Genocide

En este trabajo intentamos hacer una aproximación a la problemática de la llamada singularidad del Holocausto. Tomamos como disparador inicial un suceso alusivo relativamente reciente que acaba de causar revuelo en la opinión pública, en el que una política Africana (Helen Zille) se declaró defensora de la singularidad del genocidio perpetrado por el régimen nazi. Desde allí intentamos aproximarnos a distintas articulaciones en favor y en contra de la tesis singularista ¿Fue el Holocausto un hecho único, sin precedentes, o apenas (...) otra manifestación de la violencia occidental, o quizás un poco las dos cosas? ¿Tiene la discusión sólo un sentido “objetivo” o también uno “subjetivo”, y en este último caso, cuál de los dos es más fundamental? En este sentido abordamos de manera sucinta las articulaciones elaboradas tanto por los defensores de la formulación extrema de la tesis singularista (específicamente Goldhagen, Katz, y Genwarth) como de sus objetores relativos (como, a nuestro entender, E. Traverso) y absolutos (por ejemplo Stannard). Intentamos mostrar que la aproximación a la problemática no resiste satisfactoriamente la adopción de posturas binarias a diferencia de lo que ocurre con acercamientos más tendientes a la conciliación como el de E. Traverso, cuyo acento en el estatus doble del Holocausto (como emergente histórico en el plano fáctico-objetivo e irrupción sin precedentes en términos del proceso de comprensión y auto-comprensión occidental del ejercicio de violencia) podría suponer antes que una resignificación del debate reciente, la inauguración, casi, de todo un nuevo horizonte de investigación. (shrink)

A credible fear test is an in-depth interview process given to undocumented people of any age arriving at a U.S. port of entry to determine qualification for asylum-seeking. Credible fear tests as a typical immigration procedure demonstrate not only what structural epistemic violence looks like but also how this violence lives in and through the design of asylum policy. Key terms of credible fear tests such as “significant possibility,” “evidence,” “consistency,” and “credibility” can never be neutral in the context of (...) colonial administrative violence. We argue that these terms function as mechanisms of exclusion and demonstrate that the capacity to be violent (i.e. to be an instrument of violence) is built into these tests, ready to be deployed when an administration wants to stop certain people from certain places from entering without regard to their own ongoing occupation of Indigenous lands. Not only are such practices instruments of violence, but the concept of ‘violence’ continues to be organized, defined, and conceived within settler colonial epistemologies so as to exclude these administrative forms of violence deployed against Indigenous peoples and people of color from recognition and nameability. We argue that this is an intentional strategy of colonial power preservation that is functionalized through social processes that remain structurally stable and self-regenerating across historical and political changes. (shrink)

Is there is a moral obligation to militarily intervene in another state to stop a genocide from happening (if this can be done with proportionate force)? My answer is that under exceptional circumstances a state or even a non-state actor might have a duty to stop a genocide (for example if these actors have promised to do so), but under most circumstances there is no such obligation. To wit, “humanity,” states, collectives, and individuals do not have an obligation to make (...) such promises in the first place or to create institutions that would impose a legal obligation of intervention upon them. Nor do states or persons or humanity “collectively” have – originally, without specifically creating such duties by contracts or promises – any pro tanto or special duties to save strangers at considerable cost to themselves or their own citizens (including their soldiers). That is, these costs do not merely override a duty to intervene, but rather there is no such duty to begin with – as shown by the fact that in such cases of non-intervention agents would not owe those they let die any compensation: if I do not save someone’s life because saving him would have cost me my arm or would have come with a high risk of losing my own life or would have forced me to kill innocent bystanders, I do not owe this person compensation. Thus the point of this chapter is that there is no “natural” or “general” or “original” duty to militarily intervene (or to create a legal obligation) to stop a genocide. I will consider and refute a number of arguments to the contrary, for example by Lango, Tan, and Pattison. (shrink)

Genocide remembrance is a complex epistemological/ethical achievement, whereby survivors and descendants give meaning to the past in the quest for both personal-historical and social-historical truth. This paper offers an argument of epistemic injustice specifically as it occurs in relation to practices of (individual and collective) genocide remembrance. In particular, I argue that under conditions of genocide denialism, understood as collective genocide misremembrance and memory distortion, genocide survivors and descendants are confronted with hermeneutical oppression. Drawing on Sue Campbell’s relational, reconstructive account (...) of remembering, I argue that genocide denialism involves disrespectful challenges to memory, which systematically misrecognize rememberers. Adopting the case of Turkey’s denialism of the Armenian genocide, I discuss two interrelated mechanisms through which this can happen: i) through the systematic portrayal of survivors and descendants as vicious rememberers, and ii) through distortions of the very concept of ‘genocide’. Based on this, I show how hermeneutical and testimonial injustice are crucially interrelated when it comes to “contested” memories of historical injustice and the biographical testimony it gives rise to. (shrink)

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

The member states of the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 unanimously adopted the resolution on Responsibility to Protect to save citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Since adoption, the norm has been invoked in Libya, South Sudan, Yemen, and Syria, nonetheless, the UN refrains to respond to the genocide committed in the Jammu & Kashmir and triggering a greater sense of anxiety. In this context, the present paper elucidates the factors behind the UN failure. (...) It asks why the UN failed to call R2P despite systematic crimes against humanity in Kashmir. What factors or forces preclude the UN to invoke R2P? The paper argues that the inability of the UN to invoke R2P is a consequence of systemic and domestic factors. The Indo-US strategic partnership, materialism, and New Delhi’s influence in the international system are obstructing the UN’s ability to play a decisive role. Meanwhile, the economic and military potential of India and its regional influence forbid the international community to dissuade India not to commit genocide in Jammu & Kashmir. So the high politics of materialism and national interests override the norm of human rights and humanity. (shrink)

This essay suggests that Continental Studies of Evil need a more global approach in thinking about political evils of today. Highlighting the need for a more comparative and global perspective, I explore two proposals: first, the in-between space of the geographical binaries of East/West and Global South/Global North cultivates many political evils. Second, taking issue with the conviction in Continental philosophy that the Holocaust caused a rupture in the thinking of evil, I argue for the continuity of evils and characterize (...) the insistence on the unprecedented character of the Holocaust as an example of Eurocentrism. (shrink)

This article is concerned with how we meet the victim of genocide in the middle of experience. François Laruelle, in Théorie générale des victimes, suggests that to think the victim is a work of resurrection rather than remembrance. To think the victim should allow us to recognize that the victim, especially the victim for who they are as such, is always human in the last instance—a repeatable victim. With this thesis, the article begins with the definition of the crime of (...) genocide adopted by the United Nations to examine how knowledge production is involved in cyclical violence. The second part of the essay thinks the victim of genocide through a subversion of Jean-Luc Marion’s limit concept of the saturated phenomenon, sans transcendence. The essay concludes that in this lived realization, weakness and compassion seize to return the victim to their suffering and instead, hope to change the world. (shrink)

Calls for civility have been on the rise recently, as have presumptions that civility is both an academic virtue and a prerequisite for rational engagement and discussion among those who disagree. One imperative of epistemic decolonization is to unmask the ways that familiar conceptual resources are produced within and function to uphold a settler colonial epistemological framework. I argue that rhetorical deployments of ‘civility’ uphold settler colonialism by obscuring the systematic production of state violence against marginalized populations and Indigenous peoples, (...) relying on the colonial conceptual framework of ‘civilized’ vs ‘savage’, and excusing death-promoting rhetoric under the guise of liberal disagreement. (shrink)

Over the last several decades there has been an attempt to gender genocide by focusing on sexual as well as lethal violence during the Holocaust. While there has been tremendous consideration of women's experience of rape and sexual abuse during the Holocaust, the rape of men had not been previously engaged as a matter of study or archival investigation. This article is the first to study the rape of Jewish men and boys during the Holocaust through survivor testimonies and theorize (...) the implications these testimonies of male sexual victimization have for our understanding of sexual violence and rape more broadly. (shrink)

At first glance, hate speech and microaggressions seem to have little overlap beyond being communicated verbally or in written form. Hate speech seems clearly macro-aggressive: an intentional, obviously harmful act lacking the ambiguity (and plausible deniability) of microaggressions. If we look back at historical discussions of hate speech, however, many of these assumed differences turn out to be points of similarity. The harmfulness of hate speech only became widely acknowledged after a concerted effort by critical race theorists, feminists, and other (...) activists. Before the 1990s, slurs were widely considered socially acceptable behavior: mere jokes that weren’t intended to be harmful. Authors like Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda, and Charles Lawrence pushed back against this dismissal. In this chapter, I show that their arguments for the serious harmfulness of hate speech prefigure and provide support for current debates about the serious harmfulness of microaggressions. Exploring resonances with the 1980s hate speech debate will allow us to explain why microaggressions fall below the cutoff for legal liability but remain apt targets for moral blame. (shrink)

This essay frames systemic patterns of mental abuse against women of color and Indigenous women on Turtle Island (North America) in terms of larger design-of-distribution strategies in settler colonial societies, as these societies use various forms of social power to distribute, reproduce, and automate social inequalities (including public health precarities and mortality disadvantages) that skew socio-economic gain continuously toward white settler populations and their descendants. It departs from traditional studies in gender-based violence research that frame mental abuses such as gaslighting--commonly (...) understood as mental manipulation through lying or deceit--stochastically, as chance-driven interpersonal phenomena. Building on structural analyses of knowledge in political epistemology (Dotson 2012, Berenstain 2016), political theory (Davis and Ernst 2017), and Indigenous social theory (Tuck and Yang 2012), I develop the notion of cultural gaslighting to refer to the social and historical infrastructural support mechanisms that disproportionately produce abusive mental ambients in settler colonial cultures in order to further the ends of cultural genocide and dispossession. I conclude by proposing a social epidemiological account of gaslighting that a) highlights the public health harms of abusive ambients for minority populations, b) illuminates the hidden rules of social structure in settler colonial societies, and c) amplifies the corresponding need for structural reparations. (shrink)

Dies ist kein perfektes Buch, aber es ist einzigartig, und wenn Sie die ersten 400 oder so Seiten überspringen, sind die letzten 300 (von etwa 700) ein ziemlich guter Versuch, das, was über Verhalten bekannt ist, auf soziale Veränderungen in Gewalt und Manieren im Laufe der Zeit anzuwenden. Das Grundthema ist: Wie kontrolliert und begrenzt unsere Genetik den gesellschaftlichen Wandel? Überraschenderweise versäumt er es, die Natur der Verwandtseinsauswahl (inklusive Fitness) zu beschreiben, die einen Großteil des tierischen und menschlichen gesellschaftlichen Lebens (...) erklärt. Ihm fehlt (wie fast jeder) ein klarer Rahmen für die Beschreibung der logischen Struktur der Rationalität (LSR – John Searles bevorzugter Begriff), den ich lieber die Deskriptive Psychologie des Höheren Ordnungsdenkens (DPHOT) nenne. Er hätte etwas über die vielen anderen Arten des Missbrauchs und der Ausbeutung von Menschen und dem Planeten sagen sollen, da diese jetzt so viel schwerwiegender sind, dass andere Formen der Gewalt fast irrelevant werden. Die Ausweitung des Konzepts der Gewalt auf die globalen langfristigen-Folgen der Replikationvon Genen von jemandem und ein Verständnis dafür, wie Evolution funktioniert (d. h. die Auswahl von Verwandten), wird eine ganz andere Perspektive auf die Geschichte, die aktuellen Ereignisse und die Wahrscheinlichkeit bieten, wie die Dinge in den nächsten paar hundert Jahren ablaufen werden. Man könnte zunächst feststellen, dass der Rückgang der körperlichen Gewalt in der Geschichte durch die ständig wachsende gnadenlose Vergewaltigung des Planeten (d.h. durch die Zerstörung der Zukunft des eigenen Nachkommen) durch die Menschen ausgeglichen (und ermöglicht) wurde.’ Pinker (wie die meisten Menschen die meiste Zeit) wird oft durch die Oberflächlichkeiten der Kultur abgelenkt, wenn es auf die Biologie ankommt. Sehen Sie hier und im Netz meine aktuellen Rezensionen zu Wilsons 'The Social Conquest of Earth' und Nowak und Highfields 'SuperCooperators' hier und im Netz für eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Leere des 'wahren Altruismus'(Gruppenauswahl) und der Funktionsweise der Verwandtschaftsauswahl und der Nutzlosigkeit und Oberflächlichkeit der Beschreibung von Verhalten in kultureller Hinsicht. Dies ist die klassische Natur/Pflege-Frage und Die Natur übertrumpft die Pflege - unendlich. Was wirklich zählt, ist die Gewalt, die der Erde durch die unerbittliche Zunahme der Bevölkerungs- und Ressourcenvernichtung (aufgrund von Medizin und Technologie und Konfliktunterdrückung durch Polizei und Militär) zugefügt wird. Etwa 200.000 mehr Menschen pro Tag (ein anderes Las Vegas alle 10 Tage, ein anderes Los Angeles jeden Monat), die etwa 6 Tonnen Oberboden, die ins Meer/Person/Jahr gehen – etwa 1% der gesamten jährlichen Verschwinden der Welt, etc. bedeuten, dass, wenn nicht irgendein Wunder geschieht, die Biosphäre und Zivilisation in den nächsten zwei Jahrhunderten, weitgehend zusammenbrechen werden, und es wird Hunger, Elend und Gewalt jeder Art in einem schwindelerregenden Ausmaß geben. Die Manieren, Meinungen und Tendenzen der Menschen, Gewalttaten zu begehen, sind ohne ihre Möglichkeit, etwas zu tun, um diese Katastrophe zu vermeiden, von Bedeutung, und ich sehe nicht, wie das geschehen wird. Es gibt keinen Raum für Argumente, und auch keinen Sinn (ja, ich bin ein Fatalist), also werde ich nur ein paar Kommentare machen, als ob es Fakten wären. Stellen Sie sich nicht vor, dass ich ein persönliches Interesse daran habe, eine Gruppe auf Kosten anderer zu fördern. Ich bin 78, habe keine Nachkommen und keine nahen Verwandtenund identifiziere mich nicht mit einer politischen, nationalen oder religiösen Gruppe und betrachte die, zu der ich standardmäßig gehöre, als ebenso abstoßend wie alle anderen. Eltern sind die schlimmsten Feinde des Lebens auf der Erde, und wenn man den weiten Blick auf die Dinge nimmt, sind Frauen so gewalttätig wie Männer, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Gewalt von Frauen (wie die meisten von Männern) weitgehend in Zeitlupe, in zeitlicher und raumweiseer Entfernung erfolgt und meist durch Stellvertreter - von ihren Nachkommen und von Männern - ausgeübt wird. In zunehmendem Maße tragen Frauen Kinder, unabhängig davon, ob sie einen Partner haben, und die Wirkung, eine Frau von der Zucht abzuhalten, ist im Durchschnitt viel größer als das Stoppen eines Mannes, da sie der Fortpflanzungsengpass sind. Man kann der Ansicht sein, dass die Menschen und ihre Nachkommen das Elend, das ihnen zukommt, verdienen und (mit seltenen Ausnahmen) die Reichen und Berühmten die schlimmsten Übeltäter sind. Meryl Streep oder Bill Gates oder J.K Rowling und jedes ihrer Kinder kann 50 Tonnen Topsoil jedes Jahr für Generationen in die Zukunft zerstören, während ein indischer Bauer und seine 1 Tonne zerstören können. Wenn jemand das leugnet, ist das in Ordnung, und zu seinen Nachkommen sage ich "Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden" (WTHOE). Heute liegt der Schwerpunkt immer auf den Menschenrechten, aber es ist klar, dass die menschliche Verantwortung die Menschenrechte ersetzen muss, wenn die Zivilisation eine Chance haben soll. Niemand bekommt Rechte, ohne ein verantwortungsvoller Bürger zu sein, und das erste, was dies bedeutet, istdie minmale Umweltzerstörung. Die grundlegendste Verantwortung sind keine Kinder, es sei denn, eure Gesellschaft bittet euch, sie zu produzieren. Eine Gesellschaft oder eine Welt, die Menschen nach dem Zufallsprinzip züchten lässt, wird immer von egoistischen Genen ausgebeutet, bis sie zusammenbricht (oder einen Punkt erreicht, an dem das Leben so schrecklich ist, dass es nicht lebenswert ist). Wenn, die Gesellschaft weiterhin die Menschenrechte als primäre, zu ihren Nachkommen, kann man mit Zuversicht sagen "WTHOE". Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Questo non è un libro perfetto, ma è unico, e se scorri le prime 400 pagine o giù di lì, le ultime 300 (circa 700) sono un buon tentativo di applicare ciò che è noto sul comportamento ai cambiamenti sociali nella violenza e nelle maniere nel tempo. L'argomento di base è: come fa la nostra genetica a controllare e limitare il cambiamento sociale? Sorprendentemente non riesce a descrivere la natura della selezione dei parenti (idoneità inclusiva) che spiega gran parte della (...) vita sociale animale e umana. Egli manca anche (come quasi tutti) manca di un quadro chiaro per descrivere la struttura logica della razionalità (termine preferito di John Searle) che preferisco chiamare la Psicologia descrittiva del Pensiero dell'Ordine Superiore (DPHOT). Avrebbe dovuto dire qualcosa sui molti altri modi di abusare e sfruttare le persone e il pianeta, dal momento che questi sono ora molto più gravi da rendere quasi irrilevanti altre forme di violenza. Estendere il concetto di violenza per includere leconseguenze globali a lungoterminedella replicazione dei geni diqualcuno, e avere una comprensione della natura di come funziona l'evoluzione (cioè la selezione dei parenti) fornirà una prospettiva molto diversa sulla storia, gli eventi attuali e come le cose probabilmente andranno nei prossimi centinaia di anni. Si potrebbe iniziare notando che la diminuzione della violenza fisica nel corso della storia è stata abbinata (e resa possibile) dallo stupro spietato in costante aumento del pianeta (cioè dalla distruzione del futuro del proprio discendente).’ Pinker (come la maggior parte delle persone) è spesso distratto dalle superficialità della cultura quando è la biologia che conta. Guarda le mie recenti recensioni di Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' e 'SuperCooperators' di Nowak e Highfield qui e in rete per un breve riassunto della vacuità del 'vero altruismo'(selezione di gruppo), e l'operazione di selezione dei parenti e l'inutilità e la superficialità di descrivere il comportamento in termini culturali. Questo è il classico problema della natura/nutrimento e la natura vince nutrita --infinitamente. Ciò che conta veramente è la violenza fatta sulla terra dall'incessante aumento della popolazione e della distruzione delle risorse (a causa della medicina e della tecnologia e della repressione dei conflitti da parte della polizia e dei militari). Circa 200.000 persone in più al giorno (un altro Las Vegas ogni 10 giorni, un'altra Los Angeles ogni mese), le 6 tonnellate o giù di lì di pisolino che vanno in mare / persona / anno – circa l'1% del totale del mondo che scompare ogni anno, ecc. significa che se qualche miracolo accadrà la biosfera e la civiltà crollerà in gran parte durante i prossimi due secoli, e ci sarà fame, violenza e violenza di ogni tipo su scala impressionante. Le maniere, le opinioni e le tendenze delle persone a commettere atti violenti non hanno alcuna importanza a meno che non possano fare qualcosa per evitare questa catastrofe, e non vedo come ciò accadrà. Non c'è spazio per gli argomenti, e nessun punto sia (sì io sono un fatalista), quindi mi limiterò a fare alcuni commenti come se fossero fatti. Non immaginate di avere un'informazione personale nel promuovere un gruppo a spese degli altri. Io sono 78, nonhanno discendenti e non hanno parenti stretti e non si identificano con alcun gruppo politico, nazionale o religioso e considerano quelli a cui appartengo di default come ripugnanti come tutti gli altri. I genitori sono i peggiori nemici della vita sulla Terra e, tenendo la vista generale delle cose, le donne sono violente come gli uomini se si considera il fatto che la violenza delle donne (come la maggior parte di quella fatta dagli uomini) è in gran parte fatta al rallentatore, a distanza nel tempo e nello spazio e per lo più effettuata per procura dai loro discendenti e dagli uomini. Sempre più spesso, le donne portano figli indipendentemente dal fatto che abbiano un compagno e l'effetto di impedire a una donna di riprodursi è in media molto maggiore dell'arresto di un uomo, poiché sono il collo di bottiglia riproduttivo. Si può ritenere che le persone e la loro prole meritino riccamente qualsiasi miseria arrivi la loro strada e (con rare eccezioni) i ricchi e famosi sono i peggiori trasgressori. Meryl Streep o Bill Gates o J.K Rowling e ognuno dei loro figli può distruggere 50 tonnellate di suolo ogni anno per generazioni nel futuro, mentre un contadino indiano e il suo possono distruggere 1 tonnellata. Se qualcuno nega che va bene, e ai loro discendenti dico "Benvenuti all'inferno sulla Terra" (WTHOE). Oggi l'accento è sempre posto sui diritti dell'uomo, ma è chiaro che se si vuole che la civiltà abbia una possibilità, le responsabilità umane devono sostituire i diritti umani. Nessuno ottiene diritti senza essere un cittadino responsabile e la prima cosa che ciò significa è ladistruzione ambientalemi nimal. La responsabilità più fondamentale non è quella dei bambini a meno che la vostra società non vi chieda di produrli. Una società o un mondo che permette alle persone di allevare a caso sarà sempre sfruttato dai geni egoisti fino a quando non crolla (o raggiunge un punto in cui la vita è così orribile che non vale la pena di vivere). Se la società continua a mantenerei diritti umani come primari, ai loro discendenti si può dire con fiducia "WTHOE". Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Obwohl die SSSSK und der Rest des Weltmilitärs riesige Summen für fortschrittliche Hardware ausgeben, ist es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass WW3 (oder die kleineren Engagements, die dazu führen) von softwaredominiert wird. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die SSSSK, mit wahrscheinlich mehr Hackern (Codern), die für sie arbeiten, als der Rest der Welt zusammen, zukünftige Kriege mit minimalen physischen Konflikten gewinnen wird, nur indem sie ihre Feinde über das Netz lähmt. Keine Satelliten, keine Telefone, keine Kommunikation, keine Finanztransaktionen, kein Stromnetz, kein Internet, (...) keine fortschrittlichen Waffen, keine Fahrzeuge, Züge, Schiffe oder Flugzeuge. Es wird wahrscheinlich innerhalb weniger Jahrzehnte über den Inseln im Südchinesischen Meer oder Taiwan passieren, aber da sie weltweit Militärstützpunkte errichten, könnte es überall passieren (siehe Crouching Tiger etc.). Zukünftige Konflikte werden Hardkill- und Softkill-Aspekte mit den erklärten Zielen der KPC haben, den Cyberkrieg zu betonen, indem sie Kontrollsysteme aller militärischen und industriellen Kommunikation, Ausrüstung, Kraftwerke, Satelliten, Internet, Banken und jedes mit dem Netz verbundene Gerät oder Fahrzeug hacken und lähmen. (shrink)

La prima cosa che dobbiamo tenere a mente è che quando diciamo che la Cina dice questo o la Cina lo fa, non stiamo parlando del popolo cinese, ma dei Sociopatici che controllano il Partito Comunista Cinese CCP, cioè i Sette Killer Seriali Senile (SSSSK) del Comitato permanente del PCC o dei 25 membri del Politburo ecc. I piani del CCP per la terza guerra mondiale e il dominio totale sono strutturati abbastanza chiaramente nelle pubblicazioni e nei discorsi govt cinesi (...) e questo è il "sogno di Cina" di Xi Jinping. È un sogno solo per la piccola minoranza (forse da poche decine a poche centinaia) che governa la Cina e un incubo per tutti gli altri (tra cui 1,4 miliardi di cinesi). I 10 miliardi di dollari all'anno che si stima spendano in propaganda in tutto il mondo permette loro o i loro burattini di possedere o controllare giornali, riviste, canali televisivi e radiofonici e di inserire notizie false nella maggior parte dei principali media ovunque decine o centinaia di migliaia di volte ogni giorno. They hanno un esercito (forse milioni di persone) che oltre alla censura totale e immediata di tutti i media all'interno della Cina, troll tutti i media del mondo, mettendo più propaganda e annegando legittimo commento (l'esercito 50 centesimi). Oltre a spogliarerd il terzo mondo di risorse, una spinta importante della multi-trilionaria Belt and Road Initiative sta costruendo basi militari in tutto il mondo. Stanno costringendo il mondo libero in una massiccia corsa agli armamenti ad alta tecnologia che fa sembrare la guerra fredda con l'Unione Sovietica un picnic. Anche se la SSSSK, e il resto dell'esercito mondiale, stanno spendendo enormi somme su hardware avanzato, è altamente probabile che WW3 (o gli impegni più piccoli che portano ad esso) sarà software dominato. Non è fuori questione che la SSSSK, con probabilmente più hacker (programmatori) che lavorano per loro allora tutto il resto del mondo combinato, vincerà WW3 con minimo conflitto fisico, solo paralizzando i loro nemici tramite la rete. Niente satelliti, niente telefoni, niente comunicazioni, niente transazioni finanziarie, niente rete elettrica, niente internet, niente armi avanzate, niente veicoli, treni, navi o aerei. Ci sono solo due percorsi principali per rimuovere il PCC, liberare 1,4 miliardi di prigionieri cinesi e porre fine alla marcia folle per la terza guerra mondiale. Quello pacifico è quello di lanciare una guerra commerciale a tutto campo per devastare l'economia cinese fino a quando i militari si stancano e si avvia il PCC. Un'alternativa alla chiusura dell'economia cinese è una guerra limitata, come uno sciopero mirato di conlsi 50 droni termobarici sul 20congresso del PCC, quando tutti i membri migliori sono in un unico posto, ma che non avrà luogo fino al 2022 in modo da poter colpire la riunione plenaria annuale. I cinesi sarebbero stati informati, come è avvenuto l'attacco, che devono deporre le armi e prepararsi a tenere un'elezione democratica o essere inglobito nell'età della pietra. L'altra alternativa è un attacco nucleare a tutto campo. Il confronto militare è inevitabile, visto l'attuale corso del PCC. Accadrà probabilmente sulle isole del Mar Cinese Meridionale o Taiwan entro pochi decenni, ma man mano che stabiliscono basi militari in tutto il mondo potrebbe accadere ovunque (vedi il libro Tigre accovacciata ecc.). I futuri conflitti avranno aspetti hardkill e softkill con gli obiettivi dichiarati del PCC per enfatizzare la guerra informatica hackerando e paralizzando i sistemi di controllo di tutte le comunicazioni militari e industriali, attrezzature, centrali elettriche, satelliti, internet, banche e qualsiasi dispositivo o veicolo collegato alla rete. La SSSSK sta lentamente schierando una serie mondiale di sub o droni di superficie e subacquei con equipaggio e autonomi in grado di lanciare armi convenzionali o nucleari che possono rimanere domeggiati in attesa di un segnale dalla Cina o addirittura alla ricerca della firma di navi o aerei statunitensi. Mentre distruggevano i nostri satelliti, eliminando così la comunicazione tra gli Stati Uniti e le nostre forze in tutto il mondo, useranno i loro, insieme ai droni per colpire e distruggere le nostre forze navali attualmente superiori. Naturalmente, tutto questo è sempre più fatto automaticamente dall'IA. Di gran lunga il più grande alleato del PCC è il partito democratico degli Stati Uniti. La scelta è quella di fermare il PCC ora o guardare come estendere la prigione cinese su tutto il mondo. Naturalmente, la sorveglianza universale e la digitalizzazione delle nostre vite è inevitabile ovunque. Chi non la pensa così è profondamente fuori contatto. Naturalmente, è l'optinebbie che si aspettano che i sociopatici cinesi a governare il mondo, mentre i pessimisti (che si vedono come realisti) si aspettano AI (Intelligenza Artificiale, o come lo chiamo it Imbecility artificiale o Unalien follia) a prendere il sopravvento, forse non appena 2030. Coloro che sono interessati a ulteriori dettagli sul percorso folle della società moderna possono consultare le mie altre opere come Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 4th Edition 2020 e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2020) . (shrink)

We tend to think that mass atrocities and attempted genocides call for humanitarian intervention by other states. (Nonviolent intervention if possible, military intervention if need be.) In this chapter, I discuss these two related claims in turn. What, if anything, justifies humanitarian intervention in certain states by other states? Ought such interventions, if justified, be pacifist in nature, or is it legitimate in some cases to intervene violently? To discuss these questions, I draw primarily on principles and arguments found in (...) just war theory, pacifism, international relations, and analytic political philosophy more generally. (shrink)

This essay first analyzes the concept of survivor’s guilt, distinguishing various manifestations of it and considering whether any truly count as a form of guilt. Then, it addresses arguments for thinking that survivor’s guilt is unreasonable to exhibit, after which it takes up arguments for thinking that it is reasonable. The aim is not to come to some firm conclusion about these conceptual and evaluative matters, but instead to acquaint the reader with the debates about them among contemporary English-speaking philosophers.

There is a growing trend across North America of women being criminalized for their pregnancy outcomes. Rather than being a series of aberrations resulting from institutional failures, we argue that this trend is part of a colonial strategy of administrative violence aimed at women of color and Native women across Turtle Island. We consider a range of medical and legal practices constituting gender-based administrative violence, and we argue that they are the result of non-accidental and systematic production of population-level harms (...) that cannot be disentangled from the goals of ongoing settler occupation and dispossession of Indigenous lands. While white feminist narratives of gender-based administrative violence in Latin America function to distance the places where such violence occurs from the ‘liberal democratic’ settler nation-states of the U.S. and Canada, we hold that administrative forms of reproductive violence against Latin American women are structurally connected to efforts in the U.S. and Canada to criminalize women of color and Indigenous women for their reproductive outcomes. The purpose of these systemically produced harms is to sustain cultures of gender-based violence in support of settler colonial configurations of power. (shrink)

In everything from philosophical ethics to legal argument to public activism, it has become commonplace to appeal to the idea of human dignity. In such contexts, the concept of dignity typically signifies something like the fundamental moral status belonging to all humans. Remarkably, however, it is only in the last century that this meaning of the term has become standardized. Before this, dignity was instead a concept associated with social status. Unfortunately, this transformation remains something of a mystery in existing (...) scholarship. Exactly when and why did "dignity" change its meaning? And before this change, was it truly the case that we lacked a conception of human worth akin to the one that "dignity" now represents? In this volume, leading scholars across a range of disciplines attempt to answer such questions by clarifying the presently murky history of "dignity," from classical Greek thought through the Middle Ages and Enlightenment to the present day. (shrink)

The problem of forgiveness may rightly be regarded as a perennial philosophical problem. But of what sort? Introducing his 1973 contribution to the discussion, entitled simply "Forgiveness"—an essay that remains the standard reference for contemporary discussions of the problem, especially in the Anglo-American philosophical community—Aurel Kolnai writes that while the ethical nature of the problem is indisputable, he intends his argument "to be chiefly logical in nature: the central question I wish to discuss is … whether, and if so in (...) what manner, [forgiveness] is logically possible at all."1 The problem, as Kolnai develops it in the first two sections of his essay, is that forgiveness seems to be either... (shrink)

In this article, I argue that we need a better understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the current debates in international law surrounding hate speech and inchoate crimes. I construct a theoretical basis for speech acts as incitement to genocide, distinguishing these speech acts from speech as genocide and speech denying genocide by integrating international law with concepts drawn from speech act theory and moral philosophy. I use the case drawn on by many commentators in this area of international criminal (...) law, the trial of media executives for the roles they played in the Rwandan genocide through public speech acts by media entities insulting an ethnic group or advocating violence against an ethnic group. Each of these men were institutional leaders and were charged with using their positions within Rwandan society to distribute what I call genocidal hate speech, genocidal incitement speech, and genocidal participation speech. I argue for a distinction between these three types of speech, and a difference in individual criminal liability for the dissemination of each type of speech. I also argue that there should be a difference in individual criminal liability for speech acts within the context of an ongoing or recent genocide, and speech acts that can be separated from a site of mass violence. (shrink)

Iris Marion Young took a strong stance against humanitarian intervention and other so-called legitimate instances of what she calls ‘official violence’. Nevertheless, she was also aware that there may be some situations for which military humanitarian intervention should at least be considered. Young was concerned that some states will use their obligation to defend against human rights violations as a mechanism in securing or maintaining global dominance. In addition, she recognized that what counts as a violation of human rights is (...) not uncontroversial; human rights norms and conventions are interpreted, negotiated, and otherwise contested. In this article, I build on Young’s arguments for a social connection model of responsibility by applying it to a situation where a forceful response to violence might be justified. I juxtapose Young’s position with the emerging international standard called ‘the responsibility to protect’ in order to suggest an account of intervention for global governance relations. (shrink)

Bashabi Fraser is a poet in her own right. She is also a creative translator. This is a review of her edited volume on the Partition of Bengal. The review highlights our need to read the partition event as a warning for future and ongoing genocides. The review also shows the superiority of literature over history. And finally it has something to say about translation and separately, on P Lal. For instance, this reviewer in many other reviews too insists on (...) the superiority of Fr Mignon SJ over Prof Lal's understanding of translation. (shrink)

In this review essay, I review in detail Abram de Swann's fine new book, The Killing Compartments. The book is a theoretical analysis of the varieties and causes of genocides and other mass asymmetrical killing campaigns. I then suggest several criticisms of his analysis.

In this essay, I review two earlier anti-Semitic propaganda films of 1939, to wit, Robert and Bertram, and Linen from Ireland. I begin by rehearsing some of Abram de Swann’s analysis of genocide and then discuss in greater detail a classic sociological analysis written during WWII by Hans Speier. Speier distinguished three broad kinds of war of increasing ferocity: instrumental war, agonistic war, and absolute war. While the first two sorts of war are relatively constrained, in absolute war the in-group (...) regards the out-group as inherently evil, and consequently the goal of such a war is to exterminate the out-group, with no limitation on methods. I suggest in the piece that the focus of these films is precisely to get the audience to view Jews as three different things: different (not Germans as “Aryans” are supposed to be); disgusting (loathsome, somehow degenerate); and dangerous (a threat to Aryan Germans by their very nature). I cover both films, pointing to the scenes that are crafted to engender in the audience exactly these feelings. To help explain how the various scenes manipulate the audience to push the regime’s Anti-Semitic narrative, I use Robert Cialdini’s theory of the use of psychological mechanisms in marketing. (shrink)

Dating back to the very beginning of our knowledge of the events that constituted the Holocaust, some historians, social scientists, philosophers, theologians and public intellectuals argue that it was a unique historical, or even trans-historical, event. The aim of this article is to clarify what the uniqueness question should be about and to ascertain whether there are good reasons for judging that the Holocaust is unique. It examines the core meanings of ‘unique’ that feature in the literature and identifies which (...) of these is most apt for considering the possible uniqueness of the Holocaust. It then works out what it would take for the Holocaust to be unique in the appropriately rigorous sense, which is facilitated by inquiring into the nature of genocide. The key question turns on the relation of the Holocaust to genocide: was the Holocaust more than, or different from, genocide? (shrink)

Gail Murrow and Richard Murrow offer a novel account of dehumanization, by synthesizing data which suggest that where subject S has a dehumanized view of group G, S‘s neural mechanisms of empathy show a dampened response to the suffering of members of G, and S‘s judgments about the humanity of members of G are largely non-conscious. Here I examine Murrow and Murrow‘s suggestions about how identity-based hate speech bears responsibility for dehumanization in the first place. I identify a distinction between (...) (i) accounts of the nature of the harm effected by identity prejudice, and (ii) accounts of how hate speech contributes to the harms of identity prejudice. I then explain why Murrow and Murrow‘s proposal is more aptly construed as an account of type (i), and explain why accounts of this type, even if they‘re plausible and evidentially well-supported, have limited implications in relation to justifications for anti-hate speech law. (shrink)

Scholarship in the multidisciplinary field of genocide studies often emphasizes body counts and the number of biological deaths as a way of measuring and comparing the severity and scope of individual genocides. The prevalence of this way of framing genocide is problematic insofar it risks marginalizing the voices and experiences of victims who may not succumb to biological death but nevertheless suffer the loss of family members and other loved ones, and suffer the destruction of relationships, as well as the (...) foundational institutions that give rise to and sustain those relationships. The concept of social death, which Claudia Card offers as the central evil of genocide, marks a radical shift in conceptualizing genocide and provides space for recovering the marginalized voices of many who suffer the evils of genocide but do not suffer biological death. Here her concept of social death is explored, defended, and criticized. (shrink)

Understanding evil requires both addressing the grave wrongs done to the victim and addressing the perpetrator who does these wrongs. Claudia Card's concept of social vitality was developed to explain what génocidaires destroy in their victims. This essay brings that concept into conversation with perpetrator testimony, arguing that the génocidaires’ desire for their own social vitality, achieved through their destruction of the social world of their targets, in fact boomerangs to corrode the vitality of their own lives. This is true (...) whether they succeed or fail in their genocidal project. Card's recent analysis of “being a badass” is brought to bear on the cultivation of evil, and the essay suggests four strategies for meeting Card's “moral challenge of avoiding evil responses to evil.”. (shrink)

Genocide is a violent process that aims at the liquidation of protected groups. Like individuals, groups can be killed in a variety of ways and for many different reasons. Only the intention of the perpetrator distinguishes genocide from other forms of mass violence. The implications of the account given are striking. Genocide is not in any sense distinctively heinous. Nor is it necessarily immoral. Under certain conditions, settlercolonialism, ethnic cleansing, and forced assimilation will count as instances of the phenomenon. While (...) the argument undermines the orthodox view, it can accommodate the idea that the Holocaust was distinctively heinous. (shrink)

The category of « postmemory » has been invoked by Marianne Hirsch to refer to a traumatic past which is not directly remembered in first person, but is handed down to later generations and is recalled through the mediation of narratives and images which become “prostheses” for a lack of direct memory. But how is it that these prosthetic recollections do not simply substitute for what lacks but seem to shape the very events they are meant to reproduce ? How (...) come an event continues to haunt the memories of the present, even when no immediate remembrance of it is left ? How to think of an “afterimage” of something that was never seen in the first place? It is only quite recently that the role of prosthetic images has been more widely acknowledged in the construction and creation of memories of collective trauma. The paper will focus on the role of photographic images played in remembrance of the Armenian genocide. It shall be shown how the few pictures that were taken by witnesses of the deportations had an afterlife of their own, being reframed and receiving specific interpretations. In particular, the paper will discuss the case of Armin T. Wegner, a German voluntary serving as Sanitary Officer in the Turkish army who, during his fieldwork in 1915/16 in Anatolia and on the Euphrates in Syria, documented the final stages of deportation, taking pictures of the camps at the desert’s fringes. His photos, which are among the most important visual testimonies of the extermination, only belatedly later made Wegner aware of what he had been witnessing, turning him into a witness après coup and to a defender of the Armenian cause. (shrink)

This article develops an Arendtian conception of resentment and shows that resentment as a response to injustice is in fact only possible within a community of persons engaged in moral and recognitive relations. While Arendt is better known for her work on forgiveness—characterized as a creative rather than vindictive response to injury—this article suggests that Arendt provides a unique way of thinking about resentment as essentially a response to another human's subjectivity. But when injury is massive, so beyond the pale (...) that the possibility of face-to-face human interaction is annihilated, the space for resentment is thereby destroyed. Ironically, while the absence of resentment might at first seem to be an unproblematically good thing, Arendt shows us that the loss of resentment actually signals the loss of the properly human realm. (shrink)

This essay explores the dynamics of shame as they relate to genocidal rape in Debra Bergoffen’s work, as well as her diagnosis of the traffic in women’s bodies that motivates genocidal rape and is responsible for its deployment as a weapon of war.

The Failures of Ethics concentrates on the multiple shortfalls and shortcomings of thought, decision, and action that tempt and incite us human beings to inflict incalculable harm. Absent the overriding of moral sensibilities, if not the collapse or collaboration of ethical traditions, the Holocaust, genocide, and other mass atrocities could not have happened. Our senses of moral and religious authority have been fragmented and weakened by the accumulated ruins of history and the depersonalized advances of civilization that have taken us (...) from a bloody twentieth century into an immensely problematic twenty-first. Salvaging the fragmented condition of ethics, this book shows how respect and honor for those who save lives and resist atrocity, deepened attention to the dead and to death itself, and appeals for human rights and renewed spiritual sensitivity confirm that ethics contains and remains an irreplaceable safeguard against its own failures. (shrink)

Freedom of expression is considered a basic human right, and yet most countries have restrictions on speech they deem harmful. Following the genocide of the Tutsi, Rwanda passed a constitution (2003) and laws against hate speech and other forms of divisionist language (2008, 2013). Understanding how language shaped “recognition harms” that both constitute and fuel genocide also helps account for political decisions to limit “divisionist” discourse. When we speak, we make expressive commitments, which are commitments to the viability and value (...) of ways of speaking. This article explores reasons a society would decide to say, “We don’t talk that way around here,” thus taking control of its own expressive commitments. Understanding the scope of the law in Rwanda promises to help clarify limits to hate speech and other forms of derogatory discourse (including images). Ultimately, the argument is that wherever recognition harms are a significant factor in social and political life, changing permissible expressive commitments is crucial to social and political repair. (shrink)

An imperfect “politics of justice” seems to be inevitable in the aftermath of genocide. In Rwanda, this is especially true, given the scale of the atrocities, the breadth of participation, and the need to build a justice system from scratch while establishing security and restoring the rule of law. Official contexts for survivor testimony and corresponding perpetrator punishment are crucial for establishing shared norms and narratives, but these processes can destabilize social relations in important ways. Accordingly, without development, these justice (...) mechanisms can undermine social stability and emerging cohesion. The converse is also true: without official contexts of testimony and judgment, development is only material support, and has no recognitive force. Learning from Rwanda’s post-’94 transitional justice, broadly construed, I argue that without development, platforms for testimony and the meting out of punishment yield insufficient recognition and so undermine social stability and emerging cohesion. The converse is also true: without official contexts of testimony and judgment, development is only material support, and lacks crucial recognitive force. The crucial interdependence of development, which provides distributive justice, with criminal proceedings, which offer retributive and restorative justice, has the potential to secure a lasting and stable peace. (shrink)

In recent years, the claim of the unrepresentability of the Shoah has stirred vivid debates, especially following the strong positions taken by the French filmmaker Claude Lanzmann and author of Shoah (1986). This claim of unrepresentability, it can be shown, draws part of its attraction from the fact that it oscillates undecidedly between a claim of logical impossibility (“the Shoah can’t be represented”) and a normative demand (“the Shoah shouldn’t be represented”). This essay analyzes the argumentative structure of the advocates (...) of the unrepresentability and shows why the often made connection to Kant is flawed. Although his Critique of the Power of Judgment affirms indeed that the prohibition of representation is the “perhaps most sublime passage in the Jewish Law”, turning the prohibition of representation into a supposedly Kantian claim does not hold grounds. The essay reconstructs the political framework of the debate, situates the Kantian passage in its precise philosophical context and then successively assesses the main arguments put forward by Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière and Georges Didi-Huberman in their critique of Lanzmann’s categorical imperative. While showing why the rhetoric of the “unrepresentable” bear troubling structural analogies to what they want to fight (i.e. the politics of erasure, which always also include the erasure of the traces of erasure), a certain notion of the “unrepresentable” is rescued nevertheless at the end of the essay. Representation, so it is argued by returning to a Kantian distinction, is not a matter of Kanon, but a matter of Organon, which then puts the debate about the Sublime (which took place between Lyotard and Rancière in the 90’s) into a new perspective. (shrink)

In the wake of the Cold War a characteristic style of genocide narratives emerged in the West. For the most part, philosophers did not pay attention to this development even though they are uniquely qualified to address arguments and conceptual issues discussed in this burgeoning genocide genre. While ostensibly a response to a specific recent article belonging to the genre, this essay offers an outline of an ethics of genocide narratives in the form of four lessons on how not to (...) write about genocide. It is argued that to the extent that works on the subject of genocide are dominated by narrativism, genocidalism, activism, or extreme pacifism, they cannot properly be classified as scholarly endeavors and must be met with resistance per the requirements of academic ethics and proper scholarly methodology. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to articulate and defend a new imperative, Auschwitz survivor Charlotte Delbo’s 'Il faut donner à voir': “They must be made to see.” Assuming the ‘they’ in Delbo’s imperative is ‘us’ gives rise to three questions: (1) what must we see? (2) can we see it? and (3) why is it that we must? I maintain that what we must see is the reality of evil; that we are by and large unwilling, and often unable, to (...) see the reality of evil; and that if there is to be comprehension of—to say nothing of justice for—the survivors of evil, we nonetheless must. (shrink)

In Ender's Game and Philosophy: Genocide is Child's Play, twenty-eight philosophers explore the fascinating issues raised in Orson Scott Card's popular and controversial novel Ender's Game, and its sequels, which have been discovered and rediscovered by generations of fans. Card's stories highlight the violence and cruelty of children, the role of empathy and failure of communication in war, the military manipulation of people by disinformation, and the balance of individual dignity with the social good.