Phenomenology, Misc

Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a discrete present that, however, (...) suffers from the same difficulties that the instantaneous present is prone to. After introducing the main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature, I show that none of them favors presentism. I conclude by arguing that if even the phenomenology of time sides against presentism, the latter metaphysical theory has no scientific evidence in its favor and ought to be dropped. (shrink)

Partindo de uma crítica à condenação kantiana de toda e qualquer mentira, faz-se uma análise da relação entre a decisão de revelar a verdade e as instâncias de poder em que o sujeito se insere. Dada a introjeção das estruturas de poder e seu papel nas deliberações do Eu Consciente, concluímos que mentir implica num reconhecimento do poder da figura a quem se mente. Do ato leviano de mentir decorre prejuízo irreparável ao teste de realidade de quem mente.

Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i.e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness can (...) be supplemented by research in experimental psychology in order to tackle fundamental questions in epistemology. Our result will be a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that is in accordance with and supported by empirical phenomena such as perceptual learning and the phenomenon of blindsight. Finally, I shall shed light on the systematic limits of empirical research. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introductory survey of phenomenological theories of the emotions from 1874 until 1950. In accordance with the different phases of the developments of phenomenological movement until the middle of the last century, this chapter will distinguish between four main approaches to the emotions: 1) The origins of the movement, starting with Brentano’s descriptive psychology, which subsequently influenced Husserl’s foundation of phenomenology as an analysis of the intentional structure of consciousness and its objects; 2) The realist phenomenology, mainly (...) in the work of Scheler and Pfänder, whose interest was the description of the essence or a priori traits of the emotions and the contents of emotional consciousness; 3) Heidegger’s opposition to understand the emotions as internal mental states and his focus on their existential significance; 4) Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the emotions as an embodied form of engagement with the world. (shrink)

In this chapter we suggest that many experiences of suffering can be further illuminated as forms of transformative experience, using the term coined by L.A. Paul. Such suffering experiences arise from the vulnerability, dependence, and affliction intrinsic to the human condition. Such features can create a variety of positively, negatively, and ambivalently valanced forms of epistemically and personally transformative experiences, as we detail here. We argue that the productive element of suffering experiences can be articulated as transformative, although suffering experiences (...) are not the type mostly discussed in the transformative experience literature. We correct for this here by developing a taxonomy of negatively valenced transformative experiences. We suggest three features that make such experiences ones of suffering, following Michael Brady’s definition: intensity, novelty, and attentional focus. Finally, we suggest that one possible explanation for the edifying capacity of suffering comes from it requiring more transformation than positive experiences. (shrink)

I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role (...) it plays in organizing our experience of self and world in everyday life. Additionally, I suggest the notion can, in this context of application, potentially enhance our understanding of and empathy for those living with schizophrenic disorders. (shrink)

In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...) in normal conditions. (shrink)

We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how this altered sense of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of embodiment and affectivity characteristic of (...) these conditions. These disruptions are instructive, we suggest, in that they highlight the foundational role that body and affect play in organizing social space—the lived context in which we first encounter one another as social agents. (shrink)

We do lots of things together in a shared manner. From the phenomenological point of view, does joint or shared agency need a conscious sense of shared agency? Yet there are many processes where we seem to just go along with the group without conscious intent. Building on the classic phenomenological accounts of Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schutz, Martin Heidegger, I want to emphasize the thick horizon of the life-world as a fundamental condition for intentional shared agency. Joint agency has divergent (...) forms with their own peculiar intentionality, attentivity, anticipations and expectations, and embeddedness in a pre-predicative tacit knowledge in the overall live-world. Phenomenology recognizes that even ego-centered activities that appear to be fully ‘agential’ can be carried out in an anonymous un-owned manner, in the manner which Heidegger calls ‘das Man’, or ‘the one’. This suggests that tacit belonging to the collective ‘we’ undergirds individual agency. Husserl, Heidegger, and Schutz all have accounts of this ‘anonymous’, pre-predicative kind of group participation. Phenomenology has rich accounts of anonymous, voluntary, shared, social participation that demand a new concept of agency, one neglected in the current literature in philosophy of action. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science and technology who see themselves as coming “after” Husserl also claim that their phenomenology is hermeneutical. Yet they neither practice the same sort of phenomenology, nor do they all have the same understanding of hermeneutics. Moreover, their differences often seem to be more a function of different pre-selected substantive commitments—say, to take a “material” turn or to be resolutely “empirical”—than the product of any serious effort to clarify what it is be hermeneutical. In this essay, after (...) some discussion of Dilthey’s reception among post-Husserlians, I consider how aspiring hermeneuts might make their own pre-possession of substantive and methodological commitments a hermeneutical topic. This is, of course, is not just a scholarly question of how post-Husserlian phenomenologists might make themselves more phenomenological. Without thoughtful self-awareness of these commitments, one’s assumptions about the use of technology, design, the place of science in the larger culture and in relation to conceptions of human flourishing—all of these assumptions are likely to pass through into technoscientific practice with insufficient critical consideration. (shrink)

The relationship between traumatic experiences and subsequent distress is not well understood, and little research focuses on the lived experience of psychological trauma. I draw on Louis Sass’s phenomenological taxonomy to address this lacuna. I present his differentiation between relations of phenomenological causality and implication and demonstrate that his taxonomy can be applied to experiences of trauma. Relations of phenomenological causality and implication can be identified in the genesis and constitution of post-traumatic distress. My adaptation of Sass’s taxonomy will furthermore (...) offer an extension and development of his account, applying it to the study of post-traumatic experiences and elaborating it in the process. I shall demonstrate that whether experiences occur synchronically or diachronically is not essential to their categorization in terms of phenomenological implication and causality, respectively. I will show that an alteration in perception or behavior post trauma might temporally succeed the traumatizing event while, at the same time, being implied in the experience of the event. Thereby, I demonstrate how phenomenology may contribute to a detailed understanding of experiences of trauma. Scrutiny of traumatic experiences furthermore promises to contribute to the philosophical discourse on causality, implication, and temporal experience. (shrink)

This article offers a reading of Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology in light of Jean-Luc Marion’s more recent phenomenology. It may seem odd to compare Sartre to Marion, given that Sartre is well-known for his avowed atheism and his account of intentionality while Marion is primarily known for his work on religious phenomena and counter-intentionality. However, this article shows that there are many ways in which Sartre anticipates Marion’s work on phenomenological reduction and excessive phenomenality. By reading Sartre’s phenomenology in light of (...) Marion’s, and particularly Sartre’s analysis of the viscous slime in Being and Nothingness in relation to Marion’s account of ‘saturated phenomena’, this article presents a fresh interpretation of Sartre as a phenomenologist who has invaluable insights not only on the structures of consciousness and phenomenality, but also for the contemporary theoretical interest in the relationship between human and nonhuman entities. (shrink)

This paper accomplishes three goals. First, the essay demonstrates that Edmund Husserl’s theory of meaning consciousness from his 1901 Logical Investigations is internally inconsistent and falls apart upon closer inspection. I show that Husserl, in 1901, describes non-intuitive meaning consciousness as a direct parallel or as a ‘mirror’ of intuitive consciousness. He claims that non-intuitive meaning acts, like intuitions, have substance and represent their objects. I reveal that, by defining meaning acts in this way, Husserl cannot account for our experiences (...) of countersensical, absurd, or impossible meanings. Second, I examine how Husserl came to recognize this 1901 mistake in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation. I discuss how he accordingly reformulates his understanding of non-intuitive meaning acts from the ground up in those Revisions, where this also allows for him to properly account for the experience of impossible meanings. Instead of describing them as mirrors of intuitions, Husserl takes non-intuitive meaning acts to be modifications of intuitions, where they have no substance and do not represent their objects. Finally, in the conclusion to this essay, I demonstrate how this fundamental change to his understanding of meaning consciousness forced Husserl to revise other central tenets of his philosophy, such that the trajectory of his thought can only be properly understood in light of these revisions to his theory of non-intuitive meaning consciousness. (shrink)

This volume examines the complex dialogue between German Idealism and phenomenology, two of the most important movements in Western philosophy. Twenty-four newly authored chapters by an international group of well-known scholars examine the shared concerns of these two movements; explore how phenomenologists engage with, challenge, and critique central concepts in German Idealism; and argue for the continuing significance of these ideas in contemporary philosophy and other disciplines. Chapters cover not only the work of major figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, and (...) Merleau-Ponty, but a wide range of philosophers who build on the phenomenological tradition, including Fanon, Gadamer, and Levinas. These essays highlight key themes of the nature of subjectivity, the role of intersubjectivity, the implications for ethics and aesthetics, the impact of time and history, and our capacities for knowledge and understanding. Key features: · Critically engages two of the major philosophical movements of the last 250 years · Draws on the insights of those movements to address contemporary issues in ethics, theory of knowledge, and political philosophy · Expands the range of idealist and phenomenological themes by considering them in the context of gender, postcolonial theory, and environmental concerns, as well as their global reach · Includes new contributions from prominent, international scholars in these fields This Handbook is essential reading for all scholars and advanced students of phenomenology and German Idealism. With chapters on Beauvoir, Sartre, Scheler, Schutz, Stein, and Ricoeur, The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Phenomenology is also ideal for scholars researching these important figures in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

El presente trabajo tiene la finalidad de mostrar la fenomenología dialéctica de Eduardo Nicol. Para ello parto de lo que considera Nicol el origen de la crisis de la metafísica. Identificado el origen de tal crisis, expondré los tipos de relación del conocimiento que existen en relación a lo que Nicol llama “ontología de la verdad”. En esta exposición, mostraré el sentido que adquiere para Nicol el carácter apodícti-co de la experiencia y la relación existente entre método y ontología. Estas (...) dos ideas nos revelarán la importancia que tiene el “otro” en el desarrollo fenomenológico nicoliano así como el sentido de la historicidad.Como consecuencia, la fenomenología dialéctica se presenta como un método que pretende dar solución a la crisis de la metafísica continuando la tradición fenomenológica iniciada por Husserl a través de una revisión de la misma.This research is intended to show the phenomenological method of Eduardo Nicol. To do this I start from the consideration of Nicol regarding the origin of the crisis of metaphysics. Identified the origin of this crisis, I will explain the relationship types of knowledge that exist in relation to what Nicol called "ontology of truth." In this presentation, I will show the meaning that for Nicol has the apodictic character of experience and the relationship between method and ontology. These two ideas will reveal the importance of the "other" in the phenomenological development and sense of historicity. As a result, dialectical phenomenology is presented as a method that aims to answer the crisis of metaphysics continuing the tradition begun by Husserl through a review of it. (shrink)

The present paper provides the first presentation of Jean Hering’s dissertation Lotzes Lehre vom Apriori in light of Husserl’s assessment of Lotze’s theory of knowledge in the Logik. After a preliminary discussion of some of the main aspects of Husserl’s dismissal of both the metaphysical presuppositions and the absurd consequence of Lotze’s stance on knowledge, the case will be made for considering Hering’s critical approach to Lotze’s view on the a priori as a further development of Husserl’s position. In the (...) conclusion, some remarks will be offered on how Hering elaborates on what he calls the “philosophical concept of the a priori.”. (shrink)

This paper argues that the problematic of rule following in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Heidegger's analysis of anxiety in Being and Time have analogous structures. Working through these analogies helps our interpretation of both of these authors. Contrasting sceptical and anti-sceptical readings of Wittgenstein helps us to resolve an interpretive puzzle about what an authentic response to anxiety looks like for Heidegger. And considering the importance of anxiety to Heidegger's conception of authenticity allows us to locate in Wittgenstein's later philosophy (...) a covert appeal to something resembling Heideggerian authenticity. (shrink)

Reference to persons with personal pronouns raises the issue of the primary referent and its nature. “I” does not refer to a property or cluster of properties. This contrasts with our identifying grasp of persons. A person is a radical singularity and thus stands in contrast to a kind or sortal term. The individuation of persons is not adequately grasped by “definite descriptions” or “eidetic singularities.” In spite of the seeming possibility of persons being wholly identical in terms of properties, (...) in other words, “doubles,” the core referent of reference to persons is not to what is individuated merely by mere numerical differences or spatial-temporal, and essential-eidetic determinations. Rather we have to do with a “non-sortal unique essence.” What “I” refers to is a self-individuating substance. This raises questions for the proper referent of “love.” What is it that love intends or loves if persons are basically radical singularities. What does one love and why does one love if whom one loves is most essentially non-sortal? The question of the ontological status of persons requires integrating the status of being transcendental I’s, and thus being non-temporal, non-spatial, non-sortal, simple substances and thus not homogenous with the experienced world. (shrink)

This article reconstructs Sartre’s theory of selfhood against the background of the contemporary debate between minimal-self theories and narrative-self theories. I argue that Sartre’s theory incorporates both an emphasis on the singular first-person perspective, which is characteristic of minimal-self theories, and an emphasis on the practical intelligibility of experience, which is characteristic of narrative-self theories. The distinctiveness of the Sartrean combination of these motifs consists in its idea of the necessary ideal-relatedness of consciousness. According to Sartre, the logical structure of (...) the pre-reflective cogito requires the haunting presence of an ideal of self-coincidence, which determines for consciousness the meaning of its lived experiences. Consciousness exists as a question to itself due to this ideal-relatedness, and it answers this question by projecting its possibilities as creative and symbolic realizations of this ideal. Establishing the connection between Sartre’s theory of imagination and his theory of selfhood, I suggest that both the ideal and the possibility of consciousness are lived in the manner of the imaginary. (shrink)

Language is indisputably in some sense a social phenomenon. But in which sense? Philosophical conceptions of language often assume a simple relationship between individual speakers and a language community, one of which is attributed primacy and used to understand the other. Having identified some problems faced by two such conceptions—social holism and individualism—this article outlines an alternative phenomenological view of shared language by focusing on two principal ways that language is shared. First, it draws on the late Wittgenstein to characterize (...) how shared practices ground linguistic communities. Based on the link between language-games and corresponding subcommunities of language users, I argue that pragmatic language sharing is more fragmented than social holism suggests but more cohesive than individualism intimates. Second, it considers how linguistic community is grounded in shared sign systems. Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Husserl’s notion of institution is used to highlight that existing linguistic structures are adopted in an open process that allows varying degrees of differentiation. Combining these two perspectives, I conclude that who we are in linguistic community with and how closely we converge varies over different parts of language. Our linguistic communities are thus complex in the sense of being fragmented, differentiated and nonuniform. (shrink)

In this chapter I aim to show that Husserl’s descriptions of the nature and role of activity in the epistemic economy of our conscious lives imply a nondeflationary account of epistemic agency. After providing the main outlines of this account, I discuss how it compares to contemporary accounts of epistemic agency and respond to some potential objections. In concluding I indicate that according to this Husserlian account of epistemic agency we can be said to be intrinsically responsible for holding the (...) beliefs we do as well as for the absence of belief. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar la relación y la co-fundación entre el cuerpo viviente [Leib] y la tecnología desde una perspectiva Husserliana. Quisiera afirmar la necesidad de abandonar el concepto clásico del Leib como un ser desnudo y natural, constituyéndose a sí mismo por sus características biológicas. Estudiando la acción de la tecnología, en primer lugar como una mera extensión y después como una incorporación, la relación cofundacional entre la tecnología y el Leib se hará evidente. Sin embargo, (...) aunque exista una fundación cultural e histórica, permanece la necesidad de un Leib natural que sea la base del nivel práctico del sujeto. Leib resulta ser natural y cultural al mismo tiempo, depende de lo que se esté buscando.The aim of this paper is to study the relation and the co-foundation between the living body [Leib] and technology in a Husserlian approach.I want to assert the necessity of abandoning the classical concept of the Leib as a naked and natural being, constituting itself by its biological features. Studying the action of technology, firstly as mere extension and secondly as incorporation, the co-foundational relation between technology and Leib will be evident. However, even if there is a cultural and historical foundation, there remains the necessity of a natural Leib being the base of the subject's practical level. Leib appears to be natural and cultural at the same time, it depends on what you are looking for. (shrink)

Understood historically, culturally, politically, geographically, or philosophically, the idea of Europe and notion of European identity conjure up as much controversy as consensus. The mapping of the relation between ideas of Europe and their philosophical articulation and contestation has never benefited from clear boundaries, and if it is to retain its relevance to the challenges now facing the world, it must become an evolving conceptual landscape of critical reflection. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Europe provides an outstanding reference work (...) for the exploration of Europe in its manifold conceptions, narratives, institutions, and values. Comprising twenty-seven chapters by a group of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into three parts: • Europe of the Philosophers • Concepts and Controversies • Debates and Horizons Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, politics and European studies the Handbook will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as sociology, religion, and European history and history of ideas. Darian Meacham is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Maastricht University, The Netherlands. He is the editor-in-chief of the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology and the co-editor of Thinking After Europe: Jan Patočka and Politics (2016) Nicolas de Warren is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Jewish Studies at Pennsylvania State University, USA. He is the author of Husserl and the Promise of Time (2010), A Momentary Breathlessness in the Sadness of Time (2018), and Original Forgiveness (2020). (shrink)

In this paper, I compare the original version of the enactive view—autopoietic enactivism—with Husserl’s phenomenology, regarding the issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature. I refer to this issue as the “problem of naturalism.” I show how the idea of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, which is at the heart of autopoietic enactivism, is close to the phenomenological form of correlationism. However, I argue that there is a tension between an epistemological reading of the subject-object correlation (...) that renounces to search for its metaphysical ground, and the enactivist focus on the biological basis of cognition, which seems to imply a view of nature as the metaphysical ground of the conscious mind. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s phenomenology in the contrast between the idea of the fundamental subject-object correlation, the concept of nature as a correlate of transcendental constitution, and the investigation of the corporeal and material grounding of consciousness. I find a way out of this problem by drawing on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. I argue that the investigation of the temporality of experience in genetic phenomenology leads us to investigate the metaphysical ground of the subject-object correlation, understood dynamically as co-constitution and co-origination. Then I propose to complement phenomenology and enactivism with a form of neutral monism, which conceives of the co-constitution of subject and object as grounded in a flow of fundamental, pre-phenomenal qualities. (shrink)

I examine Michel Bitbol’s proposal of a metaphysical counterpart of neurophenomenology, arguing that such a metaphysics should address the issue of the origin of consciousness. This can be accomplished through panqualityism, which conceives of the subject and object of experience as grounded in a flow of pre-phenomenal qualities. I conclude by framing this view in terms of a critical metaphysics that is consistent with the pragmatic and existential dimension of neurophenomenology.

Most interpreters of Heidegger’s reflections on the body maintain that—whether early, middle, or late in the Gesamtausgabe—Dasein’s or the mortal’s openness to being/beyng is the ground of the fleshly or bodily, but not the reverse. In this paper, I argue that there is evidence from Heidegger’s own oeuvre demonstrating that this relationship is instead mutually reciprocal. That is to say, I contend that corporeal variability is constitutive of Dasein’s openness to being just as Dasein’s openness to being is constitutive of (...) its corporeal variability. Understood in this way, Heidegger’s thinking puts forward what I call a corpoietic understanding of the body and of the meaning of ability. I show that, despite the ableist assumptions at play in much of Heidegger’s work, such an understanding is nevertheless grounded in the idea of access, a central concept in philosophy of disability and disability studies. After developing this idea of ability as access, I close by addressing the larger political stakes of using Heidegger’s work to think about embodiment and disability given the Third Reich’s mass slaughter of people with disabilities. (shrink)

This paper investigates the madeleine-memory as a case of pre-reflective experience, from the genesis of its sedimentation into the body. Indeed, I aim to address the question of the literary protagonist Marcel on the roots of his happiness and the genesis of his memories. Until now, the madeleine-memory has been described as bodily and involuntary. In phenomenology, a wide literature has confirmed the relationship between the sense of body ownership and pre-reflective self-awareness. I aim to build upon such a mutual (...) link and show that the pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory have to be traced back to the genesis of the involuntary recollections. To this purpose, I will illustrate that the epistemological relationship between the object and the subject plays a relevant role in the way the subject remembers. First, I will present that madeleine-memory is a unique case of bodily memory, by analyzing the main features that characterize it. Secondly, I will analyze the original experience of the madeleine within the phenomenological logic of transcendence in immanence. For this aim, I will rely on the Husserlian notions of “epistemological inadequacy of perception” and “background experiences”. Through these notions, I will show that Proustian involuntary recollections are pre-reflective experiences because previously subjects have pre-reflectively experienced the content of recollections. (shrink)

In this article I offer some existential-phenomenological reflections on the interrelationships among the forms of love, loss, finitude, and the human ways of being.

El objetivo de este ensayo es primero honrar la memoria de Vicent Martínez Guzmán, destacando sus importantes contribuciones a la filosofía. Dada su relación con el autor, ha parecido lo más oportuno centrarse en la relación de su filosofía con la fenomenología puesto que otros colegas desentrañarán otras facetas. Para cumplir ese cometido el ensayo tiene cuatro partes. En la primera se hace una presentación de las etapas de la filosofía de nuestro autor. En la segunda se expone, con bastante (...) amplitud, por la importancia que tiene, la primera concepción de la fenomenología de Vicent Martínez Guzmán. El apartado tercero expone, aunque sea brevemente, por ser más conocido, el sentido fenomenológico de la filosofía para hacer las paces. Por fin, la cuarta comenta la posición de Vicent Martínez Guzmán respecto al ordoliberalismo de la Escuela de Friburgo, considerando la relación de este con la fenomenología husserliana.The aim of this essay is first of all to honor the memory of Vicent Martínez Guzmán, highlighting his important contributions to philosophy. Given its relationship with the author, it has seemed most appropriate to focus on the relationship of his philosophy with phenomenology since other colleagues will unravel other facets. To fulfill this task, the essay has four parts. In the first one, a presentation is made of the stages of our author's philosophy. In the second, the first conception of the phenomenology of Vicent Martínez Guzmán is exposed, quite widely, because of its importance. The third section exposes, even if briefly, for being better known, the phenomenological sense of “philosophy to make peace”. Finally, the fourth section comments on Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s position regarding the ordoliberalism of the Fribourg School, considering its relation to Husserlian phenomenology. (shrink)

The diaries that detail Ernst Jünger’s time in occupied Paris can be as frustrating as they are captivating. Their tone is often both elegiac and detached, at once keenly aware of and distant from the suffering occurring all around their author. This ambiguity becomes particularly apparent in the contrast between the remarkable everyday encounters the diaries describe and their broader cosmic and world-historical ruminations. In this paper, I want to suggest that this tension can be read as a response to (...) the imperatives through which totalising thought shapes how subjects operating under its confines relate to time itself. This dynamic, which can already be found in Jünger’s own earlier work, is dramatized in the way that the diaries construct the alternative temporal perspective of the witness. The witness here is one who survives outside of, and yet also remains caught between, two temporal imaginaries characteristic of modernity: Totalising historicization – the sweeping narrative of progress that demands the sacrifice of the present individual and individual present – and mechanised temporality, that is, instrumentalised clock time. (shrink)

The global COVID-19 pandemic has spotlighted several instances of churches violating state issued and scientifically recommended guidelines designed to keep populations healthy and to prevent the further spread of the disease. While these instances are minority responses to these orders, they nonetheless raise questions about the rationality of ecclesial belonging in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this article, I draw on the work of William James and W. E. B. Du Bois to articulate a conception of ecclesial belonging as (...) a social epistemological process engaging a complex, fluid multiplicity of knowers of various scales. I argue that, in this view, ecclesial rationality involves the construction of a concatenation of internal and external practices individual believers and groups can traverse so long as they consistently satisfy a plurality of desiderata. I suggest that what is irrational about religious-based defiance of COVID-19 guidelines is the church-sanctioned severance of internal from external practices. I suggest that this behavior is supported by a failure to grasp the demands of ecclesial rationality rather than embrace them, and that this conception of rationality may have been eroded by the value-neutral skepticism of secular rationality. (shrink)

Exemplified especially by Heidegger and Levinas, the phenomenology of death expresses first, the impossibility of the death experience, second, the authenticity of Dasein starting from the horizon opened by the possibility of death, and third, the relevance of the death of the other to the discovery of one’s own death. This article tries to take a step further, showing the link between the authenticity of Dasein and the desire for immortality manifested in this authenticity. By overturning Heidegger’s theses and by (...) affirming both the necessity of an authentication of death itself—in accord with Socrates’s death example—and the legitimacy of the meditation on death, this text links the need for immortality, which is phenomenologically visible, with the Christian faith in the resurrection, which is visible only for theology. (shrink)

In 2016, Colin Kaepernick, a quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers, remained seated during the national anthem in order to protest racial injustice and police brutality against African-Americans. After consulting with National Football League and military veteran Nate Boyer, Kaepernick switched to taking a knee during the anthem for the remainder of the season. Several NFL players and other professional athletes subsequently adopted this gesture. This article brings together complementary Confucian and phenomenological analyses to elucidate the significance of Kaepernick’s gesture, (...) and in the process provide a phenomenological characterization of the connection between the Confucian notions of sagehood and ritual. Kaepernick’s gesture subverts the anthem ritual from within while simultaneously remaining faithful to the ideals it is meant to express. Furthermore, it institutes a new bodily form of patriotic self-expression compatible with both American and Confucian ideals. (shrink)

La estética fenomenológica debería ser capaz de revelar cómo la estructura de cualquier objeto estético dado está conectada con la experiencia de ese objeto, así como demostrar las condiciones necesarias para la propia experiencia estética. Para hacerlo, hay que argumentar en contra de los supuestos unilaterales, como por ejemplo la suposición del objetivismo estético que postula la belleza como rasgo exclusivo de la realidad independiente del sujeto; o la creencia opuesta, que la belleza es esencial y únicamente la proyección del (...) gusto subjetivo sobre las cosas en el mundo. Sesemann analiza el objeto estético y el acto estético, enfatizando su conexión. Esta conexión se refiere a lo que se describe en la fenomenología de Husserl como la correlación entre el objeto intencional y el acto intencional. Esta conexión puede ser descubierta sólo mediante el método fenomenológico: realizando la reducción fenomenológica. En este documento se explicará en primer lugar la percepción estética en la estética de Sesemann. Más adelante, se examina la concepción de la estructura del objeto estético en el contexto de la estética de Sesemann: la composición de los elementos, las sensaciones en relación con el significado, etc. Por último, el artículo sugiere que la estética de Sesemann se basa fundamentalmente en el método de la reducción fenomenológica.Phenomenological aesthetics should also be able to show how the structure of any given aesthetic object is connected with the experience of that object, as well as to demonstrate the necessary conditions for the aesthetic experience itself. In order to do so, one must argue against one-sided assumptions, such as the aesthetic objectivism’s supposition that beauty is exclusively the trait of reality not at all dependent on the subject’s experience of it; or its opposite belief that beauty is essentially and solely the projection of the subjective taste onto the things in the world. Sesemann analizes the aesthetic object and aesthetic act by emphasizing their connection. This connection relates to what is described in Husserls phenomenology as the correlation between the intentional object and the intentional act. This connection can be discovered only by using the phenomenological method: by doing phenomenological reduction. This paper will first explain the aesthetic perception in Sesemann‘s aesthetics. Later, it examine the conception of the aesthetic object‘s structure in Sesemann‘s aesthetic: composition of elements, sensations in connection with meaning; etc. Finally, the paper will argue that Sesemann‘s aesthetics is essentially based on the method of phenomenological reduction. (shrink)

Recent reconstructions of Heidegger's thoughts on ethics have a curious paradoxical feature. On the one hand, Heidegger, particularly in his Aristotle lectures of the 1920s, offers a view of practical reason on which Dasein has its “moral knowledge” in a fully perceptual, non-cognitive way. This generally sets Heidegger in opposition to the whole business of principled moral justification before the fact. On the other hand, the literature is peppered with what appear to be principled denunciations of immorality—particularly violations of other (...) Dasein—grounded in the analytic of Dasein. To see human life as having a stable ergon (“business” or “function”), with certain broad tasks to pursue and vices to avoid, is not necessarily counter-Aristotelian; on the contrary, it is basic to the kind of Aristotelianism Husserl pursued in his own lectures on ethics. Here I set Heidegger's Aristotelian model of practical reason amid the competing, though similar, Aristotelianisms of John McDowell and Husserl, which differ on their handling of the human ergon. I conclude that Heidegger's views on practical reason and moral knowledge certainly constrain and very much alter the business of moral justification, but they do not precisely rule it out. (shrink)

The paper works out an account of the piety proper to philosophical thought. The investigation proceeds as a critical interpretation of three enigmatic claims made by Martin Heidegger about ‘the piety of thinking,’ but the paper is not simply exegetical; the interpretive work is constantly in service of an attempt to think through the phenomenon independently. Plato’s Euthyphro and Nietzsche’s critique of scientific piety both hover in the background of Heidegger’s pronouncements, and they are given special attention here. Through the (...) investigation, philosophical piety is shown to be a virtuous capacity to respond with fitting submission to the truth as what is insurmountably prior to us. To respond fittingly is, at least, to deal well with sameness and difference, which in the case of piety means to recognize two features of our situation: that philosophical questioning necessarily arises out of a fundamental listening, or affirmation, and that we always belong to being but only ever across a gap. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy of nonintuitive intentions. The analysis has two stages. First, I expose a mistake in Husserl’s account of non-intuitive acts from his 1901 Logical Investigations. I demonstrate that Husserl employs the term “signitive” too broadly, as he concludes that all non-intuitive acts are signitive. He states that not only meaning acts, but also the contiguity intentions of perception are signitive acts. Second, I show how Husserl, in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical (...) Investigation, amends his 1901 theory of non-intuitive acts, which he now calls “empty” intentions. He there accurately distinguishes empty meaning acts from the empty intentions of perception. In the conclusion, I reveal how Husserl’s alterations to his theory of non-intuitive intentions can inform our understanding of a larger shift in his philosophy. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive critique of the Heidegger problem and while putting forward a critique of Heidegger; it establishes the sanctity of Levinas. In the process of doing so; the reviewer touches on the problems of not considering Edith Stein in a book of this sort. When I got my tenure in India, one wisecrack on the board of interviewers asked me how Kit Marole influenced Shakespeare. I knew that he was just quoting Wayne C Booth's stuff on Macbeth. John (...) E Drabinski and Eric S Nelson are not those wisecrack sorts. They are serious scholars and this review gives them their due. They have shown the Janus nature of the Nazi, Heidegger who was instrumental in gassing Edith Stein, who needs to be known more throughout the academy, which COVID 19 has successfully destroyed. And we need Levinas and Stein to rebuild a world which will be mediated soon by drones and inane webinars and contactless nonsense. This reviewer suggests that we read this book with great care. And not participate in meaningless online events. (shrink)

This review of one in the series of the monumental primary works of Kierkegaard shows him as the champion and, as it were, an inaugurator of the phenomenological turn in both philosophy and literature. The review touches upon serious issues regarding mass culture and Christianity. The review of the eighth volume in this series was published in January 2020, and these two reviews are the first by any Indian Hindu. While discussing Kierkegaard the reviewer touches upon John Caputo's theology derived (...) from Jürgen Moltmann's concept of a weak God. There are inadvertent typos in this review. (shrink)

Violence is signaled by a mark of discontinuity, interruption, rupture. The tripartite temporality of violence, with its strong focus on the present, points to the originary violence. Moreover, the violent event is structuring the order of the action sequences in an actual violent interaction. The interactional dynamics in violent encounters between co-present actors shapes the specific forms of the experiencing in the violent interaction. Based on how violence is experienced in an interactive situation, the phenomenon of violence articulates itself according (...) to three coordinates: directedness, co-performativity and de-capabilisation. The outlining of the structure of the lived experience of violence is revealing something irreducible in it. To understand the experience of violence as such, I propose that we accept the idea of violence per se and depart from the idea that the acts of violence are essentially moral actions. The core of the ethical-moral discussion concerning violence should be grounded instead on the moment of conversion identifiable when we take into account the reaction to violence. (shrink)

When approaching medicine, phenomenology has at least two meanings which need to be distinguished in order to achieve results which might become relevant for medical practice. Up to now, these two meanings have been overlapped by the scholarly literature. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to differentiate between these two meanings. The first one was initiated by Edmund Husserl and takes phenomenology as transcendental, i.e. as a transcendental rigorous science based on the unraveling of transcendental subjectivity/intersubjectivity. The second takes (...) it more as a narrative enterprise, i.e. as a description of personal subjective experience, and, thus, it is closer to other approaches to disease to be found both in philosophy and outside it. Nevertheless, both provide advantages and disadvantages when it comes to approaching illness. One meaning cannot supersede the other and, therefore, one form of phenomenology cannot impose itself as the phenomenology of medicine. Yet, it is important to clarify the consequences of applying each of the two understandings of phenomenology to medicine in the context of its current development. The question of our present inquiry concerns not merely the disentanglement of the status of what today’s scholarly literature calls phenomenology of medicine in relation to both of the meanings of phenomenology, but also the limits of applying phenomenology to the field of medicine. (shrink)

Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome, we still lack substantial insight into first-personal aspects of “what it is like” to live with this condition. This is despite the fact that developments in phenomenological psychiatry have demonstrated the scientific and clinical importance of understanding subjective experience in a range of other neuropsychiatric conditions. We argue that it is time for Tourette Syndrome research to tap into the sophisticated frameworks developed in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology for describing experience (...) in a way that integrates discrete symptoms into an overarching experiential framework concerning the self, the body, and its modes of experience. Following a historical introduction that contextualises the pertinence of phenomenology to psychopathology, we distinguish this approach from the existing, psychologically oriented studies on TS that are also qualitative. We then outline gaps and opportunities for future research, including the sorts of questions that might be utilised in phenomenological interviews and why they are of potential benefit to research programs in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. In conclusion we address some of the broader implications for phenomenology of the body and philosophy of action. (shrink)

Resumo: A Logoterapia proposta por Viktor Frankl está fundamentada na teoria dos valores e antropologia de Max Scheler. Frankl constrói seu pensamento psicológico baseado em conceitos-chave do pensamento scheleriano como (i) o valor e os bens, (ii) o querer e os sentimentos, (iii) a hierarquia de valores e (iv) a ideia de pessoa. É com eles que desenvolve suas teses originais da (i) motivação espiritual da ação humana, (ii) busca de sentido e (iii) inconsciente espiritual. Ao fazê-lo, ofereceu não só (...) uma psicoterapia dos valores, mas também uma nova teoria da motivação humana positiva, não concebida como fruto de deficiência ou necessidade, mas do espírito livre direcionado a valores objetivos. A busca humana por sentido na vida só é possível ser bem-sucedida com a vivência e realização de valores superiores, no sentido hierárquico proposto por Scheler. (shrink)

"Una Pedagogía del Nosotros" pretende mostrar la esencia de la educación como punto de encuentro, compatible con todas las cosmovisiones. La pedagogía del nosotros invita a habitar la educación con originalidad, pero con un criterio más allá de la propia originalidad. Se trata de tener sensibilidad ante el peligro de manipulación, pero también ante el peligro de no educar, por temor a manipular. Los grandes problemas de la Humanidad no se producen por conflictos y crisis, sino por el egocentrismo. Las (...) dificultades, errores, debilidades, conflictos y crisis son humanos, y cuando se gestionan con nosicentrismo, suponen una oportunidad para crecer, pero si se gestionan con egocentrismo, no solo no se resuelven, sino que se agravan, y si se logra un equilibrio de egocentrismos que aporte apariencia de paz, en el fondo, no hay autorrealización porque los sujetos no están sabiendo madurar; simplemente viven para aplacar a su egocentrismo. El nosicentrismo es la maduración original de sí más allá de sí, que tiende a la autorrealización apoteósica entregándose al nosotros-maduro. Para que las comunidades sean vivencias de “nosotros” felices, es primordial que los sujetos se dispongan de forma nosicéntrica en cuerpo, mente y apertura. Cultivando el carácter, desarrollando las competencias y madurando la sensibilidad. De este modo, la unidad de sujetos forma un nosotros-maduro donde cada sí-mismo es más sí-mismo desplegándose hacia fuera, colaborando, sirviendo o dándose sin devorar y sin dejarse devorar. Es un salir para dar o darse, de modo que el sujeto se hace grande haciendo grandes a los demás y se enriquece interiormente, enriqueciendo lo otro. Cuando los sujetos desde su egocentrismo forman un nosotros, en realidad es un falso-nosotros. La educación apertural, libera del falsos-nosotros, cicatriza la originalidad y la despliega por medio de una pedagogía del nosotros-maduro. ¿Y cómo se educa la apertura? Aportando motivos por los que vale la pena abrirse, madurando la conciencia y capacitando al sujeto para una libertad consciente. El sentido es clave para dar, para darse y para saber a quién vale la pena darse por entero, por qué y para qué. ¿Y cómo descubrir el sentido de darse por entero? La clave está en enseñar a cada sujeto a mirar hacia su propio sentido original, que se encuentra en su conciencia. Y así es como realmente uno se hace original y creativo. La educación apertural no es un forzar hacia fuera “porque es bueno”, sino invitar a buscar hacia dentro para reconocerse en su origen y desplegar el sí-mismo original. Pero el sí-mismo no podrá ser plenamente sí-mismo sin el tú, así que será una educación de comunidad, comenzando por la familia. Desde esta interpretación, la acción educativa tiene mucho de acompañar a cada sujeto en la aventura de conocerse a sí mismo, descubrir su propia originalidad y disponerle para que la despliegue con sensibilidad y empatía. No se tratará de imponer desde fuera, sino invitar a sacar; ayudar a crecer. Desde la pedagogía del nosotros se busca el entendimiento de todas las cosmovisiones y de ellas entre sí, para ayudarnos a madurar y habitar en un nosotros-maduro. Así, se considera que lo más práctico es ir al fondo: ¿Cuál es el fin último de la educación? ¿Cuál es la esencia de la autorrealización máxima a la que puede aspirar un sujeto? Para sintetizar la respuesta, se tomará el concepto “apoteosis” del griego apothéōsis “deificación”, “divinización”, “endiosar”. Según cada cosmovisión, la apoteosis supone “estar en la gloria”, disfrutando del máximo bien, al que cada cual aspirará, según sus prioridades vitales: Placer, Poder, Sentido u Originalidad (se explica en el libro). Sea como fuere la cosmovisión del sujeto, el “tú” endiosa, pero es la propia conciencia la que está llamando a ser “dios” y si no se encuentra en el camino de la apoteosis, siente una especie de vacío interior, como que algo no va bien. No termina de vivir colmado; ni cuando prospera con actividades exitosas, ni en una situación general de bienestar, ni en una actitud vital de servicio a los demás, nada colma. La apoteosis es la máxima autorrealización de un sujeto en el “nosotros” o la mejor realización de la Humanidad como “nosotros total”. La educación apoteósica consiste en ayudar a descubrir o redescubrir, en conciencia, el sabor de las alegrías originales de la vida. La pedagogía del nosotros no plantea ninguna fórmula absoluta para educar ni para vivir. Sencillamente se considera el vivir humano como un vivir-con, que sorprende con descubrimientos constantes. Desde la Pedagogía del nosotros todas las instituciones intermedias: familia, escuela, etc., y la sociedad en su conjunto, contribuyen a la educación de cada sujeto, más o menos egocéntrico y más o menos abierto a la aventura de habitar la vida con mayor conciencia. La Pedagogía del nosotros invita a cada sujeto a que apueste toda su existencia a la exploración y experimentación de lo auténtico. Cada sujeto solo puede crecer y desarrollarse, una vez que ha aprendido a vivir en relación con los demás, a reconocer las posibilidades del espacio entre sus “nosotros”. El medio fundamental es el diálogo al que se ha llamado amor, que es lo que sucede cuando dos sujetos comparten en conciencia, algo o todo de sus vidas al mismo tiempo. Dice Antoine de Saint-Exúpery: "amor no es mirarse el uno al otro, sino mirar los dos en la misma dirección". Este compartir en conciencia es convivir en realidad. Dice Buber: "Toda vida real es reunión" y la sociedad, la familia y la escuela tienen la llave para reunirnos y enseñarnos a dialogar. Solo se vive la vida real, la vida auténtica desde la originalidad compartida, cohabitada. Ahí es donde los sujetos pueden ser más sí mismos, creativos y auténticamente felices. (shrink)

At first blush, phenomenology seems to be concerned preeminently with questions of knowledge, truth, and perception, and yet closer inspection reveals that the analyses of these phenomena remain bound up with language and that consequently phenomenology is, inextricably, a philosophy of language. Drawing on the insights of a variety of phenomenological authors, including Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, this collection of essays by leading scholars articulates the distinctively phenomenological contribution to language by examining two sets of questions. The first (...) set of questions concerns the relatedness of language to experience. Studies exhibit the first-person character of the philosophy of language by focusing on lived experience, the issue of reference, and disclosive speech. The second set of questions concerns the relatedness of language to intersubjective experience. Studies exhibit the second-person character of the philosophy of language by focusing on language acquisition, culture, and conversation. This book will be of interest to scholars of phenomenology and philosophy of language. (shrink)

-/- A concise and accessible introduction to phenomenology, which investigates the experience of experience. -/- This volume in the MIT Press Essential Knowledge series offers a concise and accessible introduction to phenomenology, a philosophical movement that investigates the experience of experience. Founded by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and expounded by Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and others, phenomenology ventures forth into the field of experience so that truth might be met in the flesh. It investigates everything as experienced. It does (...) not study mere appearance but the true appearances of things, holding that the unfolding of experience allows us to sort true appearances from mere appearance. -/- The book unpacks a series of terms—world, flesh, speech, life, truth, love, and wonder—all of which are bound up with each other in experience. For example, world is where experience takes place; flesh names the way our experiential exploration is inscribed into the bearings of our bodily being; speech is instituted in bodily presence; truth concerns the way our claims about things are confirmed by our experience. A chapter on the phenomenological method describes it as a means of clarifying the modality of experience that is written into its very fabric; and a chapter on the phenomenological movement bridges its divisions while responding to criticisms from analytic philosophy and postmodernism. (shrink)