Phenomenology, Misc

Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a discrete present that, however, (...) suffers from the same difficulties that the instantaneous present is prone to. After introducing the main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature, I show that none of them favors presentism. I conclude by arguing that if even the phenomenology of time sides against presentism, the latter metaphysical theory has no scientific evidence in its favor and ought to be dropped. (shrink)

Partindo de uma crítica à condenação kantiana de toda e qualquer mentira, faz-se uma análise da relação entre a decisão de revelar a verdade e as instâncias de poder em que o sujeito se insere. Dada a introjeção das estruturas de poder e seu papel nas deliberações do Eu Consciente, concluímos que mentir implica num reconhecimento do poder da figura a quem se mente. Do ato leviano de mentir decorre prejuízo irreparável ao teste de realidade de quem mente.

In 1924, the Munich-school phenomenologist Moritz Geiger argued that there are dynamic essences. His two examples are the tragic, and being human, his main ideas are that what it takes to be tragic varies over time historically and that what makes an organism human varies across different stages of its ontogenetic development. He hence points to two ways in which essences may be dynamic, that is, subject to change. The current paper takes Geiger’s view seriously and assumes that it poses (...) an explanatory challenge for the, then and now, standard view that essences are ‘Platonic’, i.e. cannot be subject to change. In the first part of the paper, I introduce Geiger’s view and a bit of its historical context. In the second, I first formulate the challenge it poses to the standard ‘platonic’ view of essence, then discuss how this challenge can be met by a contemporary view of essence discussing three potential responses. The first relies on a notion of relativized essence, the second on the distinction between determinables and determinates, the third and last one on multidimensional properties. Finally, I argue that the last of these three proposals may be preferable to the other two. (shrink)

Mathematics has a long track record of refining the concepts by which we make sense of the world. For example, mathematics allows one to speak about different senses of "sameness", depending on the larger context. Phenomenology is the name of a philosophical discipline that tries to systematically investigate the first-personal perspective on reality and how it is constituted. Together, mathematics and phenomenology seem to be a good fit to derive statements about our experience that are, at the same time, well-defined, (...) precise, and significant to our inner lives. However, there are difficulties stemming from the fact that phenomenology deals with inherently subjective things. Phenomenological investigations seem to lose their appeal when trying to approach them in the clear-cut way afforded by mathematics. How to overcome this obstacle? We argue that the Arts play a special role in mediating between the precise statements of mathematics and the sometimes fuzzy nature of our experience. Mathematics and art are complementary ways to come to a comprehensive understanding of reality. (shrink)

My central research focus over the past 30 years has been the articulation of what I call a radically temporal approach to philosophy. In the papers below, written between 2001 and 2022, I treat the varying ways in which radically temporal thinking manifests itself in the phenomenological perspectives of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Eugene Gendlin. I also discuss Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project and George Kelly's personal construct theory as examples of radically temporal thinking. With the aim of clarifying and (...) further defining the nature of this family of orientations, I have delineated the important ways in which it differs from a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that includes hermeneutic and radical constructivisms, social constructionism, 4EA (Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective) cognition, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of corporeal intersubjectivity, autopoietic self-organizing systems theory and American pragmatism. Among the authors whose work I have submitted to critique from the radically temporal perspective are: Francisco Varela (autopoietic self-organizing systems), Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Matthew Ratcliffe, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Dan Zahavi, Hanne De Jaegher, Michel Bitbol, Thomas Fuchs (enactive, embodied ('4EA') cognition), Gilles Deleuze (Deleuzian biopolitics), Ken Gergen and John Shotter ( social constructionism), Kym Maclaren ( critical phenomenology) and Jan Slaby (critical neuroscience). I argue that these authors' accounts of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, attention , reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, the basis of mathematical naturalism and sensori-motor models of behavior, and the relation between the body, language and culture remain burdened by traditional presuppositions that the radically temporal philosophies of Heidegger et al put into question. (shrink)

The aim of this intervention is to briefly advance an interpretation of the post- COVID19 digitalisation processes as to be recognised within the philosophical framework of Vorstellung Metaphysik, “metaphysics of representation”. I would maintain that the formula, firstly indicated by Martin Heidegger, can provide us with a tool to interpret contemporary culture as founded on an “iteration” of individual and collective consciousness into non-existent digital realities. Moreover, I will argue that these concepts are philosophically relatable to those of alienation and (...) reification that come from Marxist traditions. Ultimately, the analysis will try to use the above mentioned tools to delve into an interpretation of remote working and education as potential carriers of alienation. (shrink)

How should we conceive of the relationship between finite subjectivity and reflection? And what implications does this have for the phenomenological method? This article addresses these questions by reconstructing the main pillars of Patočka’s theory of the subject. I present three of Patočka’s key arguments related to finitude, consciousness, and the world (the primacy of the sum, the reduction to immanence, and temporality); then, after every argument, I outline their implications for Patočka’s philosophy. In particular, I highlight how Patočka’s thought (...) implies a repositioning of the subject in the world to which it ontologically belongs and a reassessment of the meaning of reflection. These theoretical assumptions open phenomenology to a different understanding of the subject than it had previously possessed and promote rich analysis of the movements of existence. The most important implication of Patočka’s theory of finite subjectivity, however, concerns the concept of the world, which bear a significance that extends beyond its critical position vis-à-vis transcendental subjectivity. (shrink)

This paper interprets Ortega y Gasset’s Meditations on Hunting (1972) through the concept of cognitive scaffolding in order to analyse the relationship between hunter and hunting dog as a form of inter-species distributed cognitive system. In recreational hunting, the hunter and the dog engage in a reciprocal process of mutual cognitive scaffolding that transforms both their capacities. It is further argued that this scaffolding also serves as a means of affective regulation, and that it is the affective rather than the (...) cognitive features of the system that point to the function of the scaffolding. Namely, the production of an affective state in the hunter. We detail the ways in which the cognitive and affective features of the scaffold operate and interrelate. We then explore the role of the game-animal in the affective functioning of the scaffold and consider that the hunter-dog system might represent a harmful form of scaffolding. (shrink)

I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role (...) it plays in organizing our experience of self and world in everyday life. Additionally, I suggest the notion can, in this context of application, potentially enhance our understanding of and empathy for those living with schizophrenic disorders. (shrink)

This paper revives phenomenological elements to have a better framework for addressing the implications of technologies on society. For this reason, we introduce the motto “back to the technologies themselves” to show how some phenomenological elements, which have not been highlighted in the philosophy of technology so far, can be fruitfully integrated within the postphenomenological analysis. In particular, we introduce the notion of technological intentionality in relation to the passive synthesis in Husserl’s phenomenology. Although the notion of technological intentionality has (...) already been coined in postphenomenology, it is “in tension” with the notion of technological mediation since there are still no clear differences between these two concepts and studies on how they relate one to another. The tension between mediation and intentionality arises because it seems intuitively reasonable to suggest that intentionality differs from mediation in a number of ways; however, these elements have not been clearly clarified in postphenomenology so far. To highlight what technological intentionality is and how it differs from mediation, we turn the motto “back to the things themselves” into “back to the technologies themselves,” showing how the technologies have to be taken into consideration by themselves. More specifically, we use the concept of passive synthesis developed by Husserl, and we apply it to technologies to show their inner passive activity. The notion of the passive synthesis enables to demonstrate how technologies are able to connect to a wider (technological) environment without the subjects’ activity. Consequently, we claim that technologies have their pole of action, and they passively act by themselves. (shrink)

In the realm of Philosophical Practice, there remains a lack of clarity surrounding the essential characteristics that define a practice as “philosophical”. This paper aims to establish seven minimal criteria that must be met by a philosophical consultancy in order to be considered genuinely “philosophical”. Additionally, it explores the question of how one can assess the quality of such a philosophical consultancy. I provide a (non-exhaustive) answer from an Aristotelian point of view, according to which goodness is a matter of (...) balance. In the context of philosophical consultancy, the consultant should find this balance in two respects: first, between their concern for the topic and their concern for the individual seeking counsel, and, secondly, between a hermeneutical and a critical attitude in dialogue. Finally, I present a visual representation of my findings that can serve as a tool for evaluating whether a consultancy is philosophical and whether it is balanced. __ En el ámbito de la práctica filosófica, sigue habiendo una falta de claridad en torno a las características esenciales que definen una práctica como "filosófica". Este artículo pretende establecer siete criterios mínimos que debe cumplir una consultoría filosófica para ser considerada genuinamente "filosófica". Además, explora la cuestión de cómo se puede evaluar la calidad de dicha consultoría filosófica. Aporto una respuesta (no exhaustiva) desde un punto de vista aristotélico, según el cual la bondad es una cuestión de equilibrio. En el contexto de la consultoría filosófica, el consultor debe encontrar este equilibrio en dos aspectos: en primer lugar, entre su preocupación por el tema y su preocupación por el individuo que busca consejo, y, en segundo lugar, entre una actitud hermenéutica y una actitud crítica en el diálogo. Por último, presento una representación visual de mis conclusiones que puede servir de herramienta para evaluar si una consultoría es filosófica y si está equilibrada. (shrink)

Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some (...) reasons not to proceed this way. It is therefore doubtful to hold that pragmatists and enactivists would converge in the defence of a common, non-representational conception of intentionality. (shrink)

A feminist reading of how Heidegger may have responded to an unanswered questioned he posed in 1923, "Problem: What is woman?" while using his thought to better understand how contemporary society replies to questions in the realms of law, bioethics, pedagogy, and politics.

Es dürfte wohl kaum verwundern, dass die Texte in einem Band, welche das Werk von Georg Stenger würdigen, insbesondere zwei Bereichen entspringen: der Phänomenologie und der interkulturellen Philosophie. Wollte man die herausragenden Autor:innen dieses Bandes unter einem einzigen programmatischen Begriff vereinen, so wäre dies gewiss die einer »Interkulturellen Phänomenologie«. Darunter werden indes unterschiedliche Fragestellungen verhandelt, so etwa die interkulturellen Verflechtungen des Denkens, die Verortungen der Welt, der Anspruch des Anderen im Politischen sowie das Phänomen des Dazwischen, der Genese und Physis.

The thesis aims at covering two paths that can be found within the XX Century's continental philosophy. On one hand, the analysis will focus on what M. Theunissen called Heidegger's "Being and Time"'s 'social ontology'. On the other, the work will delve into young Herbert Marcuse's so-called 'heideggerian marxism' via questioning his works located between 1928 and 1933.

Time irreversibility is a central attribute of many process-oriented projects of semiosis, from Peirce’s endless semiosis to Valsiner’s Inter-modal Pre-construction Method. Grounding time irreversibility via an incrementally more rigorous system theoretic model can contribute to the efficacy of these semiotic process philosophies. If, for example, it can be shown that each moment in a semiosic system is distinct, even if related, to all other moments, then time irreversibility will have been demonstrated. This distinctness, or thisness, of the semiosic being, is (...) the Scholastic idea of haecceity. This paper will contextualize the notion of haecceity via semiotic concepts. A system theoretic model – informed by thermodynamic, information and neuroscientific disciplines – will be summarized as a heuristic lens through which the semiotic concepts will be grounded. By extension, haecceity, understood semiotically, will also be grounded. And, once it can be rigorously illustrated that each present semiosic moment is ontologically unique and distinct from all other moments, both past and future, for the semiosic being, time irreversibility can also be justified. (shrink)

The use of philosophical phenomenology for conceptual debates in psychiatric nosology and psychopathology is beginning to be recognized. In this paper, we extend this trajectory to include Tourette Syndrome, focusing on so-called premonitory urges (PU) preceding Tourettic tics. We clarify some inconsistencies around typology in both phenomenological description and medical classification (i.e., in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition, Text Revision, International Classification of Diseases, 10th edition [World Health Organization, 2004], and the scales that elicit PU). (...) We show how a less typological approach might be usefully deployed in the field, that being the dimensional approach developed by Fernandez (2019a; 2019b). We test both the typological and dimensional approaches in relation to the experience and etiological role of PU in Tourette’s syndrome. Based on our synthesis of existing studies and new information garnered through phenomenological interviews (using an approach associated with “micro-phenomenology”), we argue that the role of PU in nosology challenges both the current “operational” criteria favored by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition, Text Revision, that are focused on behaviorally observed symptoms, as well as essential and prototypical phenomenological descriptions about a given “type” of experience. (shrink)

The Environmental Uncanny argues that the increasing destitution of our world is the result of a certain forgetfulness: we have forgotten that the basis of our knowledge is not calculative reason, but our participation in the natural world. Offering a unique interdisciplinary perspective on the global environmental crisis - ranging from traditional phenomenology, including substantial discussion of both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, to philosophy of biology, to architectural and urban design theory, to landscape photography, this book makes illuminating connections to paint (...) a multifaceted picture. (shrink)

Lavinia Marin draws from phenomenology to lay bare another aspect of the ubiquitous presence of social media. By taking the phenomenology of attention as a starting-point, she show that attention is – rather than only a scare resource as analysts departing from the perspective of the attention economy would have it – foundational for our moral relations to other beings. She argues that there is a distinctive form of other-oriented attention that enables us to perceive other beings as living beings (...) that are worthy of care. This mode of attention presupposes a form of affectivity and involves the recognition of the other as a moral being capable of forming judgments, as well as someone having certain vulnerabilities. Her analysis shows that by prioritizing homogenous interactions and standardization, social media platforms hinder us from engaging in this mode of attention, thereby undermining our capacity of recognizing to others as surprising, changing, and fallible beings. (shrink)

As touch remains commonly defined by the closeness it physically implies and it rhetorically evokes, the mere notion of distant touch and of distal haptic perception seems peculiar. But Aristotle’s perspective, which I wish to take as a point of departure, is firm: we perceive the objects of touch, the hot and the cold, the hard and the soft, the curved and the sharp, through other things: δι' ἑτέρων. In this article, I would like to explore this ἕτερος by showing (...) how the otherness of perception always implies an intermediary, a middle point (μέσος), i.e. an other not so other, an other that is able to translate the much more distant otherness of the perceived object. To explore these forgotten layers of alterity that fall into what we commonly conceive of as the impalpable emptiness of distance, I propose to study the idea of distant touch from the perspective of phenomenological aesthetics. In order to do so, I will first examine some aspects of the Husserlian account of perception and will then focus on the phenomenology of distant touch in Alejandra Costamagna’s novel El Sistema del Tacto [The System of Touch] (2018). (shrink)

What is logotherapy based on? How does logotherapy differ from psychotherapies or other traditional forms of therapy? What disorders does logotherapy help with? These are the questions to which the 'Handbook for logotherapists' gives a clear and consistent answer. The Handbook starts from two logotherapeutic premisses, according to which there is a Noological dimension in human consciousness, which differs from the psychic dimension of consciousness and human has a will to purpose. These premisses are basic assumptions set by Viktor Frankl (...) himself. ‘Handbook for Logotherapists’ aims to verify these premisses by starting with studying the Noological dimension of human consciousness in relation to the psychic dimension. Based on research, the Handbook draws e.g. the following conclusions: a) The Noological dimension differs in its function and content from the psychic dimension, b) the human will to purpose is a characteristic of the Noological dimension that cannot be found in the psychic dimension, and c) there can be disorders in the Noological dimension that originate from the experienced conflict between the functioning of (the agents of) the Noological dimension (self-distancing and self-transcendence) and the situational reality. Purpose cannot be invented, but is to be found outside of a person, in the situational reality. Searching, finding, realizing and implementing purposes always involve the functioning of both self-transcendence and self-distancing. That is why self-distancing and self-transcendence are the primary agents of the Noological dimension. However, the process of searching, finding and implementing a purpose can become corrupted, as purpose may be missing, it may be lost or gone, it may be distorted, or the situation may have distorted the purpose, even if the functioning of the agents of the Noological dimension is healthy. Although these distortions with experiencing a purpose often manifest themselves unfavorably also in a person's somatic condition and in the functioning of the psychic dimension in many different ways, they are - nevertheless - distortions that are a person's healthy reaction to a sick state or situation, and their basis is in the Noological dimension of consciousness. With the help of logotherapy, it is possible to separate disorders of the Noological dimension from disorders of the psychic dimension, to detect what kind of distortion with experiencing a purpose is involved, and to treat a particular distortion with logotherapy's own treatment methods. 'Handbook for logotherapists' shows why logotherapy as a specific form of therapy is the most appropriate aid for the treatment of purpose-centered distortions and demonstrates, how these distortions can be detected and treated with logotherapeutic tools. -/- . (shrink)

This chapter connects the phenomenon of double bookkeeping to two critical debates in the philosophy of delusion: one from the analytic tradition and one from the phenomenological tradition. First, I will show how the failure of action guidance on the part of some delusions suggests an argument to the standard view that delusions are beliefs (doxasticism about delusion) and how its proponents have countered it by ascribing behavioral inertia to avolition, emotional disturbances, or a failure of the surrounding environment in (...) supporting the agent’s motivation to act. Second, I will show how the mismatch between the experience of double bookkeeping and that of having the usual propositional attitudes of folk psychology suggests another, more recalcitrant argument not only against doxasticism but against the very attempt to fit delusion into folk psychology. Third, I will show how phenomenologically inspired theories of delusion, such as the multiple realities hypothesis, bypass the debates above and focus on describing and understanding the disturbances in the structure of experience undergone by patients. I conclude that the philosophical discussions ensuing from an appreciation of double bookkeeping show some of the limitations of the analytic philosophical approach to delusion. (shrink)

In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus’ old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus’ arguments about the “frame problem” for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of (...) the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus’ work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective. (shrink)

In this paper, I review Ariemma's latest work "I piedi del mondo. Come le Nike hanno rivoluzionato l'immaginario globale", ed. Luiss University Press, 2024. In my review, I try using the book's content as an occasion for deepening further in the methodology of pop-philosophy: what do we mean when we assert we are doing pop-philosophy, and from which theoretical structure do we argue? Finally, i develop some ideas for a phenomenological contextualization of the pop-philosophy: if this discipline works with the (...) mass objects that constitute our immediate everyday life, I see phenomenology as a conceivable declination of pop-philosophy because of its interest of returning to the things themselves. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the Kingdom Hearts series as a video game declination of the ontological concept of relation and the phenomenological view on the empathy. My aim is to explicit the philosophical background of the video games, concluding that they offer a solidly grounded analysis of what is about to be a self, and what are bounds for the subjectivity.

In the present paper, I analyze the Husserlian theory of time from a phenomenology of person perspective. I suggest that the phenomenological concept of time – especially considering the notions of ritentional modifications and sinking – is strictly related with the personal individuation. Hence, my argument is that personhood is developed with latent and subliminal inclinations too, opening a new discussion regarding the reliability of the eidetic-reductive method in characterology.

In this paper, I draw the fundamental structures of the phenomenology of the person, on the basis of a precise theoretical assumption: to introduce to phenomenology of the person is to introduce to the eidetic phenomenology. So, my paper explores the fundamental questions of the Husserlian phenomenology, and traces a path towards the contemporary questions of the phenomenology of the person: what is a person in the era of social networks and liquid society?

In this paper, I interview Francesca De Vecchi (Full Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in Vita-Salute San Raffaele University) about her qualitative ontology and its social and normative implications. If at the foundation of our lifeworld there are significantly qualitative experiences, phenomenology can investigate the most important contemporary issues, such as gender disparity, socio-virtuality depersonalizations and political urgencies.

Trauma is notoriously difficult to communicate, as it often defies understanding. It unfolds over time and cannot be told through linear narratives. Nevertheless, we show that narratives can become a medium through which experiences of trauma may be shared, alleviating the sense of alienation common to post-traumatic experience. Drawing from one of the authors’ lived experiences of cancer and her illness narrative, we focus on the question of whether traumatic events can be narrated, known, and shared. In conversation with one (...) another, and building on phenomenological literature on trauma (Husserl, 1973, Walther, 1923), illness (Carel, 2021, 2016), and working with an autoethnographic approach to cancer (Pini, 2022; Pini and Maguire-Rosier, 2021; Pini and Pini, 2019) in this chapter we address the ways in which creative and expressive illness narratives—particularly the sharing of such experiences—can help patients heal or repair from trauma. We identify the moment of the cancer diagnosis as a traumatic event, as it constitutes the expulsion of the individual into an alienworld: the world of the sick. We demonstrate how a philosophical account of unification (Walther 1923) may help shed light on the complexities of traumatic experience and highlight the potential of embodied narratives to re-establish a sense of belonging through sharing trauma experiences. We present a case in which performance art serves not only as an act of creatively re-modelling the performer’s illness narrative, but as a means to communicate this experience. Sharing the experience of trauma and recovery contributes to a re-constitution of a sense of belonging. We highlight that the (re-)constitution of feelings of belonging is a dyadic process between the traumatized individual and others. An illness narrative needs to be heard, seen, or otherwise witnessed in order to fulfil its full healing potential. In this way, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of how a narrative approach can be fruitfully applied in clinical practice. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie stellt eine der Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie dar und findet in zahlreichen Wissenschaften sowie in Praxis und Therapeutik starke Resonanz. Nach 120 Jahren Wirkungsgeschichte füllt die Bibliothek phänomenologischer Werke zahllose Bücherregale und selbst für Expert:innen ist die Forschungsliteratur mittlerweile unüberschaubar geworden. An allgemeinen Einführungen sowie spezialisierter Fachliteratur mangelt es dabei keineswegs, wohl aber an einem Handbuch, in dem sowohl der Vielfalt der historischen Entwicklungen als auch dem berechtigten Wunsch nach innerer systematischer Kohärenz Rechnung getragen wird. Das Handbuch Phänomenologie schließt (...) diese Lücke. Ausgewiesene Autor:innen bereiten in eigens für diesen Band verfassten Artikeln komplexe sachliche Zusammenhänge übersichtlich auf. Durch seinen Aufbau eignet sich das Handbuch sowohl für Anfänger:innen als auch für Fortgeschrittene. Anhand bündig präsentierter Grundbegriffe und Verfahren konturiert das Handbuch die Spezifik der phänomenologischen Methode, spart dabei jedoch nicht die Kontroversen und methodologischen Neuausrichtungen aus, die von ihrer Lebendigkeit und Vielstimmigkeit zeugen. Ein umfangreicher Schlussteil ist der Rezeption und Anwendung in einzelnen Wirkfeldern gewidmet. Als Hilfsmittel zur eigenständigen Erschließung der phänomenologischen Denkrichtung und zu ihrer Anwendung auf aktuelle Probleme zeichnet sich das Handbuch durch seine Leser:innenfreundlichkeit und einen stark forschungspraktischen Bezug aus. Ein Kompendium, das sich bald als ABC der Phänomenologie etablieren dürfte. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie stellt eine der Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie dar und findet in zahlreichen Wissenschaften sowie in Praxis und Therapeutik starke Resonanz. Nach 120 Jahren Wirkungsgeschichte füllt die Bibliothek phänomenologischer Werke zahllose Bücherregale und selbst für Expert:innen ist die Forschungsliteratur mittlerweile unüberschaubar geworden. An allgemeinen Einführungen sowie spezialisierter Fachliteratur mangelt es dabei keineswegs, wohl aber an einem Handbuch, in dem sowohl der Vielfalt der historischen Entwicklungen als auch dem berechtigten Wunsch nach innerer systematischer Kohärenz Rechnung getragen wird. Das Handbuch Phänomenologie schließt (...) diese Lücke. Ausgewiesene Autor:innen bereiten in eigens für diesen Band verfassten Artikeln komplexe sachliche Zusammenhänge übersichtlich auf. Durch seinen Aufbau eignet sich das Handbuch sowohl für Anfänger:innen als auch für Fortgeschrittene. Anhand bündig präsentierter Grundbegriffe und Verfahren konturiert das Handbuch die Spezifik der phänomenologischen Methode, spart dabei jedoch nicht die Kontroversen und methodologischen Neuausrichtungen aus, die von ihrer Lebendigkeit und Vielstimmigkeit zeugen. Ein umfangreicher Schlussteil ist der Rezeption und Anwendung in einzelnen Wirkfeldern gewidmet. Als Hilfsmittel zur eigenständigen Erschließung der phänomenologischen Denkrichtung und zu ihrer Anwendung auf aktuelle Probleme zeichnet sich das Handbuch durch seine Leser:innenfreundlichkeit und einen stark forschungspraktischen Bezug aus. Ein Kompendium, das sich bald als ABC der Phänomenologie etablieren dürfte. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie stellt eine der Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie dar und findet in zahlreichen Wissenschaften sowie in Praxis und Therapeutik starke Resonanz. Nach 120 Jahren Wirkungsgeschichte füllt die Bibliothek phänomenologischer Werke zahllose Bücherregale und selbst für Expert:innen ist die Forschungsliteratur mittlerweile unüberschaubar geworden. An allgemeinen Einführungen sowie spezialisierter Fachliteratur mangelt es dabei keineswegs, wohl aber an einem Handbuch, in dem sowohl der Vielfalt der historischen Entwicklungen als auch dem berechtigten Wunsch nach innerer systematischer Kohärenz Rechnung getragen wird. Das Handbuch Phänomenologie schließt (...) diese Lücke. Ausgewiesene Autor:innen bereiten in eigens für diesen Band verfassten Artikeln komplexe sachliche Zusammenhänge übersichtlich auf. Durch seinen Aufbau eignet sich das Handbuch sowohl für Anfänger:innen als auch für Fortgeschrittene. Anhand bündig präsentierter Grundbegriffe und Verfahren konturiert das Handbuch die Spezifik der phänomenologischen Methode, spart dabei jedoch nicht die Kontroversen und methodologischen Neuausrichtungen aus, die von ihrer Lebendigkeit und Vielstimmigkeit zeugen. Ein umfangreicher Schlussteil ist der Rezeption und Anwendung in einzelnen Wirkfeldern gewidmet. Als Hilfsmittel zur eigenständigen Erschließung der phänomenologischen Denkrichtung und zu ihrer Anwendung auf aktuelle Probleme zeichnet sich das Handbuch durch seine Leser:innenfreundlichkeit und einen stark forschungspraktischen Bezug aus. Ein Kompendium, das sich bald als ABC der Phänomenologie etablieren dürfte. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie stellt eine der Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie dar und findet in zahlreichen Wissenschaften sowie in Praxis und Therapeutik starke Resonanz. Nach 120 Jahren Wirkungsgeschichte füllt die Bibliothek phänomenologischer Werke zahllose Bücherregale und selbst für Expert:innen ist die Forschungsliteratur mittlerweile unüberschaubar geworden. An allgemeinen Einführungen sowie spezialisierter Fachliteratur mangelt es dabei keineswegs, wohl aber an einem Handbuch, in dem sowohl der Vielfalt der historischen Entwicklungen als auch dem berechtigten Wunsch nach innerer systematischer Kohärenz Rechnung getragen wird. Das Handbuch Phänomenologie schließt (...) diese Lücke. Ausgewiesene Autor:innen bereiten in eigens für diesen Band verfassten Artikeln komplexe sachliche Zusammenhänge übersichtlich auf. Durch seinen Aufbau eignet sich das Handbuch sowohl für Anfänger:innen als auch für Fortgeschrittene. Anhand bündig präsentierter Grundbegriffe und Verfahren konturiert das Handbuch die Spezifik der phänomenologischen Methode, spart dabei jedoch nicht die Kontroversen und methodologischen Neuausrichtungen aus, die von ihrer Lebendigkeit und Vielstimmigkeit zeugen. Ein umfangreicher Schlussteil ist der Rezeption und Anwendung in einzelnen Wirkfeldern gewidmet. Als Hilfsmittel zur eigenständigen Erschließung der phänomenologischen Denkrichtung und zu ihrer Anwendung auf aktuelle Probleme zeichnet sich das Handbuch durch seine Leser:innenfreundlichkeit und einen stark forschungspraktischen Bezug aus. Ein Kompendium, das sich bald als ABC der Phänomenologie etablieren dürfte. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie stellt eine der Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie dar und findet in zahlreichen Wissenschaften sowie in Praxis und Therapeutik starke Resonanz. Nach 120 Jahren Wirkungsgeschichte füllt die Bibliothek phänomenologischer Werke zahllose Bücherregale und selbst für Expert:innen ist die Forschungsliteratur mittlerweile unüberschaubar geworden. An allgemeinen Einführungen sowie spezialisierter Fachliteratur mangelt es dabei keineswegs, wohl aber an einem Handbuch, in dem sowohl der Vielfalt der historischen Entwicklungen als auch dem berechtigten Wunsch nach innerer systematischer Kohärenz Rechnung getragen wird. Das Handbuch Phänomenologie schließt (...) diese Lücke. Ausgewiesene Autor:innen bereiten in eigens für diesen Band verfassten Artikeln komplexe sachliche Zusammenhänge übersichtlich auf. Durch seinen Aufbau eignet sich das Handbuch sowohl für Anfänger:innen als auch für Fortgeschrittene. Anhand bündig präsentierter Grundbegriffe und Verfahren konturiert das Handbuch die Spezifik der phänomenologischen Methode, spart dabei jedoch nicht die Kontroversen und methodologischen Neuausrichtungen aus, die von ihrer Lebendigkeit und Vielstimmigkeit zeugen. Ein umfangreicher Schlussteil ist der Rezeption und Anwendung in einzelnen Wirkfeldern gewidmet. Als Hilfsmittel zur eigenständigen Erschließung der phänomenologischen Denkrichtung und zu ihrer Anwendung auf aktuelle Probleme zeichnet sich das Handbuch durch seine Leser:innenfreundlichkeit und einen stark forschungspraktischen Bezug aus. Ein Kompendium, das sich bald als ABC der Phänomenologie etablieren dürfte. (shrink)

This book draws on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to develop new and promising solutions to contemporary debates about perception. In providing an extension and defense of Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual content and of the relation between perception and the world, it demonstrates the enduring value of Merleau-Ponty’s insights for philosophy of perception today. -/- The author focuses on two main topics: the contents and the nature of perception. In the first half of this book, the author tackles debates about the content of (...) perception, namely, what sorts of properties or features of the world reveal themselves to us in perception and in what modes. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s description of perceptual “sense,” the author argues that perception has a unique kind of content, which cannot be adequately described in terms of sensations or concepts. He then shows how this account of perceptual sense can clarify debates about the richness of perceptual content, including whether we can perceive moral properties. In the second half, he turns to the nature of perception. Here he argues that Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual intentionality makes available a powerful combination of the core insights of two main contemporary approaches to this question: realism and intentionalism. The author shows how this combination can be developed, defends it from objections, and explains how it is equipped to deal with problems posed by the existence of illusions and hallucinations. -/- Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy of Perception will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on phenomenology and the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

This paper investigates the meaning of the smile and how various kinds of disruptions motivate its thematization. In so doing, it broaches experiences in the recent pandemic, as the masked face disrupts the givenness of the smile. Indeed, the paper claims that such a situation affords the possibility of becoming even more attentive to the conditions of meaningfulness at a global scale. It evidences such a claim by first tracing some essential points of the meaning of meaning via the analysis (...) of intentionality in the work of Edmund Husserl and Bernard Lonergan; then, it reviews the classic treatment of the smile’s meaning by Frederick Buytendijk, along with Lonergan’s further clarification of how an pre-thematic or elemental relation between persons conditions the phenomena; it concludes by suggesting how various sorts of disruption might motivate the smile’s thematization, especially in phenomenology’s inquiry back to the elemental dimension of meaning. (shrink)

This essay accomplishes two goals. First, I explore Husserl’s study of “tension” from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest,” to reveal that it comprises his de facto first analysis of instinct. Husserl there describes tension as the innate pull to execute ever new objectifications. He clarifies this pull of objectification by contrasting it to affective and volitional experiences. This analysis surprisingly prefigures a theory of drive-feelings and anticipates the idea that consciousness is both teleological and (...) autotelic. Second, I show how Husserl’s de facto account of instincts from 1893 inspires his robust philosophy of instincts from Studies concerning the Structures of Consciousness and other late manuscripts. While Husserl maintains many 1893 insights, he now claims that the instinct towards objectification comprises affective and volitional moments. Finally, I demonstrate that Husserl’s analyses of instincts throughout his life are united by the idea that consciousness possesses an essential structural lack. (shrink)

Social media has become a basis for helping us maintain human contact, especially as our alienation from our phenomenological experiences of ‘being human’ is becoming apparent due to the pandemic. I argue for how existentialist philosophy is crucial, more than ever, to interrogate our social media usage, which is a ‘necessary evil’ in our daily lives. Firstly, Kierkegaard’s critiques of the crowd and of the press are equally applicable to social media, which plays both roles: enabling an anonymous mass of (...) public opinion and doubling-up as an information source, reducing responsibility on the individual. Secondly, social media leads to an intrinsic pressure to objectify one's self (as portrayed) due to the possibility of an omnipresent Other, based on the technological design of networks. I will link my arguments on social media to other existential ideals and will conclude by suggesting changes that may promote existential ideals in one’s social media portrayal and engagement. (shrink)

The paper investigates the role played by pre-scientific experience in the philosophy of Josiah Royce and Edmund Husserl. Such a notion, generally associated with Husserl’s conception of the life-world (Lebenswelt) in the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936), finds an equivalent and historical antecedent in Royce’s distinction between a world of description and a world of appreciation. The final goal is to show how, despite their different philosophical frameworks, Royce and Husserl agree on the idea that, through the (...) rejection of the world given through mere perception (Lebenswelt/world of appreciation), European sciences have somehow failed their task of universality. As it will be shown, this idea is also due to methodological affinities among the two thinkers. The experience of interconnectedness among individual minds, while precluded in the mere scientific explanation of the world, it becomes possible through the enactment of the Lebenswelt or, as in Royce’s case, through a return to the experience of the world of appreciation. (shrink)

This article examines the meaningful intervention that Gert-Jan Van der Heiden’s recent book, The Voice of Misery: A Continental Philosophy of Testimony, makes in the developing field of the philosophy of testimony. I argue that this intervention is accomplished through a phenomenological investigation into the nature of the testimonial object and of the demand that it makes upon one who bears witness. In taking such an approach, I argue, Van der Heiden initiates an ontological turn in the field of testimonial (...) theory, shifting the conversation away from a debate about the conditions in which belief in testimony is justified – a debate that has in many ways defined the field for philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition. I suggest that Van der Heiden’s account is helpful in demonstrating that, in many cases, doing justice to a testimonial object requires an epistemic-ethical attitude other than belief. The article concludes by developing a few questions for Van der Heiden based on my interpretation of his project, including to what extent his phenomenology of testimony can account for how often our receptivity to testimony depends on the default trust that we have in others by virtue of our fundamental immersion in social life. (shrink)

Resumen: Husserl propone una teoría sobre la intersubjetividad que parte de la conciencia trascendental como inserta en el mundo de la vida donde están los otros y donde la comunidad se construye bajo una estructura de esencias que garantiza la comunalidad. El mundo de la vida es dado y compartido por todas las conciencias intencionales y trascendentales, es condición para intuiciones empíricas y eidéticas, la epoché y las reducciones eidética y trascendental. Cada momento del método fenomenológico se basa en la (...) existencia de un mundo de la vida independiente de la subjetividad. En este mundo, hay objetos reales y, entre estos, los otros, reconocidos por analogía a través de la empatía. Desde una perspectiva metodológico-epistemológico, el yo es anterior al mundo y a los otros yos. El yo constituye, en sentido fenomenológico, la realidad. La conciencia es el lugar de evidenciación de la realidad. No obstante, en la perspectiva ontológica, es lo contrario. El mundo de la vida es anterior a la conciencia individual. El mundo de la vida está ahí, disponible, existente, independiente del sujeto, funcionando con su propio orden, con sus leyes y reglas. Es el yo el que esta insertado en el mundo de la vida y que se esfuerza por desvendarlo. La realidad se impone y el yo es, sobre todo, miembro de una comunidad de otros yos. Aun así, ¿cómo compartir las experiencias? Las vivencias pueden ser diferentes, pero hay un límite en las variaciones, un límite dado por la esencia del objeto vivido y por las leyes que rigen las relaciones de tal objeto. Así, la constitución del mundo y de sus objetos está permanentemente en progreso. Es posible donarles nuevos sentidos, en los límites de su esencia. Para Husserl, la constitución comunal del mundo es la condición de posibilidad para la existencia de sujetos separados unos de los otros, y este entendimiento recíproco solo es posible a través de la constitución trascendental de la objetividad. Así, no hay una separación entre la intersubjetividad y la constitución del mundo, es la comunidad de yos la que dona sentidos a las objetividades. En el mundo de la vida con los otros en comunidad. -/- Abstract: Husserl proposes a theory on intersubjectivity that starts from transcendental consciousness as inserted in the lifeworld where the others and where the community are built under a structure of essences that guarantees communality. The lifeworld is given and shared by all intentional and transcendental consciousnesses, it is a condition for empirical and eidetic intuitions, the epoché and the eidetic and transcendental reductions. Every moment of the phenomenological method is based on the existence of a lifeworld independent of subjectivity. In this world, there are real objects and, among these, the others, recognized by analogy through empathy. From a methodologicalepistemological perspective, the self is prior to the world and the other selves. The self constitutes, in a phenomenological sense, reality. Consciousness is the locus of evidence of reality. However, from the ontological perspective, it is the opposite. The lifeworld is prior to individual consciousness. The lifeworld is there, available, existing, independent of subjectivity, functioning with its own order, with its laws and rules. It is the self that is inserted in the lifeworld and that strives to unveil it. Reality prevails and the self is, above all, a member of a community of other selves. Even so, how to share the experiences? The experiences can be different, but there is a limit in variations, a limit given by the essence of the lived object and by the laws that govern the relation of the object. Thus, the constitution of the world and its objects is permanently in progress. It is possible to give them new meanings, within the limits of their essence. For Husserl, the communal constitution of the world is the condition of possibility for the existence of subjects separated from each other, and this reciprocal understanding is only possible through the transcendental constitution of objectivity. therefore, there is no separation between intersubjectivity and the constitution of the world, it is the community of selves that gives meaning to objectivities. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that the narrative presented in Husserl’s recently translated Text 7 is a strikingly clear affirmation and vindication of the psychological adaptation of phenomenology developed by Amedeo Giorgi. I argue that Giorgi’s methodological advocacy of the epoché makes good sense when considered in the context of the history of humanistic psychology. A review of Carl Rogers’s and Abraham Maslow’s attempts to revision psychology shows that they each, in their own way, argued for a turn away from (...) all-out objectivism in research, toward what phenomenologists would refer to as the being-in-the-world-with-others that permeates the relationship between researcher and research participants. But neither could envision or develop a methodological procedure for the researcher to simultaneously suspend their habitual way of making judgements and forming conclusions in that relationship. Instead, they advocated for the extension of a humanized therapeutic clinical presence of openness, acceptance, and affirmation in psychological research. Thus, a Husserlian approach to phenomenological psychology was not only a desirable addition to humanistic thought, it was sorely needed for humanistic psychology to fulfill its research promise. Giorgi, more than any other thinker of his time, provided this addition. It is further argued that Giorgi’s contribution remains highly relevant, though underappreciated. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introductory survey of phenomenological theories of the emotions from 1874 until 1950. In accordance with the different phases of the developments of phenomenological movement until the middle of the last century, this chapter will distinguish between four main approaches to the emotions: 1) The origins of the movement, starting with Brentano’s descriptive psychology, which subsequently influenced Husserl’s foundation of phenomenology as an analysis of the intentional structure of consciousness and its objects; 2) The realist phenomenology, mainly (...) in the work of Scheler and Pfänder, whose interest was the description of the essence or a priori traits of the emotions and the contents of emotional consciousness; 3) Heidegger’s opposition to understand the emotions as internal mental states and his focus on their existential significance; 4) Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the emotions as an embodied form of engagement with the world. (shrink)