Sam Harris (2010) argues that, given our neurology, we can experience well-being, and that seeking to maximize this state lets us distinguish the good from the bad. He takes our ability to compare degrees of well-being as his starting point, but I think that the analysis can be pushed further, since there is a (non-religious) reason why well-being is desirable, namely the finite life of an individual organism. It is because death is a constant possibility that things can be assessed (...) as “for” or “against” one (Champagne 2011a; Smith 2000). Such an account lets us objectively adjudicate moral questions, as Harris desires. However, by anchoring itself in the mortal body as a whole and not just the brain, such an account dampens the claim that neuroscience would have all the answers. Moreover, it pivots on an affirmation of one’s life that can seem mysterious by regular scientific standards. This chapter thus explains why the trade-off is worthwhile. (shrink)

Le rôle majeur que jouent les sciences et les techniques dans les sociétés modernes et les mutations profondes qu’elles connaissent exigent de nouveaux moyens d’analyse. On ne peut désormais comprendre l’activité scientifique qu’en replaçant ses logiques propres dans leur contexte social. Il s’agit de saisir la pratique actuelle des sciences, en révisant les notions constitutives de leur histoire et de leur philosophie, comme l’expérimentation ou la preuve ; de penser les sciences en société, lorsqu’elles quittent le laboratoire et qu’elles interviennent (...) dans les grandes questions économiques, politiques et sociétales (OGM, nucléaire, etc.) ; de faire le point sur le statut des études récentes sur les sciences ( Science Studies ), en montrant ce qu’elles ont apporté de décisif, mais aussi ce qu’elles ignorent. Des laboratoires européens du XIXe siècle à la Silicon Valley aujourd’hui, c’est en s’appuyant sur de nombreux exemples historiques que ces études sont menées. Les savoirs scientifiques, mais aussi managériaux et économiques, participent à la mise en place de la société néolibérale, faisant surgir des questions cruciales comme celle de la possibilité d’une participation démocratique aux choix scientifiques et techniques, ou celle du sens de la notion de développement durable. C’est pourquoi la visée finale de ce livre est essentiellement politique. (shrink)

This chapter, which provides a discussion on the phenomenological foundations of predicative structure, first introduces the different steps in Edmund Husserl's argument. It is noted that not all judgements can be equated with a nexus between a conceptual function and an argument. The predicative structure shows the orientation of consciousness towards one or more objects taken as a theme of interest and utterance. The genetic phenomenological perspective posits the question of the origin of predicative judgement within a much larger context. (...) Husserl's account amounts to granting a paradigmatic character to the theory of experience of ultimate individual substrates and to the theory of perceptual judgement. Levinasian phenomenology implies a radical rethinking of the primacy of the predicative apophansis. It is noted that language can never be taken as an independent and autonomous dimension. (shrink)

L'Autre on a l'impression que l'on sait ce que c'est, mais en fait on ne le sait pas. C'est l'un des concepts les plus communément utilisés, et pourtant l'un des plus méconnus. On l'utilise de façon automatique, comme s'il était évident, comme si c'était un universel, alors que c'est une construction culturelle. Ce livre tente enfin de comprendre l'Autre.

The article compares the research programs of teaching symbolic language to chimpanzees, pointing on the dichotomy between artificial language vs. ASL, and the dichotomy between researchers who decided to establish emotional relationships between themselves and the apes, and those who have seen apes as instrumental devices. It is concluded that the experiments with the most interesting results have been both with artificial language and ASL, but with strong affiliation between researchers and animal involved in the experiments. The experiments on talking (...) apes are not so much experiments in psycholinguistics (how far can animal learn human language) but wonderful experiments in the communities of communication between human beings and great apes. (shrink)

Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent enough to allow us denial for their actions, yet too unlike us to be the targets of meaningful blame or praise—thereby fostering what Matthias has dubbed “the responsibility gap.” We agree with Sparrow that someone must be held responsible for all actions taken in a military conflict. That said, we think Sparrow overlooks the possibility of what we term “blank check” responsibility: A person of sufficiently high (...) standing could accept responsibility for the actions of autonomous robotic devices—even if that person could not be causally linked to those actions besides this prior agreement. The basic intuition behind our proposal is that humans can impute relations even when no other form of contact can be established. The missed alternative we want to highlight, then, would consist in an exchange: Social prestige in the occupation of a given office would come at the price of signing away part of one's freedoms to a contingent and unpredictable future guided by another agency. (shrink)

Building on the notational principles of C. S. Peirce’s graphical logic, Pietarinen has tried to develop a propositional logic unfolding in the medium of sound. Apart from its intrinsic interest, this project serves as a concrete test of logic’s range. However, I argue that Pietarinen’s inaugural proposal, while promising, has an important shortcoming, since it cannot portray double-negation without thereby portraying a contradiction.

Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “artificial moral agency” and “artificial moral responsibility”? I answer no. Or, to be more precise, I argue that such notions may become philosophically acceptable only after crucial metaphysical issues have been addressed. My main claim, in sum, is that “artificial moral responsibility” betokens moral responsibility to the same degree that a “fake orgasm” betokens an orgasm.

Some have suggested that images can be arguments. Images can certainly bolster the acceptability of individual premises. We worry, though, that the static nature of images prevents them from ever playing a genuinely argumentative role. To show this, we call attention to a dilemma. The conclusion of a visual argument will either be explicit or implicit. If a visual argument includes its conclusion, then that conclusion must be demarcated from the premise or otherwise the argument will beg the question. If (...) a visual argument does not include its conclusion, then the premises on display must license that specific conclusion and not its opposite, in accordance with some demonstrable rationale. We show how major examples from the literature fail to escape this dilemma. Drawing inspiration from the graphical logic of C. S. Peirce, we suggest instead that images can be manipulated in a way that overcomes the dilemma. Diagrammatic reasoning can take one stepwise from an initial visual layout to a conclusion—thereby providing a principled rationale that bars opposite conclusions—and the visual inscription of this correct conclusion can come afterward in time—thereby distinguishing the conclusion from the premises. Even though this practical application of Peirce’s logical ideas to informal contexts requires that one make adjustments, we believe it points to a dynamic conception of visual argumentation that will prove more fertile in the long run. (shrink)

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric (...) subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing uninterpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced. (shrink)

This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some (...) of the awkwardness that plagues his account would be remedied by transitioning to a more inclusive philosophy of signs. (shrink)

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period (...) – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward. (shrink)

Prompted by the thesis that an organism’s umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disvalue. For want of a more explicit account, theorists (...) writing on the topic have relied almost exclusively on semiotic insights about perception originally designed as part of a sophisticated refutation of idealism. The end result, which has been a form of direct givenness, has thus been far from convincing. In an effort to bring substance to the right-headed suggestion that values are rooted in the biological and conform to species-specific requirements, we present a novel conception that strives to make explicit the elemental structure underlying umwelt normativity. Building and expanding on the seminal work of Ayn Rand in metaethics, we describe values as an intertwined lattice which takes a creature’s own embodied life as its ultimate standard; and endeavour to show how, from this, all subsequent valuations can in principle be determined. (shrink)

Bien loin de ne poser que des problèmes spécifiques dont aurait à s'occuper une éthique particulière réservée à des experts, la médecine confrontée à l'appareil technoscientifique moderne nous oblige à reprendre à la base les questions les plus générales et les plus radicales concernant l'homme et sa conduite. C'est pourquoi cet ouvrage questionne la philosophie, le droit et l'éthique jusque dans leurs fondements avant d'aborder les problèmes les plus brûlants de notre actualité médicale. Dans une perspective à la fois interdisciplinaire (...) et fondamentale, nous présentons ici trois approches - philosophique, juridique et médicale qui constituent autant d'entrées possibles. Ainsi regroupées et articulées, les différences qui existent entre les rationalités, les pratiques et les discours peuvent devenir des facteurs d'enrichissement réciproque au lieu de constituer des obstacles. (shrink)

On fait des déclarations d'amour ainsi que des déclarations de guerre ; chacun est tenu de déclarer aussi ses impôts et ses marchandises à la douane. Déclarer, c'est d'abord dévoiler un fait pour qu'il fasse lien. Ce livre " déclare " la philosophie en ce qu'il tente de la monter à l'oeuvre au cœur des sciences, des techniques et des arts aussi bien que de la religion et de la politique. On a rédigé, en un moment solennel et mémorable, une (...) " Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen.. ".. Déclarer, ce peut être affirmer une volonté pour qu'elle fasse droit, au besoin en renouvelant le droit lui-même. On trouvera ainsi dans ce recueil une incitation à poser la question philosophique des règles et des normes dont les sciences sociales et humaines ont puissamment contribué à établir l'emprise sur notre monde. (shrink)

Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and (...) unless we benefit from what is given in experience, we cannot know whether to affirm the antecedents of those conditionals. (shrink)

"Representation" is one of those Janus-faced terms that seems blatantly obvious when used in a casual or pre-theoretic manner, but which reveals itself far more slippery when attentively studied. Any allusion to "metarepresentation", it would then seem, only compounds these difficulties. Taking the metarepresentationalist framework in its roughest outline as our point of departure, we thus articulate four key "structural" features that appear binding for any such theory.

This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is a mode of direct access to the world. Since puts no bounds on what would constitute reasonable doubt, it invites skeptical concerns which overthrow. Conversely, since says that there are some experiences which we are entitled to trust, it (...) undermines the prescriptive scope of. Drawing on C. S. Peirce's distinction between genuine and contrived doubt, I maintain that critical revisions of beliefs should be triggered only by unwanted disruptions of habits, thereby restoring unity between McDowell's two theses. (shrink)

Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up.".

This article presents the critique of cybernetics as central to the history of one of the twentieth century’s most infamous avant-garde movements: the Situationist International (SI). Bringing together and analysing a series of seemingly marginal events in the build-up to May ’68, this article shows how the SI’s portrait of cybernetics as an emerging form of social power and control foreshadows later developments in French radical thought. This little-noted trajectory in the situationist movement also highlights the ways in which aesthetics, (...) theory, and politics are inextricably tied together in the events of May ’68. (shrink)

Dominique Lecourt argues that a counter-revolution in French intellectual life has seen the period of the master thinkers of the 1960s succeeded by an era of ...

This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends less careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It is emphasized that, in order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a triadic sign - including the interpretant - would have to be abiotic (that is, not dependent on a living organism). Failure to heed this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a natural sign (like smoke coming from fire) for an (...) instance of abiotic semiosis. A more rigorous and reserved approach to the topic is called for. (shrink)

A typical device in film is to have a character narrating what is going on, but this narration is not always a reliable guide to the events. According to Maier, distortions may be caused by the narrator’s intent, naivety, use of drugs, and/or cognitive disorder/illness. What is common to these various causes, he argues, is the presence of a point of view, which appears in a movie as shots. While this perspective-based account of unreliability covers most cases, I unpack its (...) methodological consequences and gesture at a possibility that Maier’s analysis overlooks. A narration, I suggest, can be unreliable simply because it is ill-timed with the events shown on screen. In such a case, the distortion is not due to any character’s point of view; rather, it comes from the film medium’s ability to divorce what is seen and what is heard. As a consequence of this mismatch, it is possible to have a reliable narrator but an unreliable narration. Since voice and context of utterance usually match in ordinary speech, I conclude that philosophy of language may be ill-suited to properly understand this particular phenomenon. (shrink)

L’époque carolingienne est qualifiée de renaissance car il y eut alors une forte volonté de retourner aux textes antiques. Dans le présent article, après avoir précisé les conditions matérielles qui ont commandé la copie des écrits patristiques puis leur circulation dans le monde carolingien, on tente de mettre en lumière la fréquentation des Pères par les différents auteurs carolingiens. Mais, et c’est là le cœur de la question, les œuvres des Pères ne sont-elles pas employées par les clercs du ix (...) e siècle comme autant d’arguments dans les différentes polémiques qui les mettent aux prises? C’est ce qui justifierait leur copie. (shrink)

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, (...) it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others. (shrink)

L'environnementalisme n'est pas à la hauteur des véritables défis qui menacent notre société. Philosophe des techniques, Dominique Bourg nous invite à reformuler notre rapport à la nature à l'échelle de la planète. Contre les rêveries romantiques et les fantasmes futuristes, il propose une véritable politique de la biosphère en accord avec l'écologie industrielle et le développement durable. Il aborde des thèmes aussi concrets que la pollution de l'air, les plantes transgéniques ou la nécessité d'évaluer les choix technologiques. Un vrai (...) dialogue d'éducation écologique qui va à l'essentiel. (shrink)

This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed (...) by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences. (shrink)

Historians occasionally use timelines, but many seem to regard such signs merely as ways of visually summarizing results that are presumably better expressed in prose. Challenging this language-centered view, I suggest that timelines might assist the generation of novel historical insights. To show this, I begin by looking at studies confirming the cognitive benefits of diagrams like timelines. I then try to survey the remarkable diversity of timelines by analyzing actual examples. Finally, having conveyed this (mostly untapped) potential, I argue (...) that neglecting timelines might mean neglecting significant aspects of reality that are revealed only by those signs. My overall message is that once we accept that relations are as important for the mind as what they relate, we have to pay closer attention to any semiotic device that enables or facilitates the discernment of new relations. (shrink)

The present paper reports a set of experimental studies concerning the comprehension of French argumentative operators and connectives.The first part is a presentation of the theoretical framework, the methodological problems and some of the most general results. Experiments were carried out in the perspective of the linguistic theory of argumentation developed by Anscombre and Ducrot. According to this theory, a number of devices in language are mainly defined by their argumentation function, i.e. by the types of discursive sequences and conclusions (...) they involve. Three categories of such devices were examined: (1) operators like “presque” (almost), “à peine” (hardly), “au moins” (at least), etc. which give an argumentative orientation to the statement; (2) co-orientation connectives, like “même” (even), which relate two statements oriented towards the same conclusion; (3) counter-orientation connectives, like the concessive ones (“mais” (but), “quand même” (even so), etc.), which relate two statements oriented towards opposite conclusions. The data shed light on issues such as: What is the nature of the relationship between the informative and argumentative functions of different operators? Is there a hierarchical relation between the argumentative processes of “co-orientation” and “counter-orientation”? What is the role of negation in the processing of argumentative sequences?The second part of the paper focuses specifically on the study of how 8 and 10 year-old children process “counter-oriented” statements. Five concessive connectives were studied: “mais”, “pourtant”, “quand même”, “même si”, “bien que”. The test was composed of two successive completion tasks: in one task the children had to choose the relevant context of complex sentences involving concessive connectives; in the other task they had to choose their relevant conclusion. Main results show a clear evolution in the performance of children between 8 and 10, suggesting that concessive strategies are not completely mastered at the age of 8. Differences among the concessive connectives studied were brought out: the item “quand même” obtained much better results than the other items with 8-year-old subjects; statements with “mais” seemed to be better processed in the conclusion task than in the context task, especially by 10-year-old subjects. These results are compared with other data obtained in some of the numerous studies on the production and comprehension of concessive connectives in various languages, and discussed from the point of view of argumentative theory. (shrink)

Larzac, Plogoff, Creys-Malville, mais aussi Faucheurs volontaires ou Notre-Dame-des-Landes... Ces noms résonnent à nos oreilles comme autant de jalons de luttes citoyennes et politiques autour des grands enjeux de l'écologie depuis plus de 40 ans en France. Les 150 affiches réunies dans cet ouvrage nous racontent à leur façon ces engagements, de façon joyeuse, agressive, ou simplement informatives. C'est en 1974, lorsque René Dumont se présente avec panache à l'élection présidentielle française, que l'écologie politique entre dans la vie quotidienne de (...) chacun. Il apparaît alors que le diagnostic écologique appelle une réforme de la société en général. Mouvements, courants de pensée, philosophie, style de vie, les enjeux qu'elle défend sont multiples et pluriels. Progrès, croissance, nucléaire, mais aussi citoyenneté, pollution... De ce foisonnement complexe émergent des luttes locales, environnementales, nationales, européennes... Près de 150 affiches et de documents accompagnent dans ce livre le propos de l'auteur. Joyeuses, agressives, ou simplement informatives, elles montrent les enjeux de ces combats, entre utopie, détermination, et nouvelles donnes. Cette promenade dans le temps, par le texte et l'image, restitue le lyrisme ou le désenchantement d'une époque qui oscille entre espérance et désillusion. Elles donnent le ton des revendications écologiques, environnementales, sur la pertinence de la partition traditionnelle droite/gauche pour les enjeux écologiques ou simplement humains qui ponctuent notre société depuis quarante ans. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage propose une approche globale des reconstructions érudites et des utilisations polémiques de la philosophie de la Renaissance dans la France du XIXe siècle en centrant l’attention sur une relecture politique de la pratique historiographique à l’époque de Victor Cousin. This book offers a comprehensive approach to scholarly reconstructions and polemical uses of Renaissance philosophy in nineteenth-century France by focusing on the political implications of historiographical practice in Victor Cousin’s time.

Demander une assistance médicale à la procréation, recourir à l'avortement pour des raisons diverses, contrôler après coup une conduite sexuelle à risque par une pilule du lendemain, et bientôt peut-être exiger d'être euthanasié : depuis que l'État s'est engagé dans un processus de dépénalisation de ces pratiques médicales, on peut aujourd'hui faire beaucoup de choses de son propre corps quand il s'agit du début ou de la fin de vie. Cette liberté s'exerce néanmoins à une condition, toujours la même : (...) se présenter devant un médecin. Et que vous demande ce médecin? Presque rien, semble-t-il. Il vous demande de vous asseoir et de parler de votre état, de votre demande. Bref, de ce qui vous amène là. C'est ce " presque rien " dont il est question dans cet ouvrage. Un " presque rien " qui révèle, en réalité, un nouveau système de surveillance dans lequel le médecin prodigue informations et conseils à un sujet jugé désormais capable de prendre seul des décisions souveraines en matière de vie et de mort. Un face-à-face où apparaît le malaise de ceux qui assument la délicate mission de recueillir l'expression du désir ou de la détresse. À partir d'une longue enquête dans le secret des cabinets médicaux, l'auteur explique comment la régulation juridique a laissé place à des formes de pouvoir beaucoup plus sophistiquées, un dispositif souple de gouvernement des conduites qui laisse toute sa place à l'autocontrôle et à l'intériorisation par les individus des normes sociales. Elle montre ainsi comment, du cabinet du praticien jusqu'au Comité consultatif national d'éthique, c'est une nouvelle administration du vivant qui se met en place. (shrink)

Histoire de ce traité, de sa diffusion et de son influence et étude littéraire et doctrinale. L'étude doctrinale de la triade " puissance, sagesse, bonté " telle qu'elle est formulée dans le traité, sa comparaison avec les " Theologiae " d'Abélard, invitent à réinterpréter le débat trinitaire au XIIe siècle, Hugues de Saint-Victor devant être tenu pour l'auteur de la triade.

Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland in information-theoretic terms. Dennett makes much of the fact that the morphological shorthand which emerges before a witness as she looks upon cohesive aggregates of matter commands some measure of predictive power. This, for him, speaks against eliminating recourse to an intentional vocabulary. By contrast, the eliminative materialism defended by Churchland does not gloss such informational compressibility as (...) an explanatory desideratum, and thus regards the informational noise which accrues at higher levels of description as patently unacceptable. Yet, since it is unlikely, as Ross, Ladyman, and Collier (2007) have recently suggested, that anything remains once we subtract the appeal to patterns, I argue that the ubiquity of informational compression in scientific explanation seriously undermines the claim that talk of the mental could be eliminated. (shrink)

Jordan Peterson has attracted a high level of attention. Controversies may bring people into contact with Peterson's work, but ideas are arguably what keep them there. Focusing on those ideas, this book explores Peterson’s answers to perennial questions. What is common to all humans, regardless of their background? Is complete knowledge ever possible? What would constitute a meaningful life? Why have humans evolved the capacity for intelligence? Should one treat others as individuals or as members of a group? Is a (...) single person powerless in the face of evil? What is the relation between speech, thought, and action? Why have religious myths and narratives figured so prominently in human history? Are the hierarchies we find in society good or bad? After devoting a chapter to each of these questions, Champagne unites the different strands of Peterson’s thinking in a handy summary. Champagne then spends the remaining third of the book articulating his main critical concerns. He argues that while building on tradition is inevitable and indeed desirable, Peterson’s individualist project is hindered by the non-revisable character and self-sacrificial content of religious belief. This engaging multidisciplinary study is ideal for those who know little about Peterson’s views, or for those who are familiar but want to see more clearly how Peterson’s views hang together. The debates spearheaded by Peterson are in full swing, so Myth, Meaning, and Antifragile Individualism should become a reference point for any serious engagement with Peterson’s ideas. (shrink)

It is usually thought that only one being can be all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving. Challenging this monotheist conviction, I propose a universe ruled by two deities: ‘day shift God’ oversees the events that occur while the sun is up, whereas ‘night shift God’ oversees the events that occur while the sun is down. I survey objections to this proposal and conclude that the real obstacle is not an argument, but an aesthetic preference.

In response to the claim that our sense of will is illusory, some philosophers have called for a better understanding of the phenomenology of agency. Although I am broadly sympathetic with the tenor of this response, I question whether the positive-theoretic blueprint it promotes truly heralds a tenable undertaking. Marshaling a Schopenhauerian insight, I examine the possibility that agency might not be amenable to phenomenological description. Framing this thesis in terms of Charles S. Peirce’s semiotic framework, I suggest a way (...) to integrate the idea of streaming experiences with that of bodily strivings, which, owing to their primitive structure, can never be represented. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke’s (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate—and defend—what is known as the “blank check” proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could (...) willingly make themselves answerable for whatever events ensue, even if those events stem from the robot’s autonomous decision(s). This blank check solution was originally proposed in the context of automated warfare (Champagne & Tonkens, 2015), but we extend it to cover all robots. We argue that, because moral answerability in the blank check is accepted voluntarily and before bad outcomes are known, it proves superior to alternative ways of assigning blame. We end by highlighting how, in addition to being just, this self-initiated and prospective moral answerability for robot harm provides deterrence that the four other stances cannot match. (shrink)