‘Total disability’ and the wrongness of killing

Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (8):661-662 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin G Miller recently argued that the wrongness of killing is best explained by the harm that comes to the victim, and that ‘total disability’ best explains the nature of this harm. Hence, killing patients who are already totally disabled is not wrong. I maintain that their notion of total disability is ambiguous and that they beg the question with respect to whether there are abilities left over that remain relevant for the goods of personhood and human worth. If these goods remain, then something more is lost in death than in ‘total disability,’ and their explanation of what makes killing wrong comes up short. But if total disability is equivalent with death, then their argument is an interesting one.

Similar books and articles

Killing, wrongness, and equality.Carlos Soto - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):543-559.
A concise argument: on the wrongness of killing.Thomas Douglas - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):1-2.
Killing humans and killing animals.Peter Singer - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):145 – 156.
Innocence in War.Gabriel Palmer-Fernández - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (2):161-174.
Dependent relational animals.Michael Bevins - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):15-16.
Broadening the future of value account of the wrongness of killing.Ezio Di Nucci - 2015 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 18 (4):587-590.
Killing and dying.Dan Moller - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):235-247.
On the wrongness of killing.David DeGrazia - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):9-9.
Epicurus, Death, and the Wrongness of Killing.Mikel Burley - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-86.
Abortion and human nature.D. Marquis - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (6):422-426.
Killing and the Time-relative Interest Account.Nils Holtug - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):169-189.
Futures of Value and the Destruction of Human Embryos.Rob Lovering - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 463-88.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-03

Downloads
320 (#60,973)

6 months
98 (#41,170)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Omelianchuk
Baylor College of Medicine

Citations of this work

How (not) to think of the ‘dead-donor’ rule.Adam Omelianchuk - 2018 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 39 (1):1-25.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What makes killing wrong?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Franklin G. Miller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):3-7.
On the wrongness of killing.David DeGrazia - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):9-9.
Dependent relational animals.Michael Bevins - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):15-16.

View all 7 references / Add more references