Litate Doliul - Procesul de doliu - Reacţii - Cinci identităţi ale persoanelor în doliu - Ştiinţa durerii - - Cele patru traiectorii Bonanno ale durerii - Teoria celor cinci etape - Procese fiziologice şi neurologice - Teorii evolutive ale doliului - - Riscuri - - Complicaţii ale doiului Experienţe aproape de moarte - Caracteristici - Studii - - Varianţa în studiile EAM - - Analiza neurobiologică şi psihologică - - Starea REM - - Visul lucid - - Psihologia computaţională - - Efecte - - Cercetarea inter-culturală - - Studiile Van Lommel - - Studiul AWARE Nemurirea - Abordări ştiinţifice - Abordări religioase - Nemurirea biologică - - Specii biologice nemuritoare - - Evoluţia îmbătrânirii - Speranţe privind nemurirea biologică umană - - Substanţe care prelungesc durata de viaţă - - Nemurirea tehnologică - - Crionica - - Încărcarea minţii la calculator - - Cibernetica - - Nemurirea evoluţionară - Puncte de vedere religioase - - Religia greacă antică - - Marii maeştri - - Budism - - Creştinism - Etica nemuririi - - Indezirabilitatea nemuririi - Sufletul - - Abordări filosofice - - - Socrate şi Platon - - - Aristotel - - - Avicenna şi Ibn al-Nafis - - - Toma de Aquino - - - Immanuel Kant - - - James Hillman - - - Filosofia minţii - Scientologia Viaţa de Apoi (Viaţa de după moarte) - Filozofia vieţii de Apoi - - Filozofia modernă - - Filozofia procesului - Ştiinţa despre viaţa de Apoi - Modele metafizice ale Vieţii de Apoi - - Reîncarnarea - - Raiul şi iadul - - Limbo - - Purgatoriul - Religiile abrahamice - - Iudaism - - Olam Haba - - Reîncarnarea în tradiţia evreiască - - Creştinismul - Istoricitatea şi originea Învierii lui Isus - - Contextul istoric - - Învierea lui Iisus Nemorţi - Fantome - - Tipologia - - - Context antropologic - - Fantomele şi viaţa de apoi - - Teama de fantome - - Atribute comune - - Locaţii - Moroi - Scheleţi - - Mit şi folclor - Strigoi - - Etimologie - - Istorie - - Diferite tipuri de strigoi - - Cum ajunge cineva strigoi - - Prevenţie - - În cultura populară - Vampiri - - Etimologie - - Credinţe populare - - - Descriere şi caracteristicile comune - - - Credinţe non-europene - - Vampiri psihici - - - Vampiri energetici - Vârcolaci - - Caracteristici - - Apotropaice - - Vârcolacul şi Occidentul - Zombi - - Apocalipsa zombi - - - Ideea - - - Elementele arhetipale Aspecte culturale ale morţii - Înmormântarea în diferite culturi - Durerea şi doliul - Tradiţii mortuare - - Sacrificii umane şi animale - - Filozofia, religia şi mitologia morţii - - Personificări ale morţii - - Simbolismul numeric în Asia de Est - - Glorificarea şi fascinaţia morţii - Mitul originii morţii - - Africa - - Oceania - - - Polinezia - - Civilizaţia occidentală - - - Mitologia greacă - Moartea pe Internet - - E-mail - - Facebook - - Dropbox - - Google - - MySpace - - Twitter - - Wikipedia - - YouTube - - Moştenirea digitală Dispariţia omului ca specie - Percepţia riscului de extincţie umană - Soluţii propuse - În cultura populară Arta - Sculptura - - Gisant - - Îngerul durerii - Picturi - - Moartea lui Sardanapal - Poezii - - Alexandru Vlahuţã, "Din prag..." - - George Bacovia, “Decor” - - George Coşbuc, “Moartea lui Fulger” - - Lucian Blaga, “Omule” - - Mihai Eminescu, “Cu mâine zilele-ţi adaogi” - - Ştefan Augustin Doinaş, “Moartea Ofeliei” Citate Referinţe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . 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La cosiddetta “morte cerebrale totale”, o più correttamente “morte encefalica” (whole brain death), è un criterio fisiologico riferito alla cessazione irreversibile e permanente di tutte le funzioni dell’encefalo (emisferi e tronco encefalico), ed è correlato alla cessazione del funzionamento integrato dell’organismo. L’applicazione del criterio neurologico, e degli esami che lo accompagnano, è finalizzato ad una diagnosi clinica e strumentale per individuare una condizione causata da lesioni neurologiche diffuse e responsabili di coma, assenza di coscienza, di respirazione spontanea, di risposte agli (...) stimoli esterni, e di attività elettrica cerebrale in pazienti collegati alle macchine per la rianimazione. La diagnosi consente la dichiarazione legale di morte. L’assunto scientifico alla base dell’impiego del criterio neurologico è la teoria dell’integratore centrale, secondo la quale l’encefalo è responsabile del funzionamento integrato e coordinato dell’organismo. Questo contributo ricostruisce a grandi linee il dibattito bioetico italiano sui criteri per l’accertamento della morte, prestando attenzione anche ai recenti sviluppi della discussione sui mass media. (shrink)

The original text of the Constitution of the United States of America, written over 200 years ago, constitutes the supreme source of law in the American legal system. The seven articles and twenty seven amendments dictate understanding of fundamental principles of the federation’s functioning and its citizens’ rights. The paper aims to present the evolution of the U.S. Constitution’s language interpretation as provided by its final interpreter - the Supreme Court of the United States. Example of the Second Amendment will (...) be analyzed to present the change in understanding of the language grammar and, as a consequence, the sense of the right to keep and bear arms in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of District of Columbia v Heller ). It will argue for the accuracy of statement of Charles Evans Hughes, former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court: “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is...”. (shrink)

The article provides a critical overview of the Polish bioethics literature concerning the shortage of organs for transplantation. Problems related to this issue bear, to a considerable degree, on the attempt to answer the question how to increase the number of organs available in ethically acceptable ways. Polish authors have focused, in this respect, on the analysis and assessment of two solutions: an opt out system of acquiring organs and a system that allows the aquisition of organs on a “free (...) market”. Both solutions have been almost unanimously negatively assessed. Apart from the presentation and critique of the positions of Polish bioethicists on this matter, an important part of the text is constituted by a report from a debate, held at the national level, on the criteria and definition of death: for it is only from the deceased donors that unpaired bodily organs, such as heart, can be taken. (shrink)

This article examines the political controversy in the United States surrounding a new process for the disposition of human remains, alkaline hydrolysis. AH technologies use a heated solution of water and strong alkali to dissolve tissues, yielding an effluent that can be disposed through municipal sewer systems, and brittle bone matter that can be dried, crushed, and returned to the decedent’s family. Though AH is legal in eight US states, opposition to the technology remains strong. Opponents express concerns about public (...) health and safety and about the dignity of our mortal remains. Proponents focus on AH’s environmental benefits over cremation and earth burial, aligning the technology with the “green burial” movement. Drawing from historical sources, Science, Technology, and Society literature, interviews with funeral professionals, industry literature, and various media sources, this article examines four prominent conceptions of the dead human body as they are deployed by various funeral stakeholders seeking to exercise authority over the dead human body, to influence the trajectory of AH technology in the United States, and to chart a course for US deathcare culture in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

The December 2008 White Paper (WP) on “Brain Death” published by the President’s Council on Bioethics (PCBE) reaffirmed its support for the traditional neurological criteria for human death. It spends considerable time explaining and critiquing what it takes to be the most challenging recent argument opposing the neurological criteria formulated by D. Alan Shewmon, a leading critic of the “whole brain death” standard. The purpose of this essay is to evaluate and critique the PCBE’s argument. The essay begins with a (...) brief background on the history of the neurological criteria in the United States and on the preparation of the 2008 WP. After introducing the WP’s contents, the essay sets forth Shewmon’s challenge to the traditional neurological criteria and the PCBE’s reply to Shewmon. The essay concludes by critiquing the WP’s novel justification for reaffirming the traditional conclusion, a justification the essay finds wanting. (shrink)

In this issue, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin G. Miller argue that what makes killing wrong, when it is wrong, is not that it ends life, but that it causes complete and irreversible disability—what they call total disability. They hold that the wrongness of killing should be explained by reference to the harm that killing causes to the person who dies. And the only harm of this sort that killing causes, they argue, is the harm of being totally disabled: once one (...) is totally disabled, there is no further harm to one in losing one's life. It is no worse to be dead, and thus totally disabled, than it is to be totally disabled but alive.In fact, Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller concede that the story may be more complicated than this. For example, it may be that what makes killing wrong, when it is wrong, is not that it causes harm, but that it is intended to do so, or that it violates a right which protects against harm. But either way, harm plays a crucial role in explaining the wrongness of killing, and the relevant harm, they claim, is the harm of being disabled, not that of losing one's life.The Authors’ argument has important implications for medical ethics. Their view implies that killing a person need not be wrong when that person is already completely and irreversibly disabled. This suggests, for example, that the dead donor rule in organ donation is mistaken. Contrary to the rule, it could be morally permissible to harvest organs from a living donor provided that the donor is totally disabled. Harvesting organs will kill the donor, but it will not disable her, since the donor has no abilities left to lose.Four …. (shrink)

Cryoethics is a new theme within bioethics (see bioethics) concerned with the ethics of cryonic storage. Cryonics, which is also erroneously referred to as “cryogenic” technology, offers people the option of having their bodies or brain-stems preserved at very low temperatures after death in order to be revived at some point in the future when technology is sufficiently advanced to enable reanimation, and possibly immortality. The main issues in cryoethics center around whether it is ethical to use this technology, and (...) whether it is prudent to do so. While there are several prudential and ethical arguments against cryonic storage, there is only one argument in favor, but it is quite powerful: the possibility of cheating death for a few years, or even forever if technology advances enough in the time before revival (Shaw 2009). (shrink)

Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics--such as the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think about death--as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is bad (...) for its victim, what makes it bad to die, what attitude it is fitting to take towards death, the possibility of posthumous harm, and the desirability of immortality. The contributors also explore the views of ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and Epicurus on topics related to the philosophy of death, and questions in normative ethics, such as what makes killing wrong when it is wrong, and whether it is wrong to kill fetuses, non-human animals, combatants in war, and convicted murderers. With chapters written by a wide range of experts in metaphysics, ethics, and conceptual analysis, and designed to give the reader a comprehensive view of recent developments in the philosophical study of death, this Handbook will appeal to a broad audience in philosophy, particularly in ethics and metaphysics. (shrink)