Husserl: Lifeworld

V prispevku se najprej zadržim ob problematiki zadobitve »naravnega sveta« v fenomenologiji, ki privede do soočenja s kopernikanskim obratom v filozofiji in vzpodbudi t.i. drugi kopernikanski obrat. Osrednjo pozornost posvečam Husserlovemu tekstu z arhivsko oznako D 17/1 –22, ki je naslovljen »Temelje raziskave o fenomenološkem izvoru prostorskosti narave«. Husserl pa je na rob pripisal: „Prevrat kopernikanskega nauka v običajni svetnonazorski interpretaticiji. Pra-barka Zemlja se ne giblje“. Tekst je bil objavljen leta 1940 v ZDA in ga navaja tudi Merleu Ponty v (...) svoji »Fenomenologiji percepcije« iz leta 1945. Pri analizi teksta zasledujem Husserlovo fenomenološko deskripcijo Zemlje kot „telesa“ in kot „tal“, ob tem pa tudi fenomenov telesnosti, gibanja, mirovanja ter horizontskega izkustva sveta. Na podlagi tega poskušam pokazati na kako Husserl izkustvo zemeljskosti kot »invariante življenjskega sveta« vplete v pogoje možnosti izkustva nasploh. Naposled se zadržim še pri nekaterih avtorjih, na katere je Husserl v tem pogledu neposredno vplival in ki so aktualizirali njegove ugotovitve ne le v filozofskem, pač pa tudi v ekološkem, družbenem in tudi političnem kontekstu. The article first tackles the issues of acquiring the “natural world” in phenomenology, which brings about the confrontation with the Copernican Turn in philosophy and the eventuation of the so-called second Copernican turn. The main interest is divested to the Husserl’s text with the archive designation D 17/1-22, titled “Basic Research of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature”. As Husserl’s marginal note says: “The upturn of Copernican Doctrine in an ordinary world-view interpretation. The original ark Earth does not move.” The text was first published in 1940 in the USA, and was later cited by Merleau-Ponty in his “Phenomenology of Perception” in 1945. The analysis of the text follows Husserl’s description of the Earth as “body” and as “ground”, as well as the phenomena, such as corporeality, movement, stillness and the horizontal experiencing of the world. On this basis, I shall try to show how Husserl introduces the experience of earthliness as “universal life-world” into the conditions of the possibility of experience in general. Finally, attention is paid to certain authors who were, within the given context, under a direct influence of Husserl and who discovered the relevance of his insights not only within the philosophical context, but also within those of ecology, social strata as well as politics. (shrink)

Der Autor folgt der Hypothese, dass Husserls Denken der Krisis auf den folgenden Bezug gebaut ist: einerseits beeinflusst die Lebenswelt als Fluss die Art der Wissenschaft, die das Subjekt von ihr haben kann, andererseits beansprucht die transzendentale Subjektivitat die Relativierung der ganzen Lebenswelt. Der Fluss und das Bewusstsein werden Metaphern dieses Bezuges, indem sie die Paradoxien des Weltratsels ausdrucken. Aus der Moglichkeit, die Welt als wirkliche Lebenswelt zu denken, erscheint die Phanomenologie der Lebenswelt als eine Umwalzung des Rationalismus zu einem (...) Relationismus. (shrink)

In view of the incompatibility between scientific and manifest image one can either consider the scientific world as true and the sensuous world as merely subjective or consider the latter as true and the former as a subjective construction. Sellars holds the first position, namely scientific realism. By relying on Husserl, who holds the second position, I try to show that the first position has absurd consequences and is idealistic. For the measure of all things is not science, but perception.

In this contribution we first sketch an outline of the concept of lifeworld (_Lebenswelt_), to introduce the readers to the guest-edited collection of essays _Varieties of the Lifeworld: Phenomenology and Aesthetic Experience_, special issue of the “Continental Philosophy Review.” We trace back the origin of the concept of lifeworld to Husserl’s late phenomenology, although also explaining (on the basis of the careful historical-conceptual reconstructions offered by some distinguished scholars of Husserl and the phenomenological movement) that the development of Husserl’s phenomenology (...) of the _Lebenswelt_ was gradual and was connected, among other things, to the question of the natural world of experience. Then, quickly referring to Gadamer, Landgrebe, Fink and other authors belonging to the phenomenological tradition, we explain that different interpretations of the topic “Lifeworld” in Husserl’s thinking have been provided: In our view, this contributes to the fact that still nowadays this topic is a fascinating and philosophically stimulating one. Finally, making reference to more recent works by such authors as Figal, Gallagher, Zahavi and Shusterman (a pragmatist philosopher, whose somaesthetics is nonetheless very rich in insights that can be connected to phenomenological views of the body and its place in the world), we emphasize how the question concerning the lifeworld is still capable today to open a great variety of perspectives and plurality of paths for thinking, as testified by the essays collected in this guest-edited special issue of the “Continental Philosophy Review.”. (shrink)

The paper argues that the dynamics of personal and collective individuation could be interrelated and bear ethical significance thanks to an analysis of the Lifeworld and intersubjectivity that link together the genetic and the generative perspectives of phenomenology. The first section of the paper recalls the epistemological and ontological implications of Husserl's and Stein's analysis of personal individuation in relation to what Husserl would call, later, the “Lifeworld” and the intersubjective constitution of communities. The second section of the paper turns (...) to a phenomenology of the Lifeworld through an analysis of refugees' care and the intersubjective dynamics involved in the clinic of exile. Such an example will bring to light the importance of embodiment and intercorporeity to grasp the process through which the genetic constitution of the Lifeworld constitutes itself as a collective process of individuation trying to heal the scars of historicity. Consequently, individuation will appear as a personal and collective task, rather than a static and ego-centered achievement that would be forgetful of our fundamental interdependency. Finally, the last section argues that “healing the Lifeworld” does not amount to conceive of its “horizon” as being itself a predetermined “telos” of transcendental subjectivity, as if this open structure could be itself constituted. Rather, the varieties of the Lifeworld and its paradoxical movement of appropriation and differentiation point to a relational ontology that considers the becoming of a common and meaningful world as a _limit-problem_ of phenomenology and, perhaps, its ethical and critical promise. (shrink)

Life-world, means the world as it is experienced and lived, is a concept that was first born in Husserl's phenomenology and later used in various fields. Alfred Schutz, the founder of phenomenological sociology, who sought to establish a theoretical basis for interpretive sociology, applied the concept to study of mental structures in everyday life and used it in sociology. The present article seeks to answer the question, what changes did life-world undergo in Schutz's thought. The result of this study shows (...) that Schutz establishes a dialectical relationship between individual consciousness and life-world, in such a way that each constructs and influences the other. Unlike Husserl, who saw life-world as the only comprehensible reality, he referred to the multiple layers of reality and considered Husserl's term transcendence appropriate for rotation between these layers, while Husserl used “transcendence” only to awareness of another experience. In addition, Schutz does not consider transcendental phenomenology as a proper basis for the social sciences, and instead of the transcendental ego, he uses the mundane ego for his plan. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of the world elaborated by Heidegger in the early Freiburg lecture courses of the years 1919 to 1923, in which he proposes a renewed conception of phenomenology through a comparison with Husserlian phenomenology. First, I show that although the theme of the lifeworld became central only in late Husserlian works, especially in _The Crisis of European Sciences_, Husserl began to deal with this concept before 1920, anticipating some fundamental issues of the _Crisis_, as it results (...) from the lectures of 1919 on _Natur und Geist_. Husserl had addressed the concept of the world already in the lectures of 1910/11, _The Basic Problems of Phenomenology_, and, subsequently, in the second book of _Ideas_, which was published posthumously, but which was known to the young Heidegger. Then, I discuss the way in which Heidegger revisited the issue of the world in the early Freiburg lecture courses by means of a critique of Husserl’s analysis, focusing on perceptual experience as “environmental experience” and on the “world-character” of life. Particular emphasis is placed on the distinction between “environing-world,” “with-world,” and “self-world,” which Heidegger introduces in the lectures of 1919–1920. Finally, I point out that the Heideggerian rethinking of the concept of lifeworld is closely connected to the recognition of the immanent historicity of life, while Husserl only later takes into account the historicity of the lifeworld. (shrink)

The main objective of this article is to explain the subjective-relative aspect as being the essential constituent of the structure of the lifeworld in the Husserl’s work Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. To this end, it will be analyzed, in a first moment, what consist the crisis of European sciences diagnosed by Husserl and how the process of mathematization of nature took place, which configures the objectivist scientific orientation. Finally, it will be possible to analyze the subjective-relative (...) structure of the lifeworld understood as the soil of immediate intuition experience. (shrink)

According to Husserl, the epochè must be left incomplete. It is to be performed step by step, thus defining various layers of “reduction.” In phenomenology at least two such layers can be distinguished: the life-world reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Quantum physics was born from a particular variety of the life-world reduction: reduction to observables according to Heisenberg, and reduction to classical-like properties of experimental devices according to Bohr. But QBism has challenged this limited version of the phenomenological reduction advocated (...) by the Copenhagen interpretation. QBists claim that quantum states are “expectations about experiences of pointer readings,” rather than expectations about pointer positions. Their focus on lived experience, not just on macroscopic variables, is tantamount to performing the transcendental reduction instead of stopping at the relatively superficial layer of the life-world reduction. I will show that quantum physics indeed gives us several reasons to go the whole way down to the deepest variety of phenomenological reduction, may be even farther than the standard QBist view: not only reduction to experience, or to “pure consciousness,” but also reduction to the “living present.”. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendo evidenciar como a relação entre sujeito anímico e sujeito espiritual é fundamental para a compreensão da intersubjetividade e do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt). Em Ideias II, Husserl explica como, a partir do eu, sujeito e objeto são constituídos no mundo: natureza, alma e espírito. Estes três estratos do sendo são conhecidos a partir da atitude teorética e da atitude espiritual e, no processo, se dá a explicitação do eu. Numa atitude teorética, temos constituição da natureza, para o (...) que o corpo (Körper/Leib) é fundamental. Em seguida, a constituição de objetos de natureza anímica, humana ou animal, incluindo a autopercepção. Assumindo a atitude espiritual, o outro é percebido (Urpräsenz), inicialmente, como corpo junto às coisas e, ao lado desta percepção, há uma apercepção (Appräsenz) dos horizontes co-dados. Há uma identidade entre o corpo alheio e o meu, é o momento da empatia (Einfühlung). O mundo constituído a partir de uma atitude naturalista ou teórica é uma redução do mundo circundante (Umwelt), mas o mundo cotidiano da atitude personalista ou espiritual lhe antecede, o mundo vital (Lebenswelt). É, portanto, através da atitude personalista ou espiritual, que se constitui uma comunidade de sujeitos espirituais. (shrink)

Life-world is a concept present in various texts about Husserl’s phenomenology. Some interpreters consider it a late and inconsistent con-cept present in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phe-nomenology. In this paper, I argue that the idea of the life-world had already been thought in Husserl’s early texts such as Ideas II (first manuscript 1912). This idea was firstly named as surrounding world (Umwelt), then world of experience (Erfahrungswelt), and finally life-world (Lebenswelt). However, de-spite the different nomenclature, the essence (...) of the life-world remains the same throughout his work. The life-world is a priori, transcendent, and co-given. I will analyze each of these characteristics and conclude in favor of a conceptual monism running through Husserl’s work. (shrink)

The idea of the life-world: Life-world is a concept present in various texts about Husserl’s phenomenology. Some interpreters consider it a late and inconsistent concept present in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. In this paper, I argue that the idea of the life-world had already been thought in Husserl’s early texts such as Ideas II. This idea was firstly named as surrounding world, then world of experience, and finally life-world. However, despite the different nomenclature, the essence of (...) the life-world remains the same throughout his work. The life-world is a priori, transcendent, and co-given. I will analyze each of these characteristics and conclude in favor of a conceptual monism running through Husserl’s work. Keywords: Husserl, life-world, a priori, transcendent, co-given. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit thematisiert eine sowohl im deutschen als auch im spanischen und englischen Sprachraum weitgehend unbekannte philosophische Kontroverse zweier herausragender Figuren der Rezeptionsgeschichte von Husserls Phänomenologie in Mexiko zur Zeit des spanischen republikanischen Exils. Es handelt sich um die Diskussion zwischen José Gaos und Luis Villoro über den phänomenologischen Begriff der Lebenswelt. Im ersten Teil meiner Darstellung werde ich den akademischen Kontext dieser Diskussion erörtern. Im zweiten Teil gehe ich auf die Hauptthese eines Vortrags ein, den Gaos 1963 in (...) Mexiko-Stadt vor einem internationalen Publikum hielt und der als die erste dokumentierte Behandlung des Lebensweltbegriffs in der spanischsprachigen Philosophie gilt. Der dritte Teil behandelt Villoros Erwiderung auf Gaos’ Vortrag und die sich daraus ergebende Auseinandersetzung der beiden Philosophen. Im vierten Teil ziehe ich eine kritische Bilanz des Inhalts dieser Diskussion im Licht des aktuellen Stands der Husserlforschung. Dabei, und schließlich auch im fünften Teil, wird sich die unverkennbar radikale Bedeutung dieser Diskussion für die aktuelle phänomenologische Forschung herausstellen, insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Forschungsdesiderat einer Erklärung der systematischen Verhältnisse zwischen transzendentaler Erkenntniskritik und Lebenswelttheorie. (shrink)

Much of our experience today is mediated through mathematical constructs that escape our immediate intuitions, social media being a primary example. Understanding the proliferation of these constructs may help us see how they are destabilizing ethical judgment. Since its inception with Husserl, phenomenology has set out a sustained critique of the philosophical sources that led to the mathematization of nature. It has also been alert to the dangers that this mathematization presented. Husserl argued that the life-world was being transformed with (...) a gradual substitution of the abstract object for the authentic phenomenon. This paper looks at what I consider to be a contemporary form of Husserl’s critique, largely through the lens offered by the Belgian philosopher, Jean Ladrière. In line with Husserl, Ladrière argues that we are witnessing the prevalence of a specific scientific rationality of construct that is populating the life-world with its products, its artifacts. The artifacts represent fragments of reality—ones constructed on the basis of mathematical ideals, of a reduced and formal grasp the real. The consequence, according to Ladrière, is a destabilization of ethical judgment. Hermeneutic phenomenology, he suggests, offers the elements of a potential response, essentially constituted by a hermeneutic of the artificial. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis von Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft befindet sich mit ungewissem Ausgang in stetiger Bewegung. In diesem Prozess ist das treibende Element die Wissenschaft, die Technisierungen ermöglicht und mit ihren Erkenntnissen die Welt überzieht. Trotz der fortschreitenden Verwissenschaftlichung hat sich die Lebenswelt jedoch ihre Eigenständigkeit bewahrt. Die vorliegenden Studien tragen zur Aufklärung dieses erstaunlichen Phänomens bei. Sie weisen Strukturdifferenzen der beiden Erfahrungsweisen auf und zeigen, wie sie mit- und gegeneinander existieren. Zugleich wird deutlich, dass ein Ende der lebensweltlichen Eigenständigkeit einen fundamentalen (...) Wandel für die gesellschaftliche Stellung nichtwissenschaftlicher Erfahrung bedeuten würde. Die Untersuchungen sind begrifflich, wissenschaftstheoretisch und phänomenologisch orientiert. Sie gehen von einem weitgefassten Wissenschaftsbegriff aus, der auch Technikwissenschaften sowie wissenschaftliche Anwendungen umfasst. In den Fallbeispielen kommt den Naturwissenschaften und dem Naturbegriff eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu. Der Lebensweltbegriff schließt in kritischer Distanz an die Sozialphänomenologie von Alfred Schütz und die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls an. (shrink)

Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny argue that the pure causal theory of reference faces a problem, which they call the qua-problem. They propose to invoke intentional states to cope with it. Martin Kusch, however, argues that, because Devitt and Stereleny invoke intentional states to solve the problem, their causal-hybrid theory of reference is susceptible to Kripke’s sceptical attack. Kusch thinks that intentional states are what allows the sceptic to get a foothold and thus interpret words in a weird way. In (...) his view, Kripke is therefore correct in not regarding a causal theory as a solution to the problem. I think, however, that there is room to defend a causal-hybrid theory of reference. Drawing on Husserl’s notion of the life-world, I argue that this notion is helpful for overcoming some aspects of the qua-problem and the meaning scepticism which Devitt and Sterelny’s causal-hybrid theory of reference faces. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to clarify the heart of Dewey’s philosophy: his method (denotative method (DM) / pattern of inquiry (PI)). Despite the traditional understanding of Dewey as anti-foundationalist, I want to show that Dewey did have metaphysical foundations for his method: the principle of continuity or theory of emergentism. I also argue that Dewey’s metaphysical position is better named as ‘cultural emergentism’, rather than his own term ‘cultural naturalism’. What Dewey called ‘common sense’ in his Logic, Husserl termed (...) as the ‘life-world’ in his Crisis. I compare two perspectives of dealing with the phenomenon and conclude that for Dewey, the difference between natural sciences and the common sense inquiry is that of subject-matter but not of method. Thus, the goal is to find the unified method to be applied in both domains. Whereas Husserl was more pessimistic: for him, the difference was not only in subject-matter, but in the very methods. Following that discussion, I also attempt to reformulate the hard problem of consciousness in Deweyan terms. In the end, I compare Dewey’s DM / PI with Popper’s understandings of scientific method and conclude that there is no significant difference between the two and that Dewey’s method could also be looked at as hypothetic-deductive method, with the only difference in emphases. (shrink)

Previous work in Game Studies has centered on several loci of investigation in seeking to understand virtual gameworlds. First, researchers have scrutinized the concept of the virtual world itself and how it relates to the idea of “the magic circle”. Second, the field has outlined various forms of experienced “presence”. Third, scholarship has noted that the boundaries between the world of everyday life and virtual worlds are porous, and that this fosters a multiplicity of identities as players identify both with (...) themselves-offline and themselves-in-game. Despite widespread agreement that these topics are targets for research, so far those working on these topics do not have mutually agreed-upon framework. Here we draw upon the work of Alfred Schutz to take up this call. We provide a phenomenological framework which can be used to describe the phenomena of interest to Game Studies, as well as open new avenues of inquiry, in a way acceptable and useful to all. This helps to distinguish the core of the field from the supplemental theoretical and critical commitments which characterize diverse approaches within the field. (shrink)

The present article consists of four parts, and the first part examines the concept of life-world from the phenomenological perspective and argues that the characteristic features of the life-world would be through inspection, analysis and description of the life as we encounter it devoid of scientific explanations. The second part of the paper develops the idea that religion finds its meaning and significance only in the domain of life-world because the phenomena that one experiences in the religious acts take place (...) primarily in a pre-theoretical way. Thus, it is argued that the operative dimension of phenomenology of religious consciousness involves a new understanding of subjectivity—a passive plane of subjectivity—whose locus is differently conceived by Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger. The third part of the paper draws attention to the religious phenomena whose intended structures and meanings go beyond mediation and suggests that symbols form a realm between objectively given things and subjectively intended meanings. In other words, religious symbols serve as indispensable mediating bridges. The final part of the paper proposes that religious experiences like all other experiences, though are rooted in life-world, yet it transcends its worldly contents. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is threefold: To show the basic contours of transcendental subjectivity in the later work of Edmund Husserl, especially the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis, and in the strictly phenomenological work of Michel Henry, especially Material Phenomenology; to highlight Henry’s radical critique of Husserlian intersubjectivity and show that such critique, while valuable in its intention, is ultimately misguided because it neglects the important contribution Husserl’s complicated vocabulary of lifeworld makes to the study of intersubjectivity; and to (...) point toward a phenomenological conception of intersubjective practice we may call the realm of we-synthesis that prioritizes the first-person perspective rooted in empathy, which enables meaningful engagement with the second-person perspective. Working in conjunction with Husserl and Henry on the phenomenological conception of shared life enables the recuperation of the fragile line between subjectivity and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

This article discusses the content of life-world experience in Heidegger’s and Husserl’s respective concepts of death. The modern scientification of the life-world has restricted this content, but has not been able to prevent the concepts from continuing to justify the autonomy of the life-worldly experience of death. However, a phenomenological understanding of death can only be achieved if its essential naturalness is taken into account, for which metaphysics could serve phenomenology as a point of departure.

The concept of lifeworld as posited by Husserl and developed by Schutz reveals key aspects of human social life. What happens when organized forces of human control tear lifeworlds apart? Gebser warned that without a transformation of consciousness humans would destroy their world. Habermas pointed out that humans were destroying lifeworlds with little awareness of the consequences due to the predominance of rational/legal thinking, thus creating “Deathworlds”. Transformative Phenomenology has become a community-of-practice that is an antidote to Deathworld-Making. Transformative phenomenology (...) includes hermeneutics, somatics and leregogic practices and phenomenologists trained in this way exhibit ten qualities of being. We offer the Rising Sun project, a phenomenologically based social innovation, as a case example. The call to maintain and restore lifeworlds is the call to oneness and peace. In the era of growing Deathworlds, we, phenomenologists, are urged to respond and contribute to this call. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss whether and to what extent Husserl’s Crisis can help us to understand the challenges of Europe’s current crisis. The paper identifies both the problematic aspects of Husserl’s analysis and its fruitful components. In this connection, special attention is paid to three themes: the relationship between philosophical thought and Europe’s crisis, the emergence of a phenomenological philosophy of history, and the political scope of the life-world. These themes are discussed with particular reference to (...) the connection between Husserl’s philosophy of subjectivity and his conception of history. (shrink)

Jan Patočka’s early phenomenology, as presented in The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, does not merely adopt Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld. The paper demonstrates the originality of Patočka’s appropriation of this concept, but also its internal tensions and difficulties. Seeking to elaborate a concept of a phenomenology allowing for a theory of the lifeworld stricto sensu, i.e. of the life of the world, Patočka’s book effectively shows that there is no ahistorical, absolute or “natural” starting point for phenomenology. (...) Truth, as approachable through phenomenology, is not given, but must rather be developed. Elaborating on the concept of transcendental idealism, Patočka’s early phenomenology thus suggests a vivid idea of “intermeshing” monads ontologically grounding the world. (shrink)

The notion of techné in Husserl’s phenomenology is related to his treatment of the three layers of the “teaching of craft” and the two layers of the science of “life-world.” The superior layer of both is of philosophical significance. Aristotle’s statement in ethics and metaphysics: techné is man-made, but can transit to spontaneity, and then to natural becoming, which manifests physis as the ultimate aim of his philosophical system, enlightens us to notice the following aspects in Husserl’s phenomenology. 1. Pure (...) or formal ethics is of a high-level téchne in the philosophical sense. 2. The concept of life-world leads to transcendental phenomenology. 3. What Ideas II implies – as a technique the method of phenomenology tends to let the pure I and spiritual I as matters appear themselves by the natural attitude – could conduct us to understand the artistic aspect of Husserl’s philosophical theory. (shrink)

There are three steps in my description of the ground-problem of value: First, Husserl’s analysis of the crisis of reason is based on the systematic loss and phenomenological recovery of the intuitive evidence of the lifeworld. But if letter symbols are essential to formalizing abstraction, as Klein’s de-sedimentation of Vieta’s institution of modern algebra shows, then the ultimate substrates upon which formalization rests cannot be “individuals” in Husserl’s sense. The consequence of the essentiality of the letter symbols to formalization is (...) that no direct reference to intuitive evidence of individuals is possible from formal structures. Second, the crisis of reason in Marx’s Capital on commodities contains a parallel analysis of the contradictory relation between formalism and evidence. The value-structure of capitalist society expels qualitative value to subjective use and imposes a homogeneous standard on social representation of value such that quantitative values are not grounded in the experience of use which entails that the system of general value becomes a mere aggregate. Third, the problem of value, or formal axiology, is the core of a teleological convergence between phenomenology and Marxism. A short phenomenological description of the experience of value shows that practical activities generate valuations that are experienced with an intensity through which they aim toward social representation. The conclusion is that the social representation of value in capitalist society intervenes into the constitution of the community by the intensity of individuals’ value-experience to reduce its system of value to an unthematized simple aggregate of value-quantities. (shrink)

This analysis of Herbert Marcuse’s appropriation of the argument concerning the “mathematization of nature” in Edmund Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology shows that Marcuse and Husserl both assume that the perception of real, concrete individuals in the lifeworld underlies formal scientific abstractions and that the critique of the latter requires a return to such qualitative perception. In contrast, I argue that no such return is possible and that real, concrete individuals are constituted by the relation between (...) a given perception and its horizon. In this manner, Marcuse’s social critique can be combined with Husserl’s theoretical-perceptual one, making possible an ecological critique. L’analyse de l’appropriation que fait Herbert Marcuse de l’argument concernant la « mathématisation de la nature » dans la Crise des sciences europe ennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale de Husserl démontre que Marcuse et Husserl assument tous les deux que la perception des individus réels concrets dans le monde de la vie sous-tend les abstractions scientifiques formelles et que la critique de ces dernières nécessite un retour à la perception qualificative. J’avance au contraire qu’un tel retour n’est pas possible et que les individus réels concrets sont constitués par la relation entre une perception donnée et son horizon. Nous pouvons alors combiner la critique sociale de Marcuse avec la critique théorico-perceptuelle de Husserl pour en faire une critique égologique. (shrink)

Husserl beruft sich immer wieder programmatisch auf Platon als den Gründervater der europäischen Philosophie, arbeitet jedoch die Bezüge der Phänomenologie zum Platonismus nie auf - obwohl er die "historische Rückbesinnung" auf die Urstiftung seines Denkens als wesentlichen Bestandteil der "Selbstbesinnung auf ein Selbstverständnis dessen hin, worauf man eigentlich hinaus will, als der man ist, als historisches Wesen" charakterisiert. Die vorliegende Arbeit will diese Reflexion leisten. Ihr Gegenstand ist mithin die Transformation Platonischer Gedanken in Husserls Phänomenologie. Dabei werden sechs Problemgebiete thematisiert: (...) A) Philosophie als Wissenschaft, B) Philosophie als Ethik, C) Philosophie als Polemik, D) Philosophie und das Ende der Lebenswelt, E) Philosophie und das Eigenrecht des Eidetischen, F) Philosophie und das Absolute. Den Abschnitten folgen jeweils kritische Erwägungen zu den Spannungen, die vor dem Platonischen Hintergrund innerhalb der Phänomenologie sichtbar werden. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die Phänomenologie tatsächlich als eine eigenwillige Endstiftung des Platonismus betrachtet werden kann, wodurch sich eine neue Perspektive auf ihre programmatische und systematische Grundkonfiguration ergibt. (shrink)

The Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the article attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its ethical perspectives toward an ethic that intends to be inclusive. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis. Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of (...) inclusion in the life-world, an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the live-world thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness, which is open, latent, included in the life-world, non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character. (shrink)

Als erstes charakterisiere ich den historischen Wandel, der den modernen lebensweltlichen Verständnisweisen des Todes vorausliegt - und zwar im Hinblick auf die Rolle der Wissenschaften in diesem Prozess (Abschnitt 1). Insofern Verdrängung und Bewusstsein des Todes als Ent­wicklungstendenzen heute einander gegenüberstehen, resultiert für die Zukunft eine Entwicklungsoffenheit, die die Möglichkeit von Prognosen zum Verhältnis von lebensweltlicher und wissenschaftlicher Themati­sierung des Todes erheblich einschränkt. Insofern aber die Verdrängung gegenüber dem Bewusstsein des Todes dominiert, ergibt sich der Hinweis für einen veränderten Begriff (...) der Lebenswelt, auf den ich anschließend ein­gehe. Den neuen Begriff bestimme ich im Rückgriff auf die Le­bensweltkonzeptionen von Edmund Husserl und Alfred Schütz. Sie ge­statten es, die Randständigkeit der Erfahrung des Todes als Ausdruck der Spannung von dominanter Verdrängung und fortbestehenden Quellen des Todesbewusstseins zu charakterisieren (Abschnitt 2). Diese Ambivalenz gehört auch zu den Kennzeichen des Todesbegriffes von Martin Heideg­ger, der die wohl einflussreichste systematische These zum nichtwissen­schaftlichen Ursprung der lebensweltlichen Vorstellungen vom Tod for­muliert hat. Der kritischen Diskussion seines Todesbegriffes lassen sich allerdings nur noch die Jemeinigkeit und die Gewissheit als weitere Kenn­zeichen des Todes entnehmen, deren lebensweltlicher Ursprung sich rechtfertigen lässt (Abschnitt 3). Zusätzliche Hinweise auf Quellen und Grenzen lebensweltlicher Todesvorstellungen finden sich in Edmund Husserls Reflexionen zum Tod, die ich abschließend exemplarisch disku­tiere (Abschnitt 4). (shrink)

Descriptive foundations and a concern with origins are integral to both Husserlian phenomenology and Darwinian evolutionary biology. These complementary aspects are rooted in the lifeworld as it is experienced. Detailed specifications of the complementary aspects testify to a mutual relevance of phenomenology to evolutionary biology and of evolutionary biology to phenomenology. Exemplifications of the mutual relevance are given in terms of both human and nonhuman agentive abilities. The experiential exemplifications show that agentive abilities are rooted in the kinetic sequence: I (...) move, I do, I can. The kinetic sequence in turn testifies to an ability to think in movement, a thinking that engenders corporeal concepts. It also, however, attests to the need for a veritable phenomenology of learning on the one hand and for a veritable recognition of mindful bodies on the other, mindful bodies that are a driving force both in the evolution of animate forms of life and in the evolution of repertoires of I cans. (shrink)

The main goal of my inquiry is to lay out the proximity between Patočka’s and Ricœur’s readings of Husserl’s Krisis and to stress the role played by the concept of the life-world in the unfolding of their original philosophical undertakings. In the first part, I show the importance both Patočka and Ricœur assignedto the Husserlian project of an “ontology of the life-world”. In the second part, I expose the criticism these two authors addressed to Husserl’s understanding of the life-world and, (...) more precisely, to the idea that the exploration of the life-world is merely another way of gaining access to transcendental subjectivity. In the last part, I show how the concrete descriptions of the life-world given by Patočka and Ricœur depart massively from the Husserlian perspective. (shrink)

Presented are here the crucial presuppositions and building-blocks of a phenomenological philosophy. Inspired by Husserl's critique of scientific objectivism and his claim that the life-world as the world of our experience is the only real world, such a philosophy starts from the breaking of the spell of objective reality as the only and true actuality and the acknowledgment of the appearance-character of all actuality and of objective reality itself. It further requires reinterpretations of the notions of sensitivity, subjectivity and consciousness. (...) Foundational for the sketched idea of phenomenological philosophy is the insight that all conscious life is necessarily determined by interests. (shrink)

In this paper we want to show how the development of Edmund Husserl’s thinking led him to propose the concept of Life-World in Crisis. Then we highlight the relationship of this concept with the positive sciences and how it intends a priority that underlies and gives meaning to the formers. We point out how Life-World is constitutes by transcendental reduction and how this is cause of tensions with other issues of Husserl's philosophy. Analyzing the concept of world in Being and (...) Time by Martin Heidegger, we make a comparative discussion with some features of the Life-World especially in the transcendental foundation contrasted with an hermeneutics of Dasein, the understanding of temporality in each authors and the relationship between theory and praxis in the first approach to reality. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to representthe obvious understanding of the challenging concept of a science of the life-world in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and meaning of this project by Husserl. Hereof, first is very important to perpend distinction and yet relationship between the objective science and the life-world then it seems inevitable to reflect on steps to this transcendental science including epochs of the objective science, epochs ofa science of the life-world and transcendental reduction. (...) Here, the main focus lays onthe possibility of a science of the life-world project with tow attitude a reflective and a non-reflective. In the first attitude be accomplished the universal structures of the life-world in format of anontologyofthe life-world and in the second attitude be discovered on Husserl's transcendental turn on the life-world and its manner-of-givenness the transcendental solidarity between the world and the world consciousness. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to representthe obvious understanding of the challenging concept of a science of the life-world in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and meaning of this project by Husserl. Hereof, first is very important to perpend distinction and yet relationship between the objective science and the life-world then it seems inevitable to reflect on steps to this transcendental science including epochs of the objective science, epochs ofa science of the life-world and transcendental reduction. (...) Here, the main focus lays onthe possibility of a science of the life-world project with tow attitude a reflective and a non-reflective. In the first attitude be accomplished the universal structures of the life-world in format of anontologyofthe life-world and in the second attitude be discovered on Husserl's transcendental turn on the life-world and its manner-of-givenness the transcendental solidarity between the world and the world consciousness. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show how both Jan Patočka and Jürgen Habermas, starting from a reinterpretation of the idea of «lifeworld», engaged a critique of modern civilisation, aiming (with different outcomes) at a redefinition of the concept of political community. In order to achieve this goal, I firstly focus on Patočka’s understanding of modern rational civilisation and its attempt to fix the fracture between «life» and «world». At this stage, I take also advantage of Hans Blumenberg’s distinction (...) between these two terms, in order to better clarify Patočka’s stance on this problem. Secondly, I analyse Habermas’ ideas of lifeworld and system, and their uncoupling in modern societies, as well as the reemergence of this issue in Habermas’ recent works on the European economic and political crisis. Finally, I focus on the very different ways in which Patočka and Habermas tackled the ideas of conflict and crisis in contemporary world, also in view of a possible path out of this crisis through a re-constitution of Europe. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że Husserlowska diagnoza kryzysu, szczególnie kryzysu nauki wiąże się z konsekwencjami prowadzącymi do kryzysu europejskiego człowieczeństwa. Kryzys człowieczeństwa jest stałym motywem Husserlowskiej filozofii i polega zapoznaniu kwintesencji podmiotowości, jaką jest jej transcendentalny charakter. W związku z ideą kryzysu człowieczeństwa Husserl ukazuje, że nauki trwają w zaślepieniu, skutkującym utratą ich odniesieniu do życia, co powoduje ogólny kryzys. Możliwość przezwyciężenia kryzysu oznacza zwalczenie przesądów oraz wymaga przeprowadzenia autentycznej analizy świadomości jako zadania, któremu ma sprostać fenomenologiczna filozofia. Problem kryzysu (...) człowieczeństwa zostanie rozpatrzony w niniejszym artykule w postaci dwóch wątków: pierwszy dotyczy trudności związanych z ujęciem korelacji między podmiotowością i światem; drugi poświęcony jest koncepcji Lebenswelt która wiąże się z możliwością przezwyciężenia naturalistycznego sposobu myślenia. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses Edmund Husserl's concept of the ‘life-world’, found in his Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. We argue that Husserl's phenomenology fails to consider the social and material arrangements that allow subjectivity to emerge in our shared world. We begin by outlining the concept as formulated in Husserl’s Crisis. We then entertain Husserl’s critique by his most famous student, Martin Heidegger. We suggest a reformulation of intersubjectivity, along the lines of Heidegger’s mitdasein, accounts for subjectivity as (...) it emerges in the shared world. Next, we introduce ethnomethodology, pioneered by Harold Garfinkel, which gives sociological support to this argument. Through the ethnomethodological disability studies of A.B. Robillard, we argue that the life-world is not always as democratic as Husserl's philosophy may suggest. This shows the necessity of disability politics. We end by asking what a phenomenology sensitive to this fact might look like, in terms of both disability studies and phenomenological philosophy more generally. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses Edmund Husserl's concept of the ‘life-world’, found in his Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. We argue that Husserl's phenomenology fails to consider the social and material arrangements that allow subjectivity to emerge in our shared world. We begin by outlining the concept as formulated in Husserl’s Crisis. We then entertain Husserl’s critique by his most famous student, Martin Heidegger. We suggest a reformulation of intersubjectivity, along the lines of Heidegger’s mitdasein, accounts for subjectivity as (...) it emerges in the shared world. Next, we introduce ethnomethodology, pioneered by Harold Garfinkel, which gives sociological support to this argument. Through the ethnomethodological disability studies of A.B. Robillard, we argue that the life-world is not always as democratic as Husserl's philosophy may suggest. This shows the necessity of disability politics. We end by asking what a phenomenology sensitive to this fact might look like, in terms of both disability studies and phenomenological philosophy more generally. (shrink)

Zur Aufklärung der vielschichtigen Beziehungen zwischen Lebenswelt und Physik diskutiere ich die für die beiden Erfahrungsweisen jeweils typischen Konzeptualisierungen von Zeit. Nach einer Einleitung beginne ich mit der Analyse der subjektiven und objektiven lebensweltlichen Zeitformen. Anschließend erörtere ich im dritten Abschnitt das Verhältnis von lebensweltlichen und physikalischen Elementen der Weltzeit. Vier physikalische Zeitverständnisse stelle ich in ihrer Differenz zur lebensweltlichen Auffassung im vierten Abschnitt dar. Historisch hat sich die generelle Tendenz zur Vergrößerung dieser Differenz fortgesetzt, ohne dass schon Instanzen zur (...) Vermittlung der divergierenden Begriffe entstanden wären. Vor diesem Hintergrund plädiere ich im abschließenden Teil für eine plurale Begrifflichkeit. (shrink)

This paper presents an exposition and critical appraisal of the concepts of earth that appear almost simultaneously in essays by Husserl and Heidegger in the mid 1930s. I argue that while both of these earths are noteworthy insofar as they suggest, each in its own way, the isolation of a non-worldly dimension of disclosure, nevertheless, neither Husserl nor Heidegger succeeds in fully emancipating the earth from the logic of the world. In Husserl's case, the earth is implicated in a fourfold (...) schema involving: the absolute fixity of the world; the horizon of all being, sense, and judgment; the transcendental unity of the world; and the lifeworld as the basis of a common humanity. In Heidegger's case, the earth is construed as the “stream of boundary-setting” that, as the primordial adversary of the world, accomplishes the rising-up of beings into the open of being. The effect of this failure on the part of both philosophers to achieve an adequate ontological segregation of world and earth is to devalue the naïve image of the earth apprehended in the natural attitude even while the earth-dimension is divested of any discernable earthly character, leaving the earth itself barren and abstract, a pure category of thought rather than the horizon of actually lived life. (shrink)

In his pioneering sociological theory, which makes phenomenological concepts fruitful for the social sciences, Alfred Schütz has laid foundations for a characterization of an manifold of distinct domains of experience. My aim here is to further develop this pluralist theory of experience by buttressing and extending the elements of diversity that it includes, and by eliminating or minimizing lingering imbalances among the domains of experience. After a critical discussion of the criterion-catalogue Schütz develops for the purpose of characterizing different cognitive (...) styles, I move on to examine its application to one special style, the lifeworld. I appeal, on the one hand, to Husserl's characterization of the lifeworld as a world of perception, and on the other hand to the layer-model of the lifeworld developed by Schütz and Thomas Luckmann. A consequence of this approach is that the lifeworld appears as a socially definable context that is detached from other experiences but on an equal footing with them with respect to their claim of validity. The term "lifeworld" does not denote a category that encompasses culture or nature but refers to a delimited action-space. Finally, I draw upon Schütz' s criterion-catalogue to characterize two domains of experience outside of the lifeworld, which play a central role for the process of differentiation of experience in modernity and for the phenomenological analysis of types of experience: experimental science and subjectivity. (shrink)

Im ersten Abschnitt skizziere ich die ursprüngliche aristotelische Unterscheidung von Natur und Technik. Auf die neuzeitliche Kritik an ihr, die sich anschließenden historischen Veränderungen ihrer gesamtgesellschaftlichen Anwendungsbedingungen sowie auf zukünftig mögliche Szenarien des Verhältnisses von Natur und Technik gehe ich im zweiten Abschnitt ein. In den nachfolgenden zwei Abschnitten fokussiere ich meine Ausführungen auf die Lebenswelt und diskutiere exemplarisch die Anwendung der Unterscheidung auf die äußere Wahrnehmung, die Leibwahrnehmung und die Reproduktionstechnologie. Es geht mir in diesen beiden Abschnitten weniger um (...) den Nachweis der durch Technisierungen bedingten Erosion der Lebenswelt als umgekehrt um die Begründung der fortbestehenden Brauchbarkeit der aristotelischen Unterscheidung in der Lebenswelt. (shrink)

Values exist not in isolation, but in complex wholes. Values are what they are because of the complex wholes in which they are situated. To do justice to this thesis will require a holistic ontology, a theory according to which many types of entities exist only as inseparable parts or moments of wider contexts or environments. An ontological theory of environments -- with roots in Gestalt psychology and the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson and Roger Barker, and which is (...) related also to the theory of motivation sketched by Edmund Husserl as part of his theory of the lifeworld or Lebenswelt -- will help us to understand the ontology of values. It will help us to understand what values are. It will not, however, tell us what is good or bad. From facts of ontology, no value propositions follow. (shrink)

The lifeworld is, according to Husserl, the horizon of all our experiences, in the sense that it is the background environment of human being’s competences, practices, and attitudes. The lifeworld is the intersubjective, pre-given in the ontic sense, and immediately perceived world of everyday life. Although Husserl has distinguished the lifeworld from the objective world that natural science describes with mathematical methods, we cannot divide the world on the practical level into the perceived world of ordinary life and the scientific (...) world. The characteristic of human beings is that they live in the environment which they have enormously changed. Modern science has accelerated this tendency: the contemporary world is constructed so deeply scientifically and technologically. Accordingly, as Ulrich Beck pointed out, the risk of the technologically constructed world is often invisible/unperceivable. The disaster at Fukushima nuclear power plants is a terrible testament of this kind of risk. In order for a land to become the lifeworld of meaningful human interactions, the land should be first of all safe and livable for all of us. The risk calculation made by Tokyo Electric Power Company was shown to be sloppy and deceptive. The contemporary techno-science should be democratically governed and watched by all kinds of stakeholders, and never be left it to the specialists of science. For re-establishing the livable and sustainable lifeworld, safety, resilience, and vulnerability should be the fundamental values. And, the autonomy of the local residents, including the most vulnerable people, through the democratization of the techno-science must be the fundamental value to establish and protect such a safe environment. (shrink)

The paper presents Husserl’s conception of the relation between science and the living world, i.e. the world of everyday experience and communication. In Husserl view, science, or, more precisely, its basic aprioric structure is founded on the primal, essential core of the living world from which it obtains its sense. Science modifies, idealizes, and mathematizes the primal aprioric Lebenswelt. Due to those operations scientific theories can represent empirical reality.